I confess I don't understand the point of the exegesis on triangulation. I'm uncertain just what an imperfect triangle might be. My guess, however, is that it isn't a triangle. In which case a "perfect" triangle is, simply, a triangle. It should be unsurprising that when we think about a triangle, we think about a triangle. It's difficult to ascribe much significance to this fact. But it seems some do and I wonder why? — Ciceronianus

You’re able to grasp the concept of a triangle — “a flat plane bounded by three intersecting straight lines” — because you possess a rational intelligence capable of understanding what the word means. That capacity is fundamental to language and to rational thought itself.

It’s easy to take this for granted because you and I both possess it: the ability to apprehend abstract, intelligible forms. The triangle is merely a simple example. The same point applies to any number of concepts, principles, and relations that H. sapiens can grasp thanks to its fantastically elaborated forebrain.

Why does this matter? Because without universals, you can’t explain how any rule-governed thought is possible. You can’t explain how different people can understand the same concept, or why a mathematical truth holds regardless of who considers it, or how we recognise something as falling under a shared description. And, crucially, you can’t explain how we move from particular things to general claims — which is what every argument requires.

(And if that sounds like neural reductionism, it isn’t. You won’t find any of these forms or principles in neural data. The brain enables the grasp of concepts, but the concepts themselves aren’t hiding in the folds of the cortex. The way I think of it is that h.sapiens evolved to the point of being able to grasp universals, which affords them – us – with a capacity to grasp universal truths. I think this capacity is usually either assumed, explained away, or ignored. See Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, Parts II - III.)

:ok:

Excellent argument. But it will be ignored. :grin: — apokrisis

It is an excellent argument and it will be ignored―when confirmation bias is that strong it becomes impenetrable.

As the adage, apparently misattributed to Mark Twain has it: "Never argue with stupid people―they will drag you down to their level and beat you with experience".

it will be ignored — Janus

It was, in fact, addressed, point by point - but there's no use explaining that to someone who is not prepared to reckon with it. Hence Twain's adage, very suitable in the context.

Identify something you believe about "the preconditions that make observation, measurement, and intelligibility possible", and provide your justification for believing it.
— Relativist

I wouldn't expect a response to this. — wonderer1

And the response was - in case it went past you - that the precondition is the capacity to grasp rational concepts, which is not something that needs to be explained in scientific terms, but without which there could be no scientific understanding.

Curious that it was said that I would likely ignore relativist's challenges, but then when I answer them, the response is ignored. Who is ignoring what, exactly?

I have no problem with philosophical speculation. It operates in science in the form of abductive reasoning. The point is that it should be underwritten by science, if we are speculating about the nature of things. For ethics and aesthetics it might be a different matter―science may not have much to tell us in those domains.

How things such as matter, mind or consciousness intuitively seem (the province of phenomenology) which is determined by reflection on experience, tells us only about how we, prior to any scientific investigation, might imagine that these things are. That may have its own value in understanding the evolution of human understanding, but it tells us nothing about how the world things really are.

So I was responding to the dogmatic assertion that "linguistic communication would be impossible if materialism were true". I reject that as dogma because it assumes that the material world is purely a "billiard ball" world of mindless atoms in the void..

I'm discussing the justified beliefs we can derive about the actual world. Beliefs derived from science have a good justification, whereas beliefs derived from metaphysical speculation seem (to me) unjustified, or only weakly justified. We see lots of philosophical theories tossed around, but I'm not seeing much of a defense of them- other than it being possibly true. — Relativist

The bolded appears to rely on the italicised. That appears quite problematic to me, and likely what Wayfarer is getting at, i think. But you are patently correct, prima facie.

The bolded appears to rely on the italicised. That appears quite problematic to me, and likely what Wayfarer is getting at, i think. But you are patently correct, prima facie. — AmadeusD

Why is it problematic that metaphysical speculations should be based on something other than merely the imagination, scriptural authority, the supposed authority of the ancients or mystical experiences and reports?

What? I have literally no clue what you're talking about. I'll try to just clarify what I was saying in hopes that's made-sense-of.

What I am pointing out is that the bolded in that quote relies explicitly on the metaphysical/philosophical theories underlying the scientific method, reportage standards (like peer-review and all the problems that go with it including replication issues) and empirical observation-as-infallible thinking. Again, prima facie, its patently correct that measuring the rainfall and explaining clouds on that basis is a better-justified method for forming beliefs about the clouds than inferring that there's an angry man pissing from the sky.

I am simply saying this is not without shaky foundations. We do not start with observation. We start with ourselves and can only carry out observations we're going to later take as gospel (excuse the religious language) on the basis that we believe our perceptual, recall and output systems are, at least practically speaking, not fallible in any major ways. These are things science cannot give us an answer to. Wayf seems to be much more intently, and explicitly exploring that problem.

This doesn't seem to even be outside the realm of scientific: our perceptual system is not direct observation, and neither are our experiments because we are not the data. We interpret it. Our science tells us this. Oh, but that's recursive... so... yeah. We're kind of stuck conceptually and "do our best". Hence, prima facie, correct.

An interesting thing to note is that when I argue for Indirect Realism, i am given arguments about how science can't prove our perception is indirect if we are IRists(this comes in response to the next claim i am about to make..).
But that is exactly what science tells us about our perceptual system - so either my above notions are correct and IR can hold despite this failure of science to answer a fundamental issue, or we can trust the science anyway and accept Indirect realism on that basis.
Not the only options, but in criticisms laid on me for the IR position, this comes up. Bit of a stalemate.

I am simply saying this is not without shaky foundations. We do not start with observation. We start with ourselves and can only carry out observations on the basis that we think our perceptual, recall and output systems are, at least practically speaking, not fallible in any major ways. These are things science cannot give us an answer to. — AmadeusD

Science doesn't presuppose that our observations are infallible―hence the importance of peer review. All we have to work with are our perceptual and recall systems. I'm not sure what you meant by "output" systems.

Anyway science is fallibilistic through and through, and our fallible perceptions and memories are all we have to work with. You might say this is problematic if you demand certainty, but otherwise it is just the human condition, and I don't think the fallibility of science is as great as the fallibility (in the sense of being subject to illusion) of scriptural authority, mystical experience and the rest..

Anyway it looks I misunderstood you to be saying that science is not a better foundation from which to speculate metaphysically than imagination and the other things I mentioned.

Fair response all round, thank you.

I'm not sure what you meant by "output" systems. — Janus

How we convey scientific information. This could be how technical writing works, how semantics work in relation to experiments and their results, or it could mean how we teach different levels of student (tropey: in your last year of high school it is common to be told "we've taught you wrong for years for practical reasons. Now you're going to learn the real stuff". All have pitfalls, obstacles to accuracy etc.. etc.. etc..

I don't think the fallibility of science is as great as the fallibility (in the sense of being subject to illusion) of scriptural authority, mystical experience and the rest.. — Janus

I agree here, but I think plenty of philosophical thinking about non-scientific matters can produce robust beliefs. "X is good" can be extremely well justified philosophically. The break-down is going to be roughly in the same place as with science: human perception. On observational matters, I can't even get my abstract argument off the ground :sweat:

that science is not a better foundation from which to speculate metaphysically than imagination and the other things I mentioned — Janus

This is a bit of a goal-post move imo. I'm unsure that science is the best way to formulate beliefs about non-empirical matters. I'm unsure how it would have a leg up. It tends not to wade into those waters.

Positivism is a philosophical approach that argues all genuine knowledge is based on scientific observation and sensory experience. It rejects metaphysical speculation, religious faith, and other forms of "knowing", asserting that truth is found only
in verifiable, empirical facts.

A lot of people hold to a basically positivist attitude although they’ll generally deny it if it’s called. out

This is a bit of a goal-post move imo. I'm unsure that science is the best way to formulate beliefs about non-empirical matters. I'm unsure how it would have a leg up. It tends not to wade into those waters. — AmadeusD

As I said I don't believe science is always the best source to rely on in formulating beliefs about non-empirical matters such as ethics and aesthetics. I think we do have real non-science-based understandings of the human condition in general. Such understanding is exemplified in literature, novels and poetry, for example. I don't take issue with interpretations of mystical and religious experiences, provided they are acknowledged to be subjective interpretations. If religious interpretations are not acknowledged to be subjective then the road to fundamentalism opens up. And I would say the same about political ideologies.

Demonstrable truth is only to be found in logic and mathematics and to a lesser extent in science. I think people often conflate the observational and theoretical dimensions of science. We never can confirm with certainty that scientific theories are true, but observations can be confirmed by peer review. Scientific facts consist in what has been confirmed to be reliably observed. There are many scientific facts which we have no hope of observing ourselves, but I think it right to trust that the peer review process has determined which observations can be relied upon to be correct. That said, nothing about human knowledge is infallible.

Scientific facts are not matters of belief. If you know something to be factually true, then belief is superfluous. — Wayfarer

Then you don't understand what a belief is. In the strictest sense of the term, "knowledge" is true, adequately justified belief ("adequate" = sufficient to not be merely accidentally true). It's debatable whether or not scientific facts constitute "knowledge" in the strict sense, which is why I'm merely asking for a belief + its justification - something to raise it above mere possibility (I don't insist on knowledge).

You’re still treating the point I’m making as if it were an empirical claim about the contents of the world — something that could be justified the way a scientific hypothesis is. — Wayfarer

Then you misunderstand. I was simply asking what positive claims you can make about the structure and/or contents of the world other than scientific facts, and how you can justify the claim. You do make one in your reply, specifically about universals. I'll get to this shortly.

You invariably defer to the authority of science. But mine isn’t “untethered philosophising”: it’s philosophy. — Wayfarer

What I've said about science is that it produces justified beliefs about the world. Indeed, scientific "facts" are justified based on empiricism and abductive reasoning. It's interesting that you seem to treat scientific facts as something more than "beliefs". Although this suggests you misunderstand the term, "belief", it also implies that you indeed have a high regard for the understanding of the world that we have developed through science.

But I must stress that I have not made the claim of scientism, that science alone can produce justified beliefs about the world. I grant that there are aspects of the world that can be understood, and justifiably believed, independently of science. But this seems limited to fundamental concepts like universals, not to fuller metaphysical theories, not a comprehensive metaphysical theory, or even a theory of mind. Here's where you've only given me possibilities and negative facts, not justified beliefs.

Relativist: "Science can't establish which interpretation of QM is correct, but neither can philosphizing. What I object to is trying to justify belief in some metaphysical claim on the basis that it fits one particular interpretation. These resulting beliefs are better justified than philosophical speculations that produce a myriad of mutually exclusive, possibilities"


Such as? — Wayfarer

Such as the myriad of possibilities which derive from the negative fact that reductive physicalism has an explanatory gap associated with consciousness.

Nothing in [Feser's] argument is speculative. It is critical — Wayfarer

He is making a case for the reality of universals - justifying believing these exist. That's reasonable. It's also consistent with physicalism. It's a basic aspect of reality that we largely agree about. I'm looking for justification for claims you make that we disagree about.

Everyone agrees on the equations and the experimental results [of QM]; what is disputed is their meaning. If your view were correct, these interpretive disagreements could be resolved simply by “consulting the science.” — Wayfarer

Wrong again. I have never suggested that science can answer all questions. I also addressed this point explicitly in my last post when I said: "The various interpretations of QM aren't testable hypotheses, and does establish a limit to what we can justifiably know about the world- but it's a boundary that's been reached through science, not by untethered philosophizing."

Concepts are real, but not material.
They can only be grasped by a rational intelligence.
They do not exist as physical particulars or “states of affairs” in the world.
Yet science would be impossible without them. — Wayfarer

So what? You still accept scientific facts as true. You haven't suggested making any alteration, nor specific addition, to the set of (science based) beliefs about the world as a consequence of this insight. Instead, you just restate the same thing, about the role of our sensory/cognitive framework in developing these true, physical facts about the world. Other than being an interesting factoid that is folly to ignore, you haven't inferred any additional insights from it - not insights that can constitute justified beliefs. My impression is that you infer from this that reductive physicalism is false (a hasty judgement, IMO), but I haven't seen you defend some alternative.

You haven't suggested making any alteration, nor specific addition, to the set of (science based) beliefs about the world as a consequence of this insight. Instead, you just restate the same thing, about the role of our sensory/cognitive framework in developing these true, physical facts about the world. Other than being an interesting factoid that is folly to ignore, you haven't inferred any additional insights from it - not insights that can constitute justified beliefs — Relativist

Yes, I distinguish between factual knowledge and beliefs (justified or otherwise). No, I am not “opposed to science,” nor do I neglect the findings of science. What I am critical of is the appeal to science as the authoritative basis for philosophical justification.

My point about universals is simply that they are real but not physical; as Russell put it, they are not thoughts, but “when known they appear as thoughts.” Their reality is intelligible rather than phenomenal — they can be grasped by a rational mind, but they do not exist as physical particulars or states of affairs.

And recognising the role of the observing mind in the construction of knowledge is not a “factoid.” It is a philosophical insight. It does not produce new empirical claims — it clarifies the conditions that make empirical knowledge possible in the first place. It this seems a commonplace now, it is only because of the contributions of philosophers, such as Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi (and of course Immanuel Kant.) The whole subject of the relation of mind and world, is itself not a scientific one, as it cannot be sufficiently defined so as to constitute a scientific question.

That's a weird one - I don't see a tension between accepting that metaphysical discussion and lets call it 'moral' discussion can come to 'truths' and science giving us truth 'about' such and such.

I would simply say these non-empirical 'truths' are not concrete, empirical truths (as would be suggested by the two categories diverging at 'science'). Its not possibly to scientifically determine that I am thinking X. But you can be fairly certain of it in the right circumstances by conceptual analysis.

In the strictest sense of the term, "knowledge" is true, adequately justified belief ("adequate" = sufficient to not be merely accidentally true). — Relativist

This is very much problematic and has been up in the air for a while now. partially because there is no 'strictest sense' of the word knowledge which could be applied consistently.

I agree with essentially everything here, but I would put a wedge somewhere to put some distance between reliability and the scientific method - not because its rwong, but because its carried out, interpreted and put out by humans. Humans aren't very good at doing things properly.

Humans aren't very good at doing things properly. — AmadeusD

I agree with you about that. We are fucking up spectacularly when it comes to managing the ecosystem and most of us don't seem to be able to understand that only fools would treat it as an "externality", and yet that is precisely what most economists do.

The so-called hard sciences are the closest thing we have to an investigation that is impartial and open-minded (at least in principle). If scientific method is unreliable, how much more so are those practices, such as religion, which are not based on impartiality at all?

If scientific method is unreliable, how much more so are those practices, such as religion, which are not based on impartiality at all? — Janus

:fire:

You wonder how they tie their shoes, really, those religious types.

Thank you. But I don't see how the fact we possess intelligence indicates that our minds "bring" the form or concept of a triangle, or anything else for that matter, to experience. It merely indicates that we (minds and all) are able to interact with the rest of the world in a way other organisms cannot.

Thanks also for the reference to Maritain. I'm not a fan of Catholic apologists, though.

He (Feser) is making a case for the reality of universals - justifying believing these exist. That's reasonable. It's also consistent with physicalism. — Relativist

Not according to Edward Feser, it isn't. The universals that he has in mind —geometricity, equality, necessity, logical relations—are not physical, and cannot be described in physical terms. For A-T (Aristotelian-Thomism):

• Universals are forms (ideas, principles), and are real but not material
• They are instantiated by particulars, but cannot be reduced to them.
• Their mode of being is intelligible, not physical
• They are grasped by the intellect, not the senses
• They are the basis for the intelligibility of physical things (by conferring identity)

You may be referring to “universals” in Armstrong’s naturalistic sense, but they are not universals in the Aristotelian (or real!) sense. According to Armstrong:

• Universals are physical properties instantiated in the world
• (colour, mass, charge, spin, fragility, etc.)
• They are wholly located in spacetime
• (not abstract, not non-physical)
• They are identical with physical properties that recur in multiple places
• They are “universals” only in the sense of being repeatable physical features

Armstrong rejects:

• Platonic universals (too abstract)
• Aristotelian forms (too metaphysical)
• Fregean abstracta (non naturalistic)

Armstrong is not a realist about universals in the classical sense at all. He is a nominalist who has scaled up the notion of “repeatable physical properties” (not too far distant from Galileo's primary attributes) and called the result a universal. In effect, he is trying to universalise nominalism.

At issue, is the sense or mode of existence that universals (and other intelligibles) possess, as Betrand Russell also explains:



Note well his distinction 'subsists in' and 'exists'. It is of utmost importance.

Thank you. But I don't see how the fact we possess intelligence indicates that our minds "bring" the form or concept of a triangle, or anything else for that matter, to experience. — Ciceronianus

You're welcome. But, my dear sir, those elements which the mind brings to experience are precisely what Kant called the a priori conditions of cognition. They are not empirical additions; they are the very capacities that allow us to recognise and classify something as a triangle (or as a cause, an object, a quantity, and so on).

In other words, the mind does not 'inject' triangles into experience — it contributes the conceptual structure that makes “this thing” recognisable as a triangle in the first place, and thus communicable, definable, and held in common with others. It is essential to the mechanisms of meaning.

I also think it would be a slight on Maritain to dismiss him as a mere apologist. Not many on this forum seem to mention him, but his was a towering intellect, also notable for his commitment to Christian humanism, and generally identified with the religious left, in political terms. (And no, I'm not Catholic.)

I distinguish between factual knowledge and beliefs — Wayfarer

Knowledge of X entails belief of X.

What I am critical of is the appeal to science as the authoritative basis for philosophical justification. — Wayfarer

Who is defending THAT? I've simply suggested that to hold a rational belief X, that one needs (at minimum) something more than X is possible.

And recognising the role of the observing mind in the construction of knowledge is not a “factoid.” It is a philosophical insight. It does not produce new empirical claims — it clarifies the conditions that make empirical knowledge possible in the first place — Wayfarer

My question was not "what empirical claims does it lead to?" It was, "what justified beliefs does it lead to?"

If an insight leads to a dead-end, it doesn't seem to have practical significance, except for historical purposes.

My point about universals is simply that they are real but not physical; as Russell put it, they are not thoughts, but “when known they appear as thoughts.” Their reality is intelligible rather than phenomenal — they can be grasped by a rational mind, but they do not exist as physical particulars or states of affairs. — Wayfarer

We agree that (in some sense) universals exist. My view is that they exist immanently within objects- such as the 90 degree angle that exists between the walls of a room. This 90 degree relation between walls is a universal with no dependency on minds.

I seem to recall you agreeing with this immanent existence, but that you consider the (intra-mind) abstraction the universal. Perhaps you could clarify.

It was, "what justified beliefs does it lead to?" — Relativist

The justified belief that knowledge cannot be solely objective.

If an insight leads to a dead-end, — Relativist

Then it's not an insight. But the fact that someone doesn't recognise an insight doesn't mean it's a dead end.

My view is that they exist immanently within objects- such as the 90 degree angle that exists between the walls of a room. This 90 degree relation between walls is a universal with no dependency on minds. — Relativist

That is what the Russell passage above I posted is about - the relationship 'north of'. It doesn't exist in the same sense that Edinburgh and London exist, even though Edinburgh is north of London. ' There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. ...'

This is important, don't brush it aside.The reason it's not noticed is because we rely on the mind's ability to discern these relationships, without which we wouldn't be able to form an idea of the world. So that's the sense in which the world is 'mind-dependent' - not going in or out of existence, depending on whether you yourself see it, but because the whole idea of existence depends on the mind's ability to grasp these intelligible relations (which is elaborated in The Mind Created World op). Which we don't see because (as Russell says) they don't exist, they're not 'out there somewhere'. If there's a single insight that empiricism cannot grasp, it is this one and dare I say the apparent inability to grasp it, is an illustrative example.

This is becoming repetitive. If I fail to respond further, it won't be because I'm ignoring anyone's posts, but because they may not be presenting anything that hasn't alreafy been addressed.

I'm not sure what you mean by "empirical additions" but the capacities you refer to are, I'd suggest, the result of evolution--as you seemed to acknowledge in an earlier thread--and so are as much a result of our interaction with the rest of the world as are our thumbs (the evolution of which it seems played a role in the development of our intelligence).

So I'd say our capacities, like our thumbs, are the products of experience. They're derived from it. Which wouId suggest that the world created the mind instead of the mind creating the world, if we want to use such language. But I don't think we should treat them as separate in that sense.

I'm not sure what you mean by "empirical additions" but the capacities you refer to are, I'd suggest, the result of evolution--as you seemed to acknowledge in an earlier thread--and so are as much a result of our interaction with the rest of the world as are our thumbs (the evolution of which it seems played a role in the development of our intelligence). — Ciceronianus

Sure. I would never deny the facts of evolutionary theory, although I often question the significance that is attributed to it. I think if Plato had known what we now know he might have attributed his innate ideas to evolution instead of the soul having been re-born (and in fact Empedocles anticipated the idea of evolution, and even a form of natural selection.) But then, how different are the evolutionary and mythical accouts, really? H.sapiens evolved to the point of being language- and tool-using primates, capable of speech, philosophy, science and much more. As such, members of the species are born with innate capacities which other creatures lack, foremost among them language. To what extent can that be ascribed solely to evolution? Biologically, it can, but at some point, we escape the bonds, and bounds, of biological determination - we realise horizons of being that are not perceptible to other species. Hence the designation of humans as 'the rational animal' (a distinction which the current generation seems to have neglected.) By it, and through it, we are able to 'see' things which other animals cannot. Hence it was referred to in antiquity as 'the eye of reason'.

So I'd say our capacities, like our thumbs, are the products of experience. — Ciceronianus

It's the customary empiricist argument: look, we learn to count by being exposed to groups of things, and we pick up the idea.

Two points about that. Apes have thumbs, if not opposable thumbs, but no matter how much experience they have, they will not be able to master mathematical concepts (I'm not talking of shape recognition). Second, without the capacity to count, we couldn't recognise numbers in the first place, no matter what kind of experience we have. So I don't think Plato's belief in the innate capacity to reason is invalidated by the facts of evolution.

But I know that the customary sanguine acceptance of the facts of evolution will generally mitigate against mere philosophy.

We see lots of philosophical theories tossed around, but I'm not seeing much of a defense of them- other than it being possibly true.

That is philosophy, about the possibly true. If it’s verifiably true, that’s science. Philosophy is about coming up with ideas and explanations that might play a sufficient role in an explanation for something not covered by, or amenable to scientific investigation.

It’s possible that one explanation of existence is an intelligent source (as opposed to a physical source). I see no reason to reject this possibility out of hand, because it can’t be demonstrated. Because it plays a useful role in further philosophical enquiry. If the entirety of philosophical enquiry is to be bracketed out, because it has shaky empirical foundations, then again we are doing the bracketing out that Wayfarer keeps pointing out.

Let me give an example of what I mean. (This is a rather crude example and I am not equating people who rely on more scientifically based thinking as animals. I am drawing the analogy with animals because they are operating in the physical world without philosophy, they are incapable of philosophising about what they are doing)
Imagine that a colony of ants started doing science, it’s arguable that they have already done this in their small way. They could in theory continue, given favourable circumstances to achieve many of the scientific advances that we have. But they would not be doing any philosophical analysis of what they are doing, they would be doing it out of some kind of physical necessity, rather than curiosity, or philosophical enquiry. It would never occur to them that there is any meaning to be gained, or understood from it. They would be doing it only because it works and fulfills a necessary role in their development, their modus operandi. Indeed they wouldn’t be doing any thinking at all, it’s not necessary, they would be merely following a step by step activity, blind to it’s significance.

What I’m teasing out here is that human insight is a valuable tool and to limit it is to reduce its value. It would take the ants a lot longer with a lot more trial and error to achieve our level of development. But I see no reason why they would not be able to get there eventually in principle. Like a chimpanzee at a typewriter. Who would by sheer chance write Shakespeare, but not recognise it as any different to the other pages of random letters it is typing.

It’s possible that one explanation of existence is an intelligent source (as opposed to a physical source). I see no reason to reject this possibility out of hand, because it can’t be demonstrated. Because it plays a useful role in further philosophical enquiry. If the entirety of philosophical enquiry is to be bracketed out, because it has shaky empirical foundations, then again we are doing the bracketing out that Wayfarer keeps pointing out. — Punshhh

The problem I have with this is that there are infinitely many possibilities. There needs to be a reason to pluck one from the infinite set of possibilities and see where it leads. In practice, the reason may simply be that it's subjectively appealing. We're intellectually free to explore, and gain some amusement (intellectual stimulation), or driven by wishful thinking ("I don't want to die! So let's explore the possibility of an afterlife). But unless the track of enquiry leads to some objective justification to accept it, it's never more than amusement or wishful thinking.

I don't object to people amusing themselves, or thinking wishfully. I object only when they try to use these possibilities to supposedly undercut theories that ARE justifiable to accept. This is the issue that triggered my debate with Wayfarer (intermittent over a number of months and several threads). I argued that metaphysical materialism can be justifiably accepted as true. He responds by pointing to the explanatory gap, and he has raised some extreme counter possibilities (e.g. perhaps a thought is ontologically primitive). He doesn't merely say, "here's why I don't accept materialism" (which would be perfectly fine by me); he insists materialism is demonstrably false. And yet, he has not demonstrated it. I conclude that he can't, but won't admit it.

I argued that metaphysical materialism can be justifiably accepted as true. [@Wayfarer] responds by pointing to the explanatory gap, and he has raised some extreme counter possibilities (e.g. perhaps a thought is ontologically primitive). [Wayfarer] doesn't merely say, "here's why I don't accept materialism" (which would be perfectly fine by me); he insists materialism is demonstrably false. And yet, he has not demonstrated it. I conclude that [Wayfarer] can't, but won't admit it. — Relativist

:up: :up:

There needs to be a reason to pluck one from the infinite set of possibilities and see where it leads.

:100:

The problem I have with this is that there are infinitely many possibilities. There needs to be a reason to pluck one from the infinite set of possibilities and see where it leads.

Well if one accepts this, it doesn’t lead anywhere, other than staring at yourself in the mirror (metaphysics ends up reflecting the nature of the world we find ourselves in). But I don’t accept that there are an infinite number of possibilities. Of the large number of possibilities which one could theoretically come up they can be arranged into two groups, those where there is a mental origin, or ones where there is a non mental, or physical, origin. These categories are derived from the two things we know for sure about our being, 1, that we are, have, a living mind and 2, there is a physical world that we find ourselves in. If you can provide an alternative to these two, I would like to know.

When it comes to philosophical enquiry into our existence, philosophy is mute, blind, it can’t answer the question.

He doesn't merely say, "here's why I don't accept materialism" (which would be perfectly fine by me); he insists materialism is demonstrably false

I’m not going to talk for Wayfarer, but the impression I had was that the philosophical interpretation of the physical world (including our scientific findings) is what he takes issue with. Namely that this interpretation oversteps the limits of what it can say about existence and being. There is a tendency to confine being to a physical process, described in biology, neuroscience etc, and some kind of rejection of alternative origins of existence, other than what is contemplated by astrophysicists. That it seems to disregard other philosophical fields in a number of ways(he has laid the detail of this extensively, so there is no point in me repeating it).

I have no problem with philosophical speculation. It operates in science in the form of abductive reasoning. The point is that it should be underwritten by science, if we are speculating about the nature of things. For ethics and aesthetics it might be a different matter―science may not have much to tell us in those domains.

How things such as matter, mind or consciousness intuitively seem (the province of phenomenology) which is determined by reflection on experience, tells us only about how we, prior to any scientific investigation, might imagine that these things are. That may have its own value in understanding the evolution of human understanding, but it tells us nothing about how the world things really are.

So I was responding to the dogmatic assertion that "linguistic communication would be impossible if materialism were true". I reject that as dogma because it assumes that the material world is purely a "billiard ball" world of mindless atoms in the void.. — Janus

I agree that there are philosophical "domains" that go beyond the self-imposed limits of Objective Physical Science. And philosophers, back to Plato & Aristotle have argued about the value of "empty verbiage" (speculation) versus productive facts*1. Yet. what's the point of a Philosophy Forum, if it has no pragmatic results to show for the expenditure of hot air? If we had the power to communicate directly from mind to mind, there might be no need for "empty verbiage"*2. Instead, we would intuitively know how minds work to produce ideal opinions instead of material facts

I have always been interested in "hard" science", and I took basic college courses in Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc. But I also took courses in the "soft" science of Psychology. Beyond their mapping of neural coordinates of consciousness though, modern psychology tells us nothing about how a blob of matter can produce sentience & awareness & opinions : how things Ideally are. Such imaginative speculations won't put food on the table, but they may help us deal with the varying tastes & preferences & opinions of those humans sitting around the table. When your child turns-up his nose at cranberry sauce, can you discuss the "facts" with him?

Is there any "value" in understanding how people think (ideally) about how the world really is? How would we gain understanding of Other Minds without "linguistic communication" : ideas expressed in sounds & written words? Humans seldom disagree on established Facts. But they have fought wars over subjective interpretations of so-called Facts*3. Does materialistic Science have any practical value in "how in the world things really are" : RealPolitik*4? In between wars, does ideal persuasion work better than material bombs? :smile:


*1. Philosophy has always had to defend itself against the charge that it is empty verbiage, unscientific speculation. Philosophers themselves are often the harshest and most astute critics of their own enterprise, and none was more coruscating than the Austrian thinker Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).
https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/ludwig-wittgenstein-review-an-attack-on-the-abstract-8640e564

*2. The statement that "linguistic communication would be impossible if materialism were true" is a philosophical argument, not a settled fact, and is a subject of ongoing debate between materialist and anti-materialist (often dualist or idealist) viewpoints.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=linguistic+communication+would+be+impossible+if+materialism+were+true

*3. Wars are often fought not over objective facts themselves, but over subjective interpretations of events, ideologies, historical narratives, or perceptions of reality. This is a recurring theme throughout history and in modern conflicts.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=fought+wars+over+subjective+interpretations+of+so-called+Facts.

*4. Realpolitik is the approach of conducting diplomatic or political policies based primarily on considerations of given circumstances and factors, rather than strictly following ideological, moral, or ethical premises. In this respect, it shares aspects of its philosophical approach with those of realism and pragmatism.
___Oxford Dictionary
Note --- Did Hitler's war-making end because of diplomatic ideologies, or due to overwhelming guns & bombs of the allies? But how did the leaders of allied nations convince their people that resisting aggression, with blood & guts, was the right thing to do? Perhaps, a combination of empty-but-emotional (ideal) verbiage, and increased production of the (material) machines of war.

PS___ Is Materialism true (factual) or a belief (doctrinal)?
Materialism : the doctrine that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications.
___Oxford Dictionary

The theorem:
With only seven pages to check, I found none of your insistence that materialism is demonstrably false. Sometimes inappropriate in its application, manifestly appropriate in others, but never its all-encompassing fallaciousness.

The substance:

I still maintain that an effective (….) argument against physicalism…. — Wayfarer

…..here I understand this to not be a denial of it, as you have been accused. To claim denial of physicalism presupposes an argument proving its impossibility, and for any worldview the proof of its impossibility is self-contradictory, hence any argument is unintelligible.

…..you could not think if materialism were true. — Wayfarer

…..patently obvious insofar no human ever thinks in purely materialistic terms.

….not as an external agent shaping an independent material realm…. — Wayfarer

…..which presupposes it, the exact opposite of denying it. One can be quite rational in not denying a thing, without the need for affirming it.

…..the world we inhabit is inseparable from the activity of consciousness…. — Wayfarer

….here I understand inseparable to mean in conjunction with. Anything inseparable presupposes that which it is inseparable from. Given that the world represents the manifold of all possible material things, those material things are necessarily presupposed if consciousness is claimed to be inseparable from them. One cannot deny that which he has already presupposed as necessary. From which follows denial of materialism as such, is self-contradictory given from its being the ground for the composition of the world of material things consciousness is said to be inseparable from.

……linguistic communication would be impossible if materialism were true… — Wayfarer

….if materialism were true with respect to linguistic communication, it would be necessary to find a word store, assemble an aggregate of words from the shelves….or jars, or buckets, whatever they were stored in….with the additional burden of picking just that perfect word expressing whatever’s being communicated, perfectly. Makes one wonder….in 1634, say, was there a word store with “Slinky” on its shelves? Or…(sigh)….in 400BC an aggregate of them sufficient to communicate the principle of simultaneity. I think not, but the people still linguistically communicated.
(I could have soooooo much fun with this, silly as it is)

The conclusion:

….not prepared to reckon with it. — Wayfarer

“….useful truths make just as little impression….”
—————-

And that argument that was great and ignored? Was questionably the first and certainly not the second.