A single atom cannot accomplish what the whole brain does. Atoms do not process information, integrate signals, have memory, or exhibit awareness. Neither does a single neuron, either. It is in the interaction of the system components – large scale neuronal networks - from which consciousness emerges. — Questioner

The logic runs directly against this. You have not given anything that could remotely support the emergence of consciousness from elements which are themselves non-conscious. We have zero examples of this elsewhere and no evidence it is the how consciousness is generated. That is your extreme obstacle. You don't even seem adequately across your own beliefs to explain them clearly.

You are, though, because you are being obtuse, defensive, refuse to stay on topic, cannot answer simple questions and refuse to accept that your position is an emotional one (which simply means its a conviction you can't support - but want to continue).

These are all on you. I have tried to tease out some answers from you to no avail - so have others. This is not my problem at all.

we say a level of organization is strongly emergent, that means it’s rules and principles cannot be determined, constructed, in advance from the rules and principles of a lower level, even in theory. You cannot determine the principles of biology in advance from the principles of chemistry and physics. — T Clark

I will read More Is Different. Thank you. but what you were saying seems impossible. I can understand that it's possible that, if there were non-biological beings who had intelligence equal to or greater than human intelligence, they may well never postulate the principles of biology. I would imagine there are so many ways the principles of chemistry and physics can combine and interact that it's possible no one would ever stumble upon the ideas that we know as the principles of biology. But that's not the same as it being impossible in theory to come up with those principles. The principles of biology emerge from the principles of chemistry and physics, and are specifically what they are because the principles of chemistry and physics are specifically what they are. If the principles of chemistry and physics changed today, the principles of biology would, also, if there was even anything left that might be considered principles of biology.

All that being the case, what is it that makes it impossible to determine the principles of biology ahead of time, even in theory?

no matter how peculiar consciousness may be, and no matter how unlike other physical properties, this is no obstacle in itself to it being a state of a physical thing — Clarendon

I haven’t read the whole discussion (and this topic has been addressed at length elsewhere), but I thought I’d respond to your reservations. We just went through a reading of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book lecture. The first six pages (available here) claim that philosophy mistakenly uses the framework of objects for thinking, understanding, meaning as “states” (I would take consciousness as part of this group). My notes on that section are here and below that.

Because of that framework, we imagine physical mechanisms, but the reality of errors, mistakes, etc. (leading to skepticism) causes us to take the mechanism as what he calls “queer”, or what you call “peculiar”. But we just want the situation to be “problematic” for that to require (logically) an “answer” because we want inherent individuality, certainty, it being subject to knowledge, etc.

conscious states are states of something quite different to any physical thing — Clarendon

I take Wittgenstein’s conclusion to be that instead of being modeled on a physical object (“mechanisms”), these are logical distinctions; driven by our interests and reflected in our common judgments. This of course does fly in the face of the initial presumption.

what you were saying seems impossible. I can understand that it's possible that, if there were non-biological beings who had intelligence equal to or greater than human intelligence, they may well never postulate the principles of biology. I would imagine there are so many ways the principles of chemistry and physics can combine and interact that it's possible no one would ever stumble upon the ideas that we know as the principles of biology. But that's not the same as it being impossible in theory to come up with those principles. — Patterner

Here's what Anderson says:

...the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a “constructionist” one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe...

...The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the twin difficulties of scale and complexity. The behavior of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles, it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation of the properties of a few particles. Instead, at each level of complexity entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature as any other... — P.W. Anderson - More is Different

Hi,

I'm not sure of the motivation for that view. Conscious states are states and states are of things. I'm taking that for granted.

I see no problem with that way of characterizing things, such that I see no motivation for thinking we are confused when we do so.

I think there is a problem in supposing conscious states to be states of physical things. Lots and lots of problems. The particular one I am drawing attention to is that unless one attributes conscious states to the basic units of matter, to attribute it to physical wholes violates a basic law of reason - one so fundamental it underpins basic logic. To suppose a whole could have a new kind of property not in anyway present already in its parts is really no different from supposing a valid argument can have a conclusion that was in no way present in any of the premises. That is, it is no different from thinking that sometimes arguments of this form - 1. if p then q, 2. p. 3. therefore R are valid.

But this doesn't imply a problem in the idea of concious states being states. It just implies that the objects of which conscious states are states are not physical ones (not complex physical ones anyway)

"The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe..."

Of course it implies that. The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. It may not be a certainty. There may be many ways things could have gone, and any one of them might happen if we started over. But it happening the same way has got to be possible. What could rule out the possibility?

The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. — Patterner

Everything that happens, happens consistent with the laws of lower levels of organization, i.e. physics. That doesn’t necessarily mean you can predict in advance how a complex system will evolve based on those laws, even in theory.

Keeping in mind this is a controversial idea.

The ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe is a given, because it's what actually happened. — Patterner

How do you know? Maybe laws are local, or maybe they change randomly.

Conscious states are states and states are of things. — Clarendon

Wittgenstein’s point is that there is a misconception of “states” as if they are objects (not of objects), like conceptualized in the same framework that we have for objects. For example, picturing understanding as a thing (a physical mechanism, or something we “have”), rather than a judgment we make/determine. Of course I think it would be better to go to that source if that is unclear.

I thought this was in the same vein as

objects of which conscious states are states are not physical ones — Clarendon

but asking us to consider imagining a state as not only not physical but also not like an “object”, but a logical matter.

I thought this misunderstanding spoke to your misgivings when you say “I think there is a problem in supposing conscious states to be states of physical things” just turned around rather than attributing it to things.

We'd certainly have to be a lot smarter than we are to predict such a complex thing as the biology we are familiar with. If we were as smart as we'd need to be to be able to predict that, I suspect we'd be able to develop entirely new types of biology that, while possible, just haven't happened. At least not that we're aware of. I don't know why that's not possible.

How do you know? Maybe laws are local, or maybe they change randomly. — frank

One never knows. Is there reason to think they are anything but universal and consistent?

Is there reason to think they are anything but universal and consistent? — Patterner

There's reason to suspect they change over time. Do you know of anything that rules out strong emergence?

It may not be a certainty. There may be many ways things could have gone, and any one of them might happen if we started over. — Patterner

But that's exactly what the claim is, not that the very world we live in is impossible, but that it was not necessitated simply by the laws of physics.

And surely that's obvious if you just consider evolution by natural selection.

Some of us think there's reason to believe consciousness is an emergent property of certain organisms. You don't, and I get that, but did you really intend to be arguing against emergence as such?

I have been assuming throughout that consciousness is a state, not an object. Minds 'have' consciousness, but they are not made of it. It's a state of them.

The problem I am highlighting is not, then, one that is a product of picturing things incorrectly. The problem is that some people think that in the case of consciousness, we can get out what we did not put in. That is, though they accept in all other contexts that such a notion is incoherent, they suddenly accept it when it comes to consciousness.

("We're interested specifically in intentionality. Have you found that yet?") — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not convinced that’s how it goes. It seems closer to this: if you are a naturalist or physicalist, how do you account for intentionality? Does your model have sufficient explanatory power? There’s nothing to “find” but there may be an explanatory gap (Just how significant will depend on what metaphysics we subscribe to.) But that's been thrashed on that other thread.

As the celebrity physicist Sean Carroll observes, science does not require explicit metaphysical explanations in order to function, even though it inevitably rests upon metaphysical assumptions. Similarly, a talented musician doesn't need to read or formally understand music theory to perform brilliantly. Technical or pragmatic success does not depend on awareness of the underlying structures that make something possible. Effectiveness in practice can be largely independent of perhaps even indifferent to the deeper intellectual commitments and theoretical presuppositions that silently sustain it.