MU, this is going to be my last word on the topic. You're confusing distinct Aristotelian categories by treating formal and final cause as though they must be opposed. In Aristotle’s account—especially as taken up by Aquinas—the form of a thing is its principle of organization and development, and it is inherently purposive. That’s why formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in living beings: a plant’s form includes its telos to grow, reproduce, and flourish. — Wayfarer

It appears like you are not well familiar with Aristotle's "Physics" within which he draws the distinction between formal cause and final cause. Nor, it seems are you familiar with the two distinct senses of "form", and "actual", which he explains in the "Metaphysics". "Actual" may refer to what is, in the sense of being, having existence, and in this sense it is consistent with formal cause. But "actual" may also refer to what is active, changing, becoming, and in this sense it is consistent with final cause.

With logic, Aristotle demonstrates that what is actual, i.e. being, or form in the sense of formal cause, is incompatible with what is actual, i.e. becoming, or form in the sense of final cause. Therefore final cause and formal cause are necessarily separate domains in living beings. The two are incompatible. Also, Aquinas maintains this distinction. And this is why the form of a material body, as 'what is actual', is distinct from the form which is known as the immaterial soul, as 'what is active'. Therefore dualism is propagated through the Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysical tradition. Notice that O'Callaghan upholds this dualism with his distinction between external and internal teleology.

You however, are denying the dualism which is clearly a fundamental aspect of this metaphysical tradition, by affirming that formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in the study of living beings. But obviously, what a being is, in the sense of its material form, is a very distinct study from the study of the purpose of a being's activities. By classing them both into the criteria of 'formal cause', it appears to me like you are persisting in your conversion to physicalism.

As for O’Callaghan, his description of internal teleology clearly includes non-conscious natural purposiveness—such as organs functioning for the sake of the organism—not just the deliberate intention of agents. That’s why Aquinas can say even non-rational beings “act for an end.” He’s not talking about conscious volition, but about nature acting according to its form, which is exactly what top-down causation refers to in this context. — Wayfarer

The key point is that purposeful action requires agency. Agency is the internal teleology. So if we describe the activities of organs as purposeful, then we need to assign an agent. Traditionally, from Aristotelian biology, the agent is the soul, and this supports vitalism. In Aristotelian principles, the soul is necessary as the source of activity, which actualizes the potentials of the living being, as the powers of the soul. Since the powers of the soul are not always active, they are therefore classed as potentials, requiring actualization, which is a selective process carried out by the agent, the soul. Purposeful action is defined by the selective process which is essential to it.

So no, what I’m describing is not determinist, nor external imposition, nor a confusion of causes. It’s classical metaphysics. — Wayfarer

What you are describing is a confusion of causes. You are conflating formal cause with final cause, and not recognizing the very significant difference between the two which is essential to classical metaphysics, and conducive to dualism. "Formal cause" refers to the constraints of what is. "Final cause" refers to the purposeful actions of an agent, which to be purposeful must be selective. Surely you recognize that these are distinct domains. However you seem intent on conflating the two. Under this conflation you represent final cause as a feature or type of formal cause, in the way that metaphysics of modern physicalism does.

So, your model seems to me a bit like the 'world soul' present in some hellenistic philosophies, i.e. the universe as a whole as a sort of living being. So it seems to me that you are proposing a dualistic model or a dual-aspect monism, where mind and the 'physical' are two aspects of the whole. — boundless

Yes. Enformationism*1 is similar in some ways to ancient World Soul and Panpsychism worldviews. But it's based on modern science, specifically Quantum Physics and Information Science. The notion of a BothAnd Principle*2 illustrates how a Holistic worldview can encompass both Mind & Body under the singular heading of Potential or Causation or what I call EnFormAction. Here's a review of a Philosophy Now article in my blog. :smile:


*1. Dual Aspect Monism :
Another article in the Philosophy Now magazine attempts to find “a balance between two extreme views of consciousness. . . . Physicalism and panpsychism sit either end of a metaphysical seesaw, and when one is in the ascendancy it is only by bringing the other unduly low.” The author, Dr. Sam Coleman, proposes a different kind of stuff (essence) that is “neither mental nor physical in itself, but which possesses properties capable of generating both the mental and the physical.” The “one fundamental stuff” he's referring to is Consciousness, but for technical purposes I think that the scientific term “Information” fits the description better. As Claude Shannon discovered in mid-20th century, Information is not just ideas in human minds, it is also the substance of physical objects; it's both physical and mental. Coleman also offers a novel term to replace Panpsychism : Panqualityism. He admits that name is a merely a placeholder for unspecified “neutral properties” (potentials) that are able to emerge into reality as either physical or metaphysical, depending on the context. Yet again, Information already has this monist/dualist BothAnd property, which could explain how metaphysical minds emerge from the functioning of material brains. It might also suggest how a physical universe could emerge from a mathematical Singularity consisting of nothing but the information for constructing a universe from scratch : a program for creation.
https://www.bothandblog.enformationism.info/page14.html

*2. Both/And Principle :
My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system. . . . .
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

*3. EnFormAction :
Ententional Causation. A proposed metaphysical law of the universe that causes random interactions between forces and particles to produce novel & stable arrangements of matter & energy. It’s the creative force (aka : Schopenhauer's Will) of the axiomatic eternal First Cause that, for unknown reasons, programmed a Singularity to suddenly burst into our reality from an infinite source of possibility. AKA : The creative power of Evolution; the power to enform; Logos; Change.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page8.html

Much of the debate about purpose revolves around an ancient idea, telos. The ancient Greek term telos simply means end, goal, or purpose. — Wayfarer

I just came across a quote in physicist James Glattfelder's 2025 book on The Emergence of Information, Consciousness, and Meaning. After discussing Energy & Entropy, along with Dissipative Structures, he concludes : "However, one of organic life's most stunning features still remains obscure, namely agency, intentionality, volition, and purpose. Phillip Ball reports on a workshop held in 2016 at the Santa Fe Institute investigating the uniqueness of terrestrial biology" :

"It's hardly surprising that there was no consensus. But one message that emerged very clearly was that, if there's a kind of physics behind biological teleology and agency, it has something to do with the same concept that seems to have been installed at the heart of fundamental physics itself : Information." :smile:

Yes, it seems that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the whole universe, but our experiments tell us that when the approximation is reasonable, the results are coherent with conservation laws. — boundless

I do not think that your claim is reasonable. No experiment has provided 100% conservation, so it is actually unreasonable to say that results are consistent with conservation laws. For some reason, you think that stating that the law is an "approximation" makes the law reasonable. What if I told you that 9 is approximately 10, and so I proposed a law that stated 9 is always 10? Would it be reasonable to claim that this approximation justifies the truth of my law? I don't think so. Why would you think that approximation in the case of the law of conservation of energy justifies a claim that the law is true?

Also, when we know the deviations that we expect from a non-isolated system (i.e. when we know 'how much' the system is not isolated), we find a coherent result.
This certainly points to the fact that, at least, conservation laws do point to something true about the physical universe, even if the conditions where they hold without errors are never actualized. Or maybe they are valid when you take the entire physical universe all together. — boundless

What this indicates is that we always expect deviation from the law/. So we find that consistency in the deviation is coherent. Isn't that just evidence that we all actually know that the law is false? Why would people want to deceive themselves, by trying to believe that the law is true, when they always, in fact, expect deviation? How is that in any way reasonable?

Yes, the use of conservation laws does "point to something true about the physical universe". The evidence indicates overwhelmingly, that conservation laws are false. That is the single most important truth that we can abstract from the ongoing use of conservation laws.

Nope, you can measure the increase of temperature (and hence, internal energy) due to friction. But you can't recover it to use it again as work. — boundless

You misunderstand. The very act of measuring the temperature is in fact an instance of using that energy as work.

However, one of organic life's most stunning features still remains obscure, namely agency, intentionality, volition, and purpose. Phillip Ball reports on a workshop held in 2016 at the Santa Fe Institute investigating the uniqueness of terrestrial biology — Gnomon

Of course. But then, I recall you discussing Deacon's Incomplete Nature. He also is very interested in teleonomic (as distinct from teleological) phenomena in biology, as well as ententional structures (a word he coined) in both organic and inorganic. (Incidentally I just now received my copy - second hand, looking like it's been on a shelf for a good while, but in fair condition. It's an important book in my view, not that I will agree with him on every philosophical point.)

I think the basic issue is that purpose, generally, is a much more ambiguous term than the metrics of classical physics (mass, velocity etc) which can be measured and defined very accurately. To introduce consideration of what things are for, or why they exist, is to immediately raise all these questions about purpose, aboutness, intentionality, and so on.

What Deacon and others are trying to do, is accomodate purposefulness in an extended naturalist framework - to see how purpose can be understood without appealing to divine creation, but also without reducing living things to machines or bits of matter.

I do not think that your claim is reasonable. No experiment has provided 100% conservation, so it is actually unreasonable to say that results are consistent with conservation laws. For some reason, you think that stating that the law is an "approximation" makes the law reasonable. What if I told you that 9 is approximately 10, and so I proposed a law that stated 9 is always 10? Would it be reasonable to claim that this approximation justifies the truth of my law? I don't think so. Why would you think that approximation in the case of the law of conservation of energy justifies a claim that the law is true? — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean. But suppose that a theory tells you that if the conditions are perfect you get 10 and if they aren't you get 9. You never get perfect conditions and you always get 9. This doesn't refute the theory, far from it!

So, if there is no 'isolated system' and you observe that energy isn't perfectly conserved it is hardly an objection of the law of conservation of energy if it gives consistent predictions also in the cases where it is expected that energy isn't conserved.

Yes, the use of conservation laws does "point to something true about the physical universe". The evidence indicates overwhelmingly, that conservation laws are false. That is the single most important truth that we can abstract from the ongoing use of conservation laws. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. What your objection actually point to is that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the universe as a whole. Which is BTW interesting, but it doesn't refute the laws of conservation.

Your objection however does raise the problem of how to interpet the fact that idealizations seem never to find a 'realization' in nature. That's a perfectly fine area of inquiry but is different from what we were debating.

The very act of measuring the temperature is in fact an instance of using that energy as work. — Metaphysician Undercover

Honestly, I am not sure of what you are saying here. When you measure temperature (or internal energy) you don't tranform it to work.

Yes. Enformationism*1 is similar in some ways to ancient World Soul and Panpsychism worldviews. But it's based on modern science, specifically Quantum Physics and Information Science. The notion of a BothAnd Principle*2 illustrates how a Holistic worldview can encompass both Mind & Body under the singular heading of Potential or Causation or what I call EnFormAction. Here's a review of a Philosophy Now article in my blog. :smile: — Gnomon

Interesting, thanks!

Why, thanks! Will read carefully. — Wayfarer

I finally got around to reading this. It was well-written and I enjoyed it. might like it insofar as it sheds light on the bottom-up nature of his "model-building," and might like it insofar as it is closely related to "reverse mereological essentialism."

Good essay and very carefully composed. Overall, I find it congenial, although I’m not as disposed to consider the theological elements. — Wayfarer

:up:

What I have argued here does not prove that evolutionary history is teleological and has a purpose, much less a divinely intended purpose. But what it does prove is that the random variation of traits that result in survival advantages does not rule out evolution having a teleological end or purpose. Evolutionary science is and should be neutral with respect to the question of whether the process of evolution has a teleology. If an evolutionary biologist claims that evolution has no purpose because of the role of random variation within it, that is not a scientific statement of evolutionary biology.

Yes, and I would go a bit further and say that Darwinian evolution is teleological, in much the same way that craps is teleological. It's surprising that O'Callaghan did not make this connection in his essay.

---

Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's an interesting excerpt. :up:

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although O'Callaghan does not state it explicitly, I believe he holds that internal teleology is top-down. It is the internal natura of a living substance in which all of its parts participate.

According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where do you find that in the passage?

-

And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer

Yes, I tend to agree. Here is a quote that captures the thrust of the bottom-up vs. top-down distinction:

I said at the beginning that the two modes of explanation I was going to discuss were not themselves scientific theories but opposed metaphysical positions as to what the fundamental reality is to be investigated in a science like biology—the whole and its parts or the parts and their whole. — Teleology: What Is It Good For?, by John O'Callaghan

Top-down sees the whole as primary the parts as secondary, whereas bottom-up sees the parts as primary and the whole as secondary.

---

The people who deny this teleological purpose are in a way blind to it. They see things only in the external. This results in a failure to understand what an organism is. In a sense they look at individual organisms, or species and see them as one of those body parts that Frankenstein was working with. But this denies the essence of life which courses through those organisms. They should remind themselves that all life of this planet is one family, literally brothers and sisters of one common parent* and that they are a result of one continuous lineage of life. One life begetting another all the way through our evolution. — Punshhh

Yes, good point. :up:

What Deacon and others are trying to do, is accomodate purposefulness in an extended naturalist framework - to see how purpose can be understood without appealing to divine creation, but also without reducing living things to machines or bits of matter. — Wayfarer

Like Deacon, I try to stay close to the scientific evidence in order to avoid picturing the Cosmic Cause as a Biblical Creator, magically producing a world of mini-mes*1 (little gods) to serve his ego. Teleology seems to imply a human-like creator, for which the evidence is ambiguous. So, I typically refer to the First Cause as something like the Programmer of a computer program. In which case Teleonomy*2 might better apply. And the ultimate purpose may be more exploratory/experiential than definitive.

I do see evidence that the Universe began in an inexplicable state of high Energy & low Entropy, and is gradually complexifying and organizing into living & thinking things. Also, Time's Arrow seems to be pointing to some unknowable future state. However, modern science has found a fundamental element of unpredictability (uncertainty, nondeterminism) underlying that obvious progress. So, the evolutionary "machine" seems to have some degree of freedom to explore options as it progresses in a general direction. In any case, we are just guessing about the motives (if any) of the Prime Mover (if any). :smile:

PS___ My reason for quoting Philip Ball was to indicate his use of "Information" rather than "Consciousness" as a causal force. Not to promote Teleology or Teleonomy.



*1. What is Mini-Me a parody of?
Mike Myers has acknowledged that the character was directly inspired by the character of Majai in the 1996 film The Island of Dr. Moreau, who is similarly a miniature version of Marlon Brando's titular villain character. ___ Wikipedia

*2. Teleology and teleonomy are related concepts, but they differ in how they explain goal-directed behavior. Teleology refers to explanations based on an inherent purpose or end goal, often implying a conscious or supernatural design. Teleonomy, on the other hand, describes goal-directed behavior resulting from a pre-programmed mechanism, like genetic coding, without implying a conscious or preordained purpose, according to a philosophy forum and Wikipedia. . . . .
Teleology suggests a purpose for a system, while teleonomy describes a purpose within a system.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=teleonomy+vs+teleology

They should remind themselves that all life of this planet is one family, literally brothers and sisters of one common parent* and that they are a result of one continuous lineage of life. One life begetting another all the way through our evolution.
— Punshhh

Yes, good point.

I would go further, in a very real sense we are one being. One instantiation of life and all that that involves.

My reason for quoting Philip Ball… — Gnomon

The reference is to a book How Life Works: A User’ Guide to the New Biology. Yet another book I must look at :roll:

I see what you mean. But suppose that a theory tells you that if the conditions are perfect you get 10 and if they aren't you get 9. You never get perfect conditions and you always get 9. This doesn't refute the theory, far from it! — boundless

It would just mean that the theory is completely useless. If a necessary condition of the theory is perfect conditions, and it is demonstrated that perfect conditions are impossible, then the theory can be dismissed as useless, because that premise can never be fulfilled.

So, if there is no 'isolated system' and you observe that energy isn't perfectly conserved it is hardly an objection of the law of conservation of energy if it gives consistent predictions also in the cases where it is expected that energy isn't conserved. — boundless

It's not the law of conservation which produces consistent predictions, as is obvious from the fact that it is inaccurate. Predictions can be produced from statistics, and the statistics might concern deviations form the conservation law. Then the conservation law would not state anything true about the world, it would just be a useful tool for gathering statistics.

I disagree. What your objection actually point to is that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the universe as a whole. Which is BTW interesting, but it doesn't refute the laws of conservation.

Your objection however does raise the problem of how to interpet the fact that idealizations seem never to find a 'realization' in nature. That's a perfectly fine area of inquiry but is different from what we were debating. — boundless

Well, I disagree with what you've presented here. If the law of conservation is an idealization, and idealizations are never realized in nature, then we can conclude deductively that it is impossible that the law of conservation is true. It is necessarily false.

Isn't that exactly what we are debating, whether the conservation law is true or false? You've already decided that it is merely approximate, why not take the next step, and accept that it is false?

Honestly, I am not sure of what you are saying here. When you measure temperature (or internal energy) you don't tranform it to work. — boundless

That's exactly what measuring the temperature is, work being done. The energy acts on the thermometer, and this is an instance of work being done. Therefore taking the temperature is an instance of work being done.

This is why I argue that the idea of energy which is not available to do work, is an incoherent idea. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. So if we take something like the universe, and assume that it is a closed system, and claim that there is energy within this system which has no capacity to do work, then we must conclude that this energy could not be detected in any way. If it were detected, that would be a case of it doing work, which is contrary to the stipulation. Then what sense does this conception make, energy which cannot be detected as energy?

Although O'Callaghan does not state it explicitly, I believe he holds that internal teleology is top-down. It is the internal natura of a living substance in which all of its parts participate. — Leontiskos

Perhaps, but he doesn't state it, and maybe that's because he recognizes, like me, that the idea of internal teleology being top-down is incoherent. He distinguishes top-down causation from bottom-up, and he also distinguishes external teleology from internal. Then he leaves it to the reader to conclude whether internal teleology could be top-down.

Do you think you could explain how internal teleology could be top-down? What is the so-called internal nature of living substance which could act in a top-down way to keep the parts united? Top-down implies a force acting from the outside inward, yet the term is "internal nature". How could one's internal natur be produced from a top-down force?

If we propose a distinction of separate parts within an individual being, then the teleology must be pervasive to, i.e. internal to all parts. How could this telos get internal to the most basic, fundamental parts, genes, DNA, etc., through a top-down process? And if we take mind and intention as our example, then we see that each individual human being must willfully take part in human cooperation. And clearly this willful, intentional participation is bottom-up causation.

Furthermore, we have the problem which I explained to wayfarer. The whole has no existence, until after the parts unite in cooperation. Therefore the whole cannot be the cause of such cooperation. The cooperation is prior to the whole's existence. It is very telling the way O'Callaghan describes how internal teleology is a case of something coming from nothing. Since a material object always consists of parts, as having a form, the form itself, as intent, or 'internal' teleology, must actually create the parts. Surely this is bottom-up causation, as the whole itself has no existence yet, and all there is is intent. And the intent is internal, therefore it must be within, and this is bottom-up.

Where do you find that in the passage? — Leontiskos

The passage is difficult, so read it carefully. Pay particular attention to the conclusion "And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all." What the creator gives to the being is "its nature", but this nature which is given, is the nature of a being without a nature.

Here:

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

Top-down sees the whole as primary the parts as secondary, whereas bottom-up sees the parts as primary and the whole as secondary. — Leontiskos

The clear, logical problem with "the whole as primary", is as I describe, the whole has no existence until the parts are united in its creation. Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos".

In the case of living beings we are dealing with internal telos, individual beings who act intentionally. Experience and knowledge indicate to us that intentional acts are based in a capacity to choose. This is what characterizes "purpose" that possibilities are selected. And we also know that the unity produced from the intentional acts of individual beings, is a result of that freedom of choice. When the parts freely choose, by the means of internal telos, to cooperate, unite, and produce a larger whole, this can only be described as bottom-up causation.

The clear, logical problem with "the whole as primary", is as I describe, the whole has no existence until the parts are united in its creation. Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos". — Metaphysician Undercover

On the contrary, the whole is what gives unity and function to the parts. In living systems, it is the organism that organizes the parts, not the other way around. Outside the context of the whole, those “parts” aren’t really parts at all — they’re just bits of organic matter. (Gametes and zygotes are special cases, already caught up in larger reproductive processes.)

Reductionism typically assumes bottom-up causation: that component parts determine the behavior of the system. But top-down causation recognizes that the formative influence of the whole — the organism, the ecosystem, the developmental system — constrains and governs the activity of its components.

Take the acorn: yes, its DNA encodes the blueprint for the oak tree. But that blueprint is itself a product of evolutionary history — not just a list of parts, but a living record of how the whole organism has been shaped to grow, reproduce, and interact with its environment.

This has been pointed out to you again and again, but you keep reciting the same basic error to anyone who challenges you. There’s something fundamentally amiss in your grasp of this issue, so I would be obliged if you could maybe start your own thread on it, rather than persisting to make these plainly erroneous comments in this one.

Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos". — Metaphysician Undercover

Genes are generally understood to provide the information that governs the growth, development and functions of organisms. So, it seems you are right that it is not "the whole of the organism" (whatever we might take that to be) that governs its own growth and development. Should genes be considered "external" though?

It would just mean that the theory is completely useless. If a necessary condition of the theory is perfect conditions, and it is demonstrated that perfect conditions are impossible, then the theory can be dismissed as useless, because that premise can never be fulfilled. — Metaphysician Undercover

I feel that we are going to have to agree to disagree here. Perhaps there are no isolated systems but the law of conservation of energy had been incredibly useful and, in fact, you can deduce the deviations and confirm them experimentally.

It's not the law of conservation which produces consistent predictions, as is obvious from the fact that it is inaccurate. Predictions can be produced from statistics, and the statistics might concern deviations form the conservation law. Then the conservation law would not state anything true about the world, it would just be a useful tool for gathering statistics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Galileo discovered that, without the friction of air, falling object would move under the influence of gravity with an uniform rettilinean accelerated motion. Still, here on Earth we can't be without air (except in some void chambers) and, therefore, the conditions of free-fall are not met. Does this mean that Galileo was simply wrong?

Approximation is key in physics. Same goes for idealizations. The same goes for the awareness of the limitations due to them.

Isn't that exactly what we are debating, whether the conservation law is true or false? You've already decided that it is merely approximate, why not take the next step, and accept that it is false? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because I believe that even if there are no isolated systems, the usefulness of the laws prove to me that they do tell something true about the 'order of nature'. To use out of context St. Paul's phrase "we see through a glass darkly", but we aren't blind.

That's exactly what measuring the temperature is, work being done. The energy acts on the thermometer, and this is an instance of work being done. Therefore taking the temperature is an instance of work being done. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if the thermometer responds due to the work that the particles of the constituent do on it, you can't convert all the heat transferred via e.g. friction in a thermometer and then use that stored energy to do work again. The second principle of thermodynamics just says that: it is impossible to have total control of energy.

On the contrary, the whole is what gives unity and function to the parts — Wayfarer

That's the physicalist misconception of telos. Notice that in O'Callaghan's external telos, it is not the whole itself which gives unity and function to the parts, it is the telos of an external agent. The physicalist does not like to portray telos as agential, therefore assigns agency to the whole. However, as I explained , it is logically impossible that the whole causes the unity and function of the parts, because the existence of the whole is posterior in time, to that unity.

In living systems, it is the organism that organizes the parts, not the other way around. — Wayfarer

Living systems are instances of internal telos, therefore thee is no external agent acting to give unity and function to the parts, as there is in the case of external telos. And what we understand, through the example of human intention, free will, is that each particular, individual human being is a free willing agent which chooses to be a part of a larger collective, (the army example), and this is the way that the whole gains existence through the agency of the parts.

Living organism, and evolution in general, cannot be understood as having their unity caused by telos which is external to the parts, acting in a top-down way, such that the whole organizes the parts, because the causal activity of the telos must be accounted for. If we try to assign the causal action to the form of the whole, we are stymied by the interaction problem. However, known principles of physics, chemistry, and biology, allow that selection of telos may be involved in the activities of the fundamental parts. But that would be bottom-up causation.

Reductionism typically assumes bottom-up causation: that component parts determine the behavior of the system. But top-down causation recognizes that the formative influence of the whole — the organism, the ecosystem, the developmental system — constrains and governs the activity of its components. — Wayfarer

There is definitely a feedback relation between the teleological activity of the part, and its environment, what physicalists see as the whole, but ultimately final causation must be assigned to the parts. This conclusion is forced logically due to the nature of final causation, as selective. The environment may be portrayed as constraint to the free agent, but teleological agency which is an activity of selection from possibility must be assigned to the parts.

Simply put, governance is not teleological agency. Teleological agency is found within the thing which is governed. Constraints, as a form of governance, cannot provide us with the source of teleological agency. This is found in the free agent which is governed. And, if any type of "self-organization" is proposed, this fact must be respected. What we observe, is that the constraints of the self-organizing system, are actually created by the agency of the parts. There is an appearance of top-down causation, as the constraints seem to restrict the activity of the parts, but the constraint is ultimately self-willed, as will power. That the constraint must be self-willed is evident every time that a part outsteps the boundary of the constraint, which is very common in living organism, as genetic mutations etc..

Take the acorn: yes, its DNA encodes the blueprint for the oak tree. But that blueprint is itself a product of evolutionary history — not just a list of parts, but a living record of how the whole organism has been shaped to grow, reproduce, and interact with its environment. — Wayfarer

If you take O'Callaghan's internal telos as the model, you can understand that the acorn has internal telos. This is a freedom of selection which inheres within the activities which are carried out by it. We look at the DNA as a blueprint, a code of constraints. However, inherent within whatever agency is active in that process, is the selective capacity of telos. This is what allows for variation in what grows from the acorn. The purposeful activity occurs within, and is inherent to the individual active parts. That numerous different parts must have the selective capacity of agential telos is evident from the fact that variation can occur in a number of different ways.

The blueprint of evolutionary history is a self-produced code of constraint. This is analogous with habitual activity. Notice that will power allows the free willing agent to break a habit. Likewise, genetic mutation is a similar breaking of the habit. Notice that the causal agency, the telos which is responsible for breaking the habit, inheres within the part, so this is a form of bottom-up causation, even though we, in our observational analysis, observe it through top down constraint. The true agential telos acts in a bottom-up way.

This has been pointed out to you again and again, but you keep reciting the same basic error to anyone who challenges you. There’s something fundamentally amiss in your grasp of this issue... — Wayfarer

It's very obvious, that I would level the same charge against you. And, since you started this thread, I am offering my assistance to help you get it right. Together we can come up with a better understanding of the reality of the situation.

On the contrary, the whole is what gives unity and function to the parts. — Wayfarer

Right.

zygotes — Wayfarer

A zygote is a good example. Its development will literally generate (more) parts which contribute to the pre-existing whole. What occurs is development of a whole, not assembly of parts.

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Top-down implies a force acting from the outside inward — Metaphysician Undercover

Why think that? You won't find that claim anywhere in O'Callaghan's article.

If we propose a distinction of separate parts within an individual being, then the teleology must be pervasive to, i.e. internal to all parts. How could this telos get internal to the most basic, fundamental parts, genes, DNA, etc., through a top-down process? And if we take mind and intention as our example, then we see that each individual human being must willfully take part in human cooperation. And clearly this willful, intentional participation is bottom-up causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "top-down." Can you give an example of what you believe top-down explanation would be?

The passage is difficult, so read it carefully. Pay particular attention to the conclusion "And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all." What the creator gives to the being is "its nature", but this nature which is given, is the nature of a being without a nature. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather, when God gives a being a nature then that being has a nature. Sort of like when I give you a shoe you have a shoe. The second part of your quote has to do with the idea that there is no pre-existent thing which receives a nature, and that the substance receives both its nature and its existence simultaneously (both logically and temporally). It doesn't mean that the substance has no nature.

I feel that we are going to have to agree to disagree here. Perhaps there are no isolated systems but the law of conservation of energy had been incredibly useful and, in fact, you can deduce the deviations and confirm them experimentally. — boundless

The ability to predict how everything will deviate from the proposition doesn't make the proposition true. That everything deviates from the proposition indicates that it is false. The usefulness of it, I do not deny.

Because I believe that even if there are no isolated systems, the usefulness of the laws prove to me that they do tell something true about the 'order of nature'. — boundless

The truth they say is 'I am false'.

I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "top-down." Can you give an example of what you believe top-down explanation would be? — Leontiskos

There is some ambiguity in usage of the term, but in general, "top-down" refers to a hierarchical system where action or information, derives from the higher level and moves toward the lower. In O'Callaghan's article, he distinctly describes it as an explanation which understands the parts, by their functions in relation to the whole. The whole being the top, the parts being the bottom.

The basic problem with this proposed top-down explanation, is as I explained, logically, it cannot explain causation of the whole. It is logically impossible that the whole organism could cause the parts to perform the functions required for the existence of that organism, because those functions must be carried out in order for that whole to exist. In other words, this would mean that the whole causes its own existence. Clearly, the top-down explanation cannot describe the cause of any living organisms which come into being from seeds or eggs. The organism does not cause its own being.

Furthermore, the top-down explanation is shown by O'Callaghan to only be an acceptable causal explanation , in the case of external telos. But this requires an external force, which acts as the "top". In the case of internal telos, he explains the the being is given a nature which is not a presupposed nature at all, i.e. no nature, therefore there is no proper "whole" at this time, which could act in a top-down way.

Why think that? You won't find that claim anywhere in O'Callaghan's article. — Leontiskos

We do find that, in his description of external telos.

Starting with external teleology, it occurs when something distinct from an object imposes upon an object an intelligible order that is in some sense foreign to it. The object does not have that teleology but nonetheless behaves in a certain way because of the teleology imposed upon it.

This is the only way that "top-down" could be causal. The other way, which relates the parts to the whole by means of their roles, or function, is purely a descriptive explanation, and it requires either an external telos or an internal telos to account for causation. The external telos operates in a top-down way. The internal telos must operate in a bottom-up way because it could not operate in a top-down way for the following reasons.

The internal telos could not act causally in a top-down way, (whole ordering the parts) or else the organism would cause its own existence, which is illogical and inconsistent with evidence. And if God imposed the organism's existence upon it, that would be external telos. But O'Callaghan is clear to distinguish another form of purposeful causation, which is internal telos. There is no top-down option available for internal telos, one being excluded as illogical (self-causation), the other, "external telos", being excluded as insufficient to account for the capacity of intentional acts.

And, the evidence I've described to you is very clear, that internal telos must act in a bottom-up way. It is only through bottom-up causation that life on earth could have begun as a simple organism, and evolved into complex human beings. Otherwise, we are left with random chance, rather than telos as the cause. External telos has been rejected, and it is impossible that the internal telos of the human being could act causally, retroactively, to cause the simple life forms to evolve in that way, to create the complex human being. Therefore we are left with bottom-up causation as the only explanation for internal telos.

Rather, when God gives a being a nature then that being has a nature. Sort of like when I give you a shoe you have a shoe. The second part of your quote has to do with the idea that there is no pre-existent thing which receives a nature, and that the substance receives both its nature and its existence simultaneously (both logically and temporally). It doesn't mean that the substance has no nature. — Leontiskos

I think you need to reread that section. It clearly says that the created being has no presupposed nature at all, the creator "presupposes nothing about them at all". This is basic, and crucial to the distinction between external and internal telos. If, the creator presupposes some specific nature, then that creator creates something according to the prescribed nature, and this would be a case of external telos, putting parts together to make something. However, the creator is described as presupposing "nothing about them". This means that the creator gives to the created, no specific nature at all. All that is given is existence as telos. The telos then creates its own natural being, according to what is required within its environment. And this is the bottom-up process of causation which we know as evolution.

Why is everyone afraid to admit the obvious reality that evolution is a bottom-up causal process? It is impossible that it could be a top-down process unless the hand of God acts at each instance of variance. So, O'Callaghan proposes internal telos, as a means of reconciling the obvious scientific truth of bottom-up causation, with the obvious philosophical truth of purpose within the acts of living organisms. Now we have bottom-up causation through the means of internal telos.

The ability to predict how everything will deviate from the proposition doesn't make the proposition true. That everything deviates from the proposition indicates that it is false. The usefulness of it, I do not deny. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or perhaps... it shows that it is approximately true. As I said, I think we have to just agree to disagree here. For me it is OK to say that some understanding of reality can be 'approximately true'. For you, apparently, either a statement has a perfect correspondence with 'reality' or it is simply false. I do believe, instead, that some statements can be 'partially right'.

The truth they say is 'I am false'. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree.

Genes are generally understood to provide the information that governs the growth, development and functions of organisms. So, it seems you are right that it is not "the whole of the organism" (whatever we might take that to be) that governs its own growth and development. Should genes be considered "external" though? — Janus

The proposal that "the whole of the organism" is causal in an active sense does not make any sense at all. The concept of "the whole" is just a vague inapplicable idea, if the organism is actively changing in the process of growing, (becoming), without reference to a final goal, the end. Unless we assume an outside designer, who holds "the whole" in mind, and who is putting the parts together toward that end, the idea of top-down causation is inapplicable. The case of the outside designer is what O'Callaghan calls external telos.

In the case of living organisms, O'Callaghan says that they have internal telos, they act with purpose. When an organism acts with purpose this is an instance of selective intentional action. Since it is caused from within the agent, and the agent selects or chooses its action, an action which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, the existence of any larger whole produced is created through bottom-up causation. A good example of selective (intentional) action, which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, is sexual intercourse, which may or may not be reproductive. The fact that the selective act only possibly, or potentially, leads to the production of the whole, excludes the possibility that the whole is acting in a top-down causal way.

This I believe, is the key to understanding selective, purposeful acts. The effect is not caused by any determinist necessity, and so the act is selected by a completely different form of "necessity", which cannot be explained as the end causing the means, top-down). That the end causes the occurrence of the means in a top-down way ('the man walks for the sake of heath' in Aristotle's example), is an ancient, outdated, misunderstanding of telos, which is applicable only to consciously reasoned choices where the relation between means and end is understood as a logical necessity. Most selective acts of telos are not reasoned, therefore we have to consider a different form of "necessity" as the cause of those acts.