You think the you that's waking up tomorrow morning isn't really you? That if you go on a bender, you won't have to suffer the hangover? Someone else will? That's so obviously wrong. — RogueAI
To make this clearer, what I'm saying is that if you're wanting to give me a "0-0.1-0.2-0.3...1" spectrum, then you need to say at what exact point survival obtains. It cannot be part here, more there. Either the person survives at point A or not. I do not see there is another way for this to run. You simply cannot survive and not survive. — AmadeusD
I have given you ample reasons why you can partially survive, in the psychological sense. — hypericin
, it depends on what determines the difference between surviving in any form versus not surviving at all, and we have no idea what does, or could, determine that. — Mijin
It implies that if the person walking out of the transporter has a single atom the same as the person at source, then the person at source has survived. — Mijin
If you had a stroke or a TBI, what determines whether you survive in any form, or whether your old self is gone? There is no hard line. Part of you is gone, that is all. Do you think some metaphysical argument can determine this? — hypericin
What's your argument against no-continuity? Upthread I begged someone, anyone to come up with a counter-argument to it. I don't want it to be true. But before this thread I never heard an argument against it and that continues to be the case. — Mijin
For people that believe in bodily continuity, for example, any level of brain damage that doesn't kill them results in still the (numerically) same person, — Mijin
We aren't talking about qualitative identity, we are talking about numerical identity. — Mijin
Again, I don't claim to know, but it's the strongest position to take right now.
Both bodily continuity and psychological continuity have serious counter-arguments, which no-continuity does not.
What's your argument against no-continuity? Upthread I begged someone, anyone to come up with a counter-argument to it. I don't want it to be true. But before this thread I never heard an argument against it and that continues to be the case. — Mijin
Numerically the same body, not the same person. — hypericin
It is not possible to refute, because you can define it as always true, but it is incomplete. It doesn't answer who you will be after being transported or after cryonics. — SolarWind
The person's life is lost in that nanosecond. If you disperse a person's particles, the person is dead. That does not require explanation or elaboration. It's an obvious fact.Apart from that, it seems again you're just asserting bodily continuity. What would take things further is an explanation or further elaboration. A couple of posts ago you suggested that freezing time would not end the self, but even a nanosecond of separation would. Why's that? What's lost in that nanosecond? — Mijin
The person's life is lost in that nanosecond. If you disperse a person's particles, the person is dead. That does not require explanation or elaboration. It's an obvious fact. — Patterner
You seem to be interpreting "bodily continuity" as meaning something like "Let's only care about the body, and not the self". — Mijin
It means that the self is inherently tied to the physical substrate and therefore is also the self. — Mijin
You're not there. Your particles have been dispersed. Why does the author think you have any sort of feeling at all? Why would anyone think non-existence feels like something?and then — just for an instant — it’s like you’re not really there. — Zia Steele
First, I didn't say "that you are wrong." When quoting me, kindly don't misquote me. At least not intentionally. — Patterner
What if the process requires that the original remain alive for x seconds after the duplicate materializes elsewhere, then their particles disperse? — Patterner
Not does your credulity prove it.You may be incredulous of this explanation, but such incredibility would not disprove psychological continuity — Mijin
How many nanoseconds are needed to bring about simple death?nor tell us that under bodily continuity that even a nanosecond separation means simple death. — Mijin
Right-- that's a standard argument against psychological continuity that we've discussed upthread. And we've discussed the standard response; that as long as the two entities' experiences have not diverged then they are indeed the continuation of a single consciousness. — Mijin
Not does your credulity prove it. — Patterner
How many nanoseconds are needed to bring about simple death? — Patterner
But at the moment immediately after B comes into existence, they have diverged. That's crucial, and being missed. — AmadeusD
So a proponent of psychological continuity would typically say that there a period of time in which the consciousness truly exists in two places, but as soon as either entity receives stimuli from their new location, they've split into two entities. — Mijin
That doesn't seem entirely wrong to me, it just begs the question of how could that possibly matter, if all it obtains in is a single planck-length type moment — AmadeusD
Hmm, I don't think it changes anything. THe transporter need not 'work' for there to be an acceptable output. PC does that, avoiding hte problem of whether it 'works' entirely. That's why its the 'best' avenue for hte vast majority of people's intuitions. — AmadeusD
I'm not following you. — Mijin
If the copy is different to the original on creation, then it wasn't a successful copy, but if it diverges afterwards, that's fine; as our whole life is a kind of "divergence". — Mijin
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