Unless I am mistaken, then it seems to me that both the "daytime-nighttime" and "road sign" examples are determined to be objective through a process similar to the objective-relative test, thereby arguing in favour of the test.

Interesting discussion. Here is my take on it. Consider the following statements S1 and S2:

S1: "This food tastes good"
S2: "I enjoy the taste of this food"

For both statements, I am the subject, the message is roughly the same, and both are true. But in S1, the object is 'food', and the property is 'goodness'. In S2, the object is "I", and the property is 'enjoyment'. S1 is subjective because not all subjects will agree that the food is good. S2 is objective because all subjects, upon observing me, would agree that I enjoy the food.

Conclusions: 'Goodness in taste' is a subjective property, not a property of food. 'Enjoyment' is an objective property of the object that is the person experiencing it. — Samuel Lacrampe

"This food tastes good" would refer to a state of affairs where this food actually does taste good, or else how could you even say it and what you say is true? Does the food really taste good for someone, or no? That is doesn't taste good to others is another objective statement. You could clarify and say, "This food tastes good to Samuel" - another objective statement.

You can't ever escape making objective statements whenever you associate truth to your statement. Is it true that the food tastes good to Samuel? Can everyone use that statement to refer to a real state-of-affairs? Yes.

What I say isn't a claim: the subjective just is the subjective, that's how I am. It's only susceptible to ideas of truth or falsity if it becomes objective in some way. — mcdoodle

Yet another objective statement about some state-of-affairs. "That's how I am" is an objective statement.

Unless I am mistaken, then it seems to me that both the "daytime-nighttime" and "road sign" examples are determined to be objective through a process similar to the objective-relative test, thereby arguing in favour of the test. — Samuel Lacrampe

To my mind, they are. I’ve myself come to similar enough conclusions as yourself. Maybe some of the disagreements in this thread have been due to conflating—quite understandably—the notion of what is experientially objective with the notion of objectivity as a metaphysical standard. Don’t know.

So that would be an example of the object not changing state but the observer. If it's still there when you come back and it's just the same-- no, but if you come back and bring someone else with you, and the two of you walk around, look at it from different angles, maybe do so at different times of day and so on, then we start to think "objective". — Srap Tasmaner

Thought about it and I’ll give this murky territory a try. I might be coming out of left field with this one. So, some thoughts that I’ll gladly see corrected wherever needed:

First off, objectivity cannot logically be that which is completely severed from subjectivity. Were this so, then empirical objectivity could never obtain. So “independent of” should be interpreted as “indifferent to” … obviously, this without any connotation of sentience being invoked by the phrase.

Back to the subjective-objective dichotomy: As per the OP’s outline, to my mind this naturally leads to a stratification of layers regarding that which is externally objective—i.e., regarding that which externally is in manners indifferent to what any subject might will or believe.

As regards perception, first layer will always be that of an experienced direct realism between beings that share common, genotypically inherited modes of perception: all of us non-blind/color-blind people will visually perceive the same colors; what we see is what we get color wise.

Also as regards perception, a deeper layer of objectivity can be found between species of sentience: humans and bees both pay special attention to the sun’s sunlight and location in the sky (as do many other species of life—e.g., all that hold any form of circadian rhythm); both species interact with this causality-endowed-web-of-information (i.e., Heraclitean logos) produced by the sun (and which also in part is the sun) and, so, have physiological means of sensing this information. This information remains the same for both species, yet, from the vantage of both species’ perceptions of it, the information will hold a type of lowest common denominator in respect to its objective appearance relative to the two species. Hence, it will hold a common appearance to which both species, each in its own way, builds up upon vie its own species-specific means of interpreting this information. This layer of objectivity regarding what externally is in regard to perception results in a type of indirect realism.

Likewise with objects being objective: all of us humans innately know via direct experience that objects occur in the external world; we agree upon the objects’ attributes and, so, can hold objective appraisals of which objects are and which are not. Nevertheless, conjoining experience and reasoning does result in a conclusion as old as Heraclitus that it’s all processes in relation to one another. On this deeper layer of contemplation, there objectively are no objects but only processes.

This multi-layering of objective reality can be extended in many directions. Yet, in this mode of thinking, reality itself is not what dwells at the very pith of these multiple layers but, rather, the entirety of all these layers as is (fully including the subjects that are entwined with and make sense of this logos).

This, then, also has some interesting implications for truth—here interpreted via correspondence to. When one is only aware in an intuitive manner of direct perception of the rock other there, one would express—relative to one’s momentary awareness—a full truth in that the rock over there is an objective object (say, not an imagined object). However, when one has process theory in mind and views the same rock, one would then express—again relative to one’s momentary awareness—only a partial truth in saying the same thing … for while one is honest in what one innately sees, one here overlooks the additional reality one is aware of regarding the rock being only a bundle of process and, in this sense, not an object.

Like I was saying, it’s a murky territory.

One summary of this perspective is that—while always remaining indifferent to subjects at all layers and at any particular time—interpretations of what is objectively real in terms of external givens will nevertheless remain relative to the commonly shared awareness of cohort(s) of subjective beings. For simplicity of argument, and because only humans think about such things, we can safely say “relative to the commonly shared awareness of sapient beings”. (Edit: this conforming to the same conclusion of the quote from ST.)

Nevertheless—to further complicate things—in accordance with Harry Hindu’s posts, this would also lead to conclusions such as: the presence of subjects is objectively real. Going by the definition of “indifferent to subjective appraisals”, so too can intra-personal states of being be objectively real (e.g., my current emotion is objectively real, regardless of how I may interpret it after the fact). Also, leading to a kind of pseudo-paradox: the subject is itself objectively real; i.e., the presence of the subject is objective, and thereby fully entwined with objective reality in total.

Thoughts?

You can't ever escape making objective statements whenever you associate truth to your statement. — Harry Hindu

Truth is not a criteria to determine if a property is linked to the object or subject. "Yellow is the best colour" is indubitably subjective, for how could there be an objectively best colour? Yet this statement is true to the speaker.

If subject 1 says "this food tastes good", and subject 2 says "this food tastes bad", both are giving true information. But truth cannot contradict truth. Therefore the truth in both statements cannot be about the object, which is the same in both statements; and must be about the subjects, which differ in both statements.

Nevertheless—to further complicate things—in accordance with Harry Hindu’s posts, this would also lead to conclusions such as: the presence of subjects is objectively real. [...] Also, leading to a kind of pseudo-paradox: the subject is itself objectively real; i.e., the presence of the subject is objective, and thereby fully entwined with objective reality in total. — javra

This paradox is caused by not clearly identifying who or what is the object in the situation. Example:

I observe the colour yellow and say "Yellow is the best colour". In this case, the object is 'yellow', the subject is me, and the property is 'best colour'. The property is obviously subjective because it is not linked to the colour yellow in itself. Now, you come in, and observe me saying that statement "Yellow is the best colour", and so you conclude "Sam's best colour is yellow". In this case, the object is me, the subject is you, and the property is 'best colour being yellow'. The property is now objective, because any new subjects, you or someone else, will hear me saying "Yellow is the best colour".

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved.

Any property that is physical is objective. Why? Because any physical property is measurable (at least in theory), and if measurable, then it is mathematical, and if mathematical, then it is logical, and logic is indubitably an objective property of reality. This is why a science is less prone to debate if it is quantifiable. — Samuel Lacrampe

I screwed up. I still claim that whatever is measurable is objective, but it is not because it is a mathematical kind of property. I think it is actually because the property is measured by an instrument which cannot have any subjective bias.

I observe the colour yellow and say "Yellow is the best colour". In this case, the object is 'yellow', the subject is me, and the property is 'best colour'. The property is obviously subjective because it is not linked to the colour yellow in itself. Now, you come in, and observe me saying that statement "Yellow is the best colour", and so you conclude "Sam's best colour is yellow". In this case, the object is me, the subject is you, and the property is 'best colour being yellow'. The property is now objective, because any new subjects, you or someone else, will hear me saying "Yellow is the best colour".

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved. — Samuel Lacrampe

I’m in general agreement.

Here’s where it gets even trickier for me: Is the first-person point of view an object/entity, a process/becoming, both, or neither? These (we) first-person points of view are the very subjects whose presence is the source from which all subjectivity we are aware of emerges. Nevertheless, our presence as first-person points of view is, in and of itself, objectively real. Furthermore, for example: Grammatically, “me” is an object addressed and “I” is the subject that is addressing—yet both terms can hold the same exact referent.

To my mind, one way to resolve this is to interpret all objects as bundles of processes. Conversely, to not think of first person points of view as being bundles of processes leads to the conclusion of homunculi (of conscious agents as objects in the roundabout sense we typically think of rocks as objects: as somehow being perfectly stable and integral in their constituency). But, then again, to me this works its way into the difficulties of identity theory; there typically is a pervasive stability—however imperfect it may be—to a conscious agency throughout a lifetime (otherwise we typically address extreme mental disorders).

BTW, a day ago you asked about the possibility of such things as moral goodness being objective. As far as I understand things, goodness can only hold the possibility of being objective from the vantage of being a lowest common denominator that is universal to all first-person points of view. But, for emphasis, here we’d be addressing abstract universals that are integral to all, and not particulars that are relative to any context. Still, all first-person points of view hold in common so being first-person points of view … regardless of how otherwise different they may be relative to each other. If they likewise all share some attribute X whose fulfilment would be innately desired by all (though each in its own way), than the fulfilment of this attribute X would then equate to an objective good … such that its presence would be in manners indifferent to beliefs and choices. This form of reasoning, however, does require that conscious agents—i.e., first-person points of view—be acknowledge to be objectively real … but this again gets into identity theory in terms of what they (we) might metaphysically be: in essence, addressing the tricky issue I first mentioned in this post.

BTW, a day ago you asked about the possibility of such things as moral goodness being objective. As far as I understand things, goodness can only hold the possibility of being objective from the vantage of being a lowest common denominator that is universal to all first-person points of view. — javra

Let's rely on the relative-objective test to determine if moral goodness is an objective property of human behaviour. Object 1: A man acts towards others as he would want them to act towards him. Object 2: The man acts in such a way that he would hate others to act towards him. Which object would subjects observe to have the highest degree of moral goodness? I foresee that a large majority would say object 1, and the remaining few, if any, would be indecisive. But I also expect that virtually nobody would choose object 2. If this is the case, then moral goodness is objective.

Thoughts?

I think the objective-subjective distinction doesn't translate into a good-bad distinction.

Of some things we can be objective e.g. the length of a stick or the abortion debate. However, some things are purely subjective e.g. likes and dislikes.

It depends on the area of discourse on what position we can assume - subjective or objective.

In general, it's preferrable to be objective because it brings us closer to the truth but, as I said, there are things on which we can only be subjective.

Let's rely on the relative-objective test to determine if moral goodness is an objective property of human behaviour. Object 1: A man acts towards others as he would want them to act towards him. Object 2: The man acts in such a way that he would hate others to act towards him. Which object would subjects observe to have the highest degree of moral goodness? I foresee that a large majority would say object 1, and the remaining few, if any, would be indecisive. But I also expect that virtually nobody would choose object 2. If this is the case, then moral goodness is objective.

Thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

While I’d like it to be this easy, I deeply believe Donald Trump--for example--would hate being around people who act toward him the way he acts toward others (the “you’re fired” attitude among others). Given that he’s the elected president of the USA, I don’t find his personality to be too exceptional in today’s culture. I’d say a lot of people are this way and find a sense of satisfaction in so being: bullies, for instance; but I suppose it can also be characters that we don’t intuitively think of as bad. Does a shy wallflower treat others the way he/she would hate to be treated—this, say, at social gatherings? This could be so for at least some. And if it pleases people to be so, on what grounds could we justify that it’s bad for them to be so?

Myself, I’d for example here lean more on Buddhist-like philosophy of suffering and the desire to minimize it--or at least something similar to this perspective. Were this to be evidenced a universal drive, we could then say something along the lines of “that which would successfully minimize suffering, and increase happiness, for one and all would be an objective good (a good that is universal to all sentience irrespective of contexts)”. Then this can be applied to scenarios 1 and 2 which you’ve provided. If we could logically maintain that the golden rule is better at minimizing the suffering of one and all than is the standard of “doing onto others as one would hate to be done onto oneself”, then we could safely conclude that scenario 1 is closer to an objective good than is scenario 2 … and that those who follow scenario 2 go about what they truly want in (logically) wrong, or inappropriate, ways. (Here, this would hold even when many would choose scenario 2.) Though more involved, I again think this type of approach would serve as a best means of justifying what would be objectively good, and why it would so be.

Truth is not a criteria to determine if a property is linked to the object or subject. "Yellow is the best colour" is indubitably subjective, for how could there be an objectively best colour? Yet this statement is true to the speaker. — Samuel Lacrampe

Only if the speaker is a solipsist and doesn't believe in other minds who think, "Blue is the best colour", or "Green is the best colour". How can the speaker hold opposing view points and still consider one as "true". One is simply making a value statement, not a truth statement.

If subject 1 says "this food tastes good", and subject 2 says "this food tastes bad", both are giving true information. But truth cannot contradict truth. Therefore the truth in both statements cannot be about the object, which is the same in both statements; and must be about the subjects, which differ in both statements. — Samuel Lacrampe

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective.

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly. Once we switch to speaking objectively, we switch to stating truths about the way things are - the way reality actually is. The subject is an object, state-of-affairs, or an aspect of reality, that we talk about and have an expectation of truth associated with what we are talking about.

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective. — Harry Hindu

I side with SL on this: Truth cannot contradict truth.

As to why one expression over the other, to me it in part has to do with our tendency to project what is objectively real states of mind within ourselves upon external reality, including upon what the other subjects’ objectively real states of mind consist of—this being a natural occurrence that can range from being very healthy to being very nerve-racking (to say the least).

In parallel, it’s the same as saying “I’m visually perceiving this flower to be white” rather than saying “this flower is white”. The first statement can be argued to be more epistemically honest; the second statement is however more gregarious and, thereby, socially practical … since it implicitly acknowledges that it is already known that there is commonality between all people concerned in respect to what their own objectively real states of mind are when visually perceiving the given flower. Yet, however we express what objectively is, in this case truths will not contradict with truths.

Now, to build upon SL's statements, some of us may have more experience than others with honestly saying to the family chef that “This one dish doesn’t taste good; I’ll instead eat of that other dish you’ve cooked” and being told in reply, “But, it does taste good, dear; try some more of it and you’ll see”. Here truths—regarding the objectively real states of mind concerned in relation to the dish addressed—will contradict. And so these truths cannot now be deemed in any way objective respective to what they reference but, instead, can only be concluded to be relative to each subject’s personal inclinations—i.e., to be subjective truths.

Taking a step back, our commonly shared, external, objective reality will never be deemed to hold any contradictions. It will always be innately deemed to be non-contradictory in all of its aspects both big and small. This factor, I very much believe, plays into the very commonsensical notion of there being only one universe (akin to: one-ubiquitously-consistent-logos-bundle of which we are all entwined with) as regards the physical world. For example, it’s why we know that our current Theory of Relativity and QM are not the last word as regards physical reality: as of yet, there are aspects of these two models that are not fluidly congruent relative to each other (in respect to observations). But truths always cohere to truths. So we know that there is yet some subjectivity at play in at least one of these models that is incongruent to reality; else stated, that at least one of these two models contains some non-objective properties.

I agree. I think that some things are purely subjective, and some things are purely objective. I also think it is important to find out which it is for a given property, because there are consequences. We should fully allow subjective disagreements, but should work on (respectfully) finding the correct thing for objective disagreements.

One is simply making a value statement, not a truth statement. — Harry Hindu

A subjective statement can still be true or false. Say that in truth, I feel that yellow is the best colour. So if I say "Yellow is my best colour", then I speak the truth. But if I say "Blue is my best colour", then I don't speak the truth. I guess subjective truth is synonymous to honesty.

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective. — Harry Hindu

I guess you are right that we can always turn a subjective statement into an objective one by making ourselves the object, and our feeling or perception into the property; and since feelings and perceptions are objective properties of ourselves, then this will always result in an objective statement.

However, we must be careful to avoid doing this when the original property in question is already objective. E.g. the statement "This tree is 2 m tall" is already an objective statement. No need to change the statement into "I perceive this tree is 2 m tall", just to make sure the statement is always objective. The former statement is more informative than the latter, and also more interesting for others.

Bringing it back to the original topic of discussion, it appears that some properties are inherently linked to the object, and some are inherently linked to the subject, regardless of the way the statement is said. 'Goodness in colour' will always be a subjective property; and 'tallness' will always be an objective property.

Another thing...

Subjective-objective divide assumes there's an objective reality. Two problems with this are:

1. How do we know? There's no contradiction in everything being subjective, save the one that arises from self-reference. Do you think there's any problem with ''everything is subjective"?

2. Can we even access this objective reality? Your method that many same observations is objective amounts to saying subjective + subjective + subjective +... = objective and that means the objective is only a subset of the subjective. There's something wrong with this, I believe.

Both of you have switched examples of what it was we were talking about. Don't move the goal posts.

The first example was, "This food is good.". The point I was trying to make with this is that IF the person were referring to their mental state rather than some state of the food, then they would probably want to make that clear in communication because, as you pointed out, most people use shortcuts to communicate and most of believe that what is good for one may be good for others, and that may cause them to try it.

Some people might say that you're stating a personal preference, or making a value statement, because they also know that others might disagree. What you say isn't literally true.

In the example, "The flower is white", we're referring to an actual state of the flower in it's capacity to reflect all wavelengths of visible light. Seeing white is acquiring some knowledge the flower. The flower really isn't white. It reflects all wavelengths of visible light, and that reflected light's interaction with our eyes and brain causes us to see white. White is a representation of that property the flower has, and provides information about the flower.

I think that everyone that can see can see the color white, even color blind people, compared to the number of people who may find that "this food is good". Everyone that looks at the flower will see it as white which tells us something about the flower.

The color could also mean that they are ripe for eating, which explains why natural selection would promote the ability to make distinctions in certain states of food sources by means of color representation. It improved the ability of animals to use their energy more efficiently in consuming those food sources by targeting those that had the best nutritional value by the distinction in their color. In this case, the flower would also taste good to most members of its species as well.

If we are talking about one's projection of one's own experiences onto the flower that isn't a property of the flower, but a property of one's mental state and history, then we aren't making objective statements about the object, rather we'd be making objective statements about one's mental state and history projected onto the object.

So, to say that something is "the color white", is to say something about the object. To say that something is "good" is to make a value statement. That same food that is good will turn to bad if you are force fed enough of it.

"Good" and "bad" are value statements and are related to our goals. What is "good" or "bad" is what is helpful or harmful to our goals. Because we are individuals we can have different goals that sometimes come into conflict. Because we are members of the same species, we can often have shared goals where we work together for a common goal. Morality is the one thing that I can think of that isn't objective. There is no objective good and bad - only goals and what is helpful and harmful to achieving them.

1. "Everything is subjective" is a self-contradiction, because it means that nothing is objectively true, not even this very statement.

2.

Can we even access this objective reality? — TheMadFool

Sure we can. The previous statement "Some things are objective" is undeniably true and objective, as previously demonstrated. Another example is the laws of logic and math: Even if there were an evil demon feeding me false data my whole life, he could not feed me illogical or mathematically wrong information, like seeing a square circle, or seeing 2 apples and 2 more apples, and only seeing 3 apples as a result.

Your method that many same observations is objective amounts to saying subjective + subjective + subjective +... = objective and that means the objective is only a subset of the subjective. — TheMadFool

It could be the case, but how would you account for the fact that all subjects observe the same property? There is indeed the hypothesis that we all coincidently project the exact same subjective property onto the object, but this hypothesis is much less likely than the hypothesis that we are observing a property of the object.

What you say isn't literally true. — Harry Hindu

I see what you mean now. "This food is good" is not literally true because it is formulated as as though goodness is a property of the food, which it is not. I accept the distinction. Just a side note that this type of statement would be an expression of common language, and everyone understands what the speaker means by it.

I agree with everything you have said, up to the quotes below:

So, to say that something is "the color white", is to say something about the object. To say that something is "good" is to make a value statement. — Harry Hindu

Could we generalize that all that is considered good is a value? What if I said "I find this food to taste good, and yet I do not value taste"? I don't see anything contradictory in that statement, and it would imply that not all that we find good is a value statement. It seems to me that we consciously choose our values, but we don't necessarily consciously choose what tastes good to us.

There is no objective good and bad - only goals and what is helpful and harmful to achieving them. — Harry Hindu

I disagree when it comes to two values, which I claim are objective: health, and morality. The second one may be harder to prove, so I will focus on the first one for now.

What is good in terms of health is objective. I am sure there is a standard criteria in evaluating if a living cell is healthy or not. And so, using the relative-objective test, every subject observing two cells of different health state would agree on which cell is the healthiest. Furthermore, if health was only a matter of opinion, then there would no health practitioners to tell us what is healthy for us.

Could we generalize that all that is considered good is a value? What if I said "I find this food to taste good, and yet I do not value taste"? I don't see anything contradictory in that statement, and it would imply that not all that we find good is a value statement. It seems to me that we consciously choose our values, but we don't necessarily consciously choose what tastes good to us. — Samuel Lacrampe

As I said, if something is good, it helps you achieve your goal. Your goal would be to seek pleasurable experiences and the food's taste does just that. This is why some people turn to food in order to alleviate stress. Feeling good, rather than feeling bad or stressed is a goal that every human has. It's just that different things make different people feel good. You eating good food and me listening to good music are two different actions but achieve the same goal for each of us - providing stress relief.

I disagree when it comes to two values, which I claim are objective: health, and morality. The second one may be harder to prove, so I will focus on the first one for now.

What is good in terms of health is objective. I am sure there is a standard criteria in evaluating if a living cell is healthy or not. And so, using the relative-objective test, every subject observing two cells of different health state would agree on which cell is the healthiest. Furthermore, if health was only a matter of opinion, then there would no health practitioners to tell us what is healthy for us. — Samuel Lacrampe

Being healthy is a sub-goal of survival. To say that one has good or bad health is to say that their health is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival.

As I said, if something is good, it helps you achieve your goal. Your goal would be to seek pleasurable experiences and the food's taste does just that. This is why some people turn to food in order to alleviate stress. Feeling good, rather than feeling bad or stressed is a goal that every human has. It's just that different things make different people feel good. You eating good food and me listening to good music are two different actions but achieve the same goal for each of us - providing stress relief. — Harry Hindu

Assuming what you say is true, it still does not follow that all that is subjectively good is necessarily a value statement. Let's say I like the taste of donuts, so their taste is, to me, good. But because of health reasons, I have a negative value about eating donuts. Well this does not change the fact that they taste good to me. So a negative value is compatible with a subjective good.

Being healthy is a sub-goal of survival. To say that one has good or bad health is to say that their health is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival. — Harry Hindu

I agree. Now, in your last statement, the object is 'one', and the property is 'good or bad health', or 'health that is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival'. The property is linked to the object; therefore 'goodness of health' is objective.

I’d say a lot of people are this way and find a sense of satisfaction in so being: bullies, for instance — javra

No bully wants to be bullied. Therefore even the unjust person perceives the unjust treatment to be bad. They do it not because they believe it is moral, but typically to gain pleasure or avoid displeasure. E.g. it is easier to lie than to tell an uncomfortable truth. So I claim that no one, not even the immoral ones, can perceive object 2 to be morally better than object 1.

Myself, I’d for example here lean more on Buddhist-like philosophy of suffering and the desire to minimize it--or at least something similar to this perspective. — javra

This seems to be a good goal in general, but there are exceptions to it. Would it be okay for me to withhold truth from you, on the grounds that learning it would make you suffer? E.g. I know your spouse cheats on you, and you ask me if this is true or not. Lying to you would be moral according to your philosophy of minimizing suffering, but immoral according to the Golden Rule, because nobody wants to be lied to.

Assuming what you say is true, it still does not follow that all that is subjectively good is necessarily a value statement. Let's say I like the taste of donuts, so their taste is, to me, good. But because of health reasons, I have a negative value about eating donuts. Well this does not change the fact that they taste good to me. So a negative value is compatible with a subjective good. — Samuel Lacrampe

I mentioned conflicting goals earlier. This is an example of that. You have two conflicting goals. One is that you want to experience the taste of donuts, the other goal is that you want to live a long time. The taste of donuts is good, however the impact on your health is bad, so not eating the donuts would be good, but then so is the taste. What should you do? Which goal will win out?

I agree. Now, in your last statement, the object is 'one', and the property is 'good or bad health', or 'health that is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival'. The property is linked to the object; therefore 'goodness of health' is objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think it would be more accurate and simpler to use the terms, "healthy" and "unhealthy" rather than "good health" and "bad health", as that is what you objectively mean by using the terms "good health" and "bad health". Being in good health is bad if you intend to commit suicide, or if you intend to follow through on a hunger strike.

No bully wants to be bullied. Therefore even the unjust person perceives the unjust treatment to be bad. [...] So I claim that no one, not even the immoral ones, can perceive object 2 to be morally better than object 1. — Samuel Lacrampe

To be honest, this is my intuitive center of gravity as well, so to speak … and I easily project it upon all others. In no way proud of this, when I as a young kid burned ants with a magnifying glass, I knew darn well what caused them suffering and what didn’t (I had no doubts that they weren’t automata or the like; it takes an adult to dream up that one) … and I fully knew that I would not have liked to be treated the way I then treated these few ants. And so, if I’d been asked, I would have known that what I was doing was wrong -- even if it was a means for me to relieve the stress of having been bullied.

But people can sometimes act out in even stranger ways, even as adults. Think of someone, for example, who is sadistic one day and then masochistic the next—maybe as a psychological means of feeling that justice is done in terms of the previous sadisms they acted out (e.g., though, maybe, only marginally related: I’ve read that men of great power, like male judges, are the typical customers in the paid-for services of dominatrixes).

So while I fully agree that this sentiment of “no bully wants to be bullied” is a good rule of thumb, I so far still think that more involved principles would need to be invoked were one interested in accounting for all human behavior (even more so for all sentient behavior).

For example, some can be said to innately believe that a maximized control-over-other is the only means of successfully minimizing bad for oneself and for others. Fascism, Stalinism, even kingships all tend toward this conception of “objective good”: one of centralized power of sentience over all other sentience through which all other becomes ordered, thus stable, thus maximally happy. Again, it is not an uncommon perspective of what is objectively good (be it further justified as God-ordained or nature-ordained). Yet this outlook stands in direct opposition to the notion of “do onto others as you’d have done onto you” (which can be justified in like manners).

So the question again resolves into how does one justify what in fact is objectively good? For instance, why would a maximized control-over-over be immoral (unjust) in the first place? (certainly this state of being is what bullies aspire for; btw, I'll play the devil's advocate with this for a while if need be)

This seems to be a good goal in general, but there are exceptions to it. Would it be okay for me to withhold truth from you, on the grounds that learning it would make you suffer? — Samuel Lacrampe

I acknowledge that there are exceptions to what I’ve previously mentioned. As to relation between truths and suffering, there can be found various explanations for why truths sometimes lead to suffering: e.g. truths sting bubbles of ego (when the ego is not already aligned with that which is true)—this stinging of ego being the hubris-driven tragedy needed for any catharsis. In attempts to explain this relation, one can even rely on the statement of “truth shall set us free” and somehow work backwards in terms of finding the proper moderations and degrees of expressing truths … this with the reasoning that too much suffering too quickly will in the long term drive someone away from the desire to experience the cathartic pleasures of new truths. (or something like this)

Still, as you illustrate, the understanding of suffering as has been so far here expressed is not, in fact, universal to all at all times. To me, however, this only means we’d need to get deeper into what then is in fact a universal drive to all sentience … whose fulfillment would be innately deemed good by each and every sentience.

BTW, I’ve little hope that we can get to the bottom of things as to what objective goodness signifies; I nevertheless hold the attempts in high regard.

I mentioned conflicting goals earlier. This is an example of that. You have two conflicting goals. One is that you want to experience the taste of donuts, the other goal is that you want to live a long time. — Harry Hindu

I agree that the goal of wanting to be healthy can cause the negative value about eating the donut. But where does the goal of "wanting to experience the taste of donuts" come from? Just because I like the taste of donuts, it does not follow that I have a goal associated to it, does it? One does not control their taste buds like they can control their hands. Maybe with time and perseverance, we may be able to change our habits and modify our subjective preferences, but it can't happen by mere will power.

I think it would be more accurate and simpler to use the terms, "healthy" and "unhealthy" rather than "good health" and "bad health", as that is what you objectively mean by using the terms "good health" and "bad health". — Harry Hindu

This sounds ad hoc. You could do this for any type of good: goodness in taste is tasty or delicious; goodness at a task is skilled; goodness of a song is pleasurable, and so on. I will resist the temptation to ask for a definition of 'goodness'... Instead, let's just agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. With that, let's consider the following dialogue.

Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not taste good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you".

Both persons are using the word 'good'. P1 uses it to mean taste, and P2 uses it to mean health.

I agree that the goal of wanting to be healthy can cause the negative value about eating the donut. But where does the goal of "wanting to experience the taste of donuts" come from? — Samuel Lacrampe

The goal of wanting to experience the taste of donuts comes from the stored experience of eating a donut and you enjoying it. We all seek to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid unpleasant ones. That is the ultimate goal from which all other sub-goals are derived.

Just because I like the taste of donuts, it does not follow that I have a goal associated to it, does it? One does not control their taste buds like they can control their hands. Maybe with time and perseverance, we may be able to change our habits and modify our subjective preferences, but it can't happen by mere will power. — Samuel Lacrampe

Like I said, you can be full but still like the taste of donuts. Again, we are simply talking about a conflict of goals - you being full and you liking the taste of donuts. You being full doesn't make the donut taste bad, it still tastes good, which is why you have a conflict of goals. If the donut tastes bad when you are full, then you wouldn't have a conflict.

This sounds ad hoc. You could do this for any type of good: goodness in taste is tasty or delicious; goodness at a task is skilled; goodness of a song is pleasurable, and so on. I will resist the temptation to ask for a definition of 'goodness'... Instead, let's just agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. With that, let's consider the following dialogue.

Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not taste good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you".

Both persons are using the word 'good'. P1 uses it to mean taste, and P2 uses it to mean health. — Samuel Lacrampe

If both persons are using the word "good" to mean taste and health, then their sentences wouldn't make any sense as they would be:
Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not good good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you[r] [good]".

I don't agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. That is why I defined it as what is helpful to one's goals. If we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means, then it should be really easy to define and everyone will agree on the definition.

If I understand, you would like to find first principles of morality, is that it? That is up my alley.
How far do you want to extend the topic? Ethics of humans only, or of all beings? I'll keep it about humans for now. I think most of your questions can be answered by the concept of 'ontological value', or 'value of beings', where if every human has the same ontological value, then it follows that they all deserve the same level of respect.

So to answer some of your questions:
Q: "How does one justify what in fact is objectively good?"
A: By definition, Ethics is the study of how a being ought to treat other beings, and the ethical is essentially to treat each being according to their proper ontological value.

Q:"Why would a maximized control-over-[others] be immoral (unjust) in the first place?"
A: Because all humans have the same ontological value.

Note, this does not necessarily lead to communism, where all humans are equal in every way: jobs, skills, wealth, power etc. I only claim we are equal in ontological value; and as such, we ought to treat all humans as ourselves (also human) would want to be treated if we were in their shoes.

The subjective/objective dichotomy is inherently incapable of taking account of that which requires, consists in/of, and/or is existentially contingent upon both a subject/agent and something other than the subject/agent.

Truth. Meaning. Thought. Belief. All of these things require, consist in/of, and/or are existentially contingent upon both, a subject/agent and something other than the subject/agent.

Everything ever thought, believed, spoken and/or written comes through a subject. Strictly speaking, nothing ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or written is objective. That doesn't mean that everything is subjective. It means that the objective/subjective dichotomy is fraught. Best to abandon it altogether...