Appealing to an absolute standard of the good doesn’t settle the issue, it merely relocates the disagreement to whose interpretation of that standard prevails. — Tom Storm

This is spot on. It marks the link here between Tim's approach to aesthetics and his comments against liberalism and in favour of elite education.

It would appear that Tim thinks he has understood the Devine.

But why should we take his word for it?

You can have any opinion you want. But if you are trying to tell me I’m wrong, then you can’t have any opinion you want. — Fire Ologist

No, this misses something. We do not need to have absolute right and wrong to have a debate about value. Society is the product of discursive practices, we have an ongoing conversation about how we want to live together. Certain ways of living work better to achieve certain results. You don’t need a God’s-eye view of reality to make such choices.

It should be obvious that if you want a village to flourish (however that might look to you), poisoning the entire water supply will not achieve that goal. We can choose goals and aims without requiring non-human views of reality.

And in this way, I can challenge your opinions within the context of how we wish to live together. I am probably not going to say you are 'wrong' as such, more that a given view or course of proposed action may not be helpful, subject to a goal.

This is spot on. It marks the link here between Tim's approach to aesthetics and his comments against liberalism and in favour of elite education. — Banno

I think @Count Timothy von Icarus is well-read, a deep thinker and orients himself within the classical tradition, like some others here. It seems to me that for some people, philosophy revolves around finding non-human justifications, while for others, it’s a discursive process we have with ourselves.

You can have any opinion you want. But if you are trying to tell me I’m wrong, then you can’t have any opinion you want. — Fire Ologist

Do you mean wrong as in mistaken about something, or wrong as in morally wrong? Or both?

(Tim) is well-read, a deep thinker and orients himself within the classical tradition, like some others here. — Tom Storm

Quite so. However I often find it difficult to see much argument in his posts. They read more like just-so stories—rich descriptions of how he pictures the world, but with little in the way of justification for that picture. It's one thing to affirm a vision; it's another to show why we should accept it.

Consider:

...this is different from saying that there is no truth prior to "interpretation within a context of belief, intention, tradition, and reception." To say that would be to say that nothing was true until man's communities arose. Yet the order of human discourse is not the order of being, the former is contained within the latter, not vice versa. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's a false dilemma - that either there are truths prior (a loaded term) to humanity, or nothing was true until man's communities arose. Perhaps we can say truth is not invented by humans, but neither does it exist in some Platonic realm, independent of all interpretive conditions. Instead truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with.

And notice the "might" in

A First Cause, First Principle, and First Mover might follow from the idea that explanations need to be intelligible and do not bottom out in "it just is" and the spontaneous movement of potency to actuality—that's another question however. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, a false dilemma. The “might” is doing slippery rhetorical work—it creates the appearance of modesty while still reinforcing the idea that unless you accept some First Cause, you're left with unintelligibility. There’s no reason to think that rejecting a First Cause commits one to irrationalism or incoherence.

And this admission:

It comes from the assumption that our language and judgements have causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

conflating causal explanation with justificatory structure. To move from “our judgments have causes” to “therefore they must be grounded in a First Cause” is to blur the line between what explains a belief’s origin and what justifies its content. It's precisely the kind of category mistake that thinkers like Davidson, Sellars, and Brandom have warned against.

One alternative is that aesthetic judgement is embedded in community and culture, tradition and workmanship, coherence and responsiveness, and is it learned and communicable, an aspect of human growth. Aesthetic judgements are part of the stories we tell each other about what it worthwhile. This view places aesthetics firmly in the human, not the divine.

independent of all interpretive conditions . . . — Banno

This is a really interesting fulcrum for different styles of philosophy. One might ask a proponent of any philosophical perspective, "Could you specify what conditions, if any, guide your interpretations of the key terms you're using?" You might find some who would claim that interpretation is not an issue at the level of first philosophy, and that would be an important way of categorizing their method.

Perhaps we can say truth is not invented by humans, but neither does it exist in some Platonic realm, independent of all interpretive conditions. Instead truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with. — Banno

That’s sharper than my view and nicely put.

There’s probably a need to go deeper into this, partly as a way to address the ‘you can’t have values if there’s no external validation of the good’.

You might find some who would claim that interpretation is not an issue at the level of first philosophy, and that would be an important way of categorizing their method. — J

An interesting thought. I fond it hard to see how a first philosophy (again, a loaded term) might be articulated without being interpreted. But I supose that just marks my position on the issue.

There’s probably a need to go deeper into this, partly as a way to address the ‘you can’t have values if there’s no external validation of the good’ — Tom Storm

And the question becomes, external to what? If the world is always, and already, in a context and a language, then there is nothing "external" to the interpretation.

Which brings us back, I think, to how it is that Tim can understand the divine, without thereby interpreting it.

So for Tim the world is already divided up. Whereas for me the division is something we do, and re-do, as our understanding progresses.

And so I again throw the question back to Tim, why should we accept that your divisions are the absolute ones?

And it seems to me that he can answer with an argument, or simply rely on faith. But his reliance on faith is not a reason for others to follow his account. So I think he needs to present some sort of argument.

I can't see how he can do so without thereby giving some sort of interpretation of how things are.

You can have any opinion you want. But if you are trying to tell me I’m wrong, then you can’t have any opinion you want.
— Fire Ologist

Do you mean wrong as in mistaken about something, or wrong as in morally wrong? Or both? — J

I mean wrong in any sense or application.

There is your opinion.
There is my opinion.
We can leave it at that.

But if we want to debate which opinion is correct, we have to go after some third thing between us that matches one of our opinions.
That third thing would be the prior, or the objective, or the truth. With a capital T as some like to call it.

That’s my opinion.

Perhaps we can say truth is not invented by humans, but neither does it exist in some Platonic realm, independent of all interpretive conditions. Instead truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with.
— Banno

That’s sharper than my view and nicely put. — Tom Storm

That is well put.

But there is a bit of tension between these two terms:
“truth is not invented by humans” and
“truths become available within human discourse”
They may contradict each other a bit.

And there may be another contradiction by saying “not arbitrarily…”.

I think the precise point we are debating is whether quality is arbitrary or not. I am saying all is NOT arbitrary. If you are saying all is not arbitrary (as in, “…not arbitrarily”) then we agree. You should then agree that:

“You can have any opinion you want. But if you are trying to tell me I’m wrong, then you can’t have any opinion you want.”

All I’m saying is if you want to have the opinion “all is arbitrary” you can. But if you want to correct me, about anything, you are actually saying something is not arbitrary, or you are lying, or contradicting yourself.

But regardless, I think this part is all you need to sum up your main point:

truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with. — Banno

I would restate this as, truths are moving targets (ie. becoming available in discourse) articulating things that are moving (ie. of a world of relations).

I agree that articulating truth is a pickle. We may rarely hit the mark.

But it is not even possible or worth attempting if there is no truth.

What I’m saying is, the above would be better stated without using the word truth as in “opinions become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with.”

This is fine. That may be the human condition.

But then there is no truth.
And then there is no error, or correction.
And no reason to debate our opinions.

… address the ‘you can’t have values if there’s no external validation of the good’
— Tom Storm
And the question becomes, external to what? If the world is always, and already, in a context and a language, then there is nothing "external" to the interpretation.

Which brings us back, I think, to how it is that Tim can understand the divine, without thereby interpreting it.

So for Tim the world is already divided up. Whereas for me the division is something we do, and re-do, as our understanding progresses. — Banno

If there is nothing external to the interpretation, than what is it an interpretation of?

This has become a chicken and egg discussion about a statement and the truth of a statement. Or maybe a statement and what the statement is truly about.)

I agree the division is something we do. This is to give an opinion.

But then we can debate and determine something else about this opinion - does it reflect something true? Is it an opinion of something anyone who could give opinions would (or should) indeed hold because it is also there in the world, truly?

We divided the morning from the evening, and even though the light was similar at both times, one was getting brighter and the other was getting darker. So maybe the opinion that the morning is different than the evening is false because the light was similar at both times (and this division was arbitrary), or maybe it is true because of other divisions we can point out such as brightening or darkening. These divisions and interpretations are OF not merely our words and language, but of the world, not arbitrarily divided.

Well, because there is universal agreement on how to recognize and judge blue, and nothing similar in regard to beauty. But in any case, I see the context for the Hamlet quote, thanks.

There is also nothing similar in regards to truth or goodness.

But, at any rate, we're talking about dependence and priority, not agreement. If beauty is posterior to social "games," then it follows that nothing was beautiful before such games existed. Perhaps things were beautiful potentially, waiting for man to actualize that potential?

The problem I see for this answer is that it is hard to see how culture could form prior to the aesthetic (or moral and theoretical) sense. These would seem to be prerequisites for culture. More to the point, if beauty is "what pleases when known," then it would seem to already exist, in at least a primitive form vis-á-vis sensation, in lower animals that existed millions of years before the first man. If Beauty is the going out in appearances of Goodness, the "pleasingness of appearances," then I find it hard to see how life could evolve without it, since animals are presumably motivated by what pleases their senses.

Now, I'd agree that only man experiences Beauty as such, in a full sense, but this is also true of Truth. Yet the fact that Beauty (and Truth) are always filtered through and contextualized within culture for man does not require that they be posterior to culture. If they were posterior (dependent, as smoke generated by a fire) then nothing would have been true prior to the advent of man.

But note: we can still judge and reject them, but we do so from our own perspective, not from some objective, godlike viewpoint.

Right, but how does this amount to more than emotivism (or does it?)—more than "boo hoo for Hitler?" No doubt, no one denies that people can say "boo hoo for Hitler." Yet people can, and do, also say "hoorah for Hitler." If there is no human telos or values that transcend current sentiment then it seems only power relations can ultimately end up determining the question of which ought to prevail, no? That is, reason cannot judge between the life of the BTK killer and the life of a saint.

Note that the transcendence is question here is only of current norms and sentiments. Nothing "platonic" need he inferred.

But note: we can still judge and reject them, but we do so from our own perspective, not from some objective, godlike viewpoint.

We don't get access to some objective standpoint outside all human values.

"Godlike," "One True," etc., ...do pluralisms' detractors ever use this language? This language is only ever rolled to create a dichotomy to argue against, right? That might be an indication that it's a strawman.

The idea of a human telos doesn't require anything that transcends man. It merely requires something that transcends man's current sentiments, norms, and beliefs.

For example, it is bad for a bear to have its leg mangled in a bear trap because of what a bear is. Likewise, I'd argue that there are ways of living that are better and worse for man. No "Godlike" perspective is required to reach this judgement. This is observable through the senses. Being neglected is not good for children, being maimed is not good for human beings, education is conducive to human flourishing, etc.—at the very least, ceteris paribus. I would argue that these are facts about what man is that do not depend on current norms, yet neither do they depend on a god-like view, nor a view from nowhere.

But, even if you have the suspicion that my point must somehow reduce to an appeal to the "transcendent" (and I'm not sure how it does), I still think your argument has a weakness (to be fair, it's one that seems fairly endemic around these parts when it comes to arguing these sorts of things). It seems to follow the form:

Either A or B
Not A
Thus, B

That is:
Either we have access to a god-like, One True Perspective, or "view from nowhere," else man has no particular telos.

Similar arguments have been made in this thread re the status of beauty. Either we have the "god-like view," else beauty is posterior to custom and culture.

But the truth of the premise: "either A or B" is never addressed. A more convincing argument doesn't need to merely show that we lack a god-like, One True, etc. view, but rather that, if we lack this view, it entails that man lacks a telos (or, likewise in the case of beauty, that some sort of constructivist pluralism where beauty is posterior to culture and custom necessarily follows from the absence of a One True View).

That would be more convincing, particularly since I don't think I've suggested A in the first place. I've said many times on this forum that I would consider a strong challenge to a virtue ethics grounded in man's telos to be one which can demonstrate that, ceteris paribus (and not just in contrived counterexamples), it is, on average:

Not better to have fortitude, but rather better to have weakness of will.

Not better to be prudent, but rather better to be rash.

Not better to be courageous, but rather better to be reckless or cowardly.

Not better to be temperate, but rather better to be gluttonous and licentious.

Etc.

Or, barring that, that different cultures actually have wholly equivocal notions of the virtues. I think this will be an extremely hard challenge to meet though. So too for the idea of a human telos, e.g. that ceteris paribus, on average, things like lead poisoning, hunger, lack of education, lack of physical activity, etc. do not negatively impact human flourishing.

And the question becomes, external to what? If the world is always, and already, in a context and a language, then there is nothing "external" to the interpretation.

Well, here is a fundamental disagreement. I think that language is something within the world. Language is just one thing in the order of human experience, and human experience is just one thing in the order of being. The world is not "in a language." This is backwards, the former is what contains the latter. Likewise, it has not "always already been in a language" because language has not always existed.

The limits of language are not the limits of being. Being is not something contained in language. This is inflating a part into a whole, and leads to a misunderstanding of what language is and how it works. Likewise, the limits of reason are not the limits of existing languages, because reason is more than just discursive linkages between elements language or something akin to computation.

↪J So for Tim the world is already divided up. Whereas for me the division is something we do, and re-do, as our understanding progresses.

Right, what decides what an ant is has something to do with what we decide to count as an ant. I will just note that I find this implausible. The subject matter of biology is prior to our doing. Something like "how many chromosomes does a tiger have," is discovered (the uncovering of something prior). Which isn't to say science isn't bound up in culture, but rather that the facts science studies are not posterior to (dependent on) culture. Biology is not primarily the study of human distinctions, but of living organisms. Distinctions are secondary, related as means but not ends. So it is for theoretical reason, and so too for moral and aesthetic reason.

Again, this is a question of what is prior and posterior. The ant and tyrannosaurus are prior to human language. We might get them more or less correctly, but their preexistence is a key cause of our knowledge of them. There would be no reason for language to develop for these concepts if their existence wasn't prior.

And so I again throw the question back to Tim, why should we accept that your divisions are the absolute ones

You're going to run out of straw too early again friend, I cannot keep up.

But there is a bit of tension between these two terms:
“truth is not invented by humans” and
“truths become available within human discourse” — Fire Ologist

I guess the compromise for me might be to say that truth is a product of human beings, their interactions, and discourse. But perhaps the word truth is the problem, it's so ossified and redolent with pious meaning.

I think the precise point we are debating is whether quality is arbitrary or not. I am saying all is NOT arbitrary. If you are saying all is not arbitrary (as in, “…not arbitrarily”) then we agree. — Fire Ologist

I agree it's not arbitrary, there are frameworks and values underpinning our discourse. What they are not is universal or scientifically binding.

“You can have any opinion you want. But if you are trying to tell me I’m wrong, then you can’t have any opinion you want.” — Fire Ologist

Not sure I follow. My point can probably be summarised like this: all we have available is a discourse that identifies better and worse ways to achieve certain goals. Within that framework, we can say whether something is 'wrong'. That's why I gave my crude example, if you believe in human flourishing, then poisoning the town's water supply would appear to be the 'wrong' way to achieve it. But like 'truth', words like 'right' and 'wrong' are distorted by piety and a myriad preconceptions.

All I’m saying is if you want to have the opinion “all is arbitrary” you can. But if you want to correct me, about anything, you are actually saying something is not arbitrary, or you are lying, or contradicting yourself. — Fire Ologist

I'm not saying everything is arbitrary, It's the product of discourse over which we can deliberate. Just because we have no ultimate foundation for morality doesn't mean we can't identify goals and aims for how we live together. A starting point might be found in the fact that humans, as a social species, ususally try to avoid suffering and cruelty. What more do we need as a starting point?

Interesting reponses. Thanks.

"Godlike," "One True," etc., ...do pluralisms' detractors ever use this language? This language is only ever rolled to create a dichotomy to argue against, right? That might be an indication that it's a strawman. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, I’ve spent some time arguing with Hindus and Baptists who do indeed maintain that morality emanates from God’s nature or flows from the Godhead, etc. But I take your point, especially given what you write next.

The idea of a human telos doesn't require anything that transcends man. It merely requires something that transcends man's current sentiments, norms, and beliefs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well I guess I am arguing that pragmatic ethics is likely all we have, so if that's sufficient we are in agreement.

For example, it is bad for a bear to have its leg mangled in a bear trap because of what a bear is. Likewise, I'd argue that there are ways of living that are better and worse for man. No "Godlike" perspective is required to reach this judgement. This is observable through the senses. Being neglected is not good for children, being maimed is not good for human beings, education is conducive to human flourishing, etc.—at the very least, ceteris paribus. I would argue that these are facts about what man is that do not depend on current norms, yet neither do they depend on a god-like view, nor a view from nowhere. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, so we're in agreement on this. We can identify a series of aims, and, subject to those aims (flourishing, well-being, etc.), identify better or worse ways to achieve them.

I'd argue that there are ways of living that are better and worse for man. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And this is where things can get tricky, the judgment about what is better or worse can become quite shrill very quickly. Still, I prefer 'better' and 'worse' to 'right' and 'wrong'.

We can probably start with a goal, something like reducing suffering. — Tom Storm

I start with the goal of increasing suffering. Why choose yours? I'll answer that question. Because my goal is immoral.

None of this involves objectivity, it's more like a recipe made out of our shared judgements and hopes. — Tom Storm

Of course it involves objectivity. You're specifically stating that the advancement of "our shared judgments and hopes" is the Good. Notwithstanding that fact that "our" is undefined here because who "our" encompasses in the antebellum south, Nazi Germany, and in the various less than humanistic societies over time would arrive at very different "shared judgments and hopes."

So, is rape wrong? That is, regardless of how a society values women, regardless of what some dictator might say or do, are you willing to go out on a limb and say "rape is wrong, anytime, anywhere, and regardless of the consensus."

If you're not, tell me the scenario where it's ok.

I don't think you will. What that means is we need to take seriously the objectivity of morality and figure out what we're talking about and not suggest there is some sort of preference or voting taking place. If you think there are principles that apply throughout all societies, you are going to be referencing the objective whether you like it or not.

There's a key difference here. Hanover seems to be looking for a set of rules that are practiced. But what answers the question, and what you have provided, is a set of rules that ought be practiced.

So Hanover points out in triumph that they are not practiced everywhere, missing the point entirely. — Banno

No, I recognized his itemization was of the aspirational. I questioned if there were an objective anchor for those ethical statements, as in, is there something other than our agreement that makes the good the good.

If I say, we ought reduce suffering, I'm speaking in the objective. If not, then for some the increase of suffering might be good. But you disagree I'm sure in the proposition that we ought increase the pain of all redheads, for example. Why? They are a tiny little minority, and if the rest of of enjoy their pain, why limit it? Assert for me your principle. This isn't that hard.

All I’m saying is if you want to have the opinion “all is arbitrary” you can. But if you want to correct me, about anything, you are actually saying something is not arbitrary, or you are lying, or contradicting yourself. — Fire Ologist

Given this, I think your dictum could be phrased more clearly as: "Opinions are plural; anyone can have one. But if your opinion happens to be that there is nothing beyond opinions, no truth, no fact of the matter, then it is meaningless for you to also tell me I am wrong about something."

Does that work for you? It's less snappy, but it captures the self-contradiction you're claiming, which the original version does not. "Can't have" is confusing.

I agree it's not arbitrary, there are frameworks and values underpinning our discourse. What they are not is universal or scientifically binding. — Tom Storm

Yes. Something can be far from arbitrary -- it can have good reasons and justifications -- without needing a universal, cross-cultural explanation.

The idea of a human telos doesn't require anything that transcends man. It merely requires something that transcends man's current sentiments, norms, and beliefs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm having trouble understanding how that "something" would not transcend humans. Is the idea that we could discover such a telos by only studying humans as a species, the way anthropologists do? Or understanding humans' role in relation to other species and to the planet as a whole?

So, is rape wrong? That is, regardless of how a society values women, regardless of what some dictator might say or do, are you willing to go out on a limb and say "rape is wrong, anytime, anywhere, and regardless of the consensus."

If you're not, tell me the scenario where it's ok. — Hanover

If by OK you mean, "Something I might feel ethically obligated to do": Sure. A foul regime imprisons me and my family and indulges its jailers' sadistic fantasies. (This example actually happened in Nazi Germany.). "Rape your daughter," they tell me, "otherwise we'll torture your entire family to death before your eyes." I emphasized might, above, because I don't presume to know what would seem right to me under the circumstances. But I might well decide that the rape was the lesser of two evils.

This highlights two important points. First, if that's not what you mean by OK -- if, rather, you mean "Rape becomes a good thing in this scenario" -- then I agree, this can never happen. Second, while we are helpless in the face of circumstances to rely on rules, that doesn't meant that teaching our children that rape is wrong should always be contextualized. I am not a utilitarian, but this is one area where the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism is useful.

I'm having trouble understanding how that "something" would not transcend humans. Is the idea that we could discover such a telos by only studying humans as a species, the way anthropologists do? Or understanding humans' role in relation to other species and to the planet as a whole?

Sure. I would argue that such a view ultimately runs into many other problems, but such a view of man's telos does not seem prima facie unreasonable, whereas a blanket denial does.

Now, the classical view would be that man, as a rational being, is always oriented towards Truth and the Good by the two faculties of the rational soul, intellect and will. This is the natural the desire to know what is really true and possess/attain to what is truly best (both, ultimately being a sort of union). It is these intellectual appetites by which man transcends his finitude and seeks his end in rational freedom.

But, supposing we deny that man is a rational being (at least in this sense) and instead claim he is something more like a very clever rat or fox, then it would still be the case that man has a nature that determines the human good (leaving aside the question of cosmic ends).

If by OK you mean, "Something I might feel ethically obligated to do": Sure. A foul regime imprisons me and my family and indulges its jailers' sadistic fantasies. (This example actually happened in Nazi Germany.). "Rape your daughter," they tell me, "otherwise we'll torture your entire family to death before your eyes." I emphasized might, above, because I don't presume to know what would seem right to me under the circumstances. But I might well decide that the rape was the lesser of two evils.

This highlights two important points. First, if that's not what you mean by OK -- if, rather, you mean "Rape becomes a good thing in this scenario" -- then I agree, this can never happen. Second, while we are helpless in the face of circumstances to rely on rules, that doesn't meant that teaching our children that rape is wrong should always be contextualized. I am not a utilitarian, but this is one area where the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism is useful. — J

The point of the question is whether there are objective, universal rules that have to be applied in order to determine morality. It's not relevant which moral dilimma you create in answering this abstract question. The question I posed was meant to just provide a very straight forward question, as in, is it morally wrong to rape someone without adding in a bunch of absurd facts with guns to people's heads and whatnot. But, to clarify, is it wrong to rape someone just for fun, who was otherwise just an innocent bystander.

Your example does not pose a challenge to my question. It just poses a very strange example we have to consider, as in "Is it wrong to rape someone if it is the only means to save the life of another," where we then have to get into a hierarchy of moral rules and how to prioritize them.

But, to clarify, is it wrong to rape someone just for fun, who was otherwise just an innocent bystander. — Hanover

OK. But in fairness, what you said was, "Are you willing to go out on a limb and say 'rape is wrong, anytime, anywhere, and regardless of the consensus'?" This inevitably pushes to the foreground the question of the hierarchy of moral rules. I don't think it's possible to say that "getting into" how we prioritize these rules is optional, that we can achieve some kind of moral clarity without doing so.

Also, much as I wish I could agree with you that "gun to the head" dilemmas are "absurd" and "strange examples," in the world I see around me they are irrefutable facts of ethical life. Moreover, I have a hunch they always have been. Humans can be cruel to a degree that will challenge any moral system.

"Opinions are plural; anyone can have one. But if your opinion happens to be that there is nothing beyond opinions, no truth, no fact of the matter, then it is meaningless for you to also tell me I am wrong about something." — J

Yes, more precise is better. But less snappy.

Maybe, you can have any opinion you want, but if one has the two opinions “you can have any opinion you want” and “your opinion is wrong” then you are contradicting yourself.

In the context of “is there objective quality” or “is there truth, good and beauty prior to recognition as such in the eye of the beholder”, the point of the statement you clarified for me above is that, if we don’t think there is anything objective or non-subjective to beauty and truth and good, then the words beauty and truth and good are meaningless.

Maybe there is nothing good, true or beautiful, and we all fumble around when using these terms. But if you think there is nothing objective about them, we will always, only fumble. And what is the point of fumbling at each other in a debate/discussion? Power struggles for competition’s sake? But that’s a zero sum loss of the war (game) for sake of some stupid battle between we fumblers. It would be like two smart people trying to win at tic tac toe. Pointless as long as each has mastered the game.

In other words, if you can convince someone that there is nothing objective and that context will always undermine the prior and overwhelm the conclusion, all is provisional stipulation to later be revised and discarded, then really, why bother asserting anything?

I don’t believe anyone really believes these things - that nothing is ever fixed and there is no opinion that must be absolutely held by all opinion holders. That’s why we continue to assert things. Pursuit of truth, good and beauty.

Even saying “there is no one truth for all” is a truth for all. The only way to truly have the opinion “there is no truth” is to stop speaking about it. You don’t tell someone “you can’t say there is truth”. If someone is saying “there is one truth for all” and you disagree, and you think that there is no such thing, you simply cannot speak without contradicting yourself.

Cratylus, Heraclitus’ pupil, was known to wiggle his finger in response to questions about these things. That was, in my opinion, a more honest form of response based on the belief that all is flux and there is no objective quality.

But, supposing we deny that man is a rational being (at least in this sense) and instead claim he is something more like a very clever rat or fox, then it would still be the case that man has a nature that determines the human good — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, that's the difficult leap. Yes, we might be able to discover human "nature," if that is something that science can reveal. (I'm not sure it is, but let's say so.) But learning what such a nature is can't tell us what the human good is. But you and I have been here before! :smile: "Human good" is simply not an anthropological term. Unless you equate it with "survival and flourishing of the human species," which I don't think you do.

Right, and this is fairly obvious as regards statements that are straightforwardly self-undermining, if not fully self-refuting.

However, the tricky part here with various forms of "constructivist pluralism," for lack of a better term (and some other notions as well), is that the response will be: "but of course there is goodness, beauty, and truth, it just isn't what you think it is." So here, truth is no longer the adequacy of thought to being, but is variously:

- what follows from given hinges (groundless grounds, of which there are a plurality);

- "the end of inquiry," what satisfies our needs;

-consistency with other existing beliefs;

-defined wholly formally (leaving natural language truths too vague and equivocal for rigorous analysis);

etc. (with various combinations as well).

This isn't quite so straightforward. There is an equivocation at play between both parties. The question then must turn to the alternative notions of truth (or goodness, or beauty) and their appropriateness. This is likely to be fraught. However, one can look at the new definitions of truth and also see if the new definitions might themselves be self-undermining or self-refuting.

For instance, do they allow for violations of the principle of non-contradiction such that, by their own standards, they are both correct and not-correct? Do they fail to ground our most bedrock intuitions (perhaps not fatal, but certainly a difficulty)? Do they allow for conflicting truths, and in particular, conflicting truths about truth itself?

Of course, some views will claim that contradiction, of itself, is no problem. But it does seem to be a problem if a redefinition allows us to assert that the new definition (or the old for that matter) is both correct and not-correct, for then it hasn't really said anything at all.

We might also ask, given the momentous nature of the change, what presuppositions undergird the move. The move to dismiss truth as adequacy or correspondence, and to posit some particular replacement, relies on arguments. These don't tend to be presuppositionless arguments. Hence, we can ask, are these presuppositions beyond doubt? If arguments lead to radical conclusions, the first things to do are to check the validity of the argument and the truth of the premises.

And nothing can be known about what is good for a rat and a fox either?

As I've said, we've been here before!: The equivocation on "good." What is good for a human, using the same sense of "good" as we'd use for a rat, has no bearing on ethical good. Rats don't have ethics, humans do.

I understand that virtue ethics collapses this difference.

But I'm happy to let it go, as I know this is one of those deep and significant differences in interpretation.

I understand that virtue ethics collapses this difference

I don't think it does. There is a difference, it's just that the ethical good is not sui generis, and it is desirable. But at any rate, I was speaking to the view that doesn't acknowledge man as possessing rational appetites, but rather treats man like a clever rat or pigeon.

I don't think you can get to any robust "ethical good" from this presupposition. If you try, you get an "ethical good" that is desired by no one, except accidentally, and is to no one's benefit, except accidentally, which means there is no reason why anyone should care about it. Things are only good for man in the same way that they can be good for a rat or cow.

Rats don't have ethics, humans do.

What does it mean to "have ethics" here? Does man have an appetite for this ethical goodness, or some sort of duty vis-á-vis ethical goodness? What's the positive formulation?

You are critiquing a "naturalistic," purely immanent explanation of the human good for not including a dimension of ethical/moral goodness, yet you've also expressed disapproval for the notion of any values transcending man and his culture, no? So how is this ethical/moral goodness explained?

You are critiquing a "naturalistic," purely immanent explanation of the human good for not including a dimension of ethical/moral goodness, yet you've also expressed disapproval for the notion of any values transcending man and his culture, no? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. I was trying to understand how you could regard a telos as strictly humanistic or anthropological in some way, not involving transcendent elements. (You said that "such a view of man's telos does not seem prima facie unreasonable.") Personally, I think that if we're talking telos, we're talking transcendence. That is not how I understand the origin of values, because I'm not happy with talking about telos at all. But -- and again, this is the either/or thinking that is so discouraging -- that doesn't leave me in the position of reducing values to purely immanent explanations.

I really think our previous conversations about ethics have gone into this thoroughly.

Here's a false dilemma - that either there are truths prior (a loaded term) to humanity, or nothing was true until man's communities arose. Perhaps we can say truth is not invented by humans, but neither does it exist in some Platonic realm, independent of all interpretive conditions. Instead truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with.

Prior and posterior are "loaded terms" now?

The bronze of a statue and the art of sculpting are prior, the finished statue is posterior. Parents are prior to their children, the children are posterior. What is posterior comes from, or is dependent on what is prior. Is truth neither prior nor posterior to language and interpretation?

If this were so then the truth of an interpretation would not be dependent on the being of whatever the interpretation is an interpretation of. Second, since language and interpretation are not prior to truth, truth can hardly be said to always depend upon them. At the same time, to say that truth is both prior and posterior to language is a contradiction.

Whereas, to say that truth is posterior to man and his language is to say that truth is somewhat like a statue. But perhaps the "raw material" of truth is prior to language, as the bronze exists before the statue? Perhaps we could say that truth exists potentially prior to man, yet is only actualized by his language and culture?

Here is the problem with this. Truth reflects the mind's grasp of being, the adequacy of thought to what already is. Truth is founded in the being of things, in re. But things must already be actual for them to act on our intellect, and for our knowledge to be determined by them.

Being is prior to knowledge. If it weren't, then knowing (or speaking) would make things what they are (which, aside from basic plausibility, would also make it difficult to explain error and a lack of correspondence between intellect and being). Further, if we know things potentially before we know them actually, then it would seem that our potential knowledge would have to be actualized by merely potential truth.

Another way to say this is that the measure of a duck is a duck. The measure of a riverbed is a riverbed. When we assess the truth of a model, we assess the degree to which it is adequate to what it measures. But this requires that the measure is not dependent on (posterior to) the measurement (though no doubt, measurement can influence the measure, e.g. quantum mechanics), e.g. that the coastline exist prior to the map whose truth is its correspondence to the coastline.

Nothing about this priority requires any claim about stepping outside of all interpretations. This is a non-sequitur as far as I can see. I agree wholeheartedly with Rorty on the impossibility and inadvisablity of the "view from nowhere" or of "knowledge of things in themselves." That isn't what is at issue though.

Our knowledge of the truth is indeed developed over time and influenced by culture; it is situated within practices and interpretation. The truth itself is grounded in being, and hence is already actual prior to any interpretation. This gets back to the idea that language and interpretations are means of knowing, not (primarily) the objects of knowledge.

Personally, I think that if we're talking telos, we're talking transcendence.

Do you think we need transcendence to speak of the goal-directedness of life?

I really think our previous conversations about ethics have gone into this thoroughly

Really? Certainly, I've responded to a lot of critique. I don't know what the corresponding positive formulation is supposed to look like at all though. Indeed, I am pretty sure I've asked what an "ethical good" is supposed to be before.

Apparently, a naturalistic approach to telos is flawed without it. And apparently my own view of the classical tradition is also flawed because it doesn't capture it adequately. But what is exactly is this "ethical good" and "ethical ought?"

Of course it involves objectivity. You're specifically stating that the advancement of "our shared judgments and hopes" is the Good. Notwithstanding that fact that "our" is undefined here because who "our" encompasses in the antebellum south, Nazi Germany, and in the various less than humanistic societies over time would arrive at very different "shared judgments and hopes."

So, is rape wrong? That is, regardless of how a society values women, regardless of what some dictator might say or do, are you willing to go out on a limb and say "rape is wrong, anytime, anywhere, and regardless of the consensus."

If you're not, tell me the scenario where it's ok.

I don't think you will. What that means is we need to take seriously the objectivity of morality and figure out what we're talking about and not suggest there is some sort of preference or voting taking place. If you think there are principles that apply throughout all societies, you are going to be referencing the objective whether you like it or not. — Hanover

In asking for my view, you're speaking to someone socialised in the progressive West, so it’s hardly surprising that I affirm the belief that rape is wrong. But ask men in, say, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Then ask them about homosexuality, or even women’s rights. People tend to reflect the values of the cultures they’re raised in. That’s the point.

In fact, here in the West, marital rape wasn’t even considered a crime until the late 20th century. The most insidious forms of immoral behaviour must be those that aren't even recognised as problematic, perhaps trans bigotry today is such an example, where a man can never be seen as a woman…

So conversation is still needed to promote and enlarge empathy around the world. Where do you see the objectivity?

And sure, if we set a form of simple/minded human flourishing as the goal for our morality, we can devise some semblance of objective standards to achieve these. Is this what you mean? But the point surely is that flourishing looks different to different folk and we have nowhere to go to find justification, except discursively with each other in the knowledge that full agreement will never happen.

Your response rightly notes that in some cultures, even the most egregious human rights violations are considered accepted practice. We also know that racism, anti-trans bigotry, misogyny, and even that old standby, anti-Semitism, are still seen by many as acceptable, even in the West. They may even be growing. So yes, moral certainty is often claimed, but whose morality are we talking about? Where is your objective foundation to settle these questions?

Instead truths become available within human discourse—not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with. — Banno

I can't quite tell is this is part of hte false dilemma, for you. The above seems to me to be the case wrt truth. Things are as they are, and our existence only changes that insofar as our existence includes considerations of truth. Whether these can be 'moral' truths being another question, though, to be clear.

The limits of language are not the limits of being. Being is not something contained in language.. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We are a long way apart in out views.

Of course being is not contained in language. Being is not contained in anything, and neither is language a container. Hence any any attempt to step outside of all language to describe being “as such” is suspect. But this seems to be what you would do - supposing that there are ants prior to "There are ants" being true; and not temporally prior, but logically prior, as if it were not sentences that are true or false. We can't stand outside of the interpretation that claims there are ants, in order to say there are ants outside of that interpretation...

And that's also why is loaded.

Truth doesn't reflect the mind's grasp of being, it is the minds grasp of being. “Prior” suggests an ontological gap that can’t be made coherent. We don’t grasp being by representing it from the outside, but are embedded in a structure of interpretation, where belief, truth, and world hang together.

I can't see how to make sense of your attempt to foreclose on this. You bold "Nothing about this priority requires any claim about stepping outside of all interpretations" only to then say " The truth itself is grounded in being, and hence is already actual prior to any interpretation." You appear to just be smuggling back in the scheme/content distinction you reject.

I'm at a loss to make sense of such an approach.

Things are as they are, and our existence only changes that insofar as our existence includes considerations of truth. — AmadeusD

I think it's a little more radical than that. Consider any physical object - the ever-useful rock example, let's say. But now wait a minute . . . what makes it a solid object for us? Is being the discrete, solid thing that it appears to us to be a feature of "things as they are", which we have only to note and make true statements about?

Rather, isn't it the case that our particular needs and capacities as humans allow us to perceive and group items in the world according to categories like "discrete" and "solid"? This has nothing to do with whether they "really are" this or that. Now I'm not a proponent of anti-realism. For our purposes, certainly they are, and atoms are real, etc etc. My point is that we don't approach the world as a collection of neutral phenomena which hold still for us as we go on to discover what is true about them. We have a large role to play in constituting the phenomena we then say true things about. Again, this doesn't mean we make them up or that they could be any which way, or that the things we say aren't true. It means that "things as they are" should probably be reserved for a particular reductive conception of physics, and even there viewed with some doubt.

Also, if you wanted to confine "things as they are" to terms of intersubjectivity, that would work well for me. It might capture your idea, which I agree with, that the rock is going to appear discrete and solid to any normal human, and it would have this appearance even if, per impossibile, there could be an appearance with no one to appear to.