Does one's working definitions of Waking and Dreaming reduce to immediate empirical contents, to non-immediate empirical implications, to both or to neither? — sime
Do the sets of experiences referred to by one's working definition of waking and dreaming overlap, or do waking and dreaming refer to disjoint sets of experiences? — sime
But what I mean by an 'internal limit' is simply to say that (trivially) what is thinkable is limited by what is thinkable, and by "thinkable" I don't mean merely a psychological phenomenon, but the limits which are set by our concepts or logic, which define what makes sense to us. — Fafner
But what I am saying is that what reality is (in the strong metaphysical sense of 'things-being-in-themselve-independently-of-our-minds') is precisely that thing which we imagine ourselves to know if indeed we know it and are not mistaken — Fafner
On the one hand you seem to agree that our perceptions are grounded without need for a justification, but then you add that "...it doesn't follow that we're right." It sounds contradictory. To show that one is right,is to have some kind of justification, otherwise what would being right in this context mean?Yes, we do, but it doesn't follow from that that we're right. You're welcome to just commit to this acceptance and carry on with your life, but that hardly counts as a good philosophical defence of the position against alternatives (anti-realism, idealism, phenomenalism, etc.). — Michael
We have the same position here, i meant empirical verification only in the internal sense of methodological solipsism - as opposed to epistemological solipsism. In other words what is not cognizable in terms of first-person experiential phenomena is judged to be meaningless and lacking truth-value as opposed to being transcendentally right or wrong but unknowable. — sime
Unfortunately "mistakes" and "knowledge" in ordinary language are usually interpreted in terms of Truth-By-Correspondence, and this commonly held background assumption in conjunction with your "if" clause makes your paragraph read as if you at least concede to the dream-sceptic that the dream/reality distinction is logically conceivable in terms of T-B-C. — sime
In other words, Truth-by-correspondence about everything as a whole is neither right or wrong, but meaningless because it is unthinkable, so that neither skepticism nor non-skepticism in this sense is strictly meaningful. Isn't that the case? — sime
As i previously suggested, i suspect that some dream skeptics, possibly most of them, are implicitly defining the "dream vs reality" distinction in terms of the coherence and cohesiveness of their experiences - which is of course an entirely internal notion to experience that is both understandable and doesn't involve any Cartesian notion of transcendental truth-bearers beyond the individual's experience. — sime
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