How does this suit you? "the chair exists" is true iff it corresponds to a directly or indirectly observable thing that answers to your meaning.

I agree that disquotationalism is, prima facie at least, not a position that implies realism. This makes sense: disquotationalism is a deflationary theory of truth, and I suspect that, like other deflationary theories, it was conceived of with an eye toward eliminating the problems that plague correspondence and coherence theories.

I pretty much agree with the OP, and also with @Pneumenon. But here's a thought...

Disquotationalism might still seem to fit naturally with a kind of deflationary realism. For deflationary realists, the task is a defensive one, to deny the unwarranted metaphysical excursions of idealism in favour of what is ordinarily evident, from life and science: I share with others a world that's often surprising—I often literally don't know what's around the next corner—and I've seen the bones of creatures that lumbered over the Earth a hundred million years ago, long before all human consciousness. The world transcends my self, my ideas, my thoughts, and at certain points the entire intersubjective world and the whole of history. It is as real as you can get.

This is naive, unphilosophical realism, and it's what the deflationary realist is defending. The idealist comes along and tries to reduce the world to a known substance or structure, that of the mental, or discourse, etc. This metaphysical move the realist cannot allow. But the deflationary realist is not offering a competing metaphysics on what the world is, but only affirming that it exceeds our bounds, as is merely evident. And this is why he wants to abandon correspondence. Correspondence is, usually, a classically realist theory, but it is too metaphysical, too positive for the deflationary realist. For him there can be no question of language vs the world, or anything that opens the door to talk of what reality is really like. Disquotationalism could be part of a suite of deflationary tactics designed to criticize idealist metaphysics.

How does this suit you? "the chair exists" is true iff it corresponds to a directly or indirectly observable thing that answers to your meaning. — Benkei

I'd question what it means for a string of symbols to 'correspond' to something and for something to 'answer' to my meaning.

The implication of the chair existing is that it's something in the world which, in the case of chairs, is empirically verifiable. Thus, disquotation is about something more than language, otherwise there is no point in disquoting.

The implication of the chair existing is that it's something in the world which, in the case of chairs, is empirically verifiable. — Marchesk

I don't see how "if the chair exists then it is something in the world which is empirically verifiable" follows from "'the chair exists' is true iff the chair exists".

Thus, disquotation is about something more than language, otherwise there is no point in disquoting.

The purpose of the disquotation is to explain what we mean by affirming the truth of a statement; we affirm the statement.

The purpose of the disquotation is to explain what we mean by affirming the truth of a statement; we affirm the statement. — Yahadreas

That doesn't mean anything.

I don't see how "if the chair exists then it is something in the world which is empirically verifiable" follows from "'the chair exists' is true iff the chair exists". — Yahadreas

That's the reason for using disquotation. Notice the difference if you substitute unicorns. "Chairs exist" is true, but "Unicorns exist" is not. And why is that? Because unicorns aren't things in the world. This distinction would be impossible if disquotation was merely a linquistic device.

That's the reason for using disquotation. Notice the difference if you substitute unicorns. "Chairs exist" is true, but "Unicorns exist" is not. And why is that? Because unicorns aren't things in the world. This distinction would be impossible if disquotation was merely a linquistic device. — Marchesk

"Chairs exist" is true because chairs exist."Unicorns exist" is not true because unicorns do not exist. That's all disquotation shows us.

Being an empirically verifiable thing in the world is irrelevant to disquotationalism. That would be a different account of truth.

That doesn't mean anything.

Of course it means something. "'Chairs exist' is true" means "chairs exist". Whereas neither "'Chairs exist' is false" nor "Chairs exist' is a sentence" mean "chairs exist".

The point of disquotation is to show that predicating the truth of a statement does nothing that using that statement doesn't also.

I've said this before, but it bears repeating: disquotationalism as presented here is not even true. On the left side of the biconditional you have some fact about language, which requires certain conventions to be set up, and on the right side you have a fact about chairs.

Now in a situation where English never arose as one of the many human languages, but chairs still existed, then chairs would exist but "chairs exist" would not be true.

So you don't need to worry about the implications of disquotationalism in the sense that it's false to begin with.

Now in a situation where English never arose as one of the many human languages, but chairs still existed, then chairs would exist but "chairs exist" would not be true. — The Great Whatever

If chairs still existed then "chairs still existed" is true and if "chairs still existed" is true then chairs still existed. You seem to be saying that chairs still existed but "chairs still existed" is not true? That's a contradiction.

It is not a contradiction. If there is no English, then "chairs exist" is not true; yet in such a situation there can still be chairs. Whether there are chairs or not is not dependent on certain linguistic conventions being set up.

It is true that "chairs exist" is true, when evaluated relative to that situation via our current use of the sentence, as English is actually set up. But this is not what your disquotationalist premise wants to say; it wants to say that the two conditions, a sentence's being true on the one hand and chairs existing on the other, are equivalent, that is, that in any situation in which one holds, the other does as well.

This has the false consequence that any time a chair exists, English must exist as it does now as well.

But this is not what your disquotationalist premise wants to say; it wants to say that the two conditions, a sentence's being true on the one hand and chairs existing on the other, are equivalent, that is, that in any situation in which one holds, the other does as well. — The Great Whatever

I think it only says that the statements "the chair exists" and "'the chair exists' is true" mean the same thing.

But they do not mean the same thing. One is a claim about chairs; the other, about a linguistic object.

But in making that claim about the linguistic object one is making that claim about the chair. When we say that "the chair exists" is true we are saying that the chair exists and when we say that the chair exists we are saying that "the chair exists" is true.

As Arthur Prior says, every statement includes an implicit assertion of its own truth. That's really what the disquotational account explains (but in reverse).

When we say that "the chair exists" is true we are saying that the chair exists and when we say that the chair exists we are saying that "the chair exists" is true. — Yahadreas

This is false. For example, chairs can exist even if there is no English at all.

In order for "the chair exists" to be such that it can be true or false, there have to be elaborate linguistic conventions set up such that some truth value can be assigned to it. It's true that, with English as it now stands, this trivially coincides with cases in which chairs exist. But in a situation where English was different, or there was no English, this would not be so.

To see this, just reflect on the fact that your position results in the absurd conclusion that in any case in which someone makes a chair, this ipso facto means that English as it is now spoken suddenly must exist. But it's just not true that whether there are chairs or not controls whether language works in a certain way.

This doesn't address disquotationalism. Disquotationalism is a linguistic account of the role that the word "truth" plays in our language game. In English, the statements "chairs exist" and "'chairs exist' is true" mean the same thing. That's all that's being said.

It doesn't matter if we're describing a hypothetical world in which the English language has never developed because we're still using the English language to describe this hypothetical world. We can either describe this world by saying that chairs exist or we can describe this world by saying that "chairs exist" is true. It's all the same.

I can make the statement that "Unicons exist". But it's not true. Therefore, there has to be more to disquotation than it being a linquistic account. We have to take disquotation in it's historical context, which is an attempt to dissolve problems with theories of truth by saying there's nothing more to truth than what makes a statement true (or false). So in the case of chairs or unicors, it's an empirical matter.

It is not the same. We can say "chairs exist" to describe that situation. Therefore, we can also say that "chairs exist" is true, in the current situation, when that sentence is evaluated relative to the hypothetical world. Notice that this is not the same as to say that "chairs exist" is true in that hypothetical situational. It is merely still true here, when talking about that hypothetical situation.

Now, we cannot say that "chairs exist" is true in that world -- in that world, there may even be no such sentence. This is different from saying that chairs exist in that hypothetical situation. Again, one is a claim about chairs, which do exist, and another claim is about a certain linguistic object, which in that situation, does not exist, and so cannot be true or false.

Put another way, the only way a sentence can be true is if certain linguistic conventions are set up. In the imagined situation, no such conventions are set up, and therefore the statement is not true.

The alternative would be to claim (1) that in any situation in which anything describable now by language occurs, language must also exist in that situation (language, even English is necessary, and it is impossible for it not to exist as it does now, with all of its conventions for assigning truth conditions -- an absurdity), or (2) that the truth of sentences is independent of any convention, either that no language need to exist for its sentences to be true (?!) or that language (all possible languages?) exist Platonically whether they are actually instantiated or not.

Now, we cannot say that "chairs exist" is true in that world -- in that world, there may even be no such sentence. This is different from saying that chairs exist in that hypothetical situation. — The Great Whatever

But disquotationalism doesn't say that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist" is true in that world; it says that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist in that world" is true.

Put another way, the only way a sentence can be true is if certain linguistic conventions are set up. In the imagined situation, no such conventions are set up, and therefore the statement is not true.

It doesn't matter if the conventions aren't set up in this imagined situation. You have to consider the sentence "'chairs exist' is true" in the same situation in which you consider the sentence "chairs exist". Either there is no English language and one is silent or there is an English language and one can say either "chairs exist" or "'chairs exist' is true".

Under the current conventions of the existing English language-game the statements "chairs exist" and "'chairs exist' is true" mean the same thing. Both statements are used to assert the existence of chairs.

Being an empirically verifiable thing in the world is irrelevant to disquotationalism. That would be a different account of truth. — Yahadreas

Indeed. Or rather an account of what exists rather than of "truth." Disquotationalism points out a logical relationship between statements and the world-i.e. if someone is talking about an existing chair, then a chair exists in the world.

Somehow you've got the the absurd conclusion disquotationalism is giving a description of the empirical world and that this is supposedly what the realist is arguing. It is not.

Disquotationalism is the identification of a logical point and it is on these logical grounds that realism is supported; whenever there is something to talk about, logically, is a state distinct from any language which talks about it. Things are not defined by experience of the thing. They are given in themselves.

Here the realist is not making an empirical point (e.g. a chair exists) but a logical one. Regardless of what empirical states there are, language which talks about a state of the world is distinct from the thing it talks about: no matter what exists, realism obtains.

But disquotationalism doesn't say that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist" is true in that world; it says that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist in that world" is true. — Yahadreas

To say that "S" is true iff S, or to say that they mean "the same thing," is to say that in any case in which one holds, so does the other. That is, they have the same truth conditions. So if I say that "A is to the left of B" means the same thing as "B is to the right of A," that means there is no situation in which one could hold but the other not.

Now, if I say, "Chairs exist iff 'Chairs exist' is true," and by this I mean that these two mean the same thing, then I am speaking a falsehood. Why? Because there are situations in which chairs exist, but "chairs exist" is not true, viz. situations in which the linguistic conventions are different or absent.

Put another way:

(1) Whether "chairs exist" is true depends on certain linguistic conventions are in place.
(2) It is possible that chairs exist, yet no such linguistic conventions are in place.
(3) Therefore, it is possible that chairs exist, yet it is not that case that "chairs exist" is true.

Regardless of what empirical states there are, language which talks about a state of the world is distinct from the thing it talks about: no matter what exists, realism obtains. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That's not (metaphysical) realism. Anti-realism is quite capable of distinguishing between speech and the things spoken about. "Frodo" is a name and Frodo is a hobbit. This is consistent with both realism and anti-realism. Realism is the position that argues that the things spoken about satisfy a particular ontology (and anti-realism another), and this ontology doesn't necessarily follow from the logical distinction.

My point is that disquotationalism doesn't entail the ontological commitments that some realists seem to think it does.

Realism is the position that things are not dependent on experience. States of the world (e.g. an existing chair) are defined independently of experience (i.e. someone talking, thinking, seeing, touching, etc.,etc. chair). The ontology of metaphysical realism is: things don't need need to be experienced to exist.

Anti-realism holds the opposite. It equivocates the existence of a thing with the presence of experience of the thing. It treats language as if it is the things the language talks about. Don't have the experience of a chair? Then it doesn't exist.

Realist ontology IS the distinction between experience (including language) and things experienced (including what language talks about).

Realism is the position that things are not dependent on experience. States of the world (e.g. an existing chair) are defined independently of experience (i.e. someone talking, thinking, seeing, touching, etc.,etc. chair). The ontology of metaphysical realism is: things don't need need to be experienced to exist. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, so it does more than simply argue for a logical distinction between "Frodo" and Frodo.

Anti-realism holds the opposite. It equivocates the existence of a thing with the presence of experience of the thing. It treats language as if it is the things the language talks about. Don't have the experience of a chair? Then it doesn't exist.

No it doesn't. There are plenty of anti-realists (myself included) who do not equate chairs with the experience of chairs or language with the things language talks about. Anti-realism is quite capable of accepting the logical distinction between "Frodo" and Frodo. But accepting this logical distinction does not then entail accepting that Frodo is an ontologically independent person and that the truth of "Frodo is a hobbit" transcends verification (things that must be accepted to be a realist about Frodo).

Realist ontology IS the distinction between experience (including language) and things experienced (including what language talks about).

The ontological distinction between language and the things we talk about, not (just) the logical distinction. The anti-realist can accept the latter and reject the former. This is why your defence of realism and criticism of anti-realism always fails. You only address the logical distinction, which is a non sequitur.

You think it does, but it doesn't. The logical distinction between language and what language talks about IS the distinction between "Frodo" (language) and Frodo (state of the world). Realist ontology is nothing more than this logical distinction. In holding position, one takes Frodo to be a ontologically independent person. Frodo is not experience of Frodo or language about Frodo. Frodo is different state of the world (i.e. ontologically independent of) to language which talks about Frodo.

Anti-realism is not capable of accepting this logical distinction. It denies Frodo is ontologically independent (i.e. a different state of existence) to the language "Frodo."

(critically, this is not an empirical claim. In making this distinction, we are not making an argument that Frodo exists in the world. Just that Frodo ( or any given existing state) is necessarily distinct from "Frodo" (or any language which talks about a given existing state) ).

Realist ontology is nothing more than this logical distinction. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No it isn't. Realist ontology is a position regarding the ontological status of things, not a position regarding the logical distinction between sentence and subject.

Anti-realism is not capable of accepting this logical distinction. It denies Frodo is ontologically independent (i.e. a different state of existence) to the language "Frodo."

That X and "X" are logically distinct is not that X is ontologically independent of "X". The anti-realist might very well deny that Frodo is ontologically independent of "Frodo" but he doesn't deny that Frodo is logically distinct from "Frodo".

The anti-realist is quite capable of saying that Frodo is a fictional hobbit and that "Frodo" is a 5-letter word used as a name. The anti-realist doesn't say that Frodo is a 5-letter word used as a name or that "Frodo" is a fictional hobbit.

(critically, this is not an empirical claim. In making this distinction, we are not making an argument that Frodo exists in the world. Just that Frodo ( or any given existing state) is necessarily distinct from "Frodo" (or any language which talks about a given existing state) ).

To be a realist about Frodo is to say that Frodo exists in the world (in a manner independent of language and thoughts). That's why nobody is a realist about Frodo. Frodo is ontologically dependent on what we say and think about him, hence why everybody is an anti-realist about Frodo.

You continually misrepresent realism and anti-realism.

The ontological status of a thing (e.g. Frodo) and language (e.g. "Frodo" ) IS the logical distinction between subject and sentence. It is pointing out that there are two states of existence in a situation of statement which talks about a state of the world and state of the world. In this case, since we are talking about a situation in which a statement is being made about a state of the world, that X and "X" distinction is pointing out the ontological independence of the state of the world from the language which talks about it.

To be a realist about Frodo is to say that Frodo exists in the world (in a manner independent of language and thoughts). That's why nobody is a realist about Frodo. Frodo is ontologically dependent on what we say and think about him, hence why everybody is an anti-realist about Frodo. — Michael

Nope. That is to understand Frodo to exist in the world. It is an empirical claim, not the position of realism. The existence of Frodo is most certainly not dependent on what we say or think about him. Since any existing Frodo is distinct from the language which talks about him (they are different states of existence), an existing Frodo will be - regardless of whether someone talks or thinks about him.

I agree with Michael's last post. I think that The Willow keeps fallaciously concluding independence from distinction.

You are making the same mistake as Michael: thinking that "independence" means "outside language." It doesn't. Rather it specifies that, as language is a distinct state of existence from any state talked about, the presence of a thing does not require someone to speak or think about it.

You are making the same mistake as Michael: thinking that "independence" means "outside language." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Your assumption is mistaken. I'm well aware of the difference in meaning, and I'm aware that the former doesn't entail the latter.

Rather it specifies that, as language is a distinct state of existence from any state talked about, the presence of a thing does not require someone to speak or think about it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Whilst I agree with both of those claims on an individual basis, the latter doesn't logically follow from the former.

I stand by the claim that I made in my last post, and your reply (in which you reiterate your point, yet again) has failed to repudiate my criticism.