At present, robots are incapable of autonomously deliberating on constitutional principles. The idea of handing my five postulated axioms to a robot for reasoning is, frankly, laughable. Currently, robots cannot independently undertake the selection of axioms or make judgments about their reasonableness. However, they are indeed far superior to most humans in checking the validity and rigor of arguments, which is how I primarily use them.The robot pointed out that my argument was as rigorous as mathematics.

The institutional argument I refer to begins with the five axioms of action I have postulated. Starting from these axioms, I have systematically derived a series of institutional conclusions that comprehensively address the four constituent elements of a state. I argue that these conclusions should form the constitution. When having an AI review the argumentation, I consistently need to address the Humean dilemma it raises. The content I posted above summarizes my responses to the AI on this matter, and it has proven to be an effective rebuttal in the AI's assessment.
​​I thought the core idea itself was quite suitable for a forum post, which is why I shared these paragraphs.​​

I gave this example not to discuss the quality or capabilities of modern robots, but to illustrate one example of the world's fluidity, which continually raises new questions. You spoke of the constitution and its immutability, but how can it be immutable, and CAN it be? Also, in your opening post, you spoke of the emergence of the "ought" from the "necessary." But what if the necessary disappears? Does the "ought" also disappear? You haven't answered my opening question or my follow-up questions.

Why are the justified constitutional conclusions immutable? Because conclusions like 'A must not kill,' deduced from given non-contradictory premises, possess uniqueness. It is impossible for both 'A must not kill' and 'A may kill' to be true under the same conditions. Similarly, it is impossible for 'A must not kill today' to later become 'A may kill tomorrow.' Therefore, the conclusion 'A must not kill' does not require updates across time.
Due to the nuances of translation, I cannot guarantee that I have understood your meaning with perfect accuracy.

I don't speak English very well myself and use a translator. I'll try to explain it sentence by sentence.

The world is fluid. I gave an example of change. For example, robots appeared. They replaced human labor. The Constitution guarantees the right to work. Labor has become impossible. What should we do with the Constitution?

You claim: Morality arises from the "necessary." Let's say the "necessary" disappears (as in the case of minority rights). What happens to morality?

I perceive a fundamental difference in the levels at which we are discussing. You are concerned with the 'fluidity' of specific conditions and technologies within the empirical world, whereas my theory aims to demonstrate the 'logical necessity' of fundamental principles within the normative domain.
The questions you raise belong to the level of 'legal application'—that is, how to apply eternal principles to a changing world. This necessitates solutions through new, specific legislation. However, this process does not undermine the validity of normative conclusions at the constitutional level, such as the prohibitions of fraud and murder.
The 'necessity' of these normative conclusions is metaphysical and logical; it is not dependent on, nor does it change with, any specific form of society. Consequently, the 'disappearance of necessity' scenario you hypothesize occurs, within my framework, only at the level of 'specific laws' and never at the level of 'constitutional principles.' The strength of my theory lies precisely in providing an eternal foundation for a fluid reality.

You distinguish between logical and empirical necessity, but it seems to me you fail to notice that even your "logical necessity" doesn't exist in a vacuum—it itself presupposes a condition of applicability, that is, the presence of a subject of action and an environment in which that subject is capable of acting.

When you assert that "A must not kill" is a logically necessary conclusion from consistent axioms, you thereby presuppose the very possibility of the existence of living agents with goals, interests, and consciousness. But this is not a logical constant, but an ontological given that can disappear or change.

The "eternal foundation" you propose rests on a premise that itself belongs to the world of becoming, not the world of pure logic. You appeal to the eternity of the conclusion, but fail to note that its axioms can cease to be true.

Even if life as such persists, its strategy can change.
For example, during war, the act of killing ceases to be a violation of the principle of survival—on the contrary, it becomes a condition for it. In this context, the very "necessity" on which your original "ought" was based disappears. Another example: the state has weakened and can't maintain order. Neighbors break into your house and steal your food. Do they still have a "right to life" in you?

Therefore, your theory is not eternal—it is simply temporarily universal, as long as conditions exist in which "action for a purpose" is possible.

You speak of "normative principles" independent of the form of society, but I am saying that the very possibility of a norm depends on the form of existence. And in this sense, everything "eternal" in your model is nothing more than a stable fragment of a changing world.

The conclusions I argue for are, of course, valid only under the premises of my postulated axioms. When the axioms themselves are challenged, the conclusions derived from them are naturally challenged as well. I have postulated five axioms of action. Three are foundational: first, the Axiom of Efficacy, which is an analytical truth—'to achieve a purpose, efficacy must occur'—whose truth value is directly determined by the definitions I have provided. Second, the Axiom of Purpose, which states that human action is directed toward a fundamental purpose (derived from the observation that human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation). Third, the Axiom of Cognition, which states that behavioral decisions are influenced by cognition. The other two axioms are essentially integrations of the Axioms of Purpose and Cognition.

"The 'ought' you mentioned, as in 'it ought to rain,' is a prediction. In contrast, the 'must' in a normative conclusion is a requirement for action—a behavioral standard that everyone ought to abide by." — panwei

Your definition of 'must' is circular here. Circular definitions are characteristic of speech acts ("Tie your shoelaces! because I said so!") and also of analytic propositions ("Bachelor" means "unmarried man").

In such contexts, it is right to point out that their use is not necessarily inferential, because they might represent instructions, wishes, promises, postulates, conventions, orders etc, rather than assumptions or facts. But the English meaning of "ought" is used both as a speech act and as an inference, depending on the context, which reflects the fact that we often cannot know whether a sentence is meant as a speech act or as a hypothesis, especially when considering the fact that speech acts are often issued on the basis of assumptions.

This also reflects a fundamental asymmetry of information between speaker and listener; When a speaker uses "ought", they might intend it as a speech act or as a prediction but the listener cannot be certain as to what the speaker meant, even after asking the speaker to clarify himself, because we are back to circular definitions.

1. I’m not sure I understand you here. Why does your example “it is wrong to murder” correspond to the four constituent elements of a state and not “it is good for me and my kin to donate to a sperm-bank?” Could you clarify?

Also, I don’t see how “it is good for me and my kin to donate to a sperm-bank” excludes the principle of agential autonomy. One could believe “it is a necessary condition to efficiently spread my genetic material to donate to a sperm-bank while respecting personal autonomy.” Still, my point is that we don’t feel this authority or must from this (at least not in my case), so I’m skeptical that your account gives the correct explanation.

2. I see. In this case, I don’t think this captures the sense of “must” that normativity includes.

For instance, you might see me reaching for a scalding hot plate and say, “Hey, Gecko, you have an end to not feel pain and not touching that plate is a necessary condition to achieve that end.”

I could then respond: “I understand. If I touch the plate I will feel pain and I have an end to not feel pain. Still, why should I act in a way that efficiently achieves my ends?” I then touch the plate and burn myself.

I seem to be making a mistake. But I don’t see how your particular account captures the bite of that mistake. Even for this means-end statement, I believe we would still need a normative premise akin to "you should efficiently achieve your ends" for it to have that bite.

Yes, analytical truths are indeed inherently and inevitably entangled with a form of 'circularity' to a significant degree. However, this 'circularity' is not mere tautology or a logical fallacy; rather, it reveals a deep-seated structure inherent to the nature of concepts and language itself. Among the five axioms I have postulated, only the Axiom of Efficacy is an analytical truth. Therefore, the validity of this particular axiom is certain and unquestionable. It is precisely this axiom that serves as the key to deriving a special type of 'is'—namely, normative conclusions—from another 'is'.

"Personally differentiated and specific purposes only impose requirements on the individual's own behavior. Such requirements cannot serve as behavioral norms obligatory for everyone. Norms that are common to all can only be derived from the purpose common to all.
'Donating to a sperm bank' is a requirement stemming from your personal, differentiated purpose, or from a goal under such a purpose. It is not derived from the fundamental purpose common to all humanity and therefore cannot be justified as a behavioral requirement for everyone.
Both 'thou shalt not kill' and 'behavioral autonomy' are conclusions that can be rigorously demonstrated from the common fundamental purpose. Hence, they can serve as universal requirements. 'Donating to a sperm bank' cannot be justified from the fundamental purpose.
Your second example follows the same logic."

You can assert this, but I’m not yet sure I see it. Perhaps you could clarify what you mean by purpose shared by humanity, because you seemed to frame it in a Darwinian sense in your post.

I don’t see the difference yet. “It is wrong to murder” might be derived from “forbidding murder is the efficient means to achieve efficient cooperation, which is the efficient means to efficiently spreading genetic material.” Similarly, “donate to a sperm-bank” might be derived from “donating to a sperm-bank is the efficient means to procreate, which is the efficient means to efficiently spreading genetic material.” Please demonstrate the relevant difference.

In what sense does this logic resolve 2?

Let us say you’re talking with the antinatalist David Benatar. You tell him, “It is wrong to cause extinction.”

Benatar disagrees and asks you to clarify.

You say, “I mean that causing extinction is not the efficient means of the shared, biological end of spreading genetic material of the kind belonging to the species Homo sapiens.”

There seems to be no bite at all for Benatar to agree and coherently say, “Sure, it is true that spreading genetic material is our biological ends and that causing extinction is not the efficient means for that end. Yet, what does that have to do with why we should not cause extinction by collectively refusing to procreate?”

, there are many possible reasons for choosing the better over the worse,
— J

Such as? — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is where Kantian ethics makes a real contribution to the discussion. As I'm sure you know, Kant believed that only the good will was truly good, in an ethical sense. Put another way: My motivation for acting is of paramount importance; what I do may actually be ethically insignificant, but why I do it will always matter.

So, to your question: I may choose the better over the worse because I want to be seen as someone who chooses the better over the worse. (This is only one example; there are many we could consider.). Have I indeed chosen the better over the worse? Yes. Have I done so knowing it is the best? Yes. But have I chosen it for the right reason -- do I have a good will? No.

We can particularize this to an act of charity. I may correctly see that helping an effective AIDS charity is an act of goodness, or the right thing to do, or in accordance with spiritual principles, or however one cares to phrase it. But if I do so because (though I absolutely agree that it's good to help AIDS patients) I enjoy the attention and the gloss to my self-esteem, Kant would call the action ethically worthless. I wouldn't go that far, myself, but Kant is raising an important point. Isn't there a huge difference between the person who does the right thing for the wrong, or equivocal, reasons, and the person who does it because they want to do the right thing? (An interesting subsidiary question, by the way, is whether "wanting to do the right thing" can be stated in non-Kantian -- that is, non-procedural -- terms, or whether the Kantian conception requires some version of the categorical imperative as the basis for discussing ethics.)

Like everything in ethics, this is nuanced and endlessly complex. I don't think deontological ethics offers a knockdown argument to virtue ethics. In fact, I think they work best in tandem. But one can certainly point out that the question of motivation in virtue ethics needs a lot of elaboration. Is "wanting to be a 'good' human" (in the pre-modern sense of "good human", where it's the same sort of usage as a "good hammer" or "good poem") a sufficient motivation for ethical action? Doesn't it matter why one wants this? Or must we disregard motivation entirely, and merely speak of good or right actions, or the human good as a kind of correspondence with what is essential or natural to humans?

You are free to choose death, but you are not free to break the law. Choosing death may be a tendency formed by your personal, differentiated purposes and potentially erroneous cognition, but it is not a social norm that can be derived from the fundamental purpose common to all. — panwei

The point is that if someone is free to choose contrary to the "fundamental purpose," then your claim that the fundamental purpose is common to all is in jeopardy.

This axiom is derived from a commonsense observation: human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation — panwei

Sure. But doesn't your argument take steps beyond this? Either to human behaviour being determined by biological adaptation, such that we have no capacity to act against this mooted biological imperative; or that we ought only to act in accord with this biological imperative.

The first is to deny that we make choices. The second, to confuse what we do with what we ought do.

This axiom is derived from a commonsense observation: human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation — panwei

This view is known as adaptationism. It's very intuitively persuasive, but is not backed up by science. Adaptation has the biggest impact on organisms that create really large populations, like bacteria. For humans, it's definitely a factor, but not the biggest. A particular human behavior, if it is genetically determined, is as likely to be a result of genetic drift as adaptation, so we can't just assume. We have to actually do science to arrive at conclusions.

overview:

Ah, I get you now. I thought you had a typo because I was considering the case where one knowingly chooses the worse over the better, not vice versa; hence my confused response. I agree, Kant makes a crucial point here. Although, I would say that if one chooses the better strictly on the grounds that it is better (against one's other inclinations), this would still be a case of "choosing the better because it is better."

The way Plato would put it is that this is a case where the desires of the rational part of the soul (the nous, logos) weigh against those of the lower parts (or in New Testament terms, we might say the spirit, as opposed to the flesh and psyche; or the "heart," as in "the eye of the nous," not the passions, trumping the passions). And Plato's point is similar to Kant's, although I think more nuanced, in that he sees this desire for the "truly best" as known as good as what allows us to transcend current belief and desire, and thus our own finitude.

One of my problems with Kant is that his notion of freedom seems to largely be a sort of consequence of his epistemology and metaphysical assumptions (which I find flawed), and so he has to assume this sort of bare, inviolable, individual freedom. Whereas I think the ancients had the right of it that freedom is arduous to attain, and has a strong social and corporate (and even historical) element as well (something Hegel, Solovyov, and Dante get at quite well too).

We can particularize this to an act of charity. I may correctly see that helping an effective AIDS charity is an act of goodness, or the right thing to do, or in accordance with spiritual principles, or however one cares to phrase it. But if I do so because (though I absolutely agree that it's good to help AIDS patients) I enjoy the attention and the gloss to my self-esteem, Kant would call the action ethically worthless. I wouldn't go that far, myself, but Kant is raising an important point. Isn't there a huge difference between the person who does the right thing for the wrong, or equivocal, reasons, and the person who does it because they want to do the right thing? (An interesting subsidiary question, by the way, is whether "wanting to do the right thing" can be stated in non-Kantian -- that is, non-procedural -- terms, or whether the Kantian conception requires some version of the categorical imperative as the basis for discussing ethics.)

Like everything in ethics, this is nuanced and endlessly complex. I don't think deontological ethics offers a knockdown argument to virtue ethics. In fact, I think they work best in tandem. But one can certainly point out that the question of motivation in virtue ethics needs a lot of elaboration. Is "wanting to be a 'good' human" (in the pre-modern sense of "good human", where it's the same sort of usage as a "good hammer" or "good poem") a sufficient motivation for ethical action? Doesn't it matter why one wants this? Or must we disregard motivation entirely, and merely speak of good or right actions, or the human good as a kind of correspondence with what is essential or natural to humans? — J

Well, why someone acts is a huge part of ethics, both for Plato and Aristotle, but even moreso for the later tradition. Understanding is crucial. Mere habituation is a sort of half measure that is not fully self-determining. So, Kant is getting at something important here, I just don't see how it is missing from the earlier tradition, whereas he also misses that the good person ideally desires the good because of its goodness.

Of course, this is maybe a bit more clear in Plato than Aristotle, and certainly it is more clear in the later tradition, but I think it's fairly clear in Aristotle (or at least many readings of him, including all ancient ones by his fellow Greeks). Where it isn't always clear is in the "Aristotle" of modern "virtue ethics," which tends to ignore that ordering of the appetites (epithumia and thymos to be ruled and shaped by logos) and want to make Aristotle a "naturalist" in a very modern sense that only reintroduces a very weak notion of teleology, normally as some sort of "emergent property" of organisms. Deprived of its metaphysical grounding, this Aristotelian ethics does face issues with including Kant's insights, because understanding and phronema are no longer "higher."

I am working on a project that compares modern character education literature to late-antique philosophy and it's almost like two wholly different Aristotles! A concern in the modern literature is that Aristotle's ethics is "selfish" because it focuses on the perfection of one's virtue. This claim is even more common against Plotinus. I imagine the late-antique thinkers would be thoroughly perplexed by this because their metaphysics of goodness (heavily influenced by Aristotle) has it as diffusive, and always related to the whole. Plotinus took in and brought up orphans at his own expense precisely because he became more like God; "being like God" could hardly result in "selfishness" ("becoming like God" being the express goal of late-antique ethics). They would ask, "how could goodness be a curse and not a blessing?"

Well, suffice to say I think that metaphysics lies at the heart of this disagreement. If man's telos simply means that certain physical inputs (including social or "intellectual" ones, which in the modern context are still considered to be emergent physical inputs) are good for him, and others bad, based on what he is, and thus sex and food sit alongside "knowing and experiencing 'the Good'" as a menu of goods that make us happy, then we face an irreducible and unordered plurality of goods. "Knowing the good and being conformed to it," gets reduced to "having certain sorts of positive experiences." Whereas, when the Platonists read Aristotle, they thought it was obvious that the lower is ordered to the higher, and that the higher required ever-increasing conformity to the Good, which of course involves the willing of the Good for its own sake. This is perhaps more obvious in the Christian tradition, particularly in the idea of Blessed Virgin as the apex all creation, showing forth creation's (and man's) proper role in "giving birth to God," to the "body of Christ" (physically for her, as the Church for mankind) in thought and deed.