When you say “actual questions of right and wrong” are you thinking of judgements justified by rational thought and violating them would be irrational? — Mark S

Good question. No, I wasn't wanting to bring rationality into it at this point. The comparison I'm inviting between "actual" and "descriptive" would be this: An actual question of right and wrong would not reduce to its description. And I admit that "actual" is probably tendentious; perhaps I should have said "traditional." In other words, traditional moral talk asks whether X is "really" good or "really" right. It doesn't explain those terms by describing them in some other terms. Whereas descriptive moral talk does just that. It proposes that the only "real" thing going on here is an evolutionary strategy that helps humans survive. X may be characterized in those terms, and it may be pointed out that X is therefore also, traditionally, considered a "moral" behavior, but "moral" is always in quotes, because it is a description, not a conceptual analysis.

I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe . . . However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational. — Mark S

Again, I agree about the rationality question, and I wouldn't confront Joe on those terms. True, if we're going to say anything to him, we'd probably propose some reasons or arguments why he should prefer the inherently moral in our universe. But that can be done without claiming he's irrational to disagree. My question is, Are there any such arguments, given your thesis? It sounds like you agree that there are not.

Could Joe’s rationality or irrationality when he acts’ immorally’ be a distinguishing characteristic (along with moral ‘means’ vs moral ‘ends”) between the two kinds of ‘morality’ under consideration: Cooperation Morality and traditional moral philosophy’s moral systems? — Mark S

I don't think so, as above.

When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation." — J

If I understand your OP question, this is a good result, or at least good enough. For my part, I think it leaves a lot of unanswered questions about what ethical choice is, largely because I'm a semi-demi-Kantian about ethics and I don't think we can leave anyone out -- it has to be universalizable. So if we can't earn Ornery Joe's assent, we haven't set the problem up correctly.

A whole other thread!

Have you thought about cooperation in nature, apart from between humans? Bees and flowers, the symbiotic relationship that produces lichens, ant colonies, and so on; it seems there is in every aspect of relations between an organism and its environment elements of cooperation and of exploitation.

A tiger creeps through the long grass towards its prey, and the vertical stripes and slow sinuous movement convey its absence - 'just the grass rustling in the breeze'. Or the reverse deceit of the prey, as a stick insect stands immobile at just the right angle and in the right place to appear to be a dry twig. Examples of an evolved form that cooperates with the general environment to deceive, on the one side its prey, and on the other, its predator.

Or the icon of immorality - the cuckoo; .... — unenlightened

Unenlightened, I have thought about cooperation in nature.

The examples of bees/flowers, lichens (fungus and algae/cyanobacteria living together, each providing something the other needs) are good examples of mutually beneficial cross-species cooperation.

The detailed behaviors encoded in their biology maintain the benefits of cooperation (as well as for the single species examples, bees and ants) are selected for consistent with the simplest of the same cooperation problem solving strategies that humans use to gain the benefits of cooperation – though it is unlikely the lichen are aware of game theory.

Stable ecosystems could be viewed as a cooperative venture (including the tiger /prey and perhaps even “the icon of immorality,” the cuckoo). Still, I don’t see this as the most useful perspective. Stable ecosystems are better understood as stable competition with some examples of cooperation for mutual benefit.

I distinguish between cooperation in nature and morality in people based on if violations of the relevant norm are commonly thought to deserve punishment. Morality, as I understand it, is thus largely, but not entirely, a human phenomenon.

I wasn't wanting to bring rationality into it at this point. The comparison I'm inviting between "actual" and "descriptive" would be this: An actual question of right and wrong would not reduce to its description. And I admit that "actual" is probably tendentious; perhaps I should have said "traditional."
....

I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe . . . However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.
— Mark S

Again, I agree about the rationality question, and I wouldn't confront Joe on those terms. True, if we're going to say anything to him, we'd probably propose some reasons or arguments why he should prefer the inherently moral in our universe. But that can be done without claiming he's irrational to disagree. My question is, Are there any such arguments, given your thesis? It sounds like you agree that there are not.
...

When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation."
— J

If I understand your OP question, this is a good result, or at least good enough. For my part, I think it leaves a lot of unanswered questions about what ethical choice is, largely because I'm a semi-demi-Kantian about ethics and I don't think we can leave anyone out -- it has to be universalizable. So if we can't earn Ornery Joe's assent, we haven't set the problem up correctly.

... — J

J, the meaning of “Traditional moral talk” is clearer.

To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups” than traditional moral talk based on unverified (to date) speculations about moral premises.

I understand that there are arguments for and against the idea that acting immorally (based on one or another moral premise) is irrational. I expect posters here will have a range of opinions. But I am comfortable with the idea that acting morally sometimes, depending on one’s goals, requires acting irrationally.

Morality as Cooperation is universal to all cultures and, due to its origin in the mathematics of game theory, universal to all intelligent species that form highly cooperative societies. That is more than enough universality for me.

That it sometimes advocates irrational behavior (depending on one’s ultimate goals) is not a fatal flaw. As a part of science, it is what it is. Our preferences are irrelevant to its existence.

Stable ecosystems are better understood as stable competition with some examples of cooperation for mutual benefit. — Mark S

Have to disagree with this. Take a living human body as a typical fairly stable dynamic environment. Around half the cells in the body are non-human see here (The figures have recently been revised in favour of the human cells a bit, I think, but the ball park is little changed). And for most of us, most of the time, cooperation dominates, to the extent that without the right gut biome, for instance, one would be unable to digest food. When 'competition' sets in, one is ill, and sometimes one loses the competition and dies.

At the level of genes, game theory applies, and it does not require that participants understand the theory, merely that they have 'interests' (which in this case we impose on them because we are only interested in the ones that survive.) Genes themselves of course have no interest either way, they have an effect on the organism, and either survive to reproduce or not. We call those that survive 'winners' and call their effects 'self-interested'. And we call that equivalent behaviour in ourselves, 'rational'.

So let me put a little challenge to you, because what you say above about the predominance of competition is the received wisdom that founds also the terminology of game theory, and a deal of politics too: if self interest is rational, then reason it out for me. Because in fact game theory is symmetrical, and evolution works just as well if we call the survivors the losers; the aim of life is to go extinct and 99.9% have managed to find their rest sooner or later, and we are the unlucky ones who have to carry on a bit longer.

Very interesting discussion, thanks.

Have to disagree with this. Take a living human body as a typical fairly stable dynamic environment. Around half the cells in the body are non-human see here
....

Genes themselves of course have no interest either way, they have an effect on the organism, and either survive to reproduce or not. We call those that survive 'winners' and call their effects 'self-interested'. And we call that equivalent behaviour in ourselves, 'rational'.

So let me put a little challenge to you, because what you say above about the predominance of competition is the received wisdom that founds also the terminology of game theory, and a deal of politics too: if self interest is rational, then reason it out for me. Because in fact game theory is symmetrical, and evolution works just as well if we call the survivors the losers; the aim of life is to go extinct and 99.9% have managed to find their rest sooner or later, and we are the unlucky ones who have to carry on a bit longer. — unenlightened

A human body is an organism, it would not be useful nomenclature to call it an ecosystem. Our gut and skin bacteria form ecosystems where competition reigns (with some necessary cooperative behavior with us, the host organism), but they are not part of the organism defined by a fertilized egg.

I was talking about ecosystems such as those composed of many organisms of many different kinds.

“Rationality refers to choosing the best means, using logic and evidence, to achieve one’s goals, whatever those goals may be.”

Our goals are not necessarily the same as our self-interest, so acting in our self interest is not always rational.

For example, sacrificing our lives is usually not thought of as being in one’s self interest. But we could have a goal of defending others at all costs. In that case, it would be rational to sacrifice our life.

99….% of species have gone extinct because of a variety of environmental and competition reasons. I don’t see the relevance of that.

I think you're going off-topic for this thread.

Very interesting discussion, thanks. — J

Yes, I enjoyed it also.

I think you're going off-topic for this thread. — Mark S

Then I wish you well and will not disturb you further.

To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups” — Mark S

Or, what about a cooperation that does away with the notion of out-groups entirely?

I've long had the idea of morality as cooperation strategy without knowing it has had any scientific validation. To me, the core of morally as cooperation has remained more or less fixed over time and space, what changes is who is in the in-group, and who remains in the outgroup. Our halting and uncertain moral progress over the centuries, if we really have had it, has consisted in an expansion of the in-group concept. When we regress, the in-group contacts, with typically tragic consequences.

hypericin
1.7k
To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups”
— Mark S

Or, what about a cooperation that does away with the notion of out-groups entirely?

I've long had the idea of morality as cooperation strategy without knowing it has had any scientific validation.
.... — hypericin

Hi hypericin,

A lot of science has been done in the last 50 years on morality as cooperation.

Just this week, I came across a 2022 Master's Philosophy thesis that provides an excellent summary of the science of morality, specifically, morality as a form of cooperation. It is Escaping the Darwinian Dilemma with Cooperation-based Moral Realism by Frederico Carvalho.
https://www.proquest.com/openview/2ae1390e8bf5d68f04d4c0819ca8d9d0/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y

And though he holds a utilitarian, rather than a morality as cooperation, perspective, the philosopher Peter Singer's book "Expanding the Circle" describes the history of moral progress as expanding the circle of who is considered worthy of moral regard.

Well, how about that.

I see that Peter Singer is maybe even the founding figure in the animal rights movement. Someone actually translating philosophy into social change is rare indeed, impressive. Sadly, animals remain firmly in the out group of the overwhelmingly predominant animal species. At best pets gets in group treatment.

Perhaps the logical endpoint of moral progression is when not only all humans, not only all sentient animals, but future generations of humans and animals, are all accorded in group status. I'm afraid we are not going to make it there.

I cannot see how this would be 'moral' in any sense other than taking 'moral' to mean 'other-regarding' and simply widening it out without any actual analysis.

'Progress' is such a stupid term for moral workings. There's no such linear description of morality available to us without first ascertaining and objective, goal-oriented basis for morality. We could then try to figure out which goals are to be aimed at in an objective sense.

The above seems a subjective, hypericin-centered goal. That's fine, and that's how morality works on my view but I don't think this gets us anywhere near a reason to strive toward that goal, or any other tbf.

It would be pragmatically untenable to include several types of out groups (predators) within the centered group. I also think tihs runs against the nature of competitive speciation.

I see that Peter Singer is maybe even the founding figure in the animal rights movement. — hypericin

He certainly is, and a hero to all of us working in that area.

Interestingly, his case for animal rights goes through even if you disagree with the utilitarian framework, as I do. The other one to read as a founding figure is Tom Regan, "The Case for Animal Rights." Regan is also a philosopher, originally specializing in G. E. Moore's ethics, which I prefer. And the illustrious Martha Nussbaum has now joined the chorus.

Stepping in only having read your OP, I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. Thoreau of course points out that sometimes doing what is “moral” requires us to not cooperate with society.

I previously introduced a discussion about norms (as rules) and facts in this OP.

I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. — Antony Nickles

Anthony, their nature and if “moral facts” exist is a big deal in moral philosophy.

My goal here is to explore “Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”

I argue there is.

Is that function required to be solving cooperation problems?

All species that are cooperative enough to build civilizations must solve the same cooperation problems that are innate to our physical reality. So yes, something like morality as cooperation (as humans implement it) is required for all civilizations from the beginning of time to the end of time.

I am not arguing that we do not cooperate (even, fundamentally), nor even that this is a “fact” (biologically/socially universal; say, formative of our humanity, or however else this wants to be framed). I am also not arguing for or against it being “good”, because, as you’ve pointed out, it is just something we do (a means), even inevitably, necessarily. But the import being claimed for that fact (implicitly perhaps) presumes a particular framework of morality that I would suggest we have not yet adequately considered. Deontology does have its place; we do have norms and rules and we do act on them or justify our actions based on them, judge others by them. But we have traditionally warped “morality” taking it simply (only) as justified norms of action, because we want to rely on the solidity of their ground (the more factual or logical the better) rather than examine our own part.

A few things to consider: we don’t normally take all action as moral, so what categorizes a moral act? The modern answer (Nietszche, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell) is that it is when our norms and practices actually come to an end; when we are at a loss as to what to do at all and there is no guidance or authority for what is right. Thus there is no single process or level of justification because it happens at a particular case, with a specific context, and facts that are uniquely relevant.

You point to Rawls above; which brings up another facet of morality that people want to nail down (apart from having factual or rule-like norms), which is figuring it out ahead of time. Rawls would have justice be decided in a just process, only: beforehand. Now whether that is best or if science and biology is a better method is not my point. In a truly moral moment, we stake our future not in deciding it (agreeing on it, being agreed in it by biology), not thus turning on relative values or self-interest, but on our future responsibility for our current actions. Emerson will put this as “Character is higher than intellect.” We take a stand which we answer for, which characterizes who we will be.

I said I agreed that cooperation is part of morality, because it is a defining moment, and we can move forward together (in our further judgments and practices), or not (as has been said, sometimes the moral thing is to actually break with society). Our cooperation is our commitment to be intelligible to each other (even in disagreeing), without a pre-determined standard for reason, even without any guarantee of (or fact that “requires”) our success.

I cannot see how this would be 'moral' in any sense other than taking 'moral' to mean 'other-regarding' and simply widening it out without any actual analysis. — AmadeusD

It is not merely other-regarding. There are multiple ideas here:
* The purpose of our moral intuitions is to facilitate cooperation.
* The moral intuitions consist in concepts around fairness and justice.
* These concepts are largely consistent across time and cultures.
* Differences in moral regimes primarily consist in differences as to whom these concepts are applied, and to whom they are not. Who is the in-group, who is out?
* What is commonly regarded as "moral progress" consists in a widening of the in-group circle

The above seems a subjective, hypericin-centered goal. That's fine, and that's how morality works on my view but I don't think this gets us anywhere near a reason to strive toward that goal, or any other tbf. — AmadeusD

Personally I'm interested in describing what morality is, how it works. Not in providing purported reasons for some individual to be moral. Yet, I am inclined to strive to treat every moral agent with fairness and justice. As an animal endowed with moral instincts, I am predisposed to do so. As a reasoning animal, I conclude that many of the delimitations defining in-groups are culturally bound, and largely arbitrary.

'Progress' is such a stupid term for moral workings. — AmadeusD

Tell that to a woman or to a descendent of a slave.

If moral norms refers to prescriptions and cooperation refers to factual patterns of behavior (where individuals' payoffs are de facto greater when they coordinate their action then when they do not), then one would be committing a logic mistake by conflating them.
On the other side adopting moral prescriptions is in the domain of facts. If such adoption promotes cooperation this should be matter of empirical investigation.
And there is a sense in which I find this plausible: by following through words and actions moral prescriptions on one’s own initiative, one can signal to others their willingness to preserve this behavior at least if/until others do the same. And once this behavior is shared and habitual it grounds further forms of cooperation like collective production and exchange of goods and services.
There are three problems however:
1 - it is conceptually possible for an individual to act and speak in line with moral principles while being totally indifferent to how the others respond (a sort of ascetic example of morality).
2 - cultural norms, like moral principles, are acquired through education since we were kids. The source of such education is a mix of oral indoctrination, exemplar behavior, positive incentives and negative incentives. Our default moral code is never adopted as a conscious choice. So it’s education that promotes cooperation in individuals whatever cultural norms there are (see if someone is educated to become a mafia member)
3 - moral norms are taken to be universal in the sense that they must apply to all human beings anywhere and anytime. Take for example the moral prescription “do not kill others”, does that mean that we should exclude euthanasia as moral? What about killing for self-defense? Or death penalty for a mass-murderer? Or killing enemies invading one’s own country? Notice also that prescriptions like “do not kill” can be also applied to a stricter scope e.g. “do not kill member of your community”. So if moral prescritions are taken to be universal, then they can promote cooperation in the sense of making it wider than prescriptions that would hold for in-group members but wouldn’t be as categorical for out-group members. Yet I’m not sure if “universality” can fully accommodate our intuitions about morality since we find more morally outrageous to kill one’s own children than killing a random old dude in coma in a terminal state of a deadly disease or a serial mass-murder. But if universality is not part of our understanding of moral prescriptions then morality can’t be be said to promote cooperation (between in-group members) more than competition (between in-group and out-group members)

It is not merely other-regarding. — hypericin

It is. All the follow-on speaks to this. It's just other-regarding. No reason to call it moral (further, but less interestingly, I reject some of those claims anyway).

What is commonly regarded as "moral progress" consists in a widening of the in-group circle — hypericin

It is also commonly not regarded as progress. This is just a perspectival restriction. No reason to think that group is 'right' any more than the one who wants to restrict the circle of care.

As a reasoning animal, I conclude that many of the delimitations defining in-groups are culturally bound, and largely arbitrary — hypericin

I conclude the exact opposite. C'est la vie??

Tell that to a woman or to a descendent of a slave. — hypericin

Setting aside the clear and precisely manipulative intent of such a statement, I routinely mention this to women who tend to agree with me. Descendants of slaves have nothing to say. There is more slavery now. Not owning other people is progress in some ways, and a clawing-back from con-gress in some ways. It is not 'progress' unfettered. This, also, evidence by the extant slavery giving us sound reason to reject universality of "no slaves = morally good".

As to women, you're just not playing the game. Women largely agree: males aren't women and shouldn't be regarded so and afforded the rights of women. C'est la vie??