Both the external world pattern and the pattern of neuronal firings are patterns in an eternalist block spacetime, but every pattern has a qualitative aspect (in addition to its structural aspect); in the case of the neuronal firings it is a conscious quality (quale/experience) while in the case of the external world it is, presumably, an unconscious quality. — litewave

The "patterns" you refer to are a temporal succession, one neuron firing is experienced as prior to another etc. In the block universe, how does one thing get experienced as prior to another?

But as I said, both kinds of the passage of time are qualitative aspects of a static, eternalist pattern. — litewave

I don't see how a passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern. I agree that there is a temporal order to the block, but unless there is something independent from the block, which is moving through the block, I don't see how there can be a passage of time. The conscious subject can only have an experience of time passing because it consist of something which is completely independent of the objective world, and that defines it as a subject rather than an object. The objective block universe has no time passing, therefore whatever it is which is responsible for the experience of time passing, this thing must be completely independent from the objective world. So we ought to assume dualism.

What is the difference between "existing right now" and being "currently present"? — Janus

The author of the article refers to two different senses of the term "now", one in which he calls "ontological" and the other "temporal locative". When he says that Socrates isn't "currently present" he is saying that he is not "present" in the sense of temporal location, despite being ontologically real.

I believe that the ontological sense of the term "now" refers to what we normally mean when we talk about what is currently happening. When we say that you are reading this post "right now" we don't mean that it "has happened" or that it "will happen"; we mean that it is happening right now. That is just a basic fact. To say that something "has happened" or "will happen" would require a flow of time. Given that Eternalism simply lacks a passage of time by definition, this is where we get statements from the article such as:

One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. — Stanford Article on Time

The temporal location sense of the term "now" in contrast seems to refer to a similarity in coordinates. Under eternalism, everything exists in four dimensions, the fourth being time, which is functionally like space (you might as well consider it a fourth dimension of space). We not only have the notion of objects existing to the left/right, above/below, or behind/ahead of each other, we also have them exist earlier and later to one another as well. To say that Socrates isn't "present" is just to say that he is located earlier to where I am. If he was to be considered "present" by me in the temporal location sense, then he wouldn't be located later or earlier relative to me. Of course, this doesn't mean that Socrates in this four dimensional universe does not exist (in the ontological sense). He is still around for the Eternalist, just not where you are.

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'.
— noAxioms

From the Stanford entry:
According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present.
— Alec

What is the difference between "existing right now" and being "currently present"? — Janus

I'm on record for not liking the way Stanford words that whole section. My interpretation of that statement (You also edit out the disclaimer that explains what they mean by "existing right now") is that at any given moment ('now' for instance), the other moments ontologically exist equally. Thus I do not disagree with the entry, but I find it poorly worded. Alec interprets all moments "existing right now" to imply that they're all simultaneous, which is a temporal statement, not an ontological one. All moments are not simultaneous under eternalism.

Saying that something exists at a certain time ('now' for instance) leads one to imply that it does not exist at some other possible time. The Stanford entry says it doesn't mean that, but everybody is ignoring that disclaimer (OK, Mr Bee sees it).

This is similar to the idea that "right here" could be anywhere is space, or in other words is applicable in general to everywhere, not merely specifically to where you or I happen to be.

Yes, it is similar to exactly that: "Every point in space exists right here." That means that despite being right here, it does not imply that other locations do not exist. They all have equal ontology, and there is no preferred 'here'. Saying they all exist right here does not imply that all points are at the same location, but the statement "Every point in space exists right here." tempts one to interpret the statement exactly that way. Hence I don't like the Stanford wording.

That is just a basic fact. To say that something "has happened" or "will happen" would require a flow of time. — Mr Bee

I think it legal to use these tenses, but the reference point must be explicit, lacking an objective present. So from 1910's present, WWI will happen. Events are still ordered and the tenses are not completely invalid. But to imply a present when speaking on eternalist terms is to refer to an ambiguous event.

I think it legal to use these tenses, but the reference point must be explicit, lacking an objective present. — noAxioms

No it isn't. If you don't believe in an objective flow of time then there is no meaning to saying that events have occurred or will occur. That is really the main crux of the eternalist vs presentist debate, the existence of this passage. The only tense that makes sense is to say that all things "are", which is to say that they are all exist now in the way we normally understand things existing right now.

So from 1910's present, WWI will happen. Events are still ordered and the tenses are not completely invalid. — noAxioms

Under eternalism, we say that WWI is later to 1910, not that it will happen, similar to how I say that the store is to the right of my house. I believe you are referring to the temporal location sense in your use of the present here.

The "patterns" you refer to are a temporal succession, one neuron firing is experienced as prior to another etc. In the block universe, how does one thing get experienced as prior to another? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because of causal relations between one thing and another. There is a causal imprint of the earlier thing in the later thing, so the experience of the later thing enables us to identify it as being after the earlier thing.

I don't see how a passage of time is a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern. — Metaphysician Undercover

The experienced passage of time is a feeling, a quality of consciousness (quale). It is a fundamental problem in the philosophy of consciousness how a certain pattern of neuronal firings, whether viewed as static or dynamic, can give rise to a quality of consciousness, for example to the experience of red color. David Chalmers dubbed it the "hard problem of consciousness". So your inability to see how the experience of a passage of time can be a qualitative aspect of a static eternalist pattern is a special case of a wider problem - the inability to see how any experience can be a qualitative aspect of some pattern.

As I said, the qualitative aspect of the pattern can be understood as the intrinsic identity of the pattern (as opposed to its structural or compositional identity) but there seems to be an unbridgable explanatory gap between the structure of the pattern and its quality. This seems to be due to the fact that the quality cannot be logically derived from the structure (and the structure cannot be logically derived from the quality) because you can only derive a structure from a structure - logical derivation is about relations, not about qualities. So we can understand why there is some qualitative aspect of a pattern but we cannot explain why the qualitative aspect is the way it is - why the experience feels the way it feels. Moreover, we cannot even describe how the experience feels because a description of a thing always refers to other things, not to the intrinsic identity of the thing. Try to explain the experience of red color to a person who never saw it; referring to tomatoes won't help, it will only tell him about the relation of red color to tomatoes but not about the quality of red color.

Still, since the intrinsic and the structural identity of a thing are bound up like two sides of a coin (they are identities of the same thing), we can expect that structurally similar patterns will also have similar qualities. We can also expect that the quality will somehow reflect the structure, so it can make some sense that the causal structure of brain processes, which enables the identification of prior and later moments, will be reflected in the experience of a passage of time.

I'm on record for not liking the way Stanford words that whole section. — noAxioms

That's the norm, Stanford is not a good reference.

Because of causal relations between one thing and another. There is a causal imprint of the earlier thing in the later thing, so the experience of the later thing enables us to identify it as being after the earlier thing. — litewave

But causality is highly questionable in eternalism. You could perhaps assume potential causal relations, through spatial-temporal relations, but to say that there is a causal imprint from one thing on another thing, is just an arbitrary claim. It is like saying that X is similar in spatial structure to Y, and after Y in time, therefore Y caused X, but this is an arbitrary assumption. We cannot deduce a passage of time here without a definition of "cause" which assumes a passage of time. But this premise, the definition of "cause" which assumes a passing of time, would contradict the premise of the eternalist block.

Still, since the intrinsic and the structural identity of a thing are bound up like two sides of a coin (they are identities of the same thing), we can expect that structurally similar patterns will also have similar qualities. We can also expect that the quality will somehow reflect the structure, so it can make some sense that the causal structure of brain processes, which enables the identification of prior and later moments, will be reflected in the experience of a passage of time. — litewave

I do not understand how you are try to relate "structure" to temporal experience. Temporal experience is better described as "order" rather than structure. We may be able to say that order is a particular type of structure, but an argument would have to be made to show this relationship. I understand order in terms of quantity rather than quality, so if the structure you are talking about is order, then this may be why you cannot reconcile structure with quality. 1,2,3,4,5, is an order. So your argument about quality and structure, appears irrelevant to me because you haven't shown how this is related to order. That is how we experience time, as order.

No, not simultaneously. Each moment is its own time (they're not simultaneous any more than each location is the same place). It's just that no particular moment is special any more than any particular location is the one correct 'here'. — noAxioms

Of course there are simultaneously occurring phenomenon. How else do we measure time if not by the simultaneous rotation of the Earth with a movement of the hands of a clock? Sure, they are in their own "time" - which is just relative change, but change is occurring everywhere, simultaneously, but at different rates. We can call this the frequency of change.

According to eternalism, every moment in the universe's history is real and as such exists simultaneously. They all exist on a 4-D structure known as the block universe and are all equally real. Such a theory is considered static due to this fact. There is no such thing as the passage of time.
However, I am having trouble understanding how such a model accommodates our experience. To be clear though, I am not referring to an experience of time as passing in a world that isn't; that is another issue for another topic. Instead, I am talking about the fact that currently, I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec

Our minds have their own "time", as noAxioms put it. I would say that things, including our minds, have their own frequency of change. Time is simply an arbitrary measurement of change.

Our minds process the information of the world at certain rate, or frequency, that is change at a different rate, than the change that occurs around us. This means that some things appear to change so fast as to be a blur (change faster than our minds do) or change so slow as to appear to be solid, stable objects (change slower than our minds do). So the speed at which other processes of nature change is relative to our processing of it. Because our minds are part of the universe itself and change at a particular frequency, just like everything else, that is relative to the other natural processes, we end up stretching the causal relationships into what we know as space and time.

But causality is highly questionable in eternalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Causal relations are part of the structure of block spacetime. I think causal relations are a special kind of mathematical/logical relations in the context of the entropic arrow of time where consequences logically follow from causes, if we use a broad definition of "causes" as initial conditions and structural features of spacetime that we call laws of physics. So, if you can logically derive a pattern at some moment of time from a pattern at a prior moment of time and laws of physics, then there is a causal relation between the two patterns.

That is how we experience time, as order. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time is a special kind of order. At least in our world this order is defined as the time dimension of spacetime according to the theory of relativity and the direction of this order (the arrow of time) is defined by the increasing entropy (second law of thermodynamics). All of this is already included in the structure of block spacetime. The remaining problem is why this order appears to be "passing" or "flowing", and I am saying that this appearance of "passing" or "flowing" is a feeling, a quality of consciousness, a qualitative aspect of neuronal firings. This is the subjective (experiential) passage of time. I am also saying that this quality of neuronal firings is a representation of a quality of the world, and I am suggesting that this quality of the world can be regarded as an objective passage of time.

Of course there are simultaneously occurring phenomenon. How else do we measure time if not by the simultaneous rotation of the Earth with a movement of the hands of a clock? — Harry Hindu

You misunderstand me. Stanford eternalism entry says that 1917 say, "exists right now", tempting one to imply that 1917 and 'now' are simultaneous. Eternalism does not assert that.

I think it legal to use these tenses, but the reference point must be explicit, lacking an objective present.
— noAxioms

No it isn't. If you don't believe in an objective flow of time then there is no meaning to saying that events have occurred or will occur. That is really the main crux of the eternalist vs presentist debate, the existence of this passage. The only tense that makes sense is to say that all things "are", which is to say that they are all exist now in the way we normally understand things existing right now. — Mr Bee

Assuming I am an eternalist (I'm not really), is it not legal for the October2017-noAxioms to say that Christmas will be on a Monday this year and last was on a Sunday? If the October2017-noAxioms can legally use those tenses, surely it is valid for the October2016-noAxioms to assert that this Christmas will be on a Sunday. Or do you disagree? Not sure what you're saying is invalid to do.

Assuming I am an eternalist (I'm not really), is it not legal for the October2017-noAxioms to say that Christmas will be on a Monday this year and last was on a Sunday? If the October2017-noAxioms can legally use those tenses, surely it is valid for the October2016-noAxioms to assert that this Christmas will be on a Sunday. Or do you disagree? Not sure what you're saying is invalid to do. — noAxioms

Nope, because under eternalism, it simply isn't the case that Christmas "will exist". Christmas doesn't just pass into existence and October out of it. Instead it already exists at a part of the block universe and it is located later to where October-2017-noaxioms is located on the block. The Christmas located on a Sunday of 2016 is located earlier to the same individual.

You try to bring in talk of "will" and "was" to the mix, but that just confuses things, as they are commonly associated with the passage of time. It is a basic fact that eternalism is commonly associated with the rejection of the flow of time, but I highly suggest you look at any corner of the literature if you're not convinced. This is why the article says that every event exists "right now", but I am not sure why you disagree with it.

Nope, because under eternalism, it simply isn't the case that Christmas "will exist". Christmas doesn't just pass into existence and October out of it. Instead it already exists at a part of the block universe and it is located later to where October-2017-noaxioms is located on the block. The Christmas located on a Sunday of 2016 is located earlier to the same individual. — Mr Bee

So all of language is wrong if eternalism is the case? I don't consider saying that "Xmas will be on a Monday" to be an assertion of presentism. It's just how language works.

You try to bring in talk of "will" and "was" to the mix, but that just confuses things, as they are commonly associated with the passage of time. — Mr Bee

Yes, I agree that the tenses should be avoided when speaking in eternalist terms, but only because of the lack of a reference point.

It is a basic fact that eternalism is commonly associated with the rejection of the flow of time, but I highly suggest you look at any corner of the literature if you're not convinced. This is why the article says that every event exists "right now", but I am not sure why you disagree with it. — Mr Bee

I disagree with the reference to "right now". What does that mean in eternalist terms?? There is no "right now".

So all of language is wrong if eternalism is the case? I don't consider saying that "Xmas will be on a Monday" to be an assertion of presentism. It's just how language works. — noAxioms

Well, Eternalism is well-known for being counter-intuitive (again, you can look that up if you're skeptical), unless you want to argue that it is a common sense view. If you want to state that "Xmas will be on a Monday" and intend it as an expression of the passage of time, then you're probably not an eternalist. Sorry, but that is just how the words are defined.

I disagree with the reference to "right now". What does that mean in eternalist terms?? There is no "right now". — noAxioms

What does it mean when we usually speak of things existing "right now"? I am typing up this response "right now" because my fingers are currently going across the keyboard. You're reading this post "right now" as your eyes are currently looking at the screen. What does it mean when we say that?

I think the better question is, what does it mean to exist if things neither existed, will exist or currently exist.

You can try to argue that things exist "tenselessly" in the sense that they are eternal and unchanging, but that notion can be captured either by saying that they "always did exist, are existing and will always exist", or that they "currently exist" and rejecting that things ever did happen or will happen (ie. rejecting the flow of time, which is what Eternalism does). One may also try to argue that things exist "timelessly" like some may claim to be how numbers and God exist, but I am not a platonist, nor do I believe in a religious God, so the notion of existing a-temporally seems nonsensical to me.

Thanks. I couldn't find anything that significantly disagreed with anything I had said in either of your responses, so that leaves me with nothing much else to say.

I think the better question is, what does it mean to exist if things neither existed, will exist or currently exist. — Mr Bee

From the "point of view" of eternalism everything exists eternally, in its eternal "right now" or eternal present. From a temporal perspective, of course everything that has, does or will exist does not exist in the current "right now", but does exist in some other "right now".

From the "point of view" of eternalism everything exists eternally, in its eternal "right now" or eternal present. From a temporal perspective, of course everything that has, does or will exist does not exist in the current "right now", but does exist in some other "right now". — Janus

Sounds good, I think. To me, saying that everything exists in this "eternal present" is just a way of saying that they currently exist. Saying that there is a time where Napoleon exists under eternalism is no more different than saying that there is a parallel universe where everything is set 200 years back and Napoleon is alive IMO, and we have no trouble using the present tense for the latter.

You misunderstand me. Stanford eternalism entry says that 1917 say, "exists right now", tempting one to imply that 1917 and 'now' are simultaneous. Eternalism does not assert that. — noAxioms

Ok, I see where I misunderstood.

It seems to me, though, that terms like "now", "then", "before" and "after" become meaningless by eternalism. If time doesn't exist except in our minds, then how would we describe the relationship between 1917 and 2017 outside of our minds? To say that they both exist now, wouldn't make sense, but to just say that they both exist doesn't get at their relationship. After all, we could probably point to events in 1917 that led to events in 2017.

Time is a special kind of order. At least in our world this order is defined as the time dimension of spacetime according to the theory of relativity and the direction of this order (the arrow of time) is defined by the increasing entropy (second law of thermodynamics). All of this is already included in the structure of block spacetime. The remaining problem is why this order appears to be "passing" or "flowing", and I am saying that this appearance of "passing" or "flowing" is a feeling, a quality of consciousness, a qualitative aspect of neuronal firings. This is the subjective (experiential) passage of time. I am also saying that this quality of neuronal firings is a representation of a quality of the world, and I am suggesting that this quality of the world can be regarded as an objective passage of time. — litewave

If you use "increasing entropy" to describe the arrow of time, then there is no need to describe the feeling of time passing. The feeling of time passing is just the consequence of increasing entropy. However, increasing entropy is not something included in the eternalist block universe. It is something else which is added. The block universe allows that time could "flow" in either direction. So "increasing entropy" is a concept derived from observations of the physical world, and these observations directly contradict the block universe theory because they indicate that time can only flow in one direction, while the block universe allows that time could flow in either direction.

Causal relations are part of the structure of block spacetime. I think causal relations are a special kind of mathematical/logical relations in the context of the entropic arrow of time where consequences logically follow from causes, if we use a broad definition of "causes" as initial conditions and structural features of spacetime that we call laws of physics. So, if you can logically derive a pattern at some moment of time from a pattern at a prior moment of time and laws of physics, then there is a causal relation between the two patterns. — litewave

I don't agree with this at all, you seem to be just making things up. Yes, causal relations are determined in the context of the entropic arrow of time, but the entropic arrow is not a part of the block spacetime, it is something which is added to the block, to account for our observations of a flow of time. This allows that within the block, someone can distinguish between time-like relations and space-like relations, by assuming causal relations. The observations of causal relations are inconsistent with the block universe, so the block must be adapted by means of light cones and such, to allow for the arrow of time, the observations of causation.

Events are still usually ordered under determinism. 2017 is after 1917, so the relations 'before' and 'after' have meaning just like the relations 'above' and 'below' have meaning in any space where the direction 'down' is sufficiently defined. Likewise 'then' has meaning just like 'there', so long as some point is identified. The word does not require a 'now' or 'here' respectively.

On a lighter note, I notice that time identity is not associative under presentism: "The future is now" is true, but "Now is the the future" is false. So A = B, but B ~= A, a contradiction, therefore presentism is false.
That's my attempt at the dumbest proof of etermalism ever posted.

So "increasing entropy" is a concept derived from observations of the physical world, and these observations directly contradict the block universe theory because they indicate that time can only flow in one direction, while the block universe allows that time could flow in either direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, presentations of block universe typically assume a single direction of time, which is usually identified with the direction of increasing entropy along the otherwise bi-directional time dimension. As an example, imagine a gas tank with gas concentrated in one of the corners of the tank. According to the second law of thermodynamics the entropy of the gas tank increases with time, so at the subsequent moments of time the state of the tank will have more and more dispersed gas particles. So there is a series of states of the gas tank, each state having more entropy (more dispersed gas) than the previous state, and this series constitutes an eternalist block. There is no obvious "passage" of time in this block; it's just a series of arrangements of gas particles.

No, presentations of block universe typically assume a single direction of time, which is usually identified with the direction of increasing entropy along the otherwise bi-directional time dimension. As an example, imagine a gas tank with gas concentrated in one of the corners of the tank. According to the second law of thermodynamics the entropy of the gas tank increases with time, so at the subsequent moments of time the state of the tank will have more and more dispersed gas particles. So there is a series of states of the gas tank, each state having more entropy (more dispersed gas) than the previous state, and this series constitutes an eternalist block. There is no obvious "passage" of time in this block; it's just a series of arrangements of gas particles. — litewave

Right, so the point at issue is the second law of thermodynamics. It indicates that the structure of patterns within the eternalist block are such that we must proceed in our experience of time passing, in one direction only. We cannot proceed in our experience of time passing in the other direction without violating that second law. But the eternalist block allows that we could experience time in both directions. Therefore the second law of thermodynamics is inconsistent with the eternalist block representation of the universe.

Right, so the point at issue is the second law of thermodynamics. It indicates that the structure of patterns within the eternalist block are such that we must proceed in our experience of time passing, in one direction only. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, time is a special kind of order and increase of the world's entropy is one of the characteristics of this order.

But the eternalist block allows that we could experience time in both directions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think so? As far as I know, the eternalist block just says that there is no passage of time because spacetime is a static, timeless object.

Why do you think so? As far as I know, the eternalist block just says that there is no passage of time because spacetime is a static, timeless object. — litewave

That's right, Perhaps I didn't state that very clearly. The eternalist block universe does not allow for any passing of time. Any conception of time passing, would have to refer to a force outside the universe to account for time passing. There is nothing inherent within the eternalist block which would force that force to pass time in one direction, the other, or even random jumping around. The second law of thermodynamics, necessitates that time is passing in one direction, so it represents that outside force. Therefore the two, the eternalist block, and the second law, are incompatible. The second law of thermodynamics describes a force external to the universe, which is imposed on it.

The second law of thermodynamics, necessitates that time is passing in one direction, so it represents that outside force. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law of thermodynamics is just a rule for ordering the time slices of the block. It doesn't make time pass any more than any other rule for ordering time slices. But it does seem important for the feeling or quality of time passing.

The second law of thermodynamics describes a force external to the universe, which is imposed on it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law of thermodynamics is a structural feature of the universe.

The second law of thermodynamics is a structural feature of the universe. — litewave

The second law is not a structural feature of the eternalist block universe, that's the inconsistency I'm talking about. Either the eternalist block provides an incomplete representation of the universe, or the second law refers to something outside the universe.

The second law is not a structural feature of the eternalist block universe, that's the inconsistency I'm talking about. Either the eternalist block provides an incomplete representation of the universe, or the second law refers to something outside the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

The second law is just the way the time slices are ordered. Why would it be something outside the universe?

Because there is no slices in the block, it is a block. The slicing and ordering is done by something outside the universe.

Because there is no slices in the block, it is a block. The slicing and ordering is done by something outside the universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

The time slices are parts of the spacetime block. When there is an order somewhere it doesn't have to mean that the order is created by some external force.