You think the you that's waking up tomorrow morning isn't really you? That if you go on a bender, you won't have to suffer the hangover? Someone else will? That's so obviously wrong. — RogueAI

Again, I don't claim to know, but it's the strongest position to take right now.
Both "bodily continuity" and "psychological continuity" have serious counter-arguments, which "no continuity" does not.

What's your argument against "no continuity"? Upthread, I begged someone, anyone to come up with a counter-argument to it. I don't want it to be true. But before this thread, I never heard an argument against it and that continues to be the case.

To make this clearer, what I'm saying is that if you're wanting to give me a "0-0.1-0.2-0.3...1" spectrum, then you need to say at what exact point survival obtains. It cannot be part here, more there. Either the person survives at point A or not. I do not see there is another way for this to run. You simply cannot survive and not survive. — AmadeusD

☝ This guy gets it
This is absolutely key to what I am saying with the imperfect transporter.

I have given you ample reasons why you can partially survive, in the psychological sense. — hypericin

Partial survival is survival. So, going back to the idea of a continuum, the implication of what you're saying is that 0.0000001 = "partial survive", which is a form of "survive". It implies that if the person walking out of the transporter has a single atom the same as the person at source, then the person at source has survived.
...It's a consistent position I guess, but I don't think most people would bite the bullet and claim that if Obama walks into the transporter, and Reagan walks out, then Obama has survived.

, it depends on what determines the difference between surviving in any form versus not surviving at all, and we have no idea what does, or could, determine that. — Mijin

If you had a stroke or a TBI, what determines whether you survive in any form, or whether your old self is gone? There is no hard line. Part of you is gone, that is all. Do you think some metaphysical argument can determine this?

Insisting that there must be a line between survival and extinction, either in the teleporter case or a mundane brain injury, is a mistake.

It implies that if the person walking out of the transporter has a single atom the same as the person at source, then the person at source has survived. — Mijin

It implies no such thing. you are the one insisting that survival is a binary.

If you had a stroke or a TBI, what determines whether you survive in any form, or whether your old self is gone? There is no hard line. Part of you is gone, that is all. Do you think some metaphysical argument can determine this? — hypericin

Once again: you're shifting to a different situation asking a different, qualitative, question.

For people that believe in bodily continuity, for example, any level of brain damage that doesn't kill them results in still the (numerically) same person, even if their characteristic (qualitative) self has changed a great deal.
However, those people would also trivially say that in the transporter scenario it doesn't matter if the person at the destination is qualitatively identical, they still are not the numerically same person.

Now, in the case of your position, of psychological continuity, it seems you are just avoiding the question and trying to answer a far simpler question. We aren't talking about qualitative identity, we are talking about numerical identity. And you have agreed that there's such a thing as simply being dead outright.
So the question is where the line is drawn between being dead outright and still existing in some form.
You're not addressing this question at all.

What's your argument against no-continuity? Upthread I begged someone, anyone to come up with a counter-argument to it. I don't want it to be true. But before this thread I never heard an argument against it and that continues to be the case. — Mijin

It is not possible to refute, because you can define it as always true, but it is incomplete. It doesn't answer who you will be after being transported or after cryonics.

It's like answering "grass is green, please refute".

For people that believe in bodily continuity, for example, any level of brain damage that doesn't kill them results in still the (numerically) same person, — Mijin

Numerically the same body, not the same person. You can suffer enough brain damage such that your personhood is extinguished, but your body survives. And certainly enough to radically alter your self, in the deepest way possible.

We aren't talking about qualitative identity, we are talking about numerical identity. — Mijin

We are talking about numerical identity of the self, which may indeed hinge on qualitative identity. If a teleporter is not a death machine, it must.

Not at all, I've explained in quite minute detail why this is hte case, on my account.

Partial survival is survival. — Mijin

This would have been a clearer way to illustrate hte point, thanks Mijin.

Again, I don't claim to know, but it's the strongest position to take right now.
Both bodily continuity and psychological continuity have serious counter-arguments, which no-continuity does not.

What's your argument against no-continuity? Upthread I begged someone, anyone to come up with a counter-argument to it. I don't want it to be true. But before this thread I never heard an argument against it and that continues to be the case. — Mijin

Behaviorism used to be the strongest position to take regarding mind and consciousness, but it's gone out of favor, for obvious reasons. Dennett and the Churchlands used to be very influential, but now the energy has shifted from eliminative materialism to computationalism and panpsychism (which also had a heyday 100 years ago).

What's the strongest counter-argument against eliminative materialism? Your own lived experience. How do you know you're not a p-zombie? You can't be wrong about the fact you're conscious. The idea that I'm constantly dying and there's a new me popping into existence all the time (esp. when I go to sleep) used to scare the hell out of me, but I don't take it seriously anymore. As I became more idealistic, non-continuity became increasingly implausible.

Numerically the same body, not the same person. — hypericin

No; numerically the same person.

This might be the reason for the confusion here.
You seem to be interpreting "bodily continuity" as meaning something like "Let's only care about the body, and not the self". That's not what it means.
It means that the self is inherently tied to the physical substrate and therefore is also the self. (and further; that in the transporter problem there is no way to transport the self, although opinions tend to be mixed on what happens if you beam across the actual atoms of which the person is made).

It is not possible to refute, because you can define it as always true, but it is incomplete. It doesn't answer who you will be after being transported or after cryonics. — SolarWind

No. I don't know what you mean by "define it to always be true".
As I've alluded several times at this point, there are at least 3 positions we can take on the continuity of consciousness: bodily continuity, psychological continuity and no continuity.
We can certainly come up with compelling (IMO) arguments againsts the first two, and I've summarized several of them in this thread.

I don't know what you mean by no continuity being "not possible to refute" other than you cannot think of a refutation. Nor can I, and that's the point.

Apart from that, it seems again you're just asserting bodily continuity. What would take things further is an explanation or further elaboration. A couple of posts ago you suggested that freezing time would not end the self, but even a nanosecond of separation would. Why's that? What's lost in that nanosecond? — Mijin

The person's life is lost in that nanosecond. If you disperse a person's particles, the person is dead. That does not require explanation or elaboration. It's an obvious fact.

The person's life is lost in that nanosecond. If you disperse a person's particles, the person is dead. That does not require explanation or elaboration. It's an obvious fact. — Patterner

It's not though. Proponents of psychological continuity take the opposite line. e.g. Here's an article that from beginning to end implicitly assumes that as long as we can perfectly copy the quantum state of the original particles, then it is one and the same person before and after transportation.

Now, psychological continuity isn't my position. But you don't defeat that position by just saying "It's an obvious fact that you're wrong".

You seem to be interpreting "bodily continuity" as meaning something like "Let's only care about the body, and not the self". — Mijin

Nope.

It means that the self is inherently tied to the physical substrate and therefore is also the self. — Mijin

I interpret it to mean that bodily continuity is a prerequisite of physical continuity. So yes the self is in some sense tied to the physical substrate. But this does not entail a strict identification with the body that you seem to think. The body can still persist in cases where the self is extinguished. Death is the obvious limit case. Followed by brain death, then severe brain damage.

To be sure, the brain is part of the body. But (assuming bodily continuity) identity likely hinges mainly on the functioning of the brain, not the body as a whole.

First, I didn't say "that you are wrong." When quoting me, kindly don't misquote me. At least not intentionally.

It is obvious that dispersing someone's particles kills them.

What if the process requires that the original remain alive for x seconds after the duplicate materializes elsewhere, then their particles disperse? Is it more obvious that the original is dead in that scenario?

If we can do it once, them we can do it multiples times. So we perfectly copy the quantum state of the original particles a hundred times. Do we have a hundred people who are all "one and the same"?


I disagree with the article. Any conclusions about this topic are opinions, not objective facts. Here's a problem right off there bat.

and then — just for an instant — it’s like you’re not really there. — Zia Steele

You're not there. Your particles have been dispersed. Why does the author think you have any sort of feeling at all? Why would anyone think non-existence feels like something?

First, I didn't say "that you are wrong." When quoting me, kindly don't misquote me. At least not intentionally. — Patterner

It wasn't meant to be a quote; quoting someone is *one* use of scare quotes.
But yes since some of those words were used by you, I acknowledge it wasn't that clear I was paraphrasing.

What if the process requires that the original remain alive for x seconds after the duplicate materializes elsewhere, then their particles disperse? — Patterner

Right-- that's a standard argument against psychological continuity that we've discussed upthread. And we've discussed the standard response; that as long as the two entities' experiences have not diverged then they are indeed the continuation of a single consciousness.
You may be incredulous of this explanation, but such incredibility would not disprove psychological continuity, nor tell us that under bodily continuity that even a nanosecond separation means simple death.

And again FTR: my position is neither bodily continuity nor psychological continuity

You may be incredulous of this explanation, but such incredibility would not disprove psychological continuity — Mijin

Not does your credulity prove it.

nor tell us that under bodily continuity that even a nanosecond separation means simple death. — Mijin

How many nanoseconds are needed to bring about simple death?

Right-- that's a standard argument against psychological continuity that we've discussed upthread. And we've discussed the standard response; that as long as the two entities' experiences have not diverged then they are indeed the continuation of a single consciousness. — Mijin

But at the moment immediately after B comes into existence, they have diverged. That's crucial, and being missed.

Not does your credulity prove it. — Patterner

But the point was, I was asking you for an explanation of how we arrive at the position of bodily continuity, and your response was to basically assert that it is obvious that separating our particles -- for any length of time and regardless of what happens afterwards -- results in our (permanent) death.

So I was illustrating to you that, no, you can't use that kind of statement as a premise as plenty of people disagree with it. So we're still missing an explanation, other than it just seems that way.

How many nanoseconds are needed to bring about simple death? — Patterner

Again, my contention is that the least flawed position right now is that there's never continuity. So to me it's irrelevant, as at every instant of time we have simple death, followed by a new consciousness that believes it has existed for years.

But under psychological continuity the time interval is irrelevant also. If your brain was formed again in a trillion years' time, then that's you.

It's only really an issue for bodily continuity to consider if I am still alive if my particles are separated for an infinitesimal period of time, and what level of connection is required etc.

But at the moment immediately after B comes into existence, they have diverged. That's crucial, and being missed. — AmadeusD

Exactly -- they diverge when they diverge, and that is indeed after B comes into existence.

So a proponent of psychological continuity would typically say that there a period of time in which the consciousness truly exists in two places, but as soon as either entity receives stimuli from their new location, they've split into two entities.

Again: please bear in mind that psychological continuity is not my position. It's weird I'm having to defend and explain psychological continuity to proponents of bodily continuity, and vice versa, yet I don't believe in either position myself.

So a proponent of psychological continuity would typically say that there a period of time in which the consciousness truly exists in two places, but as soon as either entity receives stimuli from their new location, they've split into two entities. — Mijin

That doesn't seem entirely wrong to me, it just begs the question of how could that possibly matter, if all it obtains in is a single planck-length type moment. I realise it's not your position, I'm just kicking cans about now.

That doesn't seem entirely wrong to me, it just begs the question of how could that possibly matter, if all it obtains in is a single planck-length type moment — AmadeusD

It matters a lot for people taking the PC position, because it means the transporter works.

Until the experiences diverge, Picard exists in two places with neither having greater claim to being the "real" Picard. Then, as soon as their experiences diverge, they are separate individuals, but both are a continuation of the original.
Under PC, it's quite rational to take a transporter trip.

Of course, if, one second after you said "Engage!", you find yourself standing on the source pad, about to be dematerialized, you'll feel rather differently about it. But that person's screwed in all 3 theories of continuity.

Hmm, I don't think it changes anything. THe transporter need not 'work' for there to be an acceptable output. PC does that, avoiding hte problem of whether it 'works' entirely. That's why its the 'best' avenue for hte vast majority of people's intuitions.

Hmm, I don't think it changes anything. THe transporter need not 'work' for there to be an acceptable output. PC does that, avoiding hte problem of whether it 'works' entirely. That's why its the 'best' avenue for hte vast majority of people's intuitions. — AmadeusD

I'm not following you.

The psychological continuity position, as I understand it, does require being qualitatively the same. Abraham Lincoln walking out at destination isn't you. So it absolutely does matter whether the transport works or not.
On the subject of divergence; that matters too. If the copy is different to the original on creation, then it wasn't a successful copy, but if it diverges afterwards, that's fine; as our whole life is a kind of "divergence".

Of course we can get into the weeds of how similar is "the same" -- and that's exactly the point of the imperfect transporter.

If I've misunderstood you please elaborate.

I'm not following you. — Mijin

I know. I suggest to slow down a little and work through element-by-element - it's hard to keep hold on all the different concepts.

The transporter does not need to result in a you the way you are (relatively strictly) describing it. On a PC position, you can come out, and diverge immediately (becoming "someone else"). And this does not matter. The person, whoever it is, is continuing your psychological aspirations, desires, wants, needs and ambitions - perhaps, finishing a book you were working on.

On this account, it doesn't matter, whatsoever, that the machine failed to send "you" to Mars. The person will be you regardless (in hte sense of 'close enough'). This requires that we accept that "personal identity" does not obtain beyond numerical identity (which is logically secured). I understand from your responses, this isn't good enough. I basically agree.

If the copy is different to the original on creation, then it wasn't a successful copy, but if it diverges afterwards, that's fine; as our whole life is a kind of "divergence". — Mijin

This is more closely linked to the real issue than the previous question. I hope the above gets us somewhere close to understanding on it. I would add that if, at the moment of inception the person is not exactly the same psychologically, then continuity hasn't quite obtained. This then brings us to, as you say "how similar" one must be secure the line I've bolded above. Is this a little bit clearer?

The transporter does not need to result in a you the way you are (relatively strictly) describing it. On a PC position, you can come out, and diverge immediately (becoming "someone else"). And this does not matter. — AmadeusD

It does matter though.

Let's, as you say, break it down, because there might be a degree of us talking past each other.

1) We agree that, under PC, there is a continuation of "you" if the person at destination is the same as the person at source (was)
2) We agree that there are hypothetical situations where, under PC, there is no continuation of you -- e.g. Abraham Lincoln walks out at destination. Or a turtle.

Now, what I take you to be saying is that:
A) If the person at destination has diverged a tiny bit, well, that's still a successful translation, the same as (1) above.

...but I am not prepared to grant that.

Because, the only thing we can know for sure about PC, from the transporter problem as it is usually phrased, is that an identical copy is a continuation of the self. Anything more than that is an extrapolation, and it's one that I would want a proponent of PC to give, with an argument, because the arbitrary and unknowable nature of that is the whole point of the imperfect transporter.

If you were to say that there is a period of time in which the source and destination person are indeed identical, even if that is just for a planck time, or even if they are not coexistent (e.g. destination person at t=1 is identical to source person at t=0), then fine.
Being identical and then diverging is answered with vanilla PC. Anything else is not. And that's why the distinction matters.

I don't know what you mean by no continuity being "not possible to refute" other than you cannot think of a refutation. Nor can I, and that's the point. — Mijin

If you are standing at a fork in the road and I ask you which path you will take, you don't answer A or B.

You say that after you have walked the path, you will look back and see where you came from. That cannot be refuted, but it is also not an answer to the question.

I have no idea what you mean. I am not talking about anybody looking back. Was this response intended for this thread?

I have no idea what you mean. I am not talking about anybody looking back. — Mijin

Perhaps I don't fully understand the concept of “no continuity”.

I think you mean that you only have a relationship with yourself through the memory of who you were, i.e., in retrospect.

But that doesn't say anything about who you will be after the transport.

You should explain exactly what “no continuity” means in the context of the transporter.

I thought it was clear, but to answer the question directly: you won't exist after the transport. In fact, you won't exist in 5 minutes regardless of whether you take the transporter or not.

But to summarize the whole thing again:

1. The assumption that most people make in daily life, me included, is that we are a singular, persistent consciousness throughout our lives. Even for people who (incorrectly) believe our brains shut off during sleep, they will generally believe that the consciousness that awakes the next day is still the same singular instance.

2. The question of parfit's transporter problem concerns what happens to that singular instance when transported ala star trek. Is it merely copied, while the original is destroyed? Or can we meaningfully say it has been moved, or at least is now at, the destination?

3. The two positions outlined in (2) basically map to "bodily continuity" and "psychological continuity" respectively. We'll use BC and PC for brevity.

4. Both BC and PC have many well known counter-arguments, and the imperfect transporter is adding to that list. For the sake of us clearing up any misunderstandings first, it doesn't matter if you think all the counter arguments are flawed. They could be complete balls; let's put that to one side.

5. So I have been asked, what my position is. And I have said that the best supported right now is "no continuity" (NC). Under this position, we question the assumption, made all the way back in (1).
If consciousness is never persistent, we just have the illusion of it being so, because we inherit memories from the last guy, then all the arguments in (4) disappear. And indeed, the transporter problem is vanquished in general.