Categorical non-existence: what it was really about

WISDOMfromPO-MO

God can't make a rock that he can't lift, therefore God is not omnipotent, some people say.

That is distorting the meaning of omnipotence, I have heard at least one other person say. Omnipotent means able to do all things that are possible, he said.

Therefore, many years ago I wondered if it is possible to categorically not exist. If it is possible, and if God is omnipotent (the all possible omnipotent, not the rock you can't lift omnipotent), then that means that it is possible for God to categorically not exist.

But then God could come into existence again. Then categorical non-existence. Then existence.

It makes the whole "Does God exist?" question a moot point.

Now you know why I asked if categorical non-existence is possible.

I spent a whole thread arguing that everything exists, period. I learned a lot in the process--the idea of a being like the Empire State Building always existing and simply changing form/manifestation occurred to me for the first time.

But the whole time I believed that categorical non-existence is possible, because at least God might be able to do it, and it changes everything that I have heard people argue/debate/quarrel over about the "existence" of God.

Brian A

↪WISDOMfromPO-MO

There is a faulty premise here, namely that it is possible for God not to exist. This is a contradiction in terms, according to Aquinas' definition of God: ipsum esse subistens, or the subsistent act of being itself. Therefore since God is the essential act of existence, and since God exists inner-mostly in all things (another Aquinian def.), it is both (1) objectively impossible that God does not exist and (2) subjectively impossible to imagine it, for the very subject who affirms the so-called nonexistence of God is herself grounded in God according to the above definition.

WISDOMfromPO-MO

There is a faulty premise here, namely that it is possible for God not to exist. This is a contradiction in terms, according to Aquinas' definition of God: ipsum esse subistens, or the subsistent act of being itself. Therefore since God is the essential act of existence, and since God exists inner-mostly in all things (another Aquinian def.), it is both (1) objectively impossible that God does not exist and (2) subjectively impossible to imagine it, for the very subject who affirms the so-called nonexistence of God is herself grounded in God according to the above definition. — Brian A

The question is if categorical non-existence is possible.

If it is possible, and if omnipotence is the ability to do all things possible, and if God is omnipotent, then God could possibly categorically not exist.

But then if is possible to categorically not exist one second, come into existence the next second, and then later categorically not exist, then God could be at any of those steps at any moment and repeat all of the steps perpetually.

It makes the question "Does God exist?" useless. The appropriate question would be "Does God exist at this present moment?"

Brian A

↪WISDOMfromPO-MO

I understand better your original argument. But I still disagree that it is possible for God to categorically not exist. The definition for "omnipotence" is incorrect. Categorical non-existence is possible for many things (or perhaps all things except God), but not for God.

Premise-1: The definition of omnipotence (in relation to God) should be, "The ability to do all things possible for God," rather than "The ability to do all things possible."
Premise-2: God is the essence of being itself.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for God to categorically not exist (existence is an essential property of God).

WISDOMfromPO-MO

For several years now I have not understood why God "must" exist.

There is no evidence for the existence of God, some people assert. Well, even if it is true that with respect to the existence of God nothing presently meets their standard for evidence the fact that God could exist when nobody is looking for evidence of his existence, not exist when everybody is looking for evidence of his existence, exist when only one person is looking for evidence of his existence, etc. is not accounted for.

Some theists might object that God existing one second, not existing the next, then existing again the next second is inconsistent with the omnipresent nature of God. Well, Dictionary.com defines omnipresent as "Present everywhere at the same time". Notice that it does not say present at all times.

Again, "Does God exist at this present moment" seems to be the only appropriate question.

Brian A

↪WISDOMfromPO-MO

It seems there are two separate issues here. The first is whether God exists. But the second is that supposing he does exist, is it possible for him to categorically not exist. And to this I say no, since existence is an essential property of God, in the same sense, perhaps, that "having a horn" is the essential property of a unicorn.

Of course one could say that if God doesn't exist, then it is possible for him to categorically not exist, but that would be a tautology.

In the end, if God really does exist, then my view is that it is not possible for him to categorically cease existing, for the above reason.

jorndoe

This is a contradiction in terms, according to Aquinas' definition of God: ipsum esse subistens, or the subsistent act of being itself. — Brian A

I don't think you can define something into existence, as it were.

If you define G to be (modally) necessary, then G becomes reduced to something like (logical) consistency, which seems rather different from the more elaborate gods in theism.

The Bare Necessities (old thread on the logical modalities)

jorndoe

↪WISDOMfromPO-MO

, I think I'd have to agree.
Non-existence can be linguistic only.

Thorongil

I don't think you can define something into existence, as it were. — jorndoe

I don't think that's what he's doing, though. I've struggled with this too, but I think the claim is that if God exists, then he exists necessarily (cannot not exist). The "if" entails composing proofs, and giving a proof is different from merely stipulating a definition.

jorndoe

I don't think that's what he's doing, though. I've struggled with this too, but I think the claim is that if God exists, then he exists necessarily (cannot not exist). The "if" entails composing proofs, and giving a proof is different from merely stipulating a definition. — Thorongil

As per The Bare Necessities, if any x is (modally) necessary, then x is something like (logical) consistency.

Necessities, N, is the conjunction of possibilities for every consistent world:
$N = \bigcap_{w \in W} P(w)$
where P(w) is true propositions for w.

You could chain these together

if God exists, then he exists necessarily (cannot not exist)
if any x is (modally) necessary, then x is something like (logical) consistency

But this is just logic.
Things become significantly more complex if we move to nomological (or physical or whatever).

jorndoe

@Brian A, @Thorongil, it seems "safer" to assert that God is necessary for our world.
Though of course we don't know exactly what our world is (for that matter, I doubt omniscience is attainable).

Thorongil

↪jorndoe

I don't understand your reply, but that might be because I'm mostly ignorant of formal logic.

I will simply reiterate that to say that God is a necessary being does not, in itself, prove that he exists. Proving God's existence comes before proving that his existence is necessary.

jorndoe

@Thorongil:

1. if God exists, then he exists necessarily (cannot not exist) — Thorongil
2. if any x is (modally) necessary, then x is something like (logical) consistency — The Bare Necessities
3. therefore, if God exists, then God is something like (logical) consistency — 1 and 2

[...] which seems rather different from the more elaborate gods in theism. — jorndoe

Thorongil

if any x is (modally) necessary, then x is something like (logical) consistency — jorndoe

What do you mean by logical consistency? The principle of non-contradiction? You think God is the principle of non-contradiction? That is incoherent.

jorndoe

What do you mean by logical consistency? The principle of non-contradiction? — Thorongil

It was round up in the old The Bare Necessities thread. Possible worlds maintain standard logic by definition:

identity, x = x, p ⇔ p
non-contradiction, ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
the excluded middle, p ∨ ¬p
double negation (introduction at least), p ⇒ ¬¬p
modus ponens/tollens

And necessities hold for every possible world (even simple ones), so what do they all have in common? Consistency.

You think God is the principle of non-contradiction? That is incoherent. — Thorongil

I don't think anything in particular, except that defining God as necessary seems to resign God to some sort of triviality, like consistency. Maybe that is incoherent (it's not my definition). As mentioned, it seems "safer" to assert that God is necessary for our world (and call it a day).

WISDOMfromPO-MO

It seems there are two separate issues here. The first is whether God exists. But the second is that supposing he does exist, is it possible for him to categorically not exist. And to this I say no, since existence is an essential property of God, in the same sense, perhaps, that "having a horn" is the essential property of a unicorn.

Of course one could say that if God doesn't exist, then it is possible for him to categorically not exist, but that would be a tautology.

In the end, if God really does exist, then my view is that it is not possible for him to categorically cease existing, for the above reason. — Brian A

Existing is an essential property of God, or existing at all times is an essential property of God, which is it?

Srap Tasmaner

↪jorndoe

And there's also what I think is Alvin Plantinga's argument:
1. If God exists, he exists necessarily.
2. If God is possible, then there is some possible world in which he exists. (By definition.)
3. If he exists in that world, he exists necessarily in that world. (From 1.)
4. If he exists necessarily, he exists in all possible worlds, including this one.
5. Therefore, if God is possible, then He exists.

Brian A

↪WISDOMfromPO-MO

Existing is an essential property of God, or existing at all times is an essential property of God, which is it?

1. God is beyond space and time.
2. Therefore, existing at all times is an essential property of God.

Precisely, "at all times" is a matter of speaking in this case, since God is beyond time. Why is God beyond space and time? Since God, if postulated, must be the cause of the universe, and space and time arose only at the time of the big bang.

↪jorndoe

I don't think you can define something into existence, as it were.

I agree. My understanding is that the original post was questioning whether it is possible that God can categorically not exist, supposing hypothetically that God did exist.

jorndoe

Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for God to categorically not exist (existence is an essential property of God). — Brian A

It seems there are two separate issues here. The first is whether God exists. But the second is that supposing he does exist, is it possible for him to categorically not exist. And to this I say no, since existence is an essential property of God, in the same sense, perhaps, that "having a horn" is the essential property of a unicorn. — Brian A

Some of those snippets could be construed as misuse of language.

Existence is not a predicate
∃ and quiddity

Can't define stuff into existence.

Categorical non-existence: what it was really about

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