Why would that be in favor of theism, rather than, say, deism, pantheism, etc? — Arkady

I don't know if it is theism strictly speaking, maybe it's simply a 'higher intelligence' in some vague sense. You know, some of those Pew surveys of religion, find that a percentage of self-described atheists will still admit to having an ill-defined 'belief in a higher intelligence'. I myself don't believe in a 'heavenly father figure', but (as you know) I'm also not an atheist.

If scientific findings can be brought to bear in service of demonstrating God's existence (as you say here), I presume you believe that it is also fair game to use scientific findings to argue against the existence of God? Because it seems that in the past, such things would invite cries of "scientism" from you. — Arkady

I have often said that you can't scientifically prove the existence or non-existence of God, and I stand by that. So I wouldn't like to defend the kind of vulgar attempt to 'prove that God exists' undertaken by ID theorists. But then, neither would David Bentley Hart, or Ed Feser, both of whom a theistic philosophers, and neither of whom will have any truck with intelligent design.

My argument is more along the lines that science assumes natural laws, or the 'regularities of the heavens', or whatever; and also assumes the efficacy of mathematics. Given those two foundation - namely, natural laws, and mathematics - science can discover a great deal indeed. But why nature is so ordered, and why the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences' (to quote Eugene WIgner), is another kind of question altogether. I don't think science answers that kind of 'why'; I wouldn't expect it to, but that is no criticism of science, either.

I'll go along with Einstein on this question.

I am not an Atheist. I do not know if I can define myself as a Pantheist. The problem involved is too vast for our limited minds. May I not reply with a parable? The human mind, no matter how highly trained, cannot grasp the universe. We are in the position of a little child, entering a huge library whose walls are covered to the ceiling with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written those books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. The child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books, a mysterious order, which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects. That, it seems to me, is the attitude of the human mind, even the greatest and most cultured, toward God.

I think that you make a very good point. I agree one hundred percent.

What they find are facts, facts and more facts, with consequences that we cannot ignore — Tim

This is very interesting and I agree. I think you are a very smart person.

↪Wayfarer skee my wide knowledge scares yo — Tim

Great point again, it answers the question in a very cognitive way. It makes a good point.

I have often said that you can't scientifically prove the existence or non-existence of God, and I stand by that. So I wouldn't like to defend the kind of vulgar attempt to 'prove that God exists' undertaken by ID theorists. But then, neither would David Bentley Hart, or Ed Feser, both of whom a theistic philosophers, and neither of whom will have any truck with intelligent design. — Wayfarer

I agree that science isn't in the business of "proving" the existence of God. But that's because I don't believe that science is in the business of "proving" anything. That seems more the domain of mathematicians and logicians, wouldn't you say? In that sense, science can't "prove" the existence of electrons.

Science deals in defeasible, fallible reasoning, more inductive or abductive in nature than deductive. But the point is that you believe that certain scientific observations speak to the existence of God (you find it "persuasive" that they point to God, or at least a "higher intelligence"). Even if we are only here dealing in probabilities and not in proof per se, you are of the mind that scientific investigation can provide reasons for believing in the existence of God. But, my point is that that road surely runs two ways: if science can be brought to bear in providing reasons to believe in God, surely it can also be brought to bear (at least in principle) in service of providing reasons not to believe in God? But I suspect that you'd deem the latter to be an instance of "scientism." So, I'm not sure how to reconcile this apparent tension in your views.

My argument is more along the lines that science assumes natural laws, or the 'regularities of the heavens', or whatever; and also assumes the efficacy of mathematics. Given those two foundation - namely, natural laws, and mathematics - science can discover a great deal indeed. But why nature is so ordered, and why the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences' (to quote Eugene WIgner), is another kind of question altogether. I don't think science answers that kind of 'why'; I wouldn't expect it to, but that is no criticism of science, either.

But, as I've pointed out before, science doesn't "assume" these things: science (and the lay public, to a lesser extent) observes these things. Observing X and assuming X aren't the same thing. There is no a priori reason to believe in invariant physical laws or values of physical constants, and scientists have in fact searched for such variance, and not found any within the limits of physical detection.

But, as I've pointed out before, science doesn't "assume" these things: science (and the lay public, to a lesser extent) observes these things. — Arkady

But they do assume them. Every time that an experiment is run which involves velocity, they don't have to first check that this time, F really will equal MA. I mean 'assumes', in that naturalism assumes nature, as does realism, generally. It's not in the business of doubting the testimony of sense; and yet some philosophers will.

But, my point is that that road surely runs two ways: if science can be brought to bear in providing reasons to believe in God, surely it can also be brought to bear (at least in principle) in service of providing reasons not to believe in God? — Arkady

That is the story of the last several centuries of Western history, right? Used to believe in divine causes, now knows better because of science? But I think the wheel is turning again.

Besides, I don't think the sentiment expressed by Einstein is really very religious. The first chapter of The God Delusion was called 'A Very Religious Unbeliever', and was about - Albert Einstein.

But they do assume them. Every time that an experiment is run which involves velocity, they don't have to first check that this time, F really will equal MA. I mean 'assumes', in that naturalism assumes nature, as does realism, generally. It's not in the business of doubting the testimony of sense; and yet philosophers will do this. — Wayfarer

Assuming the reliability of the senses and assuming the existence of natural law are not the same thing. As I said, science is in the business of fallible reasoning. Scientists (knowingly or unknowingly) rely on induction or abduction. In the case of induction, this often takes the form of extrapolating from the observed to the as-yet-unobserved or to the future. Sometimes this works, sometimes one finds a black swan.

But the point is that the regularity of nature is not an a priori assumption: where nature has been observed, it has been found to be remarkably constant and uniform. It could have been otherwise (at least conceivably), and scientists have looked for such deviations, but none have presented themselves (at least as far as I'm aware: I'm not a physicist). If you want to speak to the fallibility of induction, that is fine, but that's a different topic.

That is the story of the last several centuries of Western history, right? Used to believe in divine causes, now knows better because of science? But I think the wheel is turning again. — Wayfarer

My point is that you are claiming that science does in fact provide reasons for believing in God (feel free to substitute "higher intelligence" here if you'd like), and so are claiming that scientific investigation can be brought to bear on the existence of the divine. At the very least, this seems a departure from your earlier positions. So, given that science can be so brought to bear, you surely don't begrudge those who attempt to use science to argue against the existence of God?

Assuming the reliability of the senses and assuming the existence of natural law are not the same thing. As I said, science is in the business of fallible reasoning. — Arkady

Where I take issue, is with the various attempts to present science as capable of a theory which accounts for everything - which is typical of science popularisers such as Lawrence Krauss and Jerry Coyne. A good deal of their writing on the matter is aimed at showing how the life and the universe could 'arise from nothing' (to quote Krauss' title.)

But, as philosopher David Albert pointed out in his review of Krauss' book:

It happens that ever since the scientific revolution of the 17th century, what physics has given us in the way of candidates for the fundamental laws of nature have as a general rule simply taken it for granted that there is, at the bottom of everything, some basic, elementary, eternally persisting, concrete, physical stuff. Newton, for example, took that elementary stuff to consist of material particles. And physicists at the end of the 19th century took that elementary stuff to consist of both material particles and electro­magnetic fields. And so on. And what the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all there is for the fundamental laws of nature to be about, insofar as physics has ever been able to imagine, is how that elementary stuff is arranged. The fundamental laws of nature generally take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of that stuff are physically possible and which aren’t, or rules connecting the arrangements of that elementary stuff at later times to its arrangement at earlier times, or something like that. But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.

The fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about in “A Universe From Nothing” — the laws of relativistic quantum field theories — are no exception to this. The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

My underline. That is what I mean by 'assuming nature'. Physicalism assumes that what science is analysing is ontologically real - it is arguing that the entities that physics studies, or biology studies, are the building blocks or foundational layer of reality, that what we see can be explained in those terms. That is what naturalism means, after all.

What I'm saying is that science doesn't actually explain mathematics, as such, or why the universe has the laws it has, more broadly. Science always starts with some foundational assumptions, and besides, has to appeal to mathematical reasoning - given which, it is able to explain and predict phenomena. But it doesn't, and can't, explain all of its foundational assumptions (one of the implications of Godel's theorem, as I understand it.)

But I don't want to use this to argue 'see, it must be God'. We don't know - but I think that sense of not knowing is important, and also profound. Especially when it comes to passing judgement on whether the Universe is meaningful, as that is really rather an important question.

Where I take issue, is with the various attempts to present science as capable of a theory which accounts for everything - which is typical of science popularisers such as Lawrence Krauss and Jerry Coyne. A good deal of their writing on the matter is aimed at showing how the life and the universe could 'arise from nothing' (to quote Krauss' title.) — Wayfarer

Ok. So, the existence of God is fair game for science, just as long as it doesn't purport to explain "everything"?

But, as philosopher David Albert pointed out in his review of Krauss' book:

It happens that ever since the scientific revolution of the 17th century, what physics has given us in the way of candidates for the fundamental laws of nature have as a general rule simply taken it for granted that there is, at the bottom of everything, some basic, elementary, eternally persisting, concrete, physical stuff. Newton, for example, took that elementary stuff to consist of material particles. And physicists at the end of the 19th century took that elementary stuff to consist of both material particles and electro­magnetic fields. And so on. And what the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all there is for the fundamental laws of nature to be about, insofar as physics has ever been able to imagine, is how that elementary stuff is arranged. The fundamental laws of nature generally take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of that stuff are physically possible and which aren’t, or rules connecting the arrangements of that elementary stuff at later times to its arrangement at earlier times, or something like that. But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.

The fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about in “A Universe From Nothing” — the laws of relativistic quantum field theories — are no exception to this. The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

My underline. That is what I mean by 'assuming nature'. Physicalism assumes that what science is analysing is ontologically real - it is arguing that the entities that physics studies, or biology studies, are the building blocks or foundational layer of reality, that what we see can be explained in those terms. That is what naturalism means, after all.

What I'm saying is that science doesn't actually explain mathematics, as such, or why the universe has the laws it has, more broadly. Science always starts with some foundational assumptions, and besides, has to appeal to mathematical reasoning - given which, it is able to explain and predict phenomena. But it doesn't, and can't, explain all of its foundational assumptions (one of the implications of Godel's theorem, as I understand it.)

The ontology of the most basic physical constituents of the universe is a different matter from natural law, it seems to me. You have claimed that scientists have "assumed" that nature is lawlike, and I have retorted that they don't assume this, but rather observe it. You then quote Albert as saying that scientists assume that "at the bottom of everything" is some "real," "natural" stuff. But, again, this seems a different issue than what we were discussing before (why, in your world, philosophers are allowed to opine on science, but scientists are forbidden from opining on philosophy, is a mystery to me).

But I don't want to use this to argue 'see, it must be God'. We don't know - but I think that sense of not knowing is important, and also profound. Especially when it comes to passing judgement on whether the Universe is meaningful, as that is really rather an important question.

But you said that the findings of science incline you towards theism, not agnosticism, which would seem the more reasonable option if the findings of science don't speak to the existence of God.

From the David Albert quote:

But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.

Yes, that's one of (metaphysical) Physicalism's (Materialism's, "Naturalism" 's ) problems.

"Why is there be that physical world with that stuff? In fact, why is there something instead of nothing?"

Another criticism of Materialism is that, even if true, it's irrelevant and superflouous, for reasons that I've discussed earlier.

Michael Ossipoff

So, the existence of God is fair game for science, just as long as it doesn't purport to explain "everything"? — Arkady

If someone were to claim they can 'prove' the existence of God - what could that mean? That they could show me God? I don't think that 'God' is real in that sense, as an object of empirical proof. I think that the appropriate view, for believers, is that the Universe suggests the existence of God, but they ought to realise that we can't know, because of the limitations of knowledge itself. Knowledge (as the Einstein quote says) is limited - maybe it's radically limited. So my view is that philosophy points to the border of what can and can't be claimed. And God is over that horizon, 'over yonder' (or not!)

You have claimed that scientists have "assumed" that nature is lawlike, and I have retorted that they don't assume this, but rather observe it. You then quote Albert as saying that scientists assume that "at the bottom of everything" is some "real," "natural" stuff. But, again, this seems a different issue than what we were discussing before (why, in your world, philosophers are allowed to opine on science, but scientists are forbidden from opining on philosophy, is a mystery to me). — Arkady

Whether they assume or, or observe it, those regularities must exist, in order for there to be science. But do they explain that order? I say, no they don't explain it, nor can they be expected to. That is what I mean by 'assuming' it.

So if natural theology argues that the laws are the 'handiwork of God' - they may be talking malarky, but whether they are or not, is not a scientific question. That's why I said before that the attempt to resolve the question either in the positive or negative, with reference to science, are both mistaken. I think the intellectually honest position is agnosticism.

Hawkings mused idly in his Brief History of Time that if we hit upon the 'grand theory' then we would 'know the mind of God' - which I see as hubris, especially coming from a professed atheist. But then, maybe the reason why he and his ilk hate religion is professional jealousy ;-)

I also agree with this statement

the quote

Hawkings mused idly in his Brief History of Time that if we hit upon the 'grand theory' then we would 'know the mind of God' - which I see as hubris, especially coming from a professed atheist. But then, maybe the reason why he and his ilk hate religion is professional jealousy ;-)

doesn't answer the question by using a biased form of uncorrelated evidence from the prominent atheist, Stephen Hawking, so I believe this insufficiently strays from the original question.

If someone were to claim they can 'prove' the existence of God - what could that mean? That they could show me God? I don't think that 'God' is real in that sense, as an object of empirical proof. I think that the appropriate view, for believers, is that the Universe suggests the existence of God, but they ought to realise that we can't know, because of the limitations of knowledge itself. Knowledge (as the Einstein quote says) is limited - maybe it's radically limited. So my view is that philosophy points to the border of what can and can't be claimed. And God is over that horizon, 'over yonder' (or not!) — Wayfarer

You seem to be walking a rather fine line here. The state or nature of the universe "suggests" the existence of God, and yet the existence of God is not a matter to be adjudicated empirically. So, a dispassionate, purely rational assessment of the universe can reasonably lead one to a suggestion that God exists, but one cannot (even in principle) argue that God most likely exists or anything of the sort. This seems a bit arbitrary, wouldn't you say? Surely those (on both sides of the question) who suggest that the existence of God can be investigated empirically are not too far off-base, given your position here?

Whether they assume or, or observe it, those regularities must exist, in order for there to be science. But do they explain that order? I say, no they don't explain it, nor can they be expected to. That is what I mean by 'assuming' it.

But assuming the existence of X and being unable to explain the origin of X are not equivalent.

Hawkings mused idly in his Brief History of Time that if we hit upon the 'grand theory' then we would 'know the mind of God' - which I see as hubris, especially coming from a professed atheist. But then, maybe the reason why he and his ilk hate religion is professional jealousy ;-)

I think Dawkins once chastised Hawkings for such statements, saying something to the effect that it promotes misunderstanding among those hungry to misunderstand it. I agree with Dawkins. I also think it's dumb to refer to the Higgs boson as the "God particle," and so forth.

You seem to be walking a rather fine line here. — Arkady

Thankyou! X-)

So, a dispassionate, purely rational assessment of the universe can reasonably lead one to a suggestion that God exists, but one cannot (even in principle) argue that God most likely exists or anything of the sort. — Arkady

I think that's correct, although I don't know about 'in principle'. Recall Antony Flew, the well-known British philosopher who argued throughout his career for atheism, but ultimately changed his view, saying 'in keeping his lifelong commitment to go where the evidence leads, he now believed in the existence of a God'. But again I think that is a statement of personal conviction, rather than an empirical proof. Highly intelligent persons have taken contrary views of the question, which is why I think Kant counted it among the 'antinomies of reason'.

What does 'empirical evidence' mean in such a context? Actually I think we have previously touched on one body of empirical evidence which does have bearing, namely, that of the Catholic Church in the analysis of claims of miraculous healing. There's a medical doctor by the name of Jacalyn Duffin who has written on that, having been called as an expert witness. (There's an account here.) Significantly, though, she says she is still atheist, even though she admits that the cases she was involved in don't have an empirical explanation. Hence my point! And maybe that's what 'belief' comes down to: what kinds of conclusions you're willing to consider, given certain evidence.

assuming the existence of X and being unable to explain the origin of X are not equivalent. — Arkady

It's the meaning of 'assuming'. Scientists assume that phenomena behave in accordance with what are called 'laws', i.e. their behaviour is predictable under given conditions. But knowing why those laws, is an additional step - it's 'meta-physics', by definition, as it is considering what is 'beyond physics', what causes the laws to be as they are. And the example of 'physics as metaphysics' I cited was Krauss' attempt to show how 'the universe could arise from nothing', which the critic I quoted, David Albert, who is both a physicist and philosopher, believes fails (see also The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss, by a Catholic theological philosopher.) Both critics say, basically, that Krauss doesn't understand the meaning of 'arising from nothing' (which is significant, as this is what the book is about!)

The long and short is, I don't buy the 'science vs religion conflict thesis', which underwrites most of what current atheism says on the matter including (all due respect) yourself. It arises from an insufficient understanding of the relationship between physics and metaphysics (among other things).

But the question of "Why?" remains. People want to know the truth and the complete truth. People want the whole story of reality. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

This is an old post, but it's a great issue. I think (for what it's worth) that (1) there can be no "true" answer to the why-why-why, for reasons of infinite regress, which you mentioned. But (2) I don't think we really care about the "truth and the complete truth." In my view, we are "how" creatures, and even the cosmic why is something of a "how" in disguise. If we had "ultimate metaphysical knowledge," what would we use it for? A prestige object, a badge of authority. To be fair, maybe there's a certain amount of pure curiosity. Similarly, there's a certain amount of pure empathy. But I look around and see knowledge used as a tool, again and again, usually for "selfish" purposes --including taking care of one's own beloved children, for instance, "part" of one's extended self. I'm tempted to say that the "truth" of science is technology and the "truth" of philosophy is moral authority. For years now I've considered the ultimately why to be unanswerable in principle, which is to say merely "lyrical." Reality is just here, at some point. It's hereness "surpasses" the patterns we can find in it. I feel a little more "special" for having been able to "unveil" this absurdity or radical contingency. In that sense it's like being proud of knowing the good music, the good novels, or being proud of one's social circle.

In short, inquiry strikes me as the hand of desire. This hand reaches for knowledge largely as a means rather than an end, though we must allow for curiosity and the aesthetic pleasure in patterns. I hypothesize that our stronger drive to map the world and our position in it in a way that not only does not humiliate us but gives us a sense of virtue, power, beauty, etc. Of course possessing the ultimate metaphysical truth would be a good way to scratch that itch. Indeed, my own position is a twist on that same old game, the offering of a truth about truth, the essence of inquiry, the more or less complete self-consciousness of the processes we are, etc.