We’re describing a more basic fact: that being and intelligibility are internally related. — Wayfarer

Do you mean something like "to be is to be structured"?

it’s built into what we mean by “world” in the first place. — Wayfarer

That suggests we could have a concept of an unintelligible world. I think we need to understand that that would be an incoherent concept.

Good luck with the project.

I agree that much of understanding is interpretive, but I think this actually sharpens the realist point rather than weakening it. Interpretation is an attempt to make sense of what is given in a way that can succeed or fail — i.e. in a way that is answerable to the facts, to counterexamples, to coherence with other lines of evidence, and to the possibility of correction. The very idea of interpretation makes sense only in light of such constraints. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't disagree with you. But is there anything in those things that interpretation is answerable to that promises that only one interpretation of them is true? I think there may be something here that I have missed.

I don't disagree with you. But is there anything in those things that interpretation is answerable to that promises that only one interpretation of them is true? — Ludwig V

Good question — and no, nothing in what I said guarantees that there will always be only one uniquely correct interpretation, at least not in any straightforward epistemic sense.

Underdetermination is real: the same body of evidence can support multiple interpretations, and sometimes it’s not clear how to decide between them. But underdetermination doesn’t imply that “anything goes,” only that reality’s constraint doesn’t always uniquely fix a single articulation at a given stage of inquiry.

Also, sometimes apparent pluralism reflects different levels of description rather than competing claims about the same thing. Two accounts can both be true insofar as they are answering different questions or carving reality at different joints (e.g., thermodynamics vs statistical mechanics).

So the claim I am defending is weaker but (I think) more defensible: interpretation is constrained in a way that makes genuine success and failure possible. In my opinion, that is enough for realism.

But

Also, sometimes apparent pluralism reflects different levels of description rather than competing claims about the same thing. Two accounts can both be true insofar as they are answering different questions or carving reality at different joints (e.g., thermodynamics vs statistical mechanics). — Esse Quam Videri

That resolves some cases. But not all - cf. the puzzle pictures. What is most important about them is that they high-light the role of gestalt - each element is interpreted, but in a different relationship to the other elements. The process is not atomistic.
But it matters also that there is no answer to the question what is the picture of. If there were. If there is, it would likely resolve the issue. But we cannot know what the picture is a picture of just by scrutinizing the picture itself - it needs a wider context - or an independent story about it. There's still no guarantee that there is a determinate answer to that question.

So the claim I am defending is weaker but (I think) more defensible: interpretation is constrained in a way that makes genuine success and failure possible. In my opinion, that is enough for realism. — Esse Quam Videri

I agree with you. There are many ways to order a shelf of books (see Blue Book).