Do you want to go on to the other SEP article, or have we treated it sufficiently?

I haven't gone into the detail of the section on Combinatorialism as much as we might .

Thanks for the thread.

Do you want to go on to the other SEP article, or have we treated it sufficiently? — Banno

The second article is about ontology. I think you and I will probably land in the same place regarding that topic. I think we can hold off unless you're charged up to read it.

haven't gone into the detail of the section on Combinatorialism as much as we might . — Banno

Again, it's up to you.

Well, yes, what's real is dependent on the task in hand, so the Possibilism-Actualism Debate is pretty superfluous.

And i doubt present company will make much of such a view.

The extension of "Bridgett Bardot" remains Bridgett Bardot, even if she had started a fish shop instead of going into acting. — Banno

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects.

Are you admitting that you do not recognize that there is such a difference? If so that would explain why you always seem to conflate the "actual world", in reference to a physical thing, and the "actual world" in reference to an abstract object in possible worlds semantics.

Well, yes, what's real is dependent on the task in hand, so the Possibilism-Actualism Debate is pretty superfluous. — Banno

That's exactly what I think. Where ontology leaves practical matters behind, it's a wild goose chase.

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Bardot who works in the fish shop is...?

Yeah. Send in the clowns.

Premise that only the present exists
My premise is that the world only exists in the present. It may be there is a minimum duration of time, such as Planck's time, It may be that even though clocks show a different time when either near a mass or accelerating, and even though the “present” may be different for each clock, it remains a fact that for each clock there is only one present. In this present we can remember the past but not the future.

Free will vs determinism

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present..........................
If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the properties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed. — Metaphysician Undercover

That we can remember the past but not the future means that for us there is an arrow of time. Between the past we remember and the future that we cannot remember is the present, the “now”.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic.

As regards the future, also by the Law of Non-contradiction, the future that will exist must be fixed, and thereby static rather than dynamic. As we cannot remember this future, we don’t know what this future will be. However, we do know from the laws of logic, necessary and universal, that this future will be fixed, static rather than dynamic.

A reality that is fixed must be deterministic, meaning that free will must be over and above any deterministic fixed reality, and within a meta-reality. By its very nature, a meta-reality must be unknowable within any deterministic reality. Similarly, the meaning of a language cannot be discovered within the language itself, but can only be known in a meta-language external to the language itself. As we cannot use language to discover meaning within itself, but only through a meta-language, we cannot use a deterministic reality to discover free will within itself, but only through a meta-reality.

Whether one believes in a meta-reality enabling free-will in our reality is a matter of faith rather than logic.

Memories

The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".................
"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. ……………….
Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. — Metaphysician Undercover

We experience the present and have memories of the past. If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past.

Imagination

If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see an apple on the table and imagine a yoghurt in the fridge. It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic. — RussellA

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? The things which have happened within the past are fixed, but that is changing all the time, so the past itself is dynamic.

If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. — RussellA

Claims of how long the human "now" is vary between a few milliseconds to a few seconds, depending on the purpose of the estimation. Clearly this is a much longer duration than Plank's time.

I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past. — RussellA

A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. This is basic reflex, without allowing any time for conscious thought, which is required for judgement.

It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction. — RussellA

Sure, but that's not the issue. The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction. One can imagine all sorts of things, and know that these things are contradictory to what is believed, that is not a problem. The problem is when we designate things which are contrary to what we believe as "possible".

That's what produces the contradiction, because "believing X" implies that the possibility of not-X has been excluded. If we quantify "believe" with a Bayesian model of probability, then the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris is represented as a degree of probability, rather than as a truth. This would allow the possibility that it is in Reno. But I don't think this is an accurate representation of common "belief".

When we believe something as true, we assume to exclude the possibility of falsity. When we are uncertain, we say something like "I think that is correct". However, if we all allow that knowledge is fallible, no matter how certain we are, then we'd probably accept that the Bayesian representation would be better representation. But this requires that we reject the attitude of certitude, and "truth" as we know it, which we have not.

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It cannot be the case that in December 2025 “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” and in December 2026 “Caesar did not cross the Rubicon".
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A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. — Metaphysician Undercover

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time.
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The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction — Metaphysician Undercover

I can believe one thing and imagine another thing.

Believing is not the same as imagining.

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time. — RussellA

I think I said this already. I believe there is no such thing as "a present moment in time". That is an artificial construct which amounts to a falsity. All time is duration.

Accordingly, the length of the present is dependent on perspective and purpose. We might refer to the current second, minute, hour, day, week, month, year, whatever, as the present, depending on context.