And your reasoning has been repeatedly shown to be in error. — Banno

Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please.

Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here.

Here's an AI generated summary:

Banno argues that Metaphysician Undercover fundamentally misunderstands modal logic and conflates distinct concepts. The core errors are:

**1. Conflating Truth with Necessity**
Meta treats "p is true" as meaning "p cannot be false," but this confuses truth with necessity. Something can be actually true without being necessarily true. For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it.

**2. Mixing Metaphysical and Epistemic Modality**
Meta fails to distinguish epistemic possibility (what we know) from metaphysical possibility (what could have been). Using the Jindabyne snow example, after checking weather reports we know epistemically that it didn't snow, but we can still consider metaphysically what would have happened if it had snowed.

**3. Reversing the Actuality-Possibility Relationship**
Meta claims knowing something is actual excludes it being possible, violating 2300 years of logical tradition from Aristotle onward that "what is actual must be possible". If you know something, it's trivially possible to know it—the alternative would mean Meta "knows only things that are impossible to know."

**4. Confusing Semantics with Metaphysics**
Meta conflates semantic stipulations (how we talk about worlds in models) with metaphysical claims (what world we're actually in). Possible worlds are semantic devices for evaluating formulas, not claims about multiple concrete universes.

**5. Misunderstanding Modal Operators**
Meta treats "◊Kp" (it's possible to know p) as meaning "we don't know p," when it simply means "Kp is not impossible"—an error that would render all knowledge impossible. — Claude

Point me to one place where you showed error in my reasoning please. — Metaphysician Undercover

However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible.

Banno argues that Metaphysician Undercover fundamentally misunderstands modal logic and conflates distinct concepts. The core errors are: — Claude

1. "For example, it's true you read a post, but it's also possible you might not have read it."
That speaks for itself.
2. Just because we can consider counterfactuals, doesn't indicate that it's possible that what is false could be true.
3.No demonstration here, just appeal to authority, and disregard of my logical demonstration.
4.Doesn't make sense, or perhaps is just irrelevant.
5.False.

Poor effort Claude, so I'll have to give you an F for failure. And please do not try again.



In all that AI babble you haven't yet addressed my reasoning. Are you going to show me errors in my reasoning, or just continue with the misrepresentations.

Start with the following, which follows directly from your definitions:
Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world.

Please show me where that reasoning is erroneous. Or, is it the case that your definitions are erroneous?

However solid your reasoning may be, you just have to accept the usage of whatever possible world semanticist you're reviewing. They generally say that actuality is a brand of possibility, the intuition being that all events of the actual world are logically possible. — frank

As I said to Ludwig V in the prior post, we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds, but this contradicts realism. Banno wants both, realism, and the actual world to be one of the possible worlds, and doesn't seem to understand the incompatibility. So he continues to define "actual world" in a way which contradicts how he defines "possible world", to support his realism, but also making it impossible that the actual world is one of the possible worlds.

Possible worlds consist of stipulations.
The actual world does not consist of stipulations.
Therefore the actual world is not a possible world. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.

The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations.

So both premises are muddled, and so is the conclusion.

we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds — Metaphysician Undercover

I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it.

As I said to Ludwig V in the prior post, we can make the actual world one of the possible worlds, but this contradicts realism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it does. Take a moment to read through the first two paragraphs of the SEP article on possible worlds:

Anne is working at her desk. While she is directly aware only of her immediate situation — her being seated in front of her computer, the music playing in the background, the sound of her husband's voice on the phone in the next room, and so on — she is quite certain that this situation is only part of a series of increasingly more inclusive, albeit less immediate, situations: the situation in her house as a whole, the one in her neighborhood, the city she lives in, the state, the North American continent, the Earth, the solar system, the galaxy, and so on. On the face of it, anyway, it seems quite reasonable to believe that this series has a limit, that is, that there is a maximally inclusive situation encompassing all others: things, as a whole or, more succinctly, the actual world.

Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world is only one among many possible worlds. — SEP

I did this the other day, but it's easy enough to do it again. A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false. In an informal sense it is convenient to think of possible worlds as stipulated, by setting out how, if at all, a possible world differs form the actual world.

The actual world can for logical purposes be set out in the same way, as statements setting out what is the case and what isn't. But of course the actual world doesn't consist of such statements, nor of stipulations. — Banno

The following is based on your latest description of possible worlds and actual world. Can you point out what's wrong with my reasoning?

A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world.

I will count that as progress. But your views on realism appear similarly confused. But by all means, set out the account clearly and I might address it. — Banno

See below.

Take a moment to read through the first two paragraphs of the SEP article on possible worlds: — frank

Can you explain the point you are trying to make with that passage?

Anyway, the realist assumes that there is a world, and a way that the world is, which is independent from us, the human knowers.

So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent.

That the actual world is a possible world is contrary to the realist assumption stated above.

The actual world is an abstract object like any other possible world. A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge.

A realist says the actual world contains true statements that are beyond our knowledge. — frank

Can you clarify this? What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? It doesn't make any sense to me.

What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? — Metaphysician Undercover

You've never accidentally walked into a 9th grade math class (one with an equation on the board) by mistake when you were in 5th grade? :wink:

An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering). There, of course, per nature of the topic is the idea of an "unknowable" knowledge. But that concept rests largely on the one who perceives it. If humans evolved, we now possess knowledge those before us were incapable of knowing (ergo, the "unknowable" knowledge). Yet, it became knowable. So, one might reasonably hold the belief that unless one can predict or perceive the future, there is a concept of "unknowable knowledge" that may change and become knowable.

Not unlike how—not that long ago—only a madman would consider braving the seas in search of nourishment or freedom. Yet now even the average person does so for recreation via the form of an affordable cruise. Something to think about. Perhaps, with any hope, to calm your turbulent mind. :smile:

An important distinction is, much like a child, we assume either we—or someone we know—knows all there is to know (that is to say, can simply be "exposed" to such knowledge, such as walking into a room where it's written and automatically understand it in full depth and detail as others do; this is merely the ego at work, the driving force and cause of all human suffering). — Outlander

Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time?

Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings?

Can you clarify this? What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? It doesn't make any sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It makes sense to realists. Apparently you aren't one.

Speak for yourself. I don't see why anyone would ever assume that there is someone who knows all there is to know. Since knowledge varies from one person to another, it's very counterintuitive to think that there would be one person who knows everything. Since much knowledge is context dependent wouldn't this require someone who is everywhere, all the time? — Metaphysician Undercover

All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking). Adults too. You're a mortal being, aren't you? Yes? That means time is relevant as far as how one reasonably perceives things in the world we live. Is that ice bridge solid enough to walk on? At that moment it is, so we might choose to. Do we instead go by some "set apart" (albeit deterministically equal) reality that since it will melt in, who knows, a century from now we consider it water and not able to traverse? No, it's either there or not there based on the circumstance of my present being. Let "traversable" represent "knowable."

Since knowledge is the property of knowers, are you proposing God to support the idea of knowledge which is unknowable to current human beings? — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps information or the even the general "concept of understanding" (whether ever actually attained or achieved by anyone ie. the would-be "knower") is what my statement was focused on. I'm not proposing anything only reiterating the fact that since human beings (or intelligent life itself) regularly go from periods of light and dark respectively (in terms of knowledge and understanding) there are reasonable arguments to be made in support of the idea of some "knowledge" being "unknowable". If not due to a given circumstance (observable reality) that may or may not change within the given period of a person's life (applicable period of "knowing" or "being a knower").

As far as some "unknowable knowledge" that the human mind is somehow not capable of processing (knowing), say the full digits of Pi, for example (but hypothetically might in the future, since we do not know the future). Well, that's one example it would seem. Or is it? Seems easy to get caught up in semantics with this one.

If this is supposed to be an argument for p -> ◇p (if p then possibly p), then it does not work. — SophistiCat

Not my intention. I was simply adding my voice to the litany for folks here who are trying to metaphorically knock some sense into MU's head. AFAICT MU does not do modal logic, so I was trying a different approach.

It makes sense to realists. Apparently you aren't one. — frank

I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real).

Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"?

All I was trying to say is, even a child can come across "true knowledge"—he or she simply might be "incapable of knowing (processing it?)" at the time (but might, given enough time, thus illustrating the concept of the unknowable becoming knowable, at least in one valid manner of thinking). — Outlander

Knowledge is the property of knowers. Is this knowledge which no human beings possess supposed to be possessed by God?

If so, how does that make the "actual world", as known by God, consistent with "possible worlds" which are statements made by human beings?

A possible world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
The actual world consists of statements setting out what is the case and what isn't.
Every possible world is the actual world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements.

But in addition, this argument is an obvious undistributed middle. B is A, C is A, therefore B is C.

Poor stuff.

@Frank,

What is a true statement that's beyond our knowledge? — Metaphysician Undercover

As Fitch showed, antirealists know everything that is to be known. There are no true statements outside of what an antirealist knows. Unless they reject classical logic.

I think I'm realist, that's why I have difficult making "possible worlds" (worlds which are not real), consistent with "the actual world" (a world which is real). — Metaphysician Undercover

Real? They're both abstract objects. :lol:

As Fitch showed, antirealists know everything that is to be known. There are no true statements outside of what an antirealist knows. Unless they reject classical logic. — Banno

:up:

Again, a world does not consist of a set of statements. — Banno

What does a possible world consist ofthen?

You said:
" A possible world does not consist of stipulations, so much as a complete description of a state of affairs - which statements are true and which are false."

Doesn't that mean to you, that a possible world consists of a set of statements? No wonder I'm confused, you keep contradicting yourself.

Real? They're both abstract objects. :lol: — frank

Abstractions aren't real for you, frank?

What does a possible world consist ofthen? — Metaphysician Undercover

Have a look at the definition and use in the Open Logic text already mentioned.

It'd do you good.

Abstractions aren't real for you, frank? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, why not?

I suppose we might agree that there are real abstractions... as well as false, misleading and contradictory abstractions... :wink:

I suppose we might agree that there are real abstractions... as well as false, misleading and contradictory abstractions... — Banno

There could be an evil demon that makes me believe in numbers, but they aren't real?

:rofl:

:up:


Exactly.

Sure, why not? — frank

Maybe @Metaphysician Undercover's point is to understand something, real or not, you have to have an abstraction of it. The philosopher's argument being the point of their craft: "to show the person they are a fly in a bottle, without realizing the nature of their containment, they can't ever escape from it." For example.

Abstractions or concepts are required to know what it is you're interacting with. If you have no understanding of the concept of, say, a solar eclipse, and have never seen one before, you might reasonably and rationally assume the world is ending or some cataclysmic celestial event is otherwise occurring if observed for the first time. It doesn't make a thing more real or less real, it simply reasonably (but not necessarily accurately) defines and describes something that you would otherwise either not be aware of or think to be something that it's not.

You have not addressed the issue. That is to define "the actual world" in a way which is consistent with "a possible world", and also realism. I explained it to frank here:

So to reply to your SEP article, human beings think that "things might have been different in countless ways". These different ways that human beings think that things might have been different, are thought up by human beings, and so they are not independent from us. Therefore, "possible worlds" are worlds which are not independent from us, they are dependent on us. If, "the actual world" is said to be one of the possible worlds, then the actual world is not independent from us. Possible worlds are not independent. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not addressed this question:

Care to explain what you're talking about? As far as I'm aware of, only human beings make statements, and only human beings make judgements of true and false. That is why "a true statement that's beyond our knowledge" makes no sense to me. It has nothing to do with whether I'm realist or not, it's a matter of how I understand the terms you are using. You appear to be using these terms in a way which I am not familiar with. Maybe you could define "statement" and "true"? — Metaphysician Undercover