Yes, but then there isn’t some other substance which can receive potentiality. ‘Matter’ is not a substrate which receives form. The ‘material’ out of which something is created is the already existed stuff (objects) which can be made into a whole (by way of it receiving the form of the whole); so each object is both comprised of form and matter only insofar as its parts are the matter and its form is the actualizing principle of the structure that makes those parts its parts. There is no substrate of ‘matter’. — Bob Ross

Yes. The Substrate (hyle ; wood ; matter) already exists. But the Form (morph) is what converts wood into art. In the image below, notice the hands & mind that impart design (actualizing principle) to the malleable clay. Sans Mind, clay is just mud. :smile:

Aquinas has it that angels and demons are composed in a sense. They have both essence (what they are) and an existence given by God (that they are). This constitutes their "act of existence." These aren't parts in the sense of substrate though.

They have some actuality and some potency. They can learn, turn their attention, will this or that, act here or there, etc. but they cannot grow, decay, or lose form, because they have no matter. They are not subject to generation and corruption. Their form is fixed, they do not change in what they are, but only in how they operate.

For a similar example, there is the human soul, which is immaterial but subject to change, and informed by the body.

But this isn't a part whole relationship, but rather two different principles within an act of existence. Act is received in potency and there is a limiting relationship between potency and act.

Aristotle is quite different in this regard because he hasn't separated out essence and existence. Aristotle complains about the notion of participation in the Metaphysics but Aquinas is able to plumb it more fully and make use of it. All creatures participate in God's being, which alone is subsistent. All actuality is a sort of limiting participation, that occurs according to virtual quantity (qualitative intensity). We don't have an infinite regress because all actuality ultimately traces back to God.

Aquinas has it that angels and demons are composed in a sense. They have both essence (what they are) and an existence given by God (that they are). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I remember correctly, God is eternal, and angels are aeviternal. I believe that this means God's existence is completely outside of time, whereas angels have a beginning in time (being created by God), but no end in time.

Parts are what a material object is composed of. I don't think it makes any sense to talk of the parts of an immaterial form. Neither does your argument make any sense.

How do you define a part?

Again, I defined it as something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. Nothing about a part in this sense is restricted to something with tangible parts.

Why not?

Because two ontologically simple things are ontologically indistinguishable from each other.

Yes, and without the form of clay the clay is just fine-grained mineral particles.

They have some actuality and some potency. They can learn, turn their attention, will this or that, act here or there, etc. but they cannot grow, decay, or lose form, because they have no matte

How does the idea that they have no matter but pure form not entail that matter is a kind of substrate of pure potentiality?

Likewise, wouldn’t there have to be some primitive constituent of matter that everything made of matter is comprised? Wouldn’t that primitive constituent be absolutely simple and thusly purely actual (along with God)?

For a similar example, there is the human soul, which is immaterial but subject to change, and informed by the body.

But I don’t think Aristotle believed this: this seems more of a Thomist thing. Aristotle just thought that the form of a living-being in virtue of which it is living and unified towards its natural end is the soul. It wasn’t some extra immaterial, cartesian-style thing infused with the body or informed by the body.

Aristotle is quite different in this regard because he hasn't separated out essence and existence. Aristotle complains about the notion of participation in the Metaphysics but Aquinas is able to plumb it more fully and make use of it.

Interesting. Can you elaborate more on this?

All creatures participate in God's being, which alone is subsistent.

To me, matter in the sense you described it threatens this very claim: matter would imply a basic constituent of material things which comprises them which, in turn, implies fundamental parts that are absolutely simple—they are pure potency infused in some kind of being that will receive the first form—and this would entail that there are multiple purely actual beings. What are you thoughts on that?

This is why I was thinking that composed beings must be infinitely divisible AND infused with being from God; because:

1. If a composed being is finitely divisible, then it’s fundamental part(s) are absolutely simple and two or more absolutely simple beings cannot exist; therefore, since God is absolutely simple every composed being must be infinitely divisible.

2. If composed beings are JUST infinitely divisible (viz., that explains the existence of each), then it wouldn’t exist because no member itself with have subsistent existence; therefore, God must be the first cause of the existence of the infinite chain of divisible parts of a given whole.

What do you think?

EDIT:

I am thinking of the chain of causality for a given object like this:

God → [..., parts of N - 1, parts of N, N]

I don't think it would be possible for:

God → first parts → ... → parts of N - 1 → parts of N → N

It would be impossible because the first parts would have to be absolutely simple because they are not made up of two or more parts: there would be nothing more fundamental to that contributes to the whole (of each first part) that isn't identical to it (viz., there would be no parts). Two or more absolutely simple beings cannot exist because they would be ontologically indistiguishable from each other. Therefore, since God is absolutely simple as subsistent being itself, it follows that this kind of causality would imply the contradiction of having at least two absolutely simple beings (namely God and the first parts).

What do you think?

Is humanity a "part" a of man? Is snub-nosedness a part of Socrates, or paleness? If what Socrates is does not explain that he is, would his existence be a separate "part" from his essence?

I think there is a meaningful distinction between principles and parts, and between participation and composition. A circle is not composed of circularity, but circularity inheres in it, for instance. Parts are organizational. They are ordered to an end, and that's a key difference. "Humanity" by contrast, is possessed or participated in, the idea of "limiting essence."

I agree but I don't see how this addresses the issue.

E.g., circularity is not a part of a circle; but the atoms that compose the given circle are; and those atoms are comprised of electrons, neutrons, and protons; ...

We would need to ask: does the stuff that is organized towards the whole and the wholes of those organized things and so on go on infinitely or finitely? My point was that if it is finite, then there is some stuff that comprises the second to last member of the causal chain of composition that has no parts. See what I mean?

We would need to ask: does the stuff that is organized towards the whole and the wholes of those organized things and so on go on infinitely or finitely?

I see what you mean. It strikes me that the Five Ways sort of answer this question. There is a good dialogue on them called "Does God Exist?" by Robert Delfino that is pretty good on this. One need not accept the conclusion to see the relevance here. The Second Way shows how the chain ends in terms of hierarchically structured efficient causes (as opposed to accidental linear temporal ordering). Aquinas doesn't think we can know from reason and observation alone that the world has a temporal begining, so the question is open in the horizontal dimension (being closed by revelation), but it ends in God in the vertical dimension.

The First Way shows us an end to the order of motion, the Third shows us an end in the order of necessity, and the Fourth a sort of "first principle of participation." The Fifth Way shows an end in the order of ends. We don't have infinite regresses anywhere here.

The problem of infinite composition would seem to me to involve a sort of materialist presupposition alien to Aristotle or Aquinas (but more alien to the latter), that matter is in some way subsistent and not always referred to another.

An information theoretic example might be helpful here:

Some physicists claim that information is ontologically basic and that matter and energy emerge from it. At the bottom, we get down the the bit, 1 or 0. You cannot get anymore simple. Or can we? We also have the qbit, potentiality between 1 and 0 that resolves into either.

But it would be a mistake to take this position as claiming the cosmos is "composed of bits," a position that is often ridiculed as a misunderstanding. For instance, an electron only carries information at all because it is a difference that makes a difference as measured against a background that is not an electron. As Floridi demonstrates in his Philosophy of Information, a toy universe must have at least some difference to be anything at all (akin to Hegel's point on sheer being in the Logic and sheer sense certainty in the Phenomenology). If the universe is only a point, then obviously a 1 or 0 cannot exist as there is no variance to define the difference. We only miss this because we act as "extra-real observers" sitting outside the toy universe.

So, there might be a sort of "last part" in the form of the bit, but it isn't subsistent, but instead relies on another to be actual, to be anything at all. It isn't a building block. There isn't an infinite regress. We have God at the top, nothingness at the bottom.

Dante's imagery in the Paradiso is helpful here. His material cosmos is Satanocentric. Earth is at the center, the point to which all matter moves, and Satan is at the center of the Earth. This is maximal multiplicity and potency. The sinners at the bottom of Hell and Lucifer are frozen in ice because potency cannot actualize itself because it is ultimately nothing at all. We are in the real of the untinelligible, where being trails off into nothingness.

But in the Paradiso the entire image is inverted. The outermost sphere is actually a dimensionless point, the mind of God "outside" space and time. But all space and time is contained "inside" the point in reality. Creation is like a halo projected from a point, light diffusing in mist. The limit, where the light stops, growing dimmer and dimmer until there is darkness, is just the limit of being. The end of the order is nothingness. As one moves onward, one moves up in the scale of the Transcendentals, Truth, Goodness, Unity, Being.

E.g., circularity is not a part of a circle; but the atoms that compose the given circle are; and those atoms are comprised of electrons, neutrons, and protons; ... — Bob Ross

Exactly! As a part of speech, in our materialistic language, "circularity" is a noun, a thing, an object. Yet Properties (Qualia) are not actually material things, but ideas about things that are attributed to the matter by a sentient observer. Back to the hylomorph example : the hyle is a piece of wood made of non-wood atoms. Together, the system (splintery wood), and its primary components (cellulose molecules), combine with subordinate particles (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen atoms) to appear to us humans as malleable objects that can be shaped into lumber, or paper, or idols.

In the OP, you posited that "If I am right, then it seems like we can get rid of 'matter' (in Aristotle's sense) and retain form (viz., actuality)." But the mindless philosophy of Materialism would deny that possibility. Because, objectively Reality is the objects of perception, that we know via physical senses. Yet, Ideality is the subjects of conception, that we can't point to out there, but only imagine in the mind. Hence, Form*1 is immaterial, not real, and considered unimportant, and perhaps dispensable.

So, I think you have pointed-out the crux of much argument on this forum. Some of us think, impersonally, that only the useful Hyle is worthy of consideration. While others view reality from a personal human perspective, in which the Form (properties, qualia) is all we know about the thing. :smile:


*1. In philosophical contexts, "form" often refers to the essential nature or defining characteristics of a thing, shaping its identity and properties. It's distinct from the physical matter that makes up an object, and understanding a thing's form is crucial for understanding its behavior and properties
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=the+form+is+the+properties+of+a+thing

:up:

I think I get where I was blundering: the fundamental material part would still be comprised of essence and esse, so it would not, in fact, be absolutely simple even if it was not comprised of any other material parts.

I partially agree. I don't think 'form' traditionally refers to some kind of transcendental idealistic 'idea' of a think attributed to it by cognition: it's an integrated actualizing principle of the thing, which is embedded into the thing by a mind.

I partially agree. I don't think 'form' traditionally refers to some kind of transcendental idealistic 'idea' of a think attributed to it by cognition: it's an integrated actualizing principle of the thing, which is embedded into the thing by a mind. — Bob Ross

I guess that conditional agreement depends on which traditions you refer to. Plato was very clear that he considered his Ideal & Universal Forms (e.g. circularity) to be perfect conceptual principles, transcending imperfect material reality*1. But Aristotle was more like a modern scientist in that he preferred to deal with immanent particular Reality.

Ari does philosophize (theorize) in his distinction between Form (morph) and Matter (hyle). Yet, he probably thought of the formal properties of a particular thing as attributions, metaphorically "embedded into the thing" by a mortal mind*2. Plato might wonder though, if those general classifications (circularity vs squarity) are out there in Nature, or imposed on instances by a form-seeking mind.

Over millennia, the term "Atom" referred to tiny fundamental particles of tangible stuff : bits of Prime Matter? But now, the foundational element of physics is defined as an intangible non-local mathematical universal Field (similar to gravity), with localized measurable sub-fields & forces (e.g. electromagnetism). Like Gravity, these fields are invisible & intangible. So like Energy, we infer that they exist only by observing their formal & causal effects on matter. Do we perceive material objects, or do we observe meaningful patterns (Forms), and infer tangible Matter?

For my own purposes, I would reserve the term "Form" for a transcendent universal sense, and use "Prime Matter" in an immanent specific sense : of how humans categorize the various Kinds (elements) of material objects. Both are useful concepts, but PM more for scientific work, and Form for philosophical explorations. :smile:


*1. In Plato's philosophy, the Theory of Forms posits that the physical world is a mere shadow of a higher realm of perfect, eternal, and unchanging Forms or Ideas. While Plato doesn't explicitly equate God with the Forms, his concept of the Form of the Good is often seen as the ultimate source of reality and the origin of all other Forms, bearing strong resemblance to a divine principle. Some interpretations even place the Forms within the mind of God, suggesting a divine intellect that shapes and understands the universe through these perfect archetypes
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+forms+mind+of+god

*2. Form vs Matter :
There is in any case already a considerable controversy at this basic level about what Aristotle means by matter and form: what precisely they are, how they are related to one another, how Aristotle intends to marshal arguments in support of them, and how best to deal with reasonable objections to their metaphysical consequences.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/

Again, I defined it as something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. Nothing about a part in this sense is restricted to something with tangible parts. — Bob Ross

That's not a very good definition. People contribute to things without being a part of the thing which they contribute to. The contribution itself becomes the part of the whole, not the thing which contributes it, as the person who contributes may remain separate. Furthermore "contribution" is about giving, and it is not even necessary that a part is given, as a thing may take its parts.

Here's the first definition from my OED: "some but not all of a thing, or number of things". Notice that what you call "the whole", is here called "a thing", or "number of things". To me, this implies a material object, or a group of material objects.

Because two ontologically simple things are ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

How do you support this claim? Why can't two ontologically simple things be distinguishable from each other through time and space, like one simple thing here, and another simple thing over there, at the same time? What would make these two things which are clearly distinguishable from each other, by being at different locations at the very same time, necessarily not ontologically simple?

:up:

How do you support this claim?

Something being ontologically indistinguishable from another thing entails that they are the same thing because the concept of ontological (as opposed to epistemic) indistinguishability is that there is nothing ontologically different about the two things in question.

Something being ontologically indistinguishable from another thing entails that they are the same thing because the concept of ontological (as opposed to epistemic) indistinguishability is that there is nothing ontologically different about the two things in question. — Bob Ross

But things which are ontologically simple, are not necessarily ontologically indistinguishable.

I don't see why you think that there could not be a multitude of ontologically simple things, which are distinguishable through spatial temporal principles. Why do you think that two ontologically simple things would necessarily be ontologically indistinguishable?

Because they are ontologically absolutely simple; which means they are completely without anything which contributes to the whole but is not identical to the whole. You seem to be referring to a sufficiently simple thing with "ontological simplicity" whereas I am referring to complete and perfect simplicity.

Obviously, I don't understand what you are proposing as "complete and perfect simplicity". If this means "all is one" then obviously there cannot be a multitude of complete and perfect simplicities, because by definition this would all be one.

But that is not what we were talking about. We were talking about being ontologically simple in the sense of being indivisible, And, for the reasons given, I do not see why there cannot be a multitude of ontologically simple (in this sense of being indivisible) things.

So then we do agree that two purely ontologically simple beings are impossible, but the point if contention is that we can refer to something that is impurely simple as being ontologically simple.

I think this is fine in colloquial speech. We say things like "this is circular" even when it is not perfectly circular. However, I am referring to something that is perfectly indivisible by it being ontologically simple. E.g., I am referring to perfect circularity.

You alluded to indivisibility as not requiring perfect simplicity; but this is only partially true. What you are referring to is something which is materially indivisible WHICH DOES NOT make it completely indivisible. If we had one of these simple particles that you are talking about, it would still be comprised of form and matter; and these are parts of it given that a part is something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. You would have to define a part differently and then at that point we are disagreeing merely semantically.

So then we do agree that two purely ontologically simple beings are impossible, — Bob Ross

No, we do not agree. I think your proposed concept of "complete and perfect simplicity" is incoherent, and itself an impossible, or self contradicting concept. It requires that a multiplicity be one.

However, I am referring to something that is perfectly indivisible by it being ontologically simple. E.g., I am referring to perfect circularity. — Bob Ross

If "perfectly indivisible" is what you are referring to, then why can there not be more than one of these things? Imagine a point in space. It is perfectly indivisible, but there could be a multitude of different points, each at a different place, at the same time, therefore distinguishable from each other, by having a different place of existence, yet each perfectly indivisible.

How does the concept of something not being a multiplicity entail it is a multiplicity that is one?

For the point in space, assuming it is real, it would be comprised of three parts: location, form, and matter.

How does the concept of something not being a multiplicity entail it is a multiplicity that is one? — Bob Ross

Sorry, I don't understand what you're asking here.

For the point in space, assuming it is real, it would be comprised of three parts: location, form, and matter. — Bob Ross

You can describe the point as having these three parts, but it is still indivisible. Therefore your description is false. Those three, location, matter, and form, refer to concepts, which are not actually parts of the point itself, but concepts used to understand its existence. That is like the "spin" of a virtual particle, it's simply conceptual.

This is a common problem with "divisibility". We often assume that a thing can be divided in a way which it actually can't. This problem comes form the mathematical approach, within which we assume that things can be divided any which way, and infinitely, just like we assume with numbers.. So for instance, we assume that a thing can be divided infinitely when it actually can't. Or we assume that we can make perfectly even halves, and things like that. There are real physical restrictions on division which we do not adequately understand.