, Are there structural or even transcendental arguments that show [consciousness] must remain [mysterious]? McGinn thinks so. — J

McGinn thinks it's an intractable scientific problem, that it's so complex we can't feasibly tackle it. Marcel was an existentialist, he didn't understand it as a problem to be solved but a reality to be accepted.

Buddhism has 'theories of consciousness', beginning with abhidharma, and elaborated over subsequent millenia. But the aim was never to 'explain consciousness'. It was to address the cause of suffering, dukkha, and its ending. Buddhism was always phenomenological, right from the outset. It never posited that the self and world were separated in the way that modern science does. In translations of the early Buddhist texts, the expression 'self and world' is often encountered, as they are understood to be co-arising, in modern parlance. (This is where there are convergences between modern phenomenology and Buddhism, e.g. Merleau Ponty and Buddhism)

Without the intellect setting out borders and providing explanations, there is just emotion. It doesn't belong to anybody. It's just there. Does that make sense? — frank

It does. It's an argument against solipsism. Solipsism takes as its starting point the claim that ‘my consciousness is the only thing I am indubitably certain of.’ But this claim depends on the sense of mine—of ownership—which is itself a mental construct rather than a self-evident given. What is indubitable is consciousness as such, not its appropriation as ‘my’ consciousness. If the ‘mine’ is deconstructed, then solipsism evaporates, because the certainty lies only in consciousness, not in its supposed exclusivity to a solitary self.

Descartes could have more accurately said cogitatio est, ergo esse est — 'thinking is, therefore being is.' What is indubitable is the occurrence of thought, not the existence of an enduring ego.

Descartes could have more accurately said cogitatio est, ergo esse est — 'thinking is, therefore being is.' What is indubitable is the occurrence of thought, not the existence of an enduring ego. — Wayfarer

This is good, and relates back to a discussion on Descartes I was having with @Ludwig V a while back, based on Bernard Williams' book about D. There's a middle-ground alternative too: We can posit a thinker as indubitable, along with the occurrence of thought, without having to characterize that thinker as "an enduring ego." If I'm not mistaken, Paul Ricoeur suggests something like this, connecting the "ego" in "cogito ergo sum" with the conscious "I" and pointing out that the unconscious or pre-conscious (or even cosmic consciousness) might be what truly endures.

I don't recall being in such a situation explicitly, but it wouldn't be alien either. As in, you are in crowd of people who are crying over a sad event or excited over something important, you find yourself either sad or happy without exactly knowing why, unless the event in question specifically relates to you.

But I also think the point your making is kind of similar to what I was saying. That you got angry because you were mirroring someone, you knew he was angry because when someone is angry that's how they tend to behave "like you".

But I think this amplifies to almost everything: love, pain, laughter, proudness, humiliation, etc., the reason you can feel it from others is because it comes from you too. And I'd suspect that that's how other people relate to each other, with this "like me" attitude, exceptions being granted.

:up:

My theory is that the conception of time is related to anticipation. — frank

How can you anticipate though. That is where our reasoning breaks down.

Chalmers has talked about pan-psychism as exemplifying the kind of theory we might start with: just accepting that consciousness is a property of our little universe, and go from there. — frank

Yes! Exactly.

Yes. Do you know Galen Strawson's book, Consciousness and Its Place in Nature? A very good argument for the plausibility of panpsychism. — J

I don't need convincing, but it certainly sounds like something I should read. Thanks.

How can you anticipate though. That is where our reasoning breaks down. — I like sushi

There's anticipation in agriculture, where the farmer waits for the last frost date. There's anticipation in music, as when you clap along to the beat. What you're anticipating there is a single moment in the future. Everyone anticipates the same moment and claps at the same time.

Yes! Exactly. — Patterner

Panpsychism fan?

It left me pondering how I know what it's like to be conscious if I can't know what it's like for other people. Wouldn't I need something to compare or contrast it with? I wasn't thinking about the ineffability issue. It would be closer to a private language problem, where I wouldn't be able to speak confidently about continuity of consciousness. I wouldn't be able to say it's this and not that. Maybe I have to assume other people experience things differently so I can say pinpoint something unique about me? Is it my POV that's unique? — frank

You can't know what the other person's beetle is like. You can speak about your experiences, but ultimately the words you use are defined by how you use them, not by your internal state. So when you say "I feel pain," the word "pain" just means how people use it, but because the word only means how it is used and it does not have a referent of your internal pain does not suggest you don't actually have pain.

Where I've used "pain," the same holds for the word "consciousness." That is, "I am conscious," or "I am aware," or whatever you wish to convey is definable by the words as they're used, not by the internal state.

When you seek to discuss the actual internal state as to what it is, the private sensation, you are outside what Wittgenstein would allow language to do. You're discussing metaphysics. Language isn't for that sort of discussion because meaning is use, not meaning is internal referent.

So, as to how you know that you are conscious? You experience it. You are therefore conscious. "Knowing" is a loaded term because it requires a justification, so it's more consistent just to say you are in pain without saying "I know I am in pain because I feel pain" which might implicate a metaphysical conversation about homonculi. The consistency of your word usage is controlled by public correction, not by consistency of the internal referent.

I think.

When you seek to discuss the actual internal state as to what it is, the private sensation, you are outside what Wittgenstein would allow language to do. You're discussing metaphysics. Language isn't for that sort of discussion because meaning is use, not meaning is internal referent. — Hanover

So when someone tells me they're in pain, we aren't investigating an internal state, because language doesn't do that. It's more that they're announcing that they're conscious of something bad? And they're using language to give a warning, ask for help, or just get acknowledgement?

Beyond that, we have to be satisfied that we don't have any linguistic fingers that can't touch consciousness?

Heh

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15877/property-dualism/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16075/consciousness-is-fundamental/p1

Beyond that, we have to be satisfied that we don't have any linguistic fingers that can't touch consciousness? — frank

Wittgenstein discusses how language is used, not the mystery in your head. So it's not that he's denying your inner world. He's just saying it can't be spoken about directly. That's not to say you can't say "I feel pain" and be understood, but our understanding is based upon how we as a community use words, not based upon me knowing whether your inner referent (your beetle) is the same as my inner referent (my beetle). We don't speak of beetles, except as words, not as beetles.

I agree. All I know of consciousness is that I am conscious. All the words I have to speak about it are community property, gaining meaning in practical situations. I think there is an implied commonality in the fact that we use the same words. And this sense of commonality extends to the whole world, where thunderstorms seem angry, and quiet meadows seem happy.

I think at the point we decide that you have some quality of being that belongs uniquely to you, we're laying a particular worldview over the scene. We could just as easily believe that our common language about experience has an external referent in something like the mind of God that dwells all around, and we participate in it, resonating with it, injecting our own emotions into it like a cloud. We just don't have that worldview, so we imagine distinct pockets, containing unknowable beetles.

As you say, this is metaphysics that goes beyond the character of linguistic expression. So it's not just that I can deem experience in itself as beyond language, the whole scheme that distributes beetles into boxes is also trying to express something beyond language.

I think that means that to the extent that your experience is private, what I'm talking about is your history, your unique POV, all the external trappings of personhood, with the expertise at lawyering and the owning of things.

a single moment — frank

It is more or less this that flumoxes me.

Is time discrete? If not, or if so, how can we have any appreciation of it?

a single moment
— frank

It is more or less this that flumoxes me.

Is time discrete? If not, or if so, how can we have any appreciation of it? — I like sushi

It appears to be both. If we're listening to music and clapping along, awareness of is in the anticipation, and then the gratification of all clapping at the same time, a single moment. But at other times, it feels like a flow.

This is Aristotle territory.

My point is more about how it can feel like anything. I do not see how appreciation of time can happen either in a moment or across a period without some atemporal element being involved. What that means in terms of our physical understanding of the universe is rather nonsensical to us though.

My point is more about how it can feel like anything. I do not see how appreciation of time can happen either in a moment or across a period without some atemporal element being involved. What that means in terms of our physical understanding of the universe is rather nonsensical to us though. — I like sushi

I understand what you're saying, but I think it's relative. If you're watching the passage of time, you're stationary. But you're also in the stream of time, moving past various points, the points in time are stationary. The distance between you and the American Revolution grows bigger every day. You're the one that's moving, not the revolution.

I was once sitting in a cafe and I found myself becoming agitated and angry. I couldn't pinpoint why. But I eventually realized what it was: without consciously registering it, I was looking at a man with an angry look on his face. I realized I'd experienced empathy that wasn't mediated at all by the intellect. There was just: anger, and I thought it was mine, but it wasn't. I was experiencing this other guy's feelings as if they were my own. — frank

Clearly, his anger caused your anger. But I don't think that's the same as experiencing his anger. Do you think you could become angry from looking at a photograph of someone who is obviously angry?

Clearly, his anger caused your anger. But I don't think that's the same as experiencing his anger. Do you think you could become angry from looking at a photograph of someone who is obviously angry? — Patterner

For me, at base, it's not my anger or your anger. It's just anger. Telling who it belongs to is an intellectual matter.

In my photography scenario, there is no anger until I generate it within myself. I'm not sure it's different in your cafe. He didn't declare that he was angry, and wasn't yelling, muttering, or huffing & puffing. If he had done any of those things, you would not have wondered why you were angry yourself.

Although I wonder if, had he been loud about it, you would have been "drawn in". Knowing what was going on, maybe you would have only been annoyed at the guy with no self-control.

Everyone is me.
Everywhere is here.
Every when is now. :smile:

When Svetaketu was twelve years old he was sent to a teacher, with whom he studied until he was twenty-four. After learning all the Vedas, he returned home full of conceit in the belief that he was consummately well educated, and very censorious.

His father said to him,

"Svetaketu, my child, you who are so full of your learning and so censorious, have you asked for that knowledge by which we hear the unhearable, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived and know what cannot be known?"

'What is that knowledge, sir?' asked Svetaketu.

His father replied, 'As by knowing one lump of clay
all thatthat is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name, but the truth being that all is clay so, my child,is that knowledge, knowing which we know all.'

'But surely these venerable teachers of mine are ignorant of this knowledge; for if they possessed it they would have imparted it to me. Do you, sir, therefore give me that knowledge.'

' So be it,' said the father. . . . And he said,

"Bring me a fruit of the nyagrodha tree.'

'Here is one, sir.'
'Break it.'

'It is broken, sir.'

'What do you see there?'

Some seeds, sir, exceedingly small.'

' Break one of these.'

'It is broken, sir.'

'What do you see there?'

'Nothing at all.'

The father said, 'My son, that subtle essence which you do not perceive there in that very essence stands the being of the huge nyagrodha tree. In that which is the subtle essence all that exists has its self. That is the True, that is the Self, and thou, Svetaketu, art That.'

'Pray, sir said the son, 'tell me more.'

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied; and he said, 'Place
this salt in water, and come to me tomorrow morning.'

The son did as he was told.

Next morning the father said, 'Bring me the salt which you put in the water.'

The son looked for it, but could not find it; for the salt, of
course, had dissolved.

The father said, 'Taste some of the water from the surface of the vessel. How is it?'

'Salty.'

'Taste some from the middle. How is it ?'

'Salty.'

'Taste some from the bottom. How is it?'

'Salty.'

The father said, 'Throw the water away and then come back to me again.

The son did so ; but the salt was not lost, for salt exists forever.

Then the father said, 'Here likewise in this body of yours,
my son, you do not perceive the True; but there in fact it is. In that which is the subtle essence, all that exists has its self. That is the True, that is the Self, and thou, Svetaketu, art That.

From the Chandogya Upanishad

yes :heart:

Just the passage I had in mind! ‘Tat tvam asi’ :pray: