I guess this is my goal.

1) Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit? — schopenhauer1

Animal life generally displays overwhelmingly goal-directed behaviour. The things that simple animals do out of what is blithely described is 'instinct' are quite amazing; birds and fish migrate halfway around the planet, often to the particular creek they were born in (see this story about eels that migrate from a pond in Sydney 1,800 km, and across paddocks, to Vanuatu, to breed.)

I think it's pretty clear that such behaviours can be understood and maybe explained in terms of evolutionary theory, but there seems a lot of gaps to me. How are such behaviours encoded or remembered? There is now a theory that birds migrate along magnetic field lines, but nobody really knows. Memory is a mysterious thing.

Furthermore, there is a problem of equivocation in respect of evolutionary biology and the question of purposes or goals. A major theme in the development of modern science was the overturning of medieval scholasticism and Aristotelean ideas of 'telos' or purpose. To recap, Aristotelean physics was infused by the idea that everything has a purpose as part of its essence, and will act in accordance to that essence. The school-book example is that stones are attracted towards the Earth by their very nature. Of course Galileo completely (and rightly) demolished such concepts, which were bound up with Ptolmaic cosmology and many such ideas which are demonstrably fallacious. So when it came to biological theory, that discipline too wished to divest itself altogether of such ideas as 'telos', purposes and goals, and to assume a strictly mechanist account of the origins of nature and life itself (which has been called 'physics envy' at times.)

However that has proved impracticable in respect of biology, as so much about organisms is goal-directed. This is so even on the cellular level, where billions of microscopic cellular transactions are apparently orchestrated or co-ordinated in the attempt to maintain homeostasis - something completely absent in the mechanist picture of biology. That is why biology has had to abandon mechanistic models in favour of ideas like bio-semiosis, about which Apokrisis has made many contributions. Part of that is the re-instatement of the Aristotelean notions of final and formal causes - that life is evolving 'towards' something, as it were.

The problem now is that, even if one recognises goal-directed behaviours as being biologically defensible, the question becomes 'which goals'? Obviously, from the perspective of evolutionary theory, the goals are always the same: successful reproduction and survival. But if that is taken as a philosophical purpose, then it is reductionist: our only 'goal' from that perspective, is to marry and have children. I suppose that's better than nothing - after all, Freud said the aim of his work was to enable people 'to work and to love' - but in the grand scheme, it leaves out nearly all of what philosophy was originally intended to encompass. Or so I would think.

Here is an interesting excerpt from Robert W. Lurz's book, "The Philosophy of Animal Minds":
https://books.google.com/books?id=YfYfAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=how+did+goal-oriented+behavior+evolve&source=bl&ots=SfgcMWJGeo&sig=A2nblMOI3gQswEOQT8Su_hK2syI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjewZXI_pzVAhXq8YMKHYNEDXsQ6AEINTAD#v=onepage&q=how%20did%20goal-oriented%20behavior%20evolve&f=false

It explains the difference between goal-oriented and goal-directed behavior, with examples. He also has another book, "Mindreading Animals", both of which are an interesting read.

The problem now is that, even if one recognises goal-directed behaviours as being biologically defensible, the question becomes 'which goals'? Obviously, from the perspective of evolutionary theory, the goals are always the same: successful reproduction and survival. But if that is taken as a philosophical purpose, then it is reductionist: our only 'goal' from that perspective, is to marry and have children. I suppose that's better than nothing - after all, Freud said the aim of his work was to enable people 'to work and to love' - but in the grand scheme, it leaves out nearly all of what philosophy was originally intended to encompass. Or so I would think. — Wayfarer

You have some interesting thoughts here and a nice history of biological thinking. Do you think that the "goals" you are talking about like reproduction and survival and "goals" that I am talking about in terms of linguistic-thought based goals (I want to go to X place to meet X person) are the same thing or wholly different?

It explains the difference between goal-oriented and goal-directed behavior, with examples. He also has another book, "Mindreading Animals", both of which are an interesting read. — Harry Hindu

I'll try to read some of this. Yes, this is what I might have been getting at with Wayfarer. Goal-oriented is not linguistic-based. Or perhaps when an animal makes a tool he is goal-directed because the end goal is apparent and there are concrete steps, but his desire for food is goal-oriented as it is a vague feeling and not consciously thought about. But, even tool-making might be just problem-solving without the goal really consciously known. That is more cognitive science though.

Do you think that the "goals" you are talking about like reproduction and survival and "goals" that I am talking about in terms of linguistic-thought based goals (I want to go to X place to meet X person) are the same thing or wholly different? — schopenhauer1

The point I was making is that it is commonplace nowadays to assume that human goals and behaviours are all ultimately shaped by, or the consequence of, our evolutionary biology. And I think that's reductionist, and not a sound basis for goal setting. Humans obviously have far greater scope and capacity for devising novelty, for exploring ideas and creating new things, than do animals.

I mentioned the rejection of teleology which is typical of the modern attitude. It's worth recalling the original discussion of 'telos', which is in Aristotle's Politics:

What concerns us is the telos of a human being. Just like everything else that is alive, human beings have a telos. What is it that human beings are meant by nature to become in the way that knives are meant to cut, acorns are meant to become oak trees, and thoroughbred ponies are meant to become race horses? According to Aristotle, we are meant to become happy. This is nice to hear, although it isn't all that useful. After all, people find happiness in many different ways. However, Aristotle says that living happily requires living a life of virtue. Someone who is not living a life that is virtuous, or morally good, is also not living a happy life, no matter what they might think. They are like a knife that will not cut, an oak tree that is diseased and stunted, or a racehorse that cannot run. In fact they are worse, since they have chosen the life they lead in a way that a knife or an acorn or a horse cannot.

Someone who does live according to virtue, who chooses to do the right thing because it is the right thing to do, is living a life that flourishes; to borrow a phrase, they are being all that they can be by using all of their human capacities to their fullest. The most important of these capacities is logos - a word that means "speech" and also means "reason" (it gives us the English word "logic"). Human beings alone have the ability to speak, and Aristotle says that we have been given that ability by nature so that we can speak and reason with each other to discover what is right and wrong, what is good and bad, and what is just and unjust.

Note that human beings discover these things rather than creating them. We do not get to decide what is right and wrong, but we do get to decide whether we will do what is right or what is wrong, and this is the most important decision we make in life. So too is the happy life: we do not get to decide what really makes us happy, although we do decide whether or not to pursue the happy life. And this is an ongoing decision. It is not made once and for all, but must be made over and over again as we live our lives.

I agree that Aristotle seems to fall into a kind of category error in regards to human virtue. We were "meant" to live virtually as this is our telos. Designed objects and human endeavors are two different things and to equate them is to deflate a much more complex phenomenon into a much simpler one when it is not anywhere near the same thing except by loose analogy. So to refer back to the OP, does goal-directed behaviors fall into the nominal camp of social conventions? Are goals arbitrary ways to delineate how we spend our time? Can we function without these arbitrary groupings? What would that even look like to not have goals, however short or long-term?

Related to this, Schopenhauer's whole metaphysical and ethical schema had goal-driven behavior as a an important factor. Much of what humans experience are the pangs of goals that are never satisfied that well up unconsciously via the essence of our (and all) being, namely Will. In fact, goals are a main source of dissatisfaction in the human experience as they are often frustrated, temporary, cause anxiety, and allow for little reprieve. Interestingly, I don't think he delineates between the core suffering of goal-seeking dissatisfaction and the external or contingent harms that exist in our pursuit of goals. The goal may be to get back to your house safe, but the contingent circumstances of achieving this may cause pain along the way (stubbed your toe, got into an accident, got lost, etc.). Anyways, goals seem to be the biggest part of human behavior and it is often overlooked.

I agree that Aristotle seems to fall into a kind of category error — schopenhauer1

Who are you agreeing with? I didn't say that Aristotle falls into a category error; I posted that quote because I think there's wisdom in it.

So to refer back to the OP, does goal-directed behaviors fall into the nominal camp of social conventions? — schopenhauer1

If you're a moral relativist, they must, because they're only directed by social conventions. If you're a moral realist, then they don't, because there are genuinely real and important goals that aren't dependent on social convention.

Schopenhauer's whole metaphysical and ethical schema had goal-driven behavior as a an important factor. Much of what humans experience are the pangs of goals that are never satisfied that well up unconsciously via the essence of our (and all) being, namely Will. In fact, goals are a main source of dissatisfaction in the human experience as they are often frustrated, temporary, cause anxiety, and allow for little reprieve. — schopenhauer1

I don't know if Schopenhauer would agree that the will is goal-directed. The will is blind and unconscious. And it's not goals can't be reached, more that desires can't be satisfied. 'Man can indeed do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants.' But Schopenhauer also recognized asceticism as a way - indeed the only way - of freedom from the tyranny of will, and of the importance of compassion.

Your namesake would have made the distinction between essential, or natural, pursuits and artificial pursuits. Natural pursuits being those like acquiring food, water, shelter, intercourse (but that is debatably essential), artificial pursuits being those imposed and constructed by society, like money, fame, and power.

Individuality really is a myth. A great majority of the things we do, we do because we care about what others think of us. Our self-esteem is largely dependent upon the status given to us by our peers. We know from developmental psychology (such as Rank and Becker) that people are symbolic objects to others before they begin to see themselves as individuals. We are molded and shaped by others, not even by them maliciously imposing their values on us but by simply providing nurture and care for us when we are young, and come to understand that in a system of symbols, every person must play their part, represent their symbolic role. A few fit into the heroic archetype and help knit the society together.

Even Schopenhauer, the old cranky fart, secretly perused the footnotes of the newspaper for any mention of his name, and late in life found great satisfaction in the attention given to him by the public at large. For as much as Western civilization has promoted the individual, I think it more likely that "individualistic" people are really just very good at performing an act of deception - they act removed and individualistic yet pride themselves on this image. Without anyone else, there would be no real value to being an individual - a hermit is a hermit in relation to the rest of society. Our heritage (Heidegger) is rooted in the surrounding culture, heritage is literally part of who we are even if we don't like it.

This is, I think, one of the issues I have with Heidegger's "existentialism". He takes it as a given that we are social beings with an irreplaceable heritage, and in many cases promotes and values this. His authenticity is all about creating individuality within the parameters of one's social bubble, like making a circle in the sand is saying "this is mine" while simultaneously living in society as well. It's very conservative and, in my opinion, non-radical. I see his emphasis on heritage as an escape from the "nothing" - Heidegger isn't willing to see "nihilism" to it's end. He wants to save meaning and purpose by simply turning his gaze away. It's quite inauthentic. At least that's what I interpreted it as.

Who are you agreeing with? I didn't say that Aristotle falls into a category error; I posted that quote because I think there's wisdom in it. — Wayfarer

Oh I see. I thought you meant that Aristotle was making a naturalistic fallacy by saying that the goal of virtue is our telos because everything that was created must have an final cause, including humans. I would say that Aristotle jumped the gun here having a very tenuous basis for a) there being a final cause, and b) virtue being this final cause. He took the outcomes of "good decision-making" and made it into an arbitrary value. He probably saw what his Greek society thought was "successful" and made it into a whole virtue value system. This is not much different than Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs with the virtue-under-different-name "self-actualization" as final goal.

If you're a moral relativist, they must, because they're only directed by social conventions. If you're a moral realist, then they don't, because there are genuinely real and important goals that aren't dependent on social convention. — Wayfarer

Right, so what do you say? Are goals just something to fill the void, or something entailed in human behavior? The implication for nominal origin of goals is actually more startling than you might think. It means that through social convention, we have to justify where goals are coming from, why they are dominating, and how, if possible, to not construct them as it is simply a pervasive habit, not an absolute necessity.

I don't know if Schopenhauer would agree that the will is goal-directed. The will is blind and unconscious. And it's not goals can't be reached, more that desires can't be satisfied. 'Man can indeed do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wants.' But Schopenhauer also recognized asceticism as a way - indeed the only way - of freedom from the tyranny of will, and of the importance of compassion. — Wayfarer

But I did make this distinction when I said:

Much of what humans experience are the pangs of goals that are never satisfied that well up unconsciously via the essence of our (and all) being, namely Will. — schopenhauer1

So yes, the Will is blind, but then the mind that is mediated through the Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason (through the phenomenal flipside of Will) will mediate Will with goals that frustrate and cause suffering. So it is a part of Schop's picture, but not on the side of Will (as thing-in-itself) but from the illusory phenomenal side where we have identities as subjects and objects, and goal-directed behavior. So Will manifests itself in the world of phenomena through our goals which are driven by a more deep-rooted ceaseless, goal-less, striving desire that is a manifestation of Will.

Your namesake would have made the distinction between essential, or natural, pursuits and artificial pursuits. Natural pursuits being those like acquiring food, water, shelter, intercourse (but that is debatably essential), artificial pursuits being those imposed and constructed by society, like money, fame, and power. — darthbarracuda

Yes, I agree but, that wasn't the distinction I was making. My distinction was suffering caused by his core-framework of ceaseless desire which manifests in goals and consequently suffering and suffering caused by contingent harms that are not a necessity but happen nevertheless due to circumstances of living.

Without anyone else, there would be no real value to being an individual - a hermit is a hermit in relation to the rest of society. Our heritage (Heidegger) is rooted in the surrounding culture, heritage is literally part of who we are even if we don't like it. — darthbarracuda

I would agree with this for the most part. Heritage, society, culture, is the substance of our characters- no matter how rebellious we want to be towards the historical and cultural setting that created our psychological understanding of the world, it has shaped us, and we are always in relation to it.

I see his emphasis on heritage as an escape from the "nothing" - Heidegger isn't willing to see "nihilism" to it's end. He wants to save meaning and purpose by simply turning his gaze away. It's quite inauthentic. At least that's what I interpreted it as. — darthbarracuda

What do you think would be a more authentic version?

I'll try to read some of this. Yes, this is what I might have been getting at with Wayfarer. Goal-oriented is not linguistic-based. Or perhaps when an animal makes a tool he is goal-directed because the end goal is apparent and there are concrete steps, but his desire for food is goal-oriented as it is a vague feeling and not consciously thought about. But, even tool-making might be just problem-solving without the goal really consciously known. That is more cognitive science though. — schopenhauer1

No. You didn't read enough and you projected something unrelated into what was explained in the book. Linguistics was never used in the link I provided to distinguish goal-oriented behavior from goal-directed behavior. Linguistics has nothing to do with it.

Goal-oriented behavior is basically instinctive behavior where the behavior is caused by the way in which natural selection has filtered certain behaviors so that those that are beneficial to surviving and procreating are the ones that are passed down.

Goal-directed behavior is where a mental representation of the goal is the cause of the behavior. When an organism behaves in a goal-directed fashion, it can overcome obstacles that might otherwise prevent it from reaching the goal. Even an organism that represents its environment would be unable to engage in goal-directed behavior if its representations of its goals and means to achieve those goals were not distinct. Having distinct representations allows the organism to abandon one behavior and adopt another while still retaining the goal that the previous behavior was aimed at achieving. Having distinct representations of goals and means to achieve them is thus a prerequisite for behaving in a goal-directed fashion.

No. You didn't read enough and you projected something unrelated into what was explained in the book. Linguistics was never used in the link I provided to distinguish goal-oriented behavior from goal-directed behavior. Linguistics has nothing to do with it. — Harry Hindu

I answered you before I even read the article. Ironically, what I was talking about was not that far off from the distinction made in the book you linked. I mentioned linguistic which was a more specific form of goal-directed behaviors. As the book/you mention, if it is not "distinct" then, it is not goal-directed simply goal-oriented as it's vague/basic instinctive behavior without purposeful direction. There are concrete steps that are adaptive to reaching the goal rather than basic programming that happen to produce better survival results due to vague responses to the environment.