it misses that, assuming 'trans' is a "true identity" in the way claimed by the more committed TRAs, then it is imperative that we accept that reality and adjust our priors so as to make room for its truth — AmadeusD

Trans is a 'true' identity, and has existed historically everywhere. It's just that this modern iteration of that identity does not align with how it has existed everywhere else. The simple fact that trans girls and women are more common today than trans boys and men - who, historically, have made up two thirds of trans people, indicates that we are no longer talking about a 'true' trans experience.

Late to this debate, but I take it that despite all the heat of the public debate, this is just an issue in metaphysics.

The public debate - my impression of it anyway - is that it is almost exclusively conducted by those with no training in metaphysics and it shows, for there seem to be two camps, both fairly obviously false. The two views seem to be either that you're a woman if you identify as one (so, identifying as a woman constitutively determines that one is one), or alternatively a biologist determines whether you're a woman. So, it's either you, or a biologist.

Both views are silly. It's true that both are reliably proxies for being a woman. Virtually all people who identify as women are women (just as virtually all people who identify as lawyers are lawyers). And virtually all people who satisfy the biologist's criteria for being a woman are women too. But being a reliable proxy is not the same as being the thing one is a proxy for.

Let's do some entry level metaphysics: first, not every concept can be defined, for that would generate an infinite regress in which it turns out nothing can be defined.

Thus, if there are true definitions, then there are concepts that cannot be defined.

Most people don't realize this and believe - fallaciously - that unless one can provide a definition for a concept, one doesn't understand it or have it. That's demonstrably false. But becausea they believe it, they will not believe they grasp a concept - even one of those basic concepts that are unamenable to definition - unless a definition is provided. And the first one that presents itself or is offered, will normally then be the one they cleave to thereafter, refining it if necessary but not giving it up. It's so common it's got a name: the definist fallacy.

Here's how one might fallaciously arrive at the conclusion that being a woman is constitutively determined by one's own subjective states: virtually everyone who believes they are a woman is a woman, therefore believing you're a woman is what makes you a woman, and thus a woman is just someone who identifies as one.

The other 'side' notices that there are clear counterexamples to this thesis - there are clear cases of men who are identifying as women, yet are not thereby becoming women (for they still seem to answer to the concept of a man, despite their identifying otherwise). And so they offer a different definition: that a woman is someone with immobile gametes, because when biologists look in detail at women's bodies, they find they all have that feature. And biologists - who are not metaphysicians and are just as capable of fallacious reasoning as the next person - reason that as all women they've examined have immobile gamates, then that must be what makes a woman a woman. That's fallacious. All square things have a colour, but that doesn't make the definition of a shape 'coloured'. Plus we can easily imagine someone who answers to the concept of a woman, yet does not have immobile gamates or any at all. So, it's as plainly false upon reflection as the individual subjectivist view about what makes someone a women.

But both sides think understanding comes from definitions and so they just double down on their own and get increasingly angry at the other side (as is typical of the ignorant).

The truth seems to be that we have the concept of a woman without being able to define it. It is in this respect like the concept of a mountain or a tree. Those are not amenable to definition either. In fact, there are loads and loads of concepts like this, or seem to be (we know there have to be some, remember).

We have evidence that we have an indefinable concept - though one that we nevertheless 'have' and are adept at applying - when our best attempts to define it fail. And we know that our best attempts at defining it are failing when there seem to be things that clearly answer to the concept in question, yet do not answer to the definition (and vice versa).

Is there currently a huge debate over the correct definition of a woman? Yes, that's obvious. So, the very existence of the debate - and the fact that both definitions in play are quite plainly false (which is why the debate continues, for each side can correctly highlight the absurdity of the other's defintion) - gives us reason to think that the concept of a woman is indefinable. A woman is someone who answers to the concept of a woman - that, it seems, is as much as can be said. And we already know well enough how to apply the concept - for we judge the credibility of a definition by whether or not it delivers verdicts consistent with the concept. It's just the definist fallacy prevents people from recognizing that they have the concept prior to any attempted definition - and then they feel themselves obliged to substitute their concept for the definition instead.

So, are transwomen women? Well, if a transwoman is someone who identifies as a woman but would not be considered one by a biologist in the grips of the definist fallacy....then some of them might be, and some of them might not be. It depends on whether they answer to the concept of a woman - a concept that is not amenable to definition and that biologists are not authorities about.

Best response so far. Good introductory analysis.


But as you will see, these fora are the natural home for fallacies of definition.

Trans is a 'true' identity, and has existed historically everywhere. — Jeremy Murray

Not quite. 'trans' hasn't existed many places at all. Most instances quoted are, in fact, torturous attempts to relitigate instances of historical homophobia. What's happening now isn't too far off, as you've noted elsewhere. Most trans youth resile into being gay at puberty.

What I meant by true is 'verifiable'. Claiming to be trans is nonsense, on it's face. Not that it can't mean anything at all socially, but on it's face, its like claiming to be a rock. Your second point is taken, and the sudden drop in identification in the last 18 months seems to suggest something along those lines.

Patently untrue. The definition of a woman as an 'adult human female' is not false in any sense of the word false. This entire post just prevaricates and ignores the problem.

It may be uncomfortable, and that's fine. It's not exactly the one I would use, simply because I'm happy to call polite, non-imposing people what they want to be called. That would require me to violate that definition.

So, let's actually get to some meat, and point out where what you're saying is entirely bogus:

So, are transwomen women? Well, if a transwoman is someone who identifies as a woman but would not be considered one by a biologist in the grips of the definist fallacy....then some of them might be, and some of them might not be. It depends on whether they answer to the concept of a woman - a concept that is not amenable to definition and that biologists are not authorities about. — Clarendon

"if" does so much lifting, that you've done nothing more than anyone else in this thread to even broach the topic. You're saying in the bolded that you simply take self-identity as rote, or alternately that there is no answer. So be it. But that's bollocks and I'm sure you know it.

The concept of a woman is either defined, or meaningless. I don't care which. Female does the job I need it to do.

Let's do some entry level metaphysics: first, not every concept can be defined, for that would generate an infinite regress in which it turns out nothing can be defined.

Thus, if there are true definitions, then there are concepts that cannot be defined. — Clarendon

Good point, but you'll need to demonstrate that woman cannot be defined.

Most people don't realize this and believe - fallaciously - that unless one can provide a definition for a concept, one doesn't understand it or have it. That's demonstrably false. — Clarendon

I agree. First there's the experience of something, then we go about using words to better communicate that concept to another person. Words that cannot be defined rely on a shared understanding. For example, "Sight". To understand the word, you must be able to see. I cannot define your subjective experience of sight more than mine, but we both have a shared experience that allows us to definitively separate 'sight' from 'sound'. Thus an example of a word that cannot be defined, but also isn't nonsense and useful in language. After all, a nonsense word is a nonsense thought and can be dismissed as such.

And so they offer a different definition: that a woman is someone with immobile gametes, because when biologists look in detail at women's bodies, they find they all have that feature. And biologists - who are not metaphysicians and are just as capable of fallacious reasoning as the next person - reason that as all women they've examined have immobile gamates, then that must be what makes a woman a woman. That's fallacious. — Clarendon

How is that fallacious? If there is a shared objective experience that people can point to independent of one's subjective experience, then that's a viable word. Language is at its heart a series of signs and symbols to represent concepts which can be shared with other people. There is a physical aspect that is common to an adult human female which is clearly different from an adult human male, so we point out that difference as a means to separate the sexes. If we didn't use definitions, women are the only one's who can naturally birth babies and men are the only ones who can impregnate women. While we can understand that without a definition, a definition can help clarify and add to our understanding of the physical separation of men and women.

A fallacious term would be something that was contradictory in its statement. "A bungle is a mime bigger than itself" is an example of the fallacious term 'bungle'. You can't be bigger than yourself, so its dismissive nonsense.

Plus we can easily imagine someone who answers to the concept of a woman, yet does not have immobile gamates or any at all. — Clarendon

Yet if we have a proper definition and understanding of a woman in our shared language, and someone incorrectly identifies as that definition, wouldn't they simply be wrong? Surely if I claimed you were Mr. Rogers I would be wrong? Surely if you identified as Mr. Rogers, who is long dead now, you would be wrong as well.

Definitions often have flexibility in their terminology which I know has always fascinated me. When does a molehill become a mountain? Except we don't have the question, "When does a canyon become a mountain?" Why? Because a canyon is a direct opposite or contradiction to the fundamental of a mountain. Mountains go up, canyons go down.

And thus why a man is not a woman. They are opposite and contradictory in matters of sex, which is the entire point of pointing out that an individual is a male or female. Defining a man as a woman would be fallacious if they were intended to be different concepts, as different concepts cannot be synonyms. You don't need a definition for that either. I think you have provided the means to counter the oft stated, "But what really makes up a woman anyway?" Simple, it is counter in sex functions to a man. No words or definitions needed.

Is there currently a huge debate over the correct definition of a woman? Yes, that's obvious. — Clarendon

No, I don't think there is. There's no debate that the term woman in the normative context means "Adult human female". There is a faction of people who want to create a context in which 'woman' should mean 'someone who acts in the sociologically (non-biologically) expected way some people think an adult human female should act in public' Or bizarrely, "A woman is a a person who acts like society expects a woman to act irrelevant to their biology". This is of course unclear language, which is a larger point of the OP.

"Trans woman are women" is simply unclear language. I'm also not debating that with modified adjectives to the word 'woman', we can get the context of woman as 'gendered woman'. That's what "Trans woman" does. If the normative and traditional definition of woman is "Adult human female", there should be a good reason why we replace that as the normative term with the gendered one. As there is not, and most people see 'woman' when unmodified by adjectives as "adult human female", a trans woman is not an adult human female.

Further, the language supports this separation. We have cis and trans to denote the context of woman as "sociological' expectation of adult human female cultural behavior, whereas woman unmodified means adult human female. So the proper sentence should be "Trans women are adult human males who take on the cultural behaviors associated with women" "Or if we wanted to shorten it, "Tran women are gendered women". This clearly denotes that the sentence does not imply trans women are women by sex.

But as you will see, these fora are the natural home for fallacies of definition. — Banno

Would you like to point out any fallacies I've made Banno? Or do you think I've done a good job?

I think there are vast difficulties with the whole approach to language that you, and most other folk hereabouts, adopt. The presumption that there is one correct meaning for "woman" is only one small part of the problem, as is the very notion that for each word there is such a thing as its meaning, given by a statable definition, and the task of the philosopher consists at least in part in making this meaning explicit.

But let's see how proceeds.

It's a vast area - indeed, almost all my posts are on this very topic.

The presumption that there is one correct meaning for "woman" is only one small part of the problem, as is the very notion that for each word there is such a thing as its meaning, given by a statable definition, and the task of the philosopher consists at least in part in making this meaning explicit. — Banno

Have you read the OP? I did think I made a decent argument at giving explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term. I also note that woman can take on a gendered meaning, just when it makes sense linguistically to import that in the phrase. Since it is such a focus of yours, I would be glad to hear your take as to the problem in the OP. Part of me writing this is to also be challenged Banno. I have enough of my own ideas after all.

I think it a pretty good OP, of a sort. But a part of the issue is the very idea of starting with "explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term".

The thread might best be understood as a negotiation between the players here, looking for agreement on a way to use the words women, man, gender, male, female, and so on. But folk talk as if there are correct and incorrect ways to use the term, to which each has some private access, their use being the right one, the other uses being wrong for various reasons.

But I'm saying too much. I want to see were goes. Cheers.

If people adhering to different definitions of the terms 'woman' or 'man' believe there is but one correct definition, and that it is the one they hold, as though there could be some determinable fact of the matter, then they are arguing with closed minds and will inevitably talk past one another.

Yep.

I think this is a topic where philosophy (if we can call it that) is employed for an agenda and begins to look absurd.

Gender is one thing, sex is another. Sex is obvious and always has been. There are always exceptions, but they are very rare indeed, and one need not bend over backwards to change perfectly good language because of them.

What is being presupposed by the word “trans” anyway? From what to what? One sex to another, or one gender to another, presumably. I still hold that the latter is absolutely possible — the former isn’t.

What I think is sad is that so many bigoted people use what I’ve said above to justify the mistreatment of trans people, and it’s this use that the community and its allies are truly fighting against when they argue that sex is a “concept” or that “woman” is undefined. But it’s a fool’s errand and a political trap, and in my view has set back the movement by a decade at least.

If people adhering to different definitions of the terms 'woman' or 'man' believe there is but one correct definition, and that it is the one they hold, as though there could be some determinable fact of the matter, then they are arguing with closed minds and will inevitably talk past one another. — Janus

We can define things any way we like. There is not one “true” definition of anything, except maybe in mathematics. But in everyday life, will my response to your saying “It’s a beautiful day out today” ever be “well there’s not a true definition of ‘day,’ and your standard of beauty is subjective”? Not unless I’m insane, despite there being perhaps some merit to what I’ve said “philosophically.”

I’ll call anyone what they wish to be called. I’ll call you Janus the Great if you prefer— but before I actually believe it, I’d need to see some evidence or a convincing argument. In a trans case, I’ve yet to see such an argument.

If gender is entirely and exclusively a social construct, as many feminists and even trans people like to say, then trans women are just men who want access to women's spaces.

On the other hand if gender has a real biological/psychological basis, then it seems at least imaginable that there could be people born with a penis but who are nevertheless psychologically or neurologically "female".

For what it's worth, I don't think gender is entirely and exclusively a social construct, and I believe a large fraction of trans people have some biological, neurological real explanation for their transness that science has yet to discover.

I think it a pretty good OP, of a sort. But a part of the issue is the very idea of starting with "explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term". — Banno

I think it a pretty good OP, of a sort. But a part of the issue is the very idea of starting with "explicit meaning in the phrasing of the term". — Banno

I think I see your point. It is true that terms hold personal meaning to us. My point with being explicit is taking that context into standard English. Languages have rules and intents that allow an explicit standard of communication and vocabulary to start from. I am not denying that there are not implicit definitions to words people use, but I'm also not denying there are explicit uses either.

In a language one can use an implicit personalized version of a term as long as it does not counter the explicit use of the term in the language. Thus if I'm speaking English, I cannot state, "The sun is the moon." If I have some personal meaning behind that, I need to either add new meanings of the terms, demonstrate its a metaphor, or add more context to explain my meaning. In standard English without these things, "The sun is the moon" is an illogical statement.

The phrase, "Trans women are women" is an explicit claim within the language that demands other people who speak the language accept the phrase. Whenever you involve other people into accepted terminology, it must be the case that an explicit standard is formed between all speakers of that language. Yes, there can, and will be implicit wiggle room, but if there is not an explicit agreement between people in at least some core of the term, then communication simply cannot occur. If I hold "the moon means the sun" and you hold "the sun means the moon" we aren't using the same concepts while talking to each other and will each think the other is spouting nonsense.

So the point of the OP is to establish two definitions of women, and explain when using English properly, "Trans woman are women" is most logically interpreted as "Trans women are adult human females". This is of course wrong. So the phrase needs to adjust to be more accurate among English speakers. "Trans women are men who take on the gendered role of women" is a proper sentence that clearly explains the honest explicit meaning of the phrase.

The thread might best be understood as a negotiation between the players here, looking for agreement on a way to use the words women, man, gender, male, female, and so on. But folk talk as if there are correct and incorrect ways to use the term, to which each has some private access, their use being the right one, the other uses being wrong for various reasons. — Banno

I hope you see this is not an argument for personal implicit use, but an argument about proper explicit meaning within an established language.

I think this is a topic where philosophy (if we can call it that) is employed for an agenda and begins to look absurd. — Mikie

Philosophy is employed here for thinking about a topic that confuses many people. The goal of philosophy has always been to get to a clear and logical understanding of matters about the world. This is ontology in the philosophy of language. Calling it 'an agenda' would be true if it was inflexible preaching, a lack of rational discussion and responses, or a means to simply demean, insult, or threaten people into submission.

This is just a topic to think about. You are free to disagree, point out flaws, ask questions, etc. That is the goal of philosophy. To take the issues of the day within language and being and ask, "What does this really mean?"

What is being presupposed by the word “trans” anyway? From what to what? One sex to another, or one gender to another, presumably. I hold that the latter is absolutely possible — the former isn’t. — Mikie

It is the later. The OP essentially notes that 'woman' without adjectives or modifiers normatively means "Adult human female". "Trans" adjusts woman to mean, "A person who takes on the non-biological gendered behaviors that society expects an adult human female to exhibit".

We can define things any way we like. There is not one “true” definition of anything, except maybe in mathematics. — Mikie

Not even in math. Math and language are both symbols that represent concepts. When I say the word "One", what do you imagine in your head? Its not the same as what I'm imagining. When I say the word "tree" its the same. However, this is not a discussion about the implicit meaning behind words within a person's personal context. This is about explicit meaning within an established language. Just like 'one' can have a personal meaning to you, when taken in the explicit language of mathematics, it has a clear explicit definition that must be agreed upon by all parties for the term to have any useful meaning. As long as when one is using the explicit meaning of the language, their implicit term does not contradict or violate that explicit meaning of the term, implicit meanings are highly flexible in an explicit conversation.

I’ll call anyone what they wish to be called. I’ll call you Janus the Great if you prefer— but before I actually believe it, I’d need to see some evidence or a convincing argument. — Mikie

True. You're essentially saying, "You have an implicit meaning behind that phrase, and as long as that phrase does not actually counter the explicit meaning it would imply in an objective language, I'm fine with that." You would of course have issue if this person rear ended you and gave you "Janus the Great" as his legal name when it is objectively not. When you are both in the explicit context where both parties need to have a common understanding, the phrase matters greatly. Asking your insurance company to find "Janus the Great" is going to give you problems collecting the claim.

If someone wants to implicitly say, "Trans women are women", they can of course mean whatever they choose. But the moment they start demanding that it is explicitly true within the language, "I am Janus the Great, and as such you will kneel before me or die", people have full logical recourse to say, "No, you're Percival Smithers with no title or power to demand what you want of others." Implicitly, Percival might be offended and angry, but his implicit claims of reality can always rightly be overruled by explicit claims to reality.

If gender is entirely and exclusively a social construct, as many feminists and even trans people like to say, then trans women are just men who want access to women's spaces. — flannel jesus

Correct.

On the other hand if gender has a real biological/psychological basis, then it seems at least imaginable that there could be people born with a penis but who are nevertheless psychologically or neurologically "female". — flannel jesus

Gender has a real psychological basis. It is a culture's prejudgments or expectations of public behavior that it either believes or imposes on each sex that are apart from the biology of the sex itself.

For example, there is no biological basis behind only men wearing top hats. But we can imagine an individual who thinks, "Women should not wear top hats." That's gender. Of course, we can also imagine a person who thinks, "Men should not wear top hats." That's also gender. This is because gender is not objective, but subjective. You can of course get a group of people to hold the same subjective outlook. This is seen multiple times on culture such as, "God is real" or "Step on a crack and you break your mother's back". We often have group beliefs and rituals that have no objective basis behind them. Gender is a belief system behind the behaviors and actions of a member of one sex in public.

Thus in terms of gender, one cannot be psychologically female objectively, only subjectively. That is because one's view of gendered behavior could very well contradict the definition of another's. A woman might say, "Only men wear top hats, but I'm going to anyway," and in their mind they are trans gender. However in the mind of another who believes, "Only women wear top hats," she's not trans gender.

In terms of neurology, that is not trans gender, that would be 'trans sexual'. Sex is the biological reality of a being, gender is the sociological cultural expectations it is under depending on who it is surrounded by. To demonstrate that someone has neurology associated with the other sex, there must be an objective study to find what areas of the brain are exclusive to one sex and not the other in almost all cases.

The jury is still largely out on this. Our understanding of the brain isn't in the stone age anymore, but its not exactly going to the moon yet either. My readings on the issue have generally concluded that there are neurological differences that more resemble what is female in the brains of homosexual men. We of course do not say homosexuals are 'women in men's bodies'. When heterosexual men who have gender dysphoria have their brains examined, there is no statistically significant difference between heterosexual men who have gender dysphoria. Same with homosexual men in comparison to other homosexual men. After men are put on estrogen, the brain does actually begin to change its structure in limited ways to brain structures that are more often associated with females. But again, brain science involving sex differences is still natal.

As for what we know now, there is no indicator that someone having trans gender issues has a brain difference, but a psychological difference. Just like you can I can have the same brain type but process the color 'orange' in our head differently. I may like the color orange, you may not. You may be very enamored with the social expectations of the other sex, I don't care. It seems that a trans gender individual has a combination of being enamored with the social expectations of the other sex vs disliking the cultural expectations of their own sex that they attempt to reject the gender of their own sex and take on the gender of the other.

I think this largely boils down to semantics and modern discourse not having the words to talk about this in a way that makes sense. To my mind, this discussion makes more sense if you equate "sex" with biological sex and consider "gender" as a type of social class that is different from but heavily informed by society's interpretation of the roles a person should fill based on biological sex. The gender/sex split has, in my opinion, greatly confused modern discourse on this as people constantly conflate the two.

I think this largely boils down to semantics and modern discourse not having the words to talk about this in a way that makes sense. — MrLiminal

I agree. I also believe it is the job of philosophers to step forward when current language fails us.

To my mind, this discussion makes more sense if you equate "sex" with biological sex and consider "gender" as a type of social class that is different from but heavily informed by society's interpretation of the roles a person should fill based on biological sex. — MrLiminal

Fortunately that's the actual definitions used. I am referencing gender theory and the formal understanding of these terms according to that context.

The gender/sex split has, in my opinion, greatly confused modern discourse on this as people constantly conflate the two. — MrLiminal

And that is part of the purpose of this question. How do we use terms correctly in a formal sentence? How do we avoid ambiguity and conflation? I think I've pointed out answers to these, but do you agree with the reasoning behind them?

Philosophy is employed here for thinking about a topic that confuses many people. — Philosophim

Who’s confused? I didn’t see much “confusion” about sex until recently. Ditto for many issues which are motivated not by science or philosophy, but by cultural and political agendas. So in the same way that there’s “confusion” about vaccines, I suppose you’re right. But the point stands.

It is the later. The OP essentially notes that 'woman' without adjectives or modifiers normatively means "Adult human female". "Trans" adjusts woman to mean, "A person who takes on the non-biological gendered behaviors that society expects an adult human female to exhibit". — Philosophim

Cool, then in that case I agree. If that’s truly what’s being argued for, then I have no objection.

Wild. We're in exactly hte same place, philosophically on this one. Nice.

There's some daylight between how we see the trans community being treated. But that's by hte by for the thread. Thanks for your input :)

I should preface this by saying I mostly don't think gender should exist at all, as it places unnecessary limitations on people for acting outside of what we as a society consider normal or expected for a certain sex. That said, this discourse seems like it's not going away anytime soon, so I think it may be necessary to create new words to meet the problem. Currently the question "Are trans men/women men/women" feels like it falls into the same trap as "Is water wet?" The question itself is inherently vague in a way that invites misinterpretation and arguments.

I should preface this by saying I don't think gender should exist at all, as it places unnecessary limitations on people for acting outside of what we as a society consider normal or expected for a certain sex. — MrLiminal

I think gender as a concept is fine. What I don't think is fine is elevating it in importance beyond what it is, which is a subjective societal prejudice at best, sexism at worst. And any idea that it should be elevated in importance or priority over a person's sex itself is simply irrational.

Currently the question "Are trans men/women men/women" feels like it falls into the same trap as "Is water wet?" The question itself is inherently vague in a way that invites misinterpretation and arguments. — MrLiminal

Agreed. The point of the OP is to point this out and note that the phrase is poor English and should not be used as a meaningful phrase. Instead, if people want to communicate the issue they are trying to convey clearly, they should alter the phrase to be less ambiguous in its intents.

To be honest, I'm not sure how it can be overcome. People on all sides of this issue get so oddly defense about gender stuff that really does not matter in the grand scheme of things and seem to look for reasons to get upset about it. And yes, I agree gender can be a useful shorthand for snap assumptions about a person's lived experience in much the same way race can be, but we all know what people say about assumptions. I think everyone here knows that individuals can and often go against expectations. But even if one did invent new words to better clarify their meaning, I suspect it would devolve into the same old confusion and arguments. I used to really want to engage in good faith on this topic and gender topics in general years ago, it just doesnt really seem worth it anymore. The most carefully constructed phrasing will get torn apart or misunderstood, intentionally or otherwise. We've seen it in this very thread, when you seem to be very clear you are mostly speaking about semantics. I mostly see our meat as a medium for who we are anyway, so getting hung up on the biological prison our minds are trapped in seems kind of like a waste of time to me. That said, I appreciate your honest attempts at a discussion.

I’ll call anyone what they wish to be called. I’ll call you Janus the Great if you prefer— but before I actually believe it, I’d need to see some evidence or a convincing argument. In a trans case, I’ve yet to see such an argument. — Mikie

I'm wondering what you are yet to see a convincing argument for. The question "are transwomen women" is meaningless unless we are told what 'women' is supposed to mean in the context of the question. A "transwoman" is already presupposed by the terminology of the question itself to be a kind of 'woman'.

Cheers, @Philosophim. There's a lot to be getting on with here.

First, one point I would make is almost the opposite of your "terms hold personal meaning to us". Better to drop the idea of a "personal meaning" altogether, and instead of introspection of any sort, look at how the word is actually being used, both in the thread and in the wider community. This form Wittgenstein.

Moreover, it is not true that there are "...rules and intents that allow an explicit standard of communication and vocabulary to start from", if by this is meant that language functions by following rules. This is put to the lie by the fact that we often communicate by breaking the rules. Davidson's Nice Derangement of Epitaphs ably demonstrates this, but it is also in accord with Wittgenstein's views on rule-following; in the end to follow a rule is a practice, and can be honoured in the breach as honestly as in obedience.

Consider: “To me, she is impossible to understand — the sun is the moon in her: brilliant yet hidden, warm yet distant.” Or “In that moment of grief, the sun was the moon — everything familiar turned strange, reversed, uncanny.”

These make sense, and are standard English. Metaphor an novelty are not outside of plain English, but central to it.

The issues in this thread concern changes in the use of "gender", which was previously a grammatical term. THere's a brief potted history at Gender terminology. We have found it useful to differentiate physically determined attributes of males and females from social norms relating to men and women. At issue is how we might maintain consistency in this new usage.

And there's a hint in what I just said. We can differentiate males from females on the basis of physical characteristics, and separately differentiate men form women on the basis of social norms. This works for most purposes. So a transexual is a male who adopts the social norms of a woman, or a female who adopts the social norms of a man.

We ought keep in mind that neither the classifications male/female nor man/woman are exclusive nor complete.

On this account, "Trans women are women" is a tautology, or a category mistake. Contrast "Trans women are male", which will be true in most cases.

The remainder of the SEP article is worth a read, as it sets out some far more philosophically interesting issues.

This is put to the lie by the fact that we often communicate by breaking the rules. Davidson's Nice Derangement of Epitaphs ably demonstrates — Banno

Having very recently written on this specific piece, I think you are very much overreaching on the implications of it's content.
All it really shows us is that rule breaking can come under the same banner as the rules. Rules work without breaking them - not so the other way. The irony of the Jabberwocky isn't that language doesn't operate on rules - its that humans perceive much more nuanced rules than that which is on the page, making dogma seem stupid - not that language operates on rules. Donnellan was getting at this, I think, in Reference and Definite Descriptions. More explicitly outlined in Grice's co-operative principle - that principle is just further rules for interpreting the breaking of semantic rules. I think.

which will be true in most cases. — Banno

Which cases would it not be true? Curiosity only.

If what you are saying is that if we break the rules, then by that very fact there are indeed rules, then we agree.

I want to go a step beyond that, to include, along side Davidson's point, the one made in Philosophical Investigations, §201; that there are ways of following and going against a rule that are not said, but shown; and this I take to be indicating that it is the activity that is at the core, not the rule.

All of which is almost to observe that the rules of language are all of them post hoc; inferred after the fact

Language will always be bigger than the rules folk seek to use to circumscribe it.

And that, perhaps, is also the lesson of the incompleteness theorems.

Language is not algorithmic.

All of which is almost to observe that the rules of language are all of them post hoc; inferred after the fact — Banno

:up: