I was trying to make you understand what measurement means. — Corvus

All I can say, is that what "measurement" means to you is nothing like what it means to me. And since what you said looks nonsensical to me, I can tell you with a high degree of confidence, that you will never be able to make me understand what measurement means

Why can’t two things occupy the same field without occupying the same space?

If the sun’s light is a field projected from itself, how can it occupy the same field as that which receives it? — Mww

I don't think you quite understand what I meant. What I was talking about is distinct fields in the same place. So the earth has an electromagnetic field which shares the same space as the sun's electro magnetic field. And, the proton and electron, for example, consist of fields which overlap. Therefore the proton and the electron share the same space, but are spoken of, as distinct things.

"Space and time are the pure forms of intution"―not dogmatic.
"Space and time are nothing but the pure forms of intution"―dogmatic. — Janus

You're talking nonsense just like Corvus is. I see no substantial difference between the two phrases. Why does one appear dogmatic, and the other not dogmatic to you? Are you that sensitive to the qualification of "nothing but"?

For the purpose of logical procedure, when a word such as "space" or "time", is defined in a specific way, then we must accept that the meaning for that word is "nothing but" the prescribed definition. To allow that the word might have a meaning other than the prescribed definition is to invite equivocation, which is a fallacy. You might call this "being dogmatic", but it's really just the process of maintaining validity in logic. If you prefer to throw validity out the window, and equivocate by providing a definition other than the one prescribed, because you feel that logical process is too dogmatic, that is your prerogative. We can all be illogical if we want to.

You're talking nonsense just like Corvus is. I see no substantial difference between the two phrases. Why does one appear dogmatic, and the other not dogmatic to you? Are you that sensitive to the qualification of "nothing but"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The first statement says that space and time are relevant to or operative in some domain, which doesn't rule out that they are also relevant to or operative in other domains. The second says they are relevant to and operative in only one domain. If you cannot see the difference in meaning between the two statements then I don't know what else to say.

What I was talking about is distinct fields in the same place. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I’m ok with that. Earth’s magnetic field and gravitational field are in the same space. But the particles associated with those fields are not in each other’s spaces. Neutrinos pass through the gravitational field without bothering anything, right? Jets pass through the magnetic field, and while some of the particles of the jet’s composition may be affected, for all intents and purposes, the jet isn’t, despite the reality that it’s 1 x 10 -32nd of an inch shorter than it was when it was on the ground.

But I see your point. It was Feynman in a CalTech lecture, who said fields could be considered things, insofar as they do occupy space. But you know ol’ Richard….he’s somewhat cryptic, if not facetious.

The first statement says that space and time are relevant to or operative in some domain, which doesn't rule out that they are also relevant to or operative in other domains. The second says they are relevant to and operative in only one domain. If you cannot see the difference in meaning between the two statements then I don't know what else to say. — Janus

Janus, both statements say what space and time "are". "Space and time" is the subject and the statements are definitive as to what space and time are. The subject is not "some domain" which "space and time are relevant to or operative in". What's the point in intentionally switching the subject in your interpretation of one as compared to the other?

That would be a very unusual interpretation of Kant, to say that when he states that space and time are a priori intuitions, he is talking about a domain of a priori intuitions, within which space and time play a role. And, although space and time each play a role within this domain, they are also active in some other domains. Your proposal that space and time cross over from one "domain" to another, is nothing but a category mistake.

Earth’s magnetic field and gravitational field are in the same space. But the particles associated with those fields are not in each other’s spaces. — Mww

Now the issue I pointed to is that we generally restrict the boundaries of "the object" according to visual information, and that's why we conclude that two objects cannot be in the same space. We cannot see two distinct objects at the very same place. In reality, if we include the parts of the object which we cannot see, numerous objects exist at the same place and at the same time. So for example, the gravity of the moon exists in the same space as the gravity of the earth. And, we really ought to include the object's gravity as part of the object. If we did that, then we'd have to admit that the moon exists in space that the earth also exists in, at the same time.

Furthermore, when distinct identifiable physical objects exist in the same place, like a solution of water and salt, we tend to see the two visually as one object. Then one might be inclined to rationalize how they are really just one object, instead of admitting that two things exist in the same space. So, this idea that two things cannot exist in the same space at the same time, is really just an example of how we are mislead by overconfidence in our sense of vision, toward the unreasonable acceptance of a faulty principle.

But I see your point. It was Feynman in a CalTech lecture, who said fields could be considered things, insofar as they do occupy space. But you know ol’ Richard….he’s somewhat cryptic, if not facetious. — Mww

Feynman was actually very good at explaining complicated physics. I read one paper where he explained how the electricity in a copper wire, which common language says travels as electrons within the wire, actually travels through the field around the wire. This is how an induction motor works.

He didn’t believe it; he stated for the record that nothing can be known of noumena as a logical deduction in accordance with a theory he himself constructed. I’d rather think he trusted in the logical construction of the theory, rather than only believed in its conclusions. — Mww

Yes, if we can make valid statements only about the transcendental a-priori and the empirical world, then, yes, the 'noumenon' is unknowable. But that's the problem, IMO.
Since Kant doesn't say that the empirical world is a mere projection of the transcendental subject, I believe his 'system' implies that it arises from the 'interaction' between the subject and the 'noumenon'.

Kant would then say that we shouldn't say anything about the noumenon. However, I can't see how his system doesn't say that: the noumenon is in part the 'basis' for the arising of the empirical world. But this is already saying that something about the noumenon, which would then contradict Kant's view that nothing can be known about it.

Also it is hard to me to think how could the noumenon be 'structureless/inintelligible' if it is the basis for the arising of the empirical world. If not, the 'order' we see in the empirical world would only be due to the subject. But this would actually mean that the subject the facto is the 'creator' of the empirical world and this is absurd given the apparent contingency of the subject (it is interesting that 'non-dualist' thinkers, who shared with Kant the view that the 'subject' has an active role in organizing experience, believed that in some way the individual subject is also 'ultimately unreal'...).

Notice that I do agree with Kant that the 'empirical world' arises also from the cognitive faculties of the subject. However, I believe Kant overreaches in saying that we can't know absolutely nothing about the noumenon.

All I can say, is that what "measurement" means to you is nothing like what it means to me. And since what you said looks nonsensical to me, I can tell you with a high degree of confidence, that you will never be able to make me understand what measurement means — Metaphysician Undercover

It is such a simple explanation to understand for anyone. But you seem to be determined refusing to see it. Why is it so difficult to see it? Why do you bring in such a bizarre ideas of "measurement" (property of property?) of time into the discussion?

Why is it so difficult to see it? — Corvus

You said, an instrument reads the numeric value of an object. There is a few fundamental errors with this statement, which render it incoherent.. Here's some:

1. The person using the instrument reads the number from the instrument.
2. The instrument does not read anything from the object.
3. As I already explained, it is not "the value" of the object itself which is determined by the measurement, but the value of a specific measurement parameter, which we might call a property of the object.
4, The number must be determined relative to a scale. Usually the instrument does this, places the number within a scale. The designated scale, is the property of the property. So in the phrase "5 metres of length", the property of the object is "length", and the property of that property is 5 metres.

For example, if a tape measure is the instrument, one might put it beside an object, according to the criteria of the parameter, width, height, etc. (3). Then the person reads the number from the instrument (1). The instrument does not read anything (2). And, the person must interpret the number relative to a scale, imperial system, metric system, whatever (4). The tape measure might say on it "inches", "centimeters", or something like that.

These same principles apply to the measurement of time:
1. The person measuring reads a number from the clock.
2.The clock does not read anything from the object (time) itself.
3. It is not time itself (the object) which is measured, but a specific parameter which is commonly called "duration".
4. The number read, (4:02 for example) must be determined relative to a scale, atomic scale, solar scale, or something like that.

Is the in itself purely imaginary or is it real? — Janus

Hmmm…..the in-itself is purely conceptual, as a mere notion of the understanding, thus not real, so of the two choices, and in conjunction with conceptions being merely representations, I’m forced to go with imaginary. But every conception is representation of a thought, so while to conceive/imagine/think is always mind-dependent, we can further imagine such mind-dependent in-itself conceptions as representing a real mind-independent thing, by qualifying the conditions the conception is supposed to satisfy. This is what he meant by the thought of something being not at all contradictory.
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Would you say the refusal to infer from experience the nature of the in itself (while acknowledging that it cannot be certainly known) is motivated by the practical reason of making room for faith? — Janus

While the gist of what you’re asking here comes from the CPR B intro, your altogether different application of it isn’t really wrong. It actually does take some faith to accept some transcendental idea born from pure speculative reason, the experience of which is quite impossible. The impossibility of knowledge does make room for faith, but making room for faith doesn’t make faith necessary.

Refusal to infer from experience is really loaded. Inferences from experience belong to judgement, a fully operational logical faculty that only does inferences. Inferences for experience in general is transcendental and belongs to reason. Dunno how refusal to infer is possible. A faculty the job of which is inference can’t not infer.

Anyway…fun to think about.

Feynman was actually very good at explaining complicated physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, he was. For those liking their physics complicated.

You’re taking things into a realm I don’t care anything about. It’s highly unlikely I’ll be doing the SOL anytime soon, and there’s really no good reason for getting two candles into the same holder.

I’m ok with things the way I’ve thought of them, and I don’t deny what you’ve said of them. I just like my way better.

I believe his 'system' implies that it arises from the 'interaction' between the subject and the 'noumenon' — boundless

It being the world; the world arises from. Ok, how would that work?

I can't see how his system doesn't say that: the noumenon is in part the 'basis' for the arising of the empirical world. — boundless

His doesn’t say, and his system doesn’t allow, that the noumenon is in part the basis for the arising of the empirical world.

Granting the empirical world is the totality of all possible real things, it is absurd to suppose a single human logical construct is responsible for the existence of it. And even if the empirical world is merely a concept, in that we as humans could never experience such a thing as the totality of all possible real things….what has noumena to do with any of that?

Also it is hard to me to think how could the noumenon be 'structureless/inintelligible' if it is the basis for the arising of the empirical world. — boundless

Which just says it’s not hard to think the opposite if it isn’t. Which makes more sense? It depends on what one thinks a noumenon to be, doesn’t it? What do you think it is, other than structureless/inintelligible, and if that, why is it that way and not some other?

If you are making noumena your own, which you’re perfectly entitled to do, the burden then falls on you to say what any relation of which it is a part is, and how that relation is possible.

Proceed?