Omniscience is a logical impossibility if interaction is involved, for interacting with that what the knowledge is about will destroy the knowledge you had before interacting. Hoisting the interaction aboard of the knowledge already there doesn't change the outcome. If the process of knowing becomes part of the process the knowing is about then the knowing itself becomes a hindrance to knowledge of it all.

Only the evolution of neatly isolated material arrangements, given well defined initial conditions, can be related to omniscience. The science being about the material insofar it satisfies the criterion of being valid knowledge. If the arrangement is started and we let it evolve freely, without us intervening, the evolution can be known completely. The moment we intervene, the knowledge is frustrated. If the molded matter behaves not as expected the knowledge has to be adjusted. Which potentially involves changing the theory, or changing the mold and conditions.

There are no referents for words like, time, nothing, the, free will, etc — Sam26

Why shouldn't there be referents for these? Time refers to a clock, free will refers to the will, the refers to nouns, etc refers to a not mentioned part. Only nothing refers to nothing. All words have referents or meaning. Unless you use the words like words only, like can be done in poetry.

Omniscience is a logical impossibility if interaction is involved, for interacting with that what the knowledge is about will destroy the knowledge you had before interacting. Hoisting the interaction aboard of the knowledge already there doesn't change the outcome. If the process of knowing becomes part of the process the knowing is about then the knowing itself becomes a hindrance to knowledge of it all.

Only the evolution of neatly isolated material arrangements, given well defined initial conditions, can be related to omniscience. The science being about the material insofar it satisfies the criterion of being valid knowledge. If the arrangement is started and we let it evolve freely, without us intervening, the evolution can be known completely. The moment we intervene, the knowledge is frustrated. If the molded matter behaves not as expected the knowledge has to be adjusted. Which potentially involves changing the theory, or changing the mold and conditions. — Raymond

This is just too convoluted Raymond.

Why shouldn't there be referents for these? Time refers to a clock, free will refers to the will, the refers to nouns, etc refers to a not mentioned part. Only nothing refers to nothing. All words have referents or meaning. Unless you use the words like words only, like can be done in poetry. — Raymond

There are plenty of threads in this forum that discuss this, so I'm not going to explain it again. I find it funny that you think 'time' refers to a clock. So, if we didn't have clocks there would be no time? What if there was nothing used to measure time, would there be no time, and what would be its referent then?

It's an illusion. Language again confounds us — Sam26

Yes, I completely agree. The point that kept me awake was the specific challenge - "OK, it's an illusion - now at which step exactly is the fallacy in the argument outlined in the wikipedia article - what premiss(es) do we have to deny and at what apparent cost?" As you say, there's a problem with 'unknown truths'. But coming into the room afresh, I ask myself - are there unknown truths? - well, yes, sure, everything that is the case that we don't know is an unknown truth... But as you point out, that is where we can be confounded.

There is just so much of this in philosophy, and in our general thinking, it's difficult to unravel it all. And, even those of us, including myself, who think we understand Wittgenstein, makes these same errors, over and over again.

The flies enjoy being in the bottle. (At least this one does). Perhaps that's the problem...

Yes, we feel at home in the bottle.

So, if we didn't have clocks there would be no time? What if there was nothing used to measure time, would there be no time, and what would be its referent then? — Sam26

Basically, yes! It is us who have constructed clocks, and the periodic processes accompanying them, like pendulums and metronomes, atomic vibrations, or orbital motions of celestial objects (showing not the amount of time passed but only the periodic motion we measure it by). Time as a periodic motion, put in relation to process that are going on in the world is not a property that existed before we mentally and practically constructed it. You can make a clock tick aside a physical process, reversible or irreversible, and say that the periodic motion has occured 536.78 times, but this will be the case only after the introduction of the clock. The clock has to be a reversible process, which is why it's so difficult to make one, as almost, if not all, processes are irreversible (which means it isn't possible to simply reverse all motion, which can only be done for the perfect, ideal clock).

So, quantified time is a human invention. You can mentally place a clock near all events, like is done in relativity or Newtonian mechanics. The processes you put the clocks next to take a number of periods. The number of periods is our invention, the processes are real. It turns out that some processes, when compared with reversible process of the clock, take more periods than others. If there would only be reversible processes there wouldn't be processes, there would be no irreversible processes next to which the clock could be positioned, and it are exactly these processes which can be meaningfully be quantized by time, as they evolve in one direction.

You can mentally reverse all motion in the universe, reverse time, but then the problem becomes that the end conditions become begin conditions, and the much bigger problem that you simply can't reverse momenta universally. You can do it mentally, or introduce a god, but reversing the process introduces initial conditions (the reversed end conditions) which are determined by the initial conditions when the process was still going in forward direction. Which means that you have to impose initial conditions which are reversed end conditions of the process you reverse. So the reversed end conditions become dependent on the initial conditions of the forward process, which is different from a forward process emerging from initial conditions only.

So while the quantified time, the number on the time axis, is a human construct, the processes it refers to are real, and if you compare them with a clock, different events will read different times, and in relativity this proceeding of the clock, the quantity of time, will depend even on space and motion. The irreversible processes that are quantified contain amounts of time, and we also notice time without quantifying it. So time is not only the clock. It's not only the amount of periods, the number of seconds, clicks, or vibrations, that constitutes time. For time to have a meaningful existence, irreversible processes are needed. One can say that a reversible process has taken 10 seconds but then it's not clear if time ran forward or backward.

Something can take long, when it's boring, like what I write right now. People watch on their watch. Another 5 minutes... When having fun, the clock isn't looked on. Time over, when the end is there.


Something like that.

:cool:

The idea that meaning is generally derived from referents has been debunked. — Sam26

As I told you, Wittgenstein never made any sense to me. I don't know why. I can't seem to fathom how words could mean anything if not that they refer to something.

G'day.

That's understandable, you're not alone. It's difficult material. I still find large parts difficult to follow, and I started reading his notes in 1979. Good hunting Agent Smith.

That's understandable, you're not alone. It's difficult material. I still find large parts difficult to follow, and I started reading his notes in 1979. Good hunting Agent Smith. — Sam26

:ok: I'll have to read his books! Damn it! I thought I'd leave the heavy lifting to others.

One of the best books to read starting out is, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann. You can get it used for just a few dollars.

One of the best books to read starting out is, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, by K. T. Fann. You can get it used for just a few dollars. — Sam26

:ok: I was hoping to read his original works.

Yes, you want to read his original works, but read this first it will give you a lot of background information, then read his works.

Yes, you want to read his original works, but read this first it will give you a lot of background information, then read his — Sam26

:ok: K. T. Fann it is then.

Omniscience is coherent.

You can be omniscient and not know that you are omniscient.

To be omniscient is to be in possession of all knowledge. This is typically confused with being in possession of all true beliefs. But the two are not synonymous. A belief, to qualify as an item of knowledge, must not just be true, but also justified. It is entirely possible for there to be truths that are not justified. And thus one can be omniscient, yet be ignorant of some truths.

I think God does not know he is omniscient, for God is all good and thus is humble. And a humble person does not believe they possess all knowledge. Thus God does not believe he possesses all knowledge, despite the fact he does. And that is entirely consistent, so far as I can see.

God is the arbiter of justifications, and so as God does not approve of anyone - including himself - believing that they are in possession of all knowledge, then the belief that one is omniscient is one that, even when true, will not be justified. Thus, the belief in one's own omniscience is a belief that is inevitably unjustified. But that is entirely consistent with it being true.

But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!? — Sam26

Do you mind elaborating a bit on this?

A: Has sufficient epistemic warrant to know X.

B: Was told by A that X is true, but lacks sufficient epistemic warrant to know X because "B said so" is inadequate. Has never had cause to doubt A's claims of truth and believes that if A says it is true, it is true. If "X" was "It is true that this bridge is safe for you to walk across" and B said it to A, B would unhaltingly walk across the bridge.

B says, "I don't know that X is true."

But do we ever say, "I don't know that it's true (i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth), that Paris is the capital of France." So, it's true, but I don't know it. What!?
— Sam26

Do you mind elaborating a bit on this?

A: Has sufficient epistemic warrant to know X.

B: Was told by A that X is true, but lacks sufficient epistemic warrant to know X because "B said so" is inadequate. Has never had cause to doubt A's claims of truth and believes that if A says it is true, it is true. If "X" was "It is true that this bridge is safe for you to walk across" and B said it to A, B would unhaltingly walk across the bridge.

B says, "I don't know that X is true." — Ennui Elucidator

This gets back to the statement, "X is an unknown truth." First, I hold to the view that generally speaking, the definition of knowledge is justified true belief, i.e., for many of our uses of the concept know, this definition works perfectly well.

Second, if someone makes a claim that X is true, it's just a claim, not known to be true. For a claim to be true, it needs a justification, otherwise it's just a claim and nothing more. What's being stated here, is that we have a truth, categorically, not a claim that maybe true, but a truth. But, how can we make such a claim, unless that truth is known to be true, and if it's known, then it's by definition, knowledge. It follows necessarily then, that the statement, "X is an unknown truth," is contradictory. There are unknown claims (beliefs or opinions), that is, we don't know if their true or false. There are unknown facts, yet to be discovered, but there is no such thing as an unknown truth. It's like saying there are unknown knowns. Keep in mind, again, to say that something is definitively true, then supposedly you have good reasons or good evidence to support the truth of the claim. Otherwise, again, to repeat myself for clarity, you don't have a truth, you have a proposition that maybe true, or maybe false.

Your example seems to make a similar mistake. Let's say, for example, "Joe tells me that the bridge is safe to cross," and let's suppose that I know Joe, and have interacted with Joe on innumerable occasions, and moreover, I know Joe is honest and levelheaded. Would I have sufficient warrant to believe Joe? Yes. We justify many of our beliefs in this way. In fact, most of our beliefs are justified based on the testimony of others, unless there are mitigating circumstances that give us reason to suppose otherwise. So, you do have sufficient warrant to believe Joe. And, if you don't believe what Joe said is true, then supposedly you have reason to doubt what Joe said. In this case you don't have a justification for the truth of what Joe said, so it's not a truth, it's simply a claim, a simple proposition.

What's being stated here, is that we have a truth, categorically, not a claim that maybe true, but a truth. But, how can we make such a claim, unless that truth is known to be true, and if it's known, then it's by definition, knowledge. — Sam26

This is the part that needs some firmer footing. Can A know X and B not know X? Does B not knowing X change X's truth? How does A's epistemic warrant about X relate to B's epistemic warrant about X?

Knowledge happens to individual agents, no? Or do systems have knowledge?

Notice the change from "is B justified in B's belief that X is true based on 1, 2, and 3?" (call it "B-Just") as compared to "Does B believe X is true?" (call it "B-Unjust"). Is the assertion of truth ("(i.e., I'm affirming the truth, not doubting the truth)") dependent on the answer to B-Just or B-Unjust?

Or on the triune analysis of JTB, can't you have TB without the J such that you can say, "X is true and I believe X is true, but I lack justification such that I don't know X is true?" Consider the old "Child believes his father has his wallet because he gave it to him moments before, but as it turns out, the Child is wrong about who his father is because he was kidnapped at birth by FakeFather, FakeFather doesn't have his wallet because someone just pickpocketed him, and the pickpocket is Realfather!"

P.S. Maybe we should use a simpler example of, "X believes in tossing bones and that information gleaned from tossing those bones is true. X tosses some bones and is told that Z is X's father. X thereafter believes that Z is X's father and tells everyone that is the case. X has never met Z and has no other information about Z other than the bone toss. As it turns out, Z is X's father." Does X know that Z is his father? (It is true, it is believed, but there is inadequate warrant for the belief.)

Or on the triune analysis of JTB, can't you have TB without the J such that you can say, "X is true and I believe X is true, but I lack justification such that I don't know X is true?" Consider the old "Child believes his father has his wallet because he gave it to him moments before, but as it turns out, the Child is wrong about who his father is because he was kidnapped at birth by FakeFather, FakeFather doesn't have his wallet because someone just pickpocketed him, and the pickpocket is Realfather!" — Ennui Elucidator

I thought my explanation was very clear, but apparently not. I'll just respond to this. Can you have a true belief, without the justification? Obviously you can, in at least three ways. First, I can have a belief that's true, i.e., I don't know it's true, I just believe it's true without the justification. In this case, it's akin to a lucky guess, since there is no justification. Second, I can hold to a belief that's based on some or little evidence, but it's not enough to, again, justify believing it's true. You still don't know if it's true. So, still, in these two cases, you can't make a definitive claim that it's true. A claim to truth doesn't equate to truth. Third, and finally, you can have a truth claim that's justified, you have good reasons or good evidence to back up the claim, if this is the case, then you not only have a truth claim, but a truth claim that's amounts to knowledge.

In your example, which seems to allude to the Gettier examples, is that the child believes something that's not true, so what's the point? Presumable the point is that the child thinks their justified, when their not, so their belief is false. Again, the difference between believing a claim is true, and it actually being true. These are totally different things. All of the Gettier examples fall short of actually being justified, or actually being true, as opposed to thinking or believing one is justified. The same with your example.

You still don't know if it's true. So, still, in these two cases, you can't make a definitive claim that it's true. A claim to truth doesn't equate to truth. — Sam26

Same slip again. What is true is independent of what is believed. One can assert the truth of a statement that is true. It doesn't matter if that person knows it is true. The way that we (the outside evaluators) know that it is true is based upon our own justifications, not the person that merely believes something is true by luck (or other insufficient warrant). We know it is true, they don't know it, we both assert that it is true. Why is that a problem?

Same slip again. What is true is independent of what is believed. One can assert the truth of a statement that is true. It doesn't matter if that person knows it is true. The way that we (the outside evaluators) know that it is true is based upon our own justifications, not the person that merely believes something is true by luck (or other insufficient warrant). We know it is true, they don't know it, we both assert that it is true. Why is that a problem? — Ennui Elucidator

You seem to be confusing certain concepts. A truth is simply what is asserted, what is independent is the fact that the truth claim is about. If I say, "The Earth has one moon," it's true, why? Because it tells us something that mirrors or reflects reality, generally speaking. Truths are just claims that are expressed as propositions, they don't exist somewhere in the ether. The only things that have this ontology, that you seem to be referring to, are the facts, the states-of-affairs in reality.

That's it for me, I'm in the middle of writing a book. Good Luck.

Truths are just claims that are expressed as propositions, they don't exist somewhere in the ether. — Sam26

No one said that they do. It is just that different people can utter the same proposition. To the extent that proposition is true when uttered, it doesn't become not true because someone with different epistemic warrant utters it. The criteria for "is true" are not the criteria for "is believed" or "is justified". Are you claiming that when I say, "Ennui is wearing a wedding ring" it is true given my warrant and that when you say "Ennui is wearing a wedding ring" it is false because you lack sufficient warrant?

P.S. Good luck with your book.