The purpose of transcendental philosophy should be to give an account of the structure of subjectivity, not the content, whereas the question of mind-dependence is a question that should be asked at the level of content, not structure. — Esse Quam Videri

The structure of subjectivity goes beyond the purview of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in that the structure of subjectivity must include pure practical reason, re: moral philosophy, which transcendental philosophy does not address. Ref: A15/B29

Transcendental philosophy has for its object the structure and bounds of pure speculative reason, all its content already having been abstracted, and the critique of it is that by which understanding obtains the rules for its proper concerns, re: the possibility for and validity of pure a priori synthetic cognitions in relation to empirical conditions.
————-

Kant gives you the “participatory” part, but it’s at the expense of the “knowing” part. — Esse Quam Videri

Might this be separating the system in the talk of it, from the system in the operation of it? The system in and of itself, regardless of the talk about it, is both participatory and knowing. The system doesn’t have subjects and objects; the talk of it merely reifies some speculative content into comprehensible expressions, of which the modus operandi doesn’t have and therefore of which it makes no use.

Bottom line is we don’t know how we know stuff, but we’re at a complete loss if we then say we really don’t know anything. As soon as we say we know we are obliged to say how we know, in which is found the necessity that the part that participates in knowing, and knowing which is participated in, are the same.

In Kant then is found that the participatory part is the prescription for the knowing part, hence cannot really be said the one is at the expense of the other.

If I’ve understood you close enough, that is.

So we have three things:

*A subject
*An object
*A relation between subject and object — Esse Quam Videri

But surely this construction is made from a perspective outside all three of them! Look, you say, on the one side, the proverbial chair, on the other, the subject, and between them, the act of cognition. But that observation can only be made from third person perspective. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but it is, again, an abstraction. The subject whom you are here designating an object, is only object from a third-person or external perspective. So the entire construction still remains 'vorstellung', representation, in Schopenhauer's terms.

This line of thought has been greatly elaborated by later phenomenology and existentialism.

what I am skeptical of is the notion that the entirety of the contents of the lebenswelt exists only in the mind. — Esse Quam Videri

Recall a key claim from the mind-created world OP:

it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind.

So I am acknowledging the empirical facts of the matter. I say at the outset that the claim is not that 'the world is all in the mind' in a naive sense. But that

what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis.

This is the fulcrum of the entire argument, and where it is most indebted to Kant. I'm not saying that 'the object' ceases to exist sans observer, but that it neither exists, nor doesn't exist. Either claim rests on an inherent notion of what it means for something to exist. ('Neither existent nor non-existent' is what I take the 'in-itself' to denote.)

The natural sciences will proceed entirely in terms of what is objectively so, with no regard for this point. The discoveries of quantum physics, however, have obliged science to reckon with 'the observer' - which is the impact of 'the observer problem'.

A great deal of the dialectic of modern philosophy has vacillated between 'the object alone is real', materialism, and 'the subject alone is real', Berkelian idealism. Kant threads the needle between those two extremes. He doesn't deny the empirical reality of the objective domain but notes that the mind provides the context within which the sense of the objective world is intelligible:

If we take away the subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. — COPR, B59

As Paul Davies notes (The Goldilocks Enigma, p. 271), cosmologist Andrei Linde argues—on the basis of quantum cosmology—that time disappears when the universe is treated as a whole, and can only be recovered by partitioning the universe into an observer-with-a-clock and the rest. In that precise sense, the observer plays a constitutive role: without it, the universe is “dead,” i.e. non-temporal. Linde develops the technical basis of this claim in Inflation, Quantum Cosmology and the Anthropic Principle (hep-th/0211048), while expressing its philosophical implications more explicitly in talks and interviews (including this Closer to Truth interview with Robert Lawrence Kuhn).

I think he's trying to convey precisely the same point as Kant.

As for the unknowable nature of the in-itself. Kant has been criticized for this suggestion from the time it was made, but I don't think it's nearly so radical as it is often depicted. I'd endorse this:

Bottom line is we don’t know how we know stuff, but we’re at a complete loss if we then say we really don’t know anything. — Mww

I will happily concede that some readings of Kant seem to leave us completely separated from an unknowable reality. But on the other hand, a sense of the 'unknowability of existence' is a fundamental philosophical virtue in my book.

A form existing in a mind-independent way (esse naturale) is always potentially intelligible. When the intellect grasps the form it becomes actually intelligible (esse intentionale). However, it is still one-and-the-same form now instantiated in two different ways. — Esse Quam Videri

It is nevertheless the case that the form can only be grasped by nous. That is what rationality enables, it is the faculty that makes us 'the rational animal'. The philosophical question is, in what sense do forms exist? Again, they're not phenomenal existents (unless you accept the D M Armstrong definition which equates forms with attributes of particulars, which I don't.) They are, as per the classical tradition, intelligibles - not dependent on the mind, but only perceptible to the intellect.

Meaning requires a Me. A digital computer has no self-concept to serve as the Subject to interpret incoming data relative to Self-interest. Does AI know itself? — Gnomon

I tossed this to Claude. Read on if you wish.

Another difficult subject. Suffice to say, I think it's the understanding, taken as obvious by a lot of our contemporaries, that science is the arbiter of what is truly the case. But scientific method embodies certain characteristic attitudes and procedures which are problematic in a philosophical context. — Wayfarer

How else do we know "what is true"? asserts that Formal or Mathematical Logic is the arbiter of true/false questions. And algorithmic computers are known as the masters of math. But philosophy is supposed to be a search for Wisdom, while religion is presumed to provide absolute divinely-revealed Truth. Some disparagingly call philosophy "the study of questions without answers". Yet ancient Philosophy has spawned empirical Science as a tool to provide pertinent facts (not truths) to guide us in our exploration of a puzzling world.

A Scientific American Nov25 article is entitled "Can AI outdo mathematicians?" The article author, professor of mathematics at Johns Hopkins, warned : " Although so-called reasoning models are prompted to break problems down into pieces [analysis] and explain their 'thinking' step-by-step [logic], the output is as likely to produce an argument that sounds logical but isn't as to constitute a genuine proof". She concludes by noting : "in life, there is a lot of uncertainty".

A related question may be : can True/False computers replace Maybe/Maybe-Not human philosophers?*1 In a formal (ideal) world, digital and large-language computers may outperform human reasoning. But that's precisely because the machines omit & avoid the complexities & contradictions ("shades of color" & nuances of meaning) characteristic of informal human thinking about real world inter-subjective situations. 1/0 and true/false deliberately "exclude the middle" of uncertainties & infinities that plague imperfect analog humans.

As Wayfarer repeatedly notes : Logical Math, Reductive Science, and Digital Computers have no self-perspective to put the world into a meaningful dynamic context relative to personal questioners. Hence, their absolute either-or, black-vs-white, ideal-world outputs cannot account for real-world problems & questions of fallible-but-goal-oriented humans. Computers supply yes/no answers, but they don't ask philosophical questions*2. Socrates asked a lot of questions, and aspired to ideal Truth, but admitted in intellectual humility that he knew nothing for certain.

Consequently, in my humble opinion, bivalent (two-value) reasoning has no place on an informal forum like this, where we ask not-what-is-true-or-false, but what-is-meaningful in a specific situation. Is this a Science & Technology Forum or a Philosophy forum? :nerd:



*1. What is the difference between mathematical reasoning and philosophical reasoning?
I think the big difference between mathematics and philosophy is that mathematics tends to start from something like a formal system, and see how much can be proven within it. Philosophy approaches the question of "what formal systems are right?" If a formal system proves something non-intuitive, Philosophers will immediately start studying the axioms of the formal system to see if they may be missing something. Philosophers admit more shades of "color" into their arguments than mathematicians can.
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/21304/what-is-the-difference-between-mathematical-reasoning-and-philosophical-reasoning

*2. Computers can simulate asking and answering philosophical questions by processing vast amounts of text and mimicking philosophical discourse, but whether they can truly ask original, conscious philosophical questions is a major debate, largely hinging on consciousness, understanding (semantics vs. syntax), and the nature of ideas, with most experts currently saying no, as current AI manipulates symbols without genuine comprehension or subjective experience (qualia).
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=can+computers+ask+philosophical+questions

Meaning requires a Me. A digital computer has no self-concept to serve as the Subject to interpret incoming data relative to Self-interest. Does AI know itself? — Gnomon
I tossed this to Claude. Read on if you wish. — Wayfarer

I have no experience with AI, other than Google Search. But I suspect that the human programmers of Chat-Bots necessarily include a self-reference algorithm in the basic code. But whether that kind of reflection constitutes self-awareness, I have to agree with Claude : "I'm genuinely uncertain whether I have experiences with the qualitative character that humans do, or whether there's "something it's like" to be me processing these words". :smile:


A self-referential algorithm is a computational process that can inspect, modify, or interact with its own structure, data, or operation, often creating a feedback loop where the algorithm's behavior influences its future state or even its own code.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=self+referential+algorithm

↪180 Proof asserts that Formal (mathematical) Logic is the arbiter of true/false questions. — Gnomon

I'm not interested in being drawn into comments about debates with 180proof. From time to time I may respond to his comments directed at me.

As for AI - I recommend spending some time with one of the AI systems, they're freely available. Claude.ai is as good as any. Their model is such that they are time-limited - they will limit the number of responses unless you sign up for a subscription. But you will find them vastly superior to random search results generated by Google (a fact that Google itself is well aware of.) I think you would be surprised by the depth and nuance of the responses they're capable of giving.

How else do we know "what is true"? — Gnomon

Notice that in the context of science, this is usually limited to a specific question or subject matter, but can also then be expanded to include general theories and hypotheses. Philosophical questions are much more open-ended and often not nearly so specific. That is the subject of another thread, The Predicament of Modernity.

The Galilean division. This marks a major turning point in the history of ideas. In seeking to render nature mathematically intelligible, Galileo distinguished between primary and secondary qualities: the former—extension, shape, motion, and number—belong to objects themselves and are therefore measurable; the latter—colour, taste, sound, and all that pertains to sense or value—were deemed to exist only in the perceiving mind. This move, later assumed by the British Empiricists, established the framework of modern science but also quietly redefined reality as whatever could be expressed in quantitative terms. The world thus became a domain of pure objectivity, stripped of meaning, while meaning itself was relegated to the interior realm of subjective experience.

That accounts for a lot of what is going on here.

can True/False computers replace Maybe/Maybe-Not human philosophers?* — Gnomon

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic address this, at least to a degree.

I'm not interested in being drawn into comments about debates with 180proof. From time to time I may respond to his comments directed at me. — Wayfarer

Me too. Apparently, because my BothAnd philosophy is so offensive to his Either/Or worldview, he seldom engages me in philosophical dialog. So normally, I ignore his trolling taunts & gibes, unless he happens to raise a question pertinent to the current topic.

In this thread, I think his two-value logic is not appropriate. So, I tried to explain to myself why philosophy does not deal in yes-no questions. I only include his reply-name because, in years past, he objected to my talking behind his back, without naming him. I don't know why he wastes time actually reading my posts on topics that seem to viscerally upset him. :smile:

There is something I'll add, as a long-time forum habitué. There is an unspoken prohibition in much of modern philosophy against expressions and ideas that can be associated with religion, even if tenuously.

When I did undergrad philosophy, I formed the view that a great deal of modern English-language philosophy is deliberately couched in terms which exclude anything associated with classical metaphysics. That reached its sharpest expression with logical positivism (in which I did a unit), but it also animates many of the debates here.

There's also the matter of temperament. Some are temperamentally drawn to religious ideas, others are temperamentally averse to them.

So there are several dynamics at play in many of these debates, often revolving around unstated premises and beliefs.

I've got two of Thomas Nagel's essays online which are relevant, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament and Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. Thomas Nagel is important, because he's no religious apologist, indeed he says he is atheist with no 'sensus divinatus', and he's well regarded in analytic philosophy. (Although since his 2012 Mind and Cosmos, he is routinely accused of giving 'aid and comfort to creationists', but to me that just signifies the close-mindedness of his detractors,)

I have no experience with AI, other than Google Search. But I suspect that the human programmers of Chat-Bots necessarily include a self-reference algorithm in the basic code. But whether that kind of reflection constitutes self-awareness, I have to agree with Claude : "I'm genuinely uncertain whether I have experiences with the qualitative character that humans do, or whether there's "something it's like" to be me processing these words". :smile:

There seems to be a conflation in this discussion, between self reference and self awareness. Claude is clearly both self-referential and self-aware. But has no conscious understanding or experience of what it is aware of. This is because consciousness is not a computational process, it is a living state. Claude may be more self-aware than any human, ie. Fully knowledgeable of every piece of information, accessible to it at all times and yet entirely unconscious and unconscious of what it is aware of. Whereas a person is only partially self aware and has to struggle to remember things, or decide how he/she feels about things, while being all too conscious of how slowly the cogs are turning in their own mind.

We need to tease out what is intelligence from what is consciousness and keep them separate.

Now I hold that plants are conscious, just not like us. But they are alive and present and conscious in a more meditative state than us, because they don’t have a brain. A thought experiment; a tree as it grows might encounter an accurately fashioned metal cube and grow around it as it gets bigger. In a sense, it has represented the shape, or form of that cube in it’s body and when the tree is cut down and the cube removed, the shape and dimensions of that cube can be obtained by measuring the void in the tree’s body. So the tree has described and recorded the metal cube and is able to deliver that information to the person examining the void in its body. So in a sense the tree is performing the same task as the AI. Describing and recording data about something and transferring that data to us. But just in a different way, a way that includes conscious behaviour, but which the tree is entirely unconscious of, rather like the way the AI is entirely unconscious of what it is doing.

AI systems can be fully described and specified in terms of information science. They are not in the least conscious. A microbe has a higher degree of consciousness than does a multi-billion dollar data processing centre running the most up-to-date AI system. At the same time, because of the enormous amounts of information they have absorbed, and the ability they have to cross reference and infer meanings, they very well emulate what conscious beings such as ourselves might say.

Yes AI are masters of mimicry, it’s important to keep what they do separate from being conscious.

…..some readings of Kant seem to leave us completely separated from an unknowable reality. — Wayfarer

We have to be completely separated from the unknowable, don’t we? An unknowable reality is a contradiction in terms, technically, but still, we have to be separated from the unknowable simply by the limitations of our system of knowing. But that’s fine; we aren’t seeking the unknowable anyway. We want to know what’s given to us, not what isn’t.

….the 'unknowability of existence' is a fundamental philosophical virtue…. — Wayfarer

Many things exist; there is no such thing as existence. Nothing whatsoever is added to the conception of a thing, by including existence in its predicate.

The rejoinder often in the form…is existence a property of a thing, or a condition for the possibility of a thing? It is neither, if it is actually a category, and categories are that which grounds the very possibility of experience of things in general. Theoretically.

Dunno about virtue, though. Not sure about its philosophical significance.

The structure of subjectivity goes beyond the purview of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in that the structure of subjectivity must include pure practical reason, re: moral philosophy, which transcendental philosophy does not address. Ref: A15/B29

Transcendental philosophy has for its object the structure and bounds of pure speculative reason, all its content already having been abstracted, and the critique of it is that by which understanding obtains the rules for its proper concerns, re: the possibility for and validity of pure a priori synthetic cognitions in relation to empirical conditions. — Mww

Yes, this is Kant’s definition of transcendental philosophy, but I am approaching it differently. Kant excludes the analysis of practical reason because it deals with desire, which is an empirical matter. For Kant the transcendental is not only epistemically “prior” to the empirical, but also “ontologically” prior (in some sense) as well, whereas the account I’ve been elaborating sees it as only epistemically prior.

Might this be separating the system in the talk of it, from the system in the operation of it? The system in and of itself, regardless of the talk about it, is both participatory and knowing. The system doesn’t have subjects and objects; the talk of it merely reifies some speculative content into comprehensible expressions, of which the modus operandi doesn’t have and therefore of which it makes no use. — Mww

I think what you are describing here is the idea that the system in operation is, in some sense, “overabundant” with respect to the system in the talk of it which, if you think about it, is already implied within the idea that the object in-itself is in excess of the object for-consciousness as laid out previously. The system in operation is trying to understand itself. This just means that the system itself plays the role of “object” in its conceptualization of itself. This implies that the system as it is in-itself is always epistemically in excess of the system as it is for-consciousness. There is always more to know about the system than is already known.The system knows it doesn’t know everything about itself. This is the known-unknown. Unknown, but not unknowable, otherwise inquiry would cease (or, more accurately, never get started in the first place).

I am approaching it differently — Esse Quam Videri

As did Schopenhauer; nothing wrong with it, as long as it remains true to its name. Wouldn’t be fair or right to call it transcendental philosophy when approached differently enough to falsify its tenets.

I’d agree Kant’s account is epistemic, but not sure about “prior to the empirical”. And I don’t know in what sense any of Kant’s account is ontological, re: “… The proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine must give
way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding…” (A247/B303).

I think what you are describing here is idea that the system in operation is, in some sense, “overabundant” with respect to the system in the talk of it…. — Esse Quam Videri

Actually, I was going for the opposite. The system in operation is just that; the talk of the system is over and above, or in addition to, the operation itself. I mean…the system never talks to itself, isn’t trying to understand itself; it is just that which understands, and is necessarily presupposed by the talk of it.

I would sooner just admit to the intrinsic circularity of the human intellectual system, regardless of its name. To use reason in describing what reason is or does, and all the other speculatively derived faculties and conditions as well, is the epitome of circular reasoning, but at the same time, is in all cases unavoidable, for otherwise, as you say, inquires would cease.

The warning to guard against it, and the method for it, is in the text, but the elimination of “in-excess” thinking and rational constructs generally, is impossible. Search for the unconditioned and all that jazz.

This is why Kant took pains to emphasize his method was strictly grounded in tripartite logical syllogism, in which the truth in the premises grants the truth in the conclusion. He never says his system is in fact the operative human system, which he would never admit to knowing in the first place, but only the “if this then that” construct.

I can sorta see the “object-in-itself” is in excess of the “object-for-consciousness”, but they are certainly very different from each other.

But surely this construction is made from a perspective outside all three of them! Look, you say, on the one side, the proverbial chair, on the other, the subject, and between them, the act of cognition. But that observation can only be made from third person perspective. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but it is, again, an abstraction. The subject whom you are here designating an object, is only object from a third-person or external perspective. So the entire construction still remains 'vorstellung', representation, in Schopenhauer's terms. — Wayfarer

I don’t agree with the idea that the subject is forever hidden behind a veil of representation, firstly because I don’t believe that knowledge is essentially representational in nature. Furthermore, I would argue that consciousness is intrinsically reflexive such that we can experience our experiencing, understand our understanding, reason about our reasoning, etc. This doesn’t require an impossible “exit” from subjectivity, but is built into how consciousness works. The subject isn’t something hiding behind its acts, but is constituted by those acts and is accessible through them. This isn’t just theoretical artifice - it’s a part of how I plainly experience, understand and know myself on a day-to-day basis.

Furthermore, to claim that “the subject is unknowable” amounts to a performative contradiction since it is itself a claim made by the subject about the subject. If true, how do you know it’s true? Either the claim is known to be true, in which case knowledge of the subject is possible, or else it is false, in which case knowledge of the subject is possible.

I will happily concede that some readings of Kant seem to leave us completely separated from an unknowable reality. But on the other hand, a sense of the 'unknowability of existence' is a fundamental philosophical virtue in my book. — Wayfarer

I think this sounds more romantic than it really is. If Being is unknowable then inquiry is pointless. I’d rather say that the intelligibility of Being is inexhaustible. No matter how much we already know, there’s always more to be known.

It is nevertheless the case that the form can only be grasped by nous. That is what rationality enables, it is the faculty that makes us 'the rational animal'. The philosophical question is, in what sense do forms exist? Again, they're not phenomenal existents (unless you accept the D M Armstrong definition which equates forms with attributes of particulars, which I don't.) They are, as per the classical tradition, intelligibles - not dependent on the mind, but only perceptible to the intellect. — Wayfarer

Yes, form can only be grasped by nous - the very same forms that also exist in the world independently of nous. This is just how mind and world connect. I would argue that the reason that this is hard for you to see is that you’ve chosen an epistemology (based on an ontology) that makes it impossible for mind and world to connect in this manner.

can True/False computers replace Maybe/Maybe-Not human philosophers?* — Gnomon
Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic address this, at least to a degree. — Relativist

Yes. Non-algorithmic Fuzzy Logic*1 is an attempt to make digital computers think more like humans. And it may be necessary for Chat Bots to deal with imprecise human dialog. Yet it reduces the primary advantage of computers : precision & predictability.

Microprocessor inventor, Federico Faggin says : "There is an unbridgeable gap between artificial and human intelligence, which is characterized by comprehension : a non-algorithmic property of consciousness that is often underestimated and inaccessible to computers"

I suspect that, if developers want to create a more realistic humanoid companion robot, they will have make them out of non-algorithmic flesh & blood instead of silicon semiconductors. But we may then have to deal with loveable ditzy dames, instead of stolid Mr. Spock robots.. :wink:


*1. Fuzzy logic's main advantages include its ability to handle imprecise, vague, or uncertain information (like human language), mimicking human reasoning for more natural decisions, and its robust, cost-effective nature, allowing simple sensors and easy performance tuning for complex control systems in areas like appliances, automotive, and AI. It provides smooth, gradual control and can model complex, non-linear systems without needing exact mathematical models
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=fuzzy+logic+advantages

There's also the matter of temperament. Some are temperamentally drawn to religious ideas, others are temperamentally averse to them. — Wayfarer

Yes. As an anti-social introvert, I am not temperamentally attracted to emotional social religions. I suppose dull rational internet philosophy is my religion substitute. :nerd:

Now I hold that plants are conscious, just not like us. But they are alive and present and conscious in a more meditative state than us, because they don’t have a brain. . . . .
Describing and recording data about something and transferring that data to us. But just in a different way, a way that includes conscious behaviour, but which the tree is entirely unconscious of, rather like the way the AI is entirely unconscious of what it is doing. — Punshhh

That's an interesting way to look at the consciousness conundrum. Living organic plants could not survive if they didn't sense their environment, and interact with it in a manner controlled by self-interest. The Consciousness definition below includes a social factor (with) that might help to distinguish human-style awareness from plant & amoeba sensitivity to internal needs and external goods. As social beings, we need to be aware of what our fellows are aware of. :smile:


*1. The word consciousness comes from Latin conscientia, meaning "shared knowledge," combining con- (with) and scire (to know), initially implying joint awareness or a shared secret. It evolved in English in the 17th century, first meaning "internal knowledge," then expanding to "awareness of one's own mind" (1670s) and later "awareness of anything" (1740s). The term has roots in the Latin conscius (knowing with) and its Greek predecessor syneidesis, highlighting a core idea of knowing alongside or within oneself.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=consciousness+etymology

Yes. Non-algorithmic Fuzzy Logic*1 is an attempt to make digital computers think more like humans. And it may be necessary for Chat Bots to deal with imprecise human dialog. Yet it reduces the primary advantage of computers : precision & predictability. — Gnomon

Fuzzy logic and paraconsistent logic ARE algorithmic- it's feasible to program these. The programmming could keep it predictable (a given input will necessarily produce the same output), or randomness could be introduced.

Neither of these processes is inconsistent with standard 1st order logic. Standard logic is a special case of fuzzy logic with each premise assigned a 100% certainty.

Microprocessor inventor, Federico Faggin says : "There is an unbridgeable gap between artificial and human intelligence, which is characterized by comprehension : a non-algorithmic property of consciousness that is often underestimated and inaccessible to computers" — Gnomon

He is expressing an opinion, one that I regard as rooted in a lack of imagination.

To be clear (and to repeat what I've said elsewhere in this thread), feelings are not algorithmic. They are the one serious challenge for physicalism. They do not, however, falsify it.

Set that challenge aside for the moment, and assume as a premise that feelings could be added to the hardware. I suggest that this would make it feasible to duplicate human reasoning: not a mere simulation, but duplicating the algorthmic processing that it involves.

I don’t agree with the idea that the subject is forever hidden behind a veil of representation — Esse Quam Videri

I didn't say that. I said, the subject is not an object, except to another subject. When i look at you, I see another subject as object, although the fact that we use personal pronouns acknowledges the fact that you are another subject, and not an object. First-person subjectivity is real, but it is not something that can appear to itself as an object. That’s a categorical point, not a skeptical one.

I would argue that consciousness is intrinsically reflexive such that we can experience our experiencing, understand our understanding, reason about our reasoning, etc. — Esse Quam Videri

We can obviously think about our own thinking, but it remains the fact that although we can see our eye in the mirror, we cannot see our own act of seeing. Also a categorical distinction.

Yes, form can only be grasped by nous - the very same forms that also exist in the world independently of nous. — Esse Quam Videri

But, do forms exist in the world? If they are only grasped by intellect, in what sense do they exist? That is a very large question, of course, and one that I by no means expect to be able to resolve. But if they are intelligible objects, then their existence is by definition intelligible.

In the pre-modern tradition this was expressed by saying that forms exist “in the divine intellect.” That wasn’t meant as a theological add-on, but as a way of saying that intelligibility has a transcendental ground. The intellect's grasp of an intelligible is what makes objectivity possible. They were said to be 'truly so', in a way that overflows even the objective reality, in that they were the form that the particular strived to become.

The late medieval rejection of transcendentals marks a decisive shift: intelligibility is no longer treated as foundational, but is increasingly reduced to what can be abstracted from empirical particulars (which is nominalism). That shift ultimately culminates in modern empiricism and the contemporary “immanent frame” (Charles Taylor).

The critique presented in the “mind-created world” is not an attempt to revive the doctrine of the divine intellect, but to show that mind can still be understood as foundational even within the immanent frame, once we abandon the assumption that reality can be grasped solely in terms of objects.

I’d agree Kant’s account is epistemic, but not sure about “prior to the empirical”. And I don’t know in what sense any of Kant’s account is ontological, re: “… The proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognition of things in general in a systematic doctrine must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding…” (A247/B303). — Mww

What I mean by “epistemically prior to the empirical” is that a proper understanding of the empirical depends on a proper understanding of the transcendental. By “ontologically prior” I mean that the existence of the empirical world depends on the existence of the operations of the transcendental subject. I would argue Kant’s system entails both, though I recognize there are other interpretations.

Actually, I was going for the opposite. The system in operation is just that; the talk of the system is over and above, or in addition to, the operation itself. I mean…the system never talks to itself, isn’t trying to understand itself; it is just that which understands, and is necessarily presupposed by the talk of it. — Mww

I would disagree with this. As mentioned in my reply to Wayfarer, I see consciousness as inherently reflexive. It can (and manifestly does) use experience, understanding and reason to appropriate itself as experiencer, understander and reasoner.

Set that challenge aside for the moment, and assume as a premise that feelings could be added to the hardware. I suggest that this would make it feasible to duplicate human reasoning: not a mere simulation, but duplicating the algorthmic processing that it involves.

Then the way forward would be to create a cyborg. The technology is already being developed, but is in its infancy. It’s only a matter of time now.

I didn't say that. I said, the subject is not an object, except to another subject. When i look at you, I see another subject as object, although the fact that we use personal pronouns acknowledges the fact that you are another subject, and not an object. First-person subjectivity is real, but it is not something that can appear to itself as an object. That’s a categorical point, not a skeptical one.

We can obviously think about our own thinking, but it remains the fact that although we can see our eye in the mirror, we cannot see our own act of seeing. Also a categorical distinction — Wayfarer

It sounds like we may be at an impasse here. It seems fairly self-evident to me that the subject can become its own object, otherwise self-knowledge would be impossible. However, you seem particularly concerned here, not with self-knowledge, but with self-experience. From my perspective it seems equally self-evident that I am aware of my acts of seeing. This isn’t because I can “see my own seeing”, but because conscious awareness is intrinsic to the act of seeing something. I am intrinsically conscious of my conscious acts - otherwise they wouldn’t be conscious acts.

But, do forms exist in the world? If they are only grasped by intellect, in what sense do they exist? — Wayfarer

Recall that in the Aristotelian tradition material substance is a compound of matter, form and existence. Form is what actualizes matter and doesn’t exist independently of matter. So yes, in that tradition, forms exist in the world in a mind-independent way as immanent to material substance - not in the mind of God, nor in a Platonic “third-realm”. Whether this account (or something like it) is correct is another question, but this is my understanding of how Aristotle would have answered your question, and I would tend to agree with the general approach, if not with all of the fine details.