Since moral imperatives have no truth value — jancanc

Do you mean that these imperatives are instructions rather than statements? Like ''open the door''?

That's interesting but what would be the basis for commanding someone to be honest? People will ask that and, inevitably, you'll have to give a reason and reasons have to be true/false.

Some argue that there are a hierarchy of goods, so some moral dilemmas can be solved, as Plato does in beginning of his Republic. Where he asserts that protection of life is more choice worthy than payment of a debt to a madman, which may cause harm to others.

Others such as Sophie's Choice are real dilemmas with no solution. Sophie is in a concentration camp and she must choose which one of her children will live, the other will be sent to the gas chamber, and she must choose, because if she does not, then they both die.

Do you mean that these imperatives are instructions rather than statements? Like ''open the door''? — TheMadFool

More like commands, or imperative sentences.

For the purposes of argument let's say we have a moral principle that states:

1. One ought to always be honest and one ought to lie to protect the innocent.

there are 2 moral imperatives in this principle.

Since moral imperatives have no truth value, is it technically right to say that the principle is still contradictory? — jancanc

Your example does not contain imperatives, it contains two statements.

These are imperatives, and therefore cannot have truth values:
Always be honest.
Lie to protect the innocent.

These are statements, and therefore can have truth values:
One ought to always be honest.
One ought to lie to protect the innocent.

Since the statements that make up your example statement can have truth values, it is possible for your example statement to be contradictory. If we assume that to be honest means to tell the truth, then since the first statement says that one ought always to tell the truth and the second says that one ought sometimes to not tell the truth, they are contradictory.

Your example does not contain imperatives, it contains two statements.

These are imperatives, and therefore cannot have truth values:
Always be honest.
Lie to protect the innocent.

These are statements, and therefore can have truth values:
One ought to always be honest.
One ought to lie to protect the innocent. — Herg

That's debatable. A prescriptivist will argue that ethical sentences, which might appear to be truth-apt propositions, are actually imperatives, so "one ought not kill" just means "don't kill".

Noted, but given the grammatical form of the sentences, the burden of proof here is on the prescriptivist.

Perhaps, but that's not relevant in this case as the OP isn't really arguing in favour of prescriptivism over cognitivism but is asking if the imperative "always be honest and lie to protect the innocent" is contradictory, despite not being truth-apt.



I haven't read it, but Bergström's Imperatives and Contradiction might be a relevant read.

Well, you can't actually do both. You can say both fine though.

Well, you can't actually do both. — Wosret

So the issue is that only an actual contradiction can satisfy the imperative. It's the same issue that arises with Buridan's bridge and the Pinocchio paradox.

Whether or not you want to then call the imperative itself a contradiction is a matter of taste, I guess.

Both of those are problems with living your statements. Though I would solve the first with Bill and Ted's excellent adventure rules, where they could just magic events or objects to themselves at their whim, as long as they maintained that they would later use their time machine to make it happen, so that the consequences of their future facilitation were reaped right there in that moment. Plato could say "okay, fine" and let Socrates cross, and then throw him in the water ten years later on a whim, when and where he'll do it isn't actually qualified, or made mutually exclusive.

Neither really is the Pinocchio one, as I don't believe that it is ever stated that it is impossible for his nose to grow unless he lies. All because every time he lies his nose grows, doesn't mean that it is impossible for his nose to grow at all otherwise. That's a hidden premise that is required.

In the first case, since it isn't really based on something, you could probably get a good lawyer to write Plato's foot into his mouth, but not in the second case, as that is sourced.

Neither really is the Pinocchio one, as I don't believe that it is ever stated that it is impossible for his nose to grow unless he lies. All because every time he lies his nose grows, doesn't mean that it is impossible for his nose to grow at all otherwise. That's a hidden premise that is required. — Wosret

You just strengthen the initial premise to "Pinocchio's nose grows if and only if he tells a falsehood".

Both of those are problems with living your statements. Though I would solve the first with Bill and Ted's excellent adventure rules, where they could just magic events or objects to themselves at their whim, as long as they maintained that they would later use their time machine to make it happen, so that the consequences of their future facilitation were reaped right there in that moment. Plato could say "okay, fine" and let Socrates cross, and then throw him in the water ten years later on a whim, when and where he'll do it isn't actually qualified, or made mutually exclusive.

You just strengthen Socrates' reply to "you will not permit me to pass and will instead throw me into the water".

As I said, the Pinocchio one is sourced, and if you're just going to reinvent the rules as they suit you, then it isn't about Pinocchio, nor a dilemma that he could be said to find himself in. It becomes fan fiction at that point.

Plato could maintain that statements that predict the future are indeterminate, or undecidable, like Schrodinger's cat stuff, and reject it entirely, as it can not at this time be determined to be true or false, and the rules require a true or false statement.

As I said, the Pinocchio one is sourced, and if you're just going to reinvent the rules as they suit you, then it isn't about Pinocchio, nor a dilemma that he could be said to find himself in. It becomes fan fiction at that point. — Wosret

This is really confused. It's not at all how these things work. I'm applying the principle of charity.

Plato could maintain that statements that predict the future are indeterminate, or undecidable, like Schrodinger's cat stuff, and reject it entirely, as it can not at this time be determined to be true or false, and the rules require a true or false statement. — Wosret

Sure, and he could also decide to just break his rule and do whatever he likes regardless. But that just ignores the spirit of the problem.

I just don't find those to be very interesting problems, they either play on different tenses, or recursion.

Since moral imperatives have no truth value, is it technically right to say that the principle is still contradictory? — jancanc

ONLY if these imperatives are absolute, and not simply prima facie reasons for doing things (re: W. D. Ross my homeboy).

1. One ought to always be honest and one ought to lie to protect the innocent.

there are 2 moral imperatives in this principle.

Since moral imperatives have no truth value, is it technically right to say that the principle is still contradictory?

It seems to me that this principle is self defeating because you simply can not be honest and lie at the same time, it is an impossibility. If you really give it some thought then you would come to realize that you would not need to lie to protect someone who was innocent because the person is innocent a lie would not be needed. So the person being innocent would I would imagin rather you be honest about what 3ever it was that happened to them since they had not commited the problem as they are innocent. You can't lie and be honest at the same time because a lie is not honest at all so somewhere your firing the wrong signals and are not responding in the way that you need to respond in.