Its usually called state space or formerly logical space. That by which I mean to say the ontology of any system is represented by its state space.

Does that make it real?

Yes, the function or property is real in its own state space.

Real in philosophical context means ontological, not whether the term applies in some language game.

Is think were still assuming every physical law is computable?

I don't know whether every law is computable, I've just seen the claim that it is.

What counts as computation?

What counts as computation? — Michael

Something like symbol manipulation via calculation.

Something like symbol manipulation via calculation. — Marchesk

But what does that mean? If it's just a case of taking some input, doing something with it, and then outputting the result, then every physical process is an act of computation, isn't it?

But what does that mean? If it's just a case of taking some input, doing something with it, and then outputting something else, then every physical process is an act of computation, isn't it? — Michael

We can say that, but I'm not sure how meaningful a rock computer is. I can't use it to do anything useful I would use a computer for. And how am I supposed to differentiate between computing machines and computing rocks? Does that mean computers existed before we built computing machines and people computed with pen and pencil? Was the Big Bang the first computer?

Also, the idea that physical systems are transforming inputs into outputs is an interpretation where we treat things as inputs and outputs.

We can say that, but I'm not sure how meaningful a rock computer is. I can't use it to do anything useful I would use a computer for. — Marchesk

So for something to count as computation, the output has to be useful? Then how about the physical processes that brought about the Sun, or DNA?

Also, the idea that physical systems are transforming inputs into outputs is an interpretation where we treat things as inputs and outputs.

I think you're being too pedantic. If we just look at the physics of a calculator, all that happens is some physical thing reacts to some physical force. Kinetic energy causes a chain reaction that results in certain LEDs emitting light.

Does this reductionist account of a calculator's behaviour count as computation?

I see it as an attempt to bridge the Leibniz's gap. From wet nerve cells to experience there is a gap. You can't open up a head and see flying unicorns ect.
So once they have the computational language they attempt to recreate it artificially, perhaps with ideal modifications so it recognizes faces better than humans can or whatever.

It exists as a working model but the map is not the territory, hence why mistakes occur when modelling real things. But computer systems (afaik) are more predictable and successful since they are based on the language being true.

So for something to count as computation, the output has to be useful? Then how about the physical processes that brought about the Sun, or DNA? — Michael

Keep in mind that we coined computation in the context of symbol manipulation and mathematical calculation, not nuclear physics or protein production.

I think you're being too pedantic. If we just look at the physics of a calculator, all that happens is some physical thing reacts to some physical force. Kinetic energy causes a chain reaction that results in certain LEDs emitting light. — Michael

This is an ontological question, so being pedantic is expected. You're right that the physics of a calculator doesn't involved symbol manipulation, which goes to a deeper point. Computation exists when we say a physical system produces meaningful symbols for us.

Since there's nothing meaningful to the universe, I would suggest that computation can't be ontological. Rather, it's a product of mind and culture.

Well, if you define computation as involving symbols, and if you define symbols as things that have a particular meaning to us, then it follows by definition that computation doesn't exist independent of human minds and culture.

Well, if you define computation as involving symbols, and if you define symbols as things that have a particular meaning to us, then it follows by definition that computation doesn't exist independent of human minds and culture. — Michael

Then the question is whether defining computation in a broader sense is meaningful. If every physical system can be understood as computing, what would non-computational system look like? How do you distinguish computation from non-computation?

What makes a system computational independent of human denotation?

I think animals display limited computational ability, but no animal I am aware of, display recursive abilities and perhaps it is this lack of recursion that makes the difference.

Does computation exist independent of human minds and culture? — Marchesk

Isn't computation a human activity (or an activity of manmade devices)?

But of course abstract logical facts, mathematical theorems, hypothetical relational-rules among hypotheticals, etc. don't depend on people, and needn't exist in any context other than their referential relation to eachother.

Of course, for a hypothetical story to be perceived by someone requires someone. ...a story-protagonist. ...as in the example of you, your life-experience story, and the possibility-world in which it is set.

...we could be living inside a simulation, etc.

Thanks for bringing up that claim.

Our life-experience possibility-stories, and the possibility-world in which they're set, "are there" as a hypothetical if/then relational system. Being already "there", in the sense of its elements' referential relation to eachother, it doesn't need to be created by a computer simulation.

Yes, maybe, in some world, programmers of some supercomputer could (by chance) simulate our world. But they wouldn't be creating it (for the reason given in the previous paragraph). All they'd be creating would be an opportunity for them to observe our world.

However, if the any physical system can in principle be simulated, does that say something deep about the world? Does math or qubits form the structure of what we experience?

Yes. Search Google for Max Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH)

Michael Ossipoff

Do we have to define computation as symbol manipulation? There are clearly phenomena in nature that are driven by information transfer rather than just energy transfer. It seems relatively natural to think of systems that rely on such mechanisms as also being computational, whatever else they may be. (Insert several pages of @apokrisis here.)

Do we have to define computation as symbol manipulation? There are clearly phenomena in nature that are driven by information transfer rather than just energy transfer. — Srap Tasmaner

Why is it clear that any information is being transferred? Information seems like something that minds are concerned with, not physical processes. Information is intentional by nature. It's about something. But aboutness is mental.

In contrast, physical systems aren't about anything.

How do you intelligibly talk about genetic material without allowing that there are molecules carrying information?

How do you intelligibly talk about genetic material without allowing that there are molecules carrying information? — Srap Tasmaner

I wonder if a precise physical description for genetics could be given, would there be any need for information?

Is information a kind of heuristic shortcut we use to make sense of highly complex physical systems?

But it's a good question. However, also keep in mind that DNA's role is a little messier than it sounds. There was a Radio Lab episode which started out talking about how the thinking was that protein production was like clockwork, since DNA specified precisely what sort of organism is to be produced (or maintained). However, when scientists figured out a way using light to watch proteins being produced, it was a very random affair, even for genetically identical cells.

The conclusion was that there is no order at the level of protein production, but somehow other systems (eleven total) give order to the chaos. They contrasted it with cleaning up an old song from a noisy tape with creating a song from random noise, protein production being the random noise.

That doesn't sound very computer-like, at least not at the level of genes. It does sound like emergent complexity, though.