Forgive me if it's a dumb question but, I am currently composing a paper examining the conceptual relationship between Nietzsche and nihilism, with particular attention to the apparent reductive tendency within academic discourse to interpret nihilism as a static, monolithic concept—an interpretation exemplified by scholars such as Reginster and Gemes (yes even Gemes, who critiques Reginster for exactly the same reason). I contend that these readings tend to be overly cognitive and perhaps overlook Nietzsche’s explicit critique of essentialism. Nietzsche himself explicitly emphasizes his rejection of fixed, essentialist categories; however, I have yet to identify a definitive quotation that directly substantiates this stance. It seems to me that this drive to 'grasp' Nietzsche's nihilism not as a philosophical-transformative process that is situated in history, but as one concept, is problematic.

Could anyone provide clarification on this matter or point me toward specific passages where Nietzsche specifically articulates his anti-essentialist perspective, that could be interpreted as a critique on pulling something out of it's historical context? I would greatly appreciate any assistance, as I am not an expert on Nietzsche and did not select this topic myself, I couldn't choose.

The secondary sources I am referring to are: Reginster's The affirmation of life: Nietzsche on overcoming nihilism, and Gemes' Nihilism and the Affirmation of Life: A Review of and Dialogue with Bernard Reginster