This "nothing" was brought to attention so that we could call it a nothing, though. Were you not just 'handling' this "it" as an intelligible if ambiguous entity as you questioned its existence? — t0m

I find this so very hard to understand. Antigonish.

To me that deferment of meaning is noteworthy. There is "something that it is like" for you to read this, a 'voice' in your head. This is invisible. It's not a public object any more than seeing redness is a public object. — t0m

It's not a public object and yet it is something. Antigonish. Words summon phantoms into conversation, like what it is like to be a bat, or what it is like to read this thread.

I read your post, I experience something that it is like. I read the thread again. Do I experience something that it is like again? How could I tell? In what way is the something that it is like different from the perfectly public exercise of reading the post?

I find this so very hard to understand. Antigonish. — Banno

But do you really?

It's not a public object and yet it is something. Antigonish. Words summon phantoms into conversation, like what it is like to be a bat, or what it is like to read this thread. — Banno

For me this "phantom" metaphor suggests a contingent perspective. A phantom relative to what? Is spacetime a phantom? Is an understanding of the scientific method a phantom? Or is this method just symbols that clever monkeys involve in their publicly visible actions?

In what way is the something that it is like different from the perfectly public exercise of reading the post? — Banno

I don't think the something-that-it's-like is different from reading the post. But I disagree that reading the post is a 'perfectly public exercise.' I can record you (in theory) staring at a text with a video camera as evidence of this staring, but this staring at symbols is clearly not what is referred to by 'reading.' Do you not at all find the disavowal of 'consciousness' a little disingenuous? I'm not defending 'mind' here, that's what you're imagining. I also like cleaning up 'language on holiday.' But from my point of view you're being the metaphysician here, clinging to an artificial paradigm.

Do you not at all find the disavowal of 'consciousness' a little disingenuous? — t0m

I'm not denying consciousness.

Edit: Why would you conclude that?

Discover, not invented. — Banno

Now there's a topic that can generate a whole 'nother discussion. I considered 'discover' and discarded it in favour of 'invented', knowing full well that most people, and philosophical 'realists' in particular, are likely to prefer 'discover'.

But to go down that wombat hole would be a potential derailment, which I would not wish to do, as this thread is generating so much enjoyment.

Thanks for the PI 48 ref. It's a good 'un.

No, I think we neither see 'directly' nor 'indirectly'. We simply see the trees: which is not to say we see them 'directly' because it's not even in principle possible for 'seeing' to take place 'indirectly': the qualifier 'direct/indirect' is a defunct one that has no place in talking about perception, it's a distinction without an intelligible difference. — StreetlightX

I see what you're saying, but it really is equivalent to the indirect realist position, assuming you allow for those external inputs. What you're arguing is that naive realism cannot be true, because the act of perception generates an appearance for us. The tree we see is an appearance. It is not whatever is generating the external inputs, because it makes no sense to talk about what a tree looks like when nobody is perceiving it.

Edit:

Perhaps this is more Kantian than indirect, depending on what the indirect realist has to say about the actual tree (if it is a tree), not it's appearance.

I'm not going to read the whole thread - but thanks for pointing this out to me. I don't see anything objectionable in it. — Banno

I seriously doubt you actually agree with Street's position, but perhaps I never fully understood yours. I took you to argue for direct access to trees. The tree we see is what the tree is (within the limits of our perceptual abilities).

All those threads about Mount Everest being the tallest mountain before anyone knew it, and post apocalyptic chairs existing without any perceivers sounds pretty real to me.

And I tend to want to agree with you, but posters like Apo, Michael, Street, etc. make rather good points against it.

I also find it reassuring that we regularly navigate the world with considerable success, and even modify it in ways which indicate, to a reasonable degree of probability, that we're interacting with something which is very close to what we think it is and perceive it to be, and that, e.g. the roads we see and build and cars we drive on them are very close to what we think them to be and won't suddenly prove to be something else. — Ciceronianus the White

That is a good point. Technology works, we're able to survive, experiments are repeatable, etc.

What you're arguing is that naive realism cannot be true, because the act of perception generates an appearance for us. The tree we see is an appearance. — Marchesk

No, no, no. The tree we see is not 'an appearance'. It doesn't make sense to say something 'is' an appearance. That's grammatical garble. The tree itself appears to us, and as such, we see the tree itself. That we see the tree's appearance does not mean that the tree 'is' an appearance. It simply means we see what can be seen of the tree, itself.

Stop opposing 'the actual tree'' and 'the appearance of the tree': there is no zero sum game here, the one does not preclude the other (which does not in turn mean the appearance of the tree 'is' the tree). The 'actual' tree appears, and that is what we see.

I've long argued a direct realist position because it is the obvious response to the absurdity of idealism. In the end it is the dichotomy that is muddled. That's always underpinned my approach.

That we see the tree's appearance does not mean that the tree 'is' an appearance. It simply means we see what can be seen of the tree, itself. — StreetlightX

In what sense would our sensations be exhaustive of the tree? That’s taking the direct realist position.

Or maybe the sentence is just badly worded? You mean we see the kinds of things we can see due to our perceptual habits. Other habits might see something that appears very different. Like think of how a spider might see the tree.

In what sense would our sensations be exhaustive of the tree? — apokrisis

Isn't this all just the usual disagreement about terminology, though? We don't report seeing the tree with all of this metaphysical baggage in mind. We don't mean that we see the tree exhaustively. We don't think of matter in spacetime. We think of the tree in the shared everyday world, a green thing that grows, that can chopped into firewood, enjoyed for its shade, or used as a landmark. The more complicated attitudes about the tree are (seemingly) erected on this foundation. My own self-consciousness of taking this tree in the 'ordinary way' is itself one such complicated attitude, thematizing what is otherwise just the dim background of common sense.

We can say that the way we see the tree is a function of our human as opposed to spider's cognition. We might instead say that we see a representation of a tree, but I find this awkward. It's think it's better to go with just seeing the tree, aware of course that there is interpretation/mediation in this seeing. But for me there's a gap between arguing for a least awkward expression and adopting this or that -ism.

But you are stressing the subjective tree - the one that appears to us even in our dreams. It is tree-ness in all the ways we could possibly imagine.

And the concern here is with the objective tree, the mind-independent tree, the Kantian tree-in-itself.

This is where those peddling Wittgensteinian quietism are being disingenuous.

The language game tree is the social tree, the one that appears to a community of minds connected by a web of linguistic relations. There is a right way of speaking about trees because there is a social level of subjectivity or semiosis.

But then the Witti-ites smuggle in their realist claims under the language game smokescreen. Scratch them and you find they believe that makes perception direct. The language game tree is the objective tree - being now defined in terms of the limit of the speakable.

It’s a laughable ruse. But there you go. They probably believe it themselves.

There is both a subjective tree and an objective tree?

I'm going to avoid "direct realism" or "access" because there lies rabbit holes.

For example, when I see a tree while wide awake using my eyes, am I conscious of a mental tree, or the tree itself?

In anticipation of objections concerning seeing mental trees, it's uncontroversial that we experience seeing trees in our dreams, which must be mental, on pain of being a dream content realist. And it's uncontroversial that we can call to waking mind a memory or visualization of a tree, which is also mental. And there's hallucinating a tree.

But is the tree mental when we actually perceive one (see, smell, touch, hear it fall in the woods, etc)? — Marchesk

I think the issue is simply about how veridical and non-veridical experiences are categorized.

When we are awake and in a normal state, we see trees. No problem. Now we can also dream about trees, remember that we saw a tree yesterday, hallucinate a tree, visualize a tree and so on.

However it's a category mistake to suppose that those experiences are a kind of seeing (or perception generally) rather than sui generis experiences. That category mistake leads to the creation of ghostly entities, dualism, skepticism and so on.

So, to answer your question, I think we should apply Occam's razor to the mental trees.

There are both subjectivising and objectivising language games. So we have some great epistemic theories to underpin our ontological commitments.

Pragmatism works. Neither realism nor idealism can.

The experience of seeing a tree when we're awake is not mental. The experience of seeing a tree in a virtual reality that is so realistic that it is indistinguishable from reality is mental. I think that everyone will agree on this point. Where people disagree is the manner in which we differentiate between the two. Given two identical objects, how can we say they are different? My answer is context.

If I at least think I'm awake, safe and sound and see a tree, I find no problems with it being subjective or objective. I can use it, as "tree" in conversations with myself and others in a manner which does not make any problems. If I however think it's beautiful, I run into problem with the mental thing. So yeah, Pragmatism is the name of the game here. Of course, I might be dreaming it all up, but if I do not give a ... about that it flies for me. It's a tree.

Maybe one day I will wake up and realize that this forum discussion was only a dream. But until then, I have no reason to think that this is the case. There is simply no evidence at present time to support it.

When we go to sleep and fall asleep and when we start dreaming we forget. We forget everything we knew. This alone allows us to be certain, as we dream, that everything that happens, within our dreams, is real. There is simply no evidence that we're not in a dream. We forgot it. However, as soon as we wake up and unforget what has been forgotten, we change our minds.

But you are stressing the subjective tree - the one that appears to us even in our dreams. It is tree-ness in all the ways we could possibly imagine. — apokrisis

I can why you would say that, but for me this is still a layer of abstraction on the (non-Kantian) phenomenon. "That which shows itself" is primary, one might say. It shows itself, not its showing. To be fair, taking a phenomenological position is still 'metaphysical' in a certain sense. I can't be right about this IMV but only advertise a preference. (And of course we have different kinds of talk for different purposes. But I see the charm or appeal of direct realism understood in a particular fashion.)

And the concern here is with the objective tree, the mind-independent tree, the Kantian tree-in-itself. — apokrisis

Perhaps, but isn't that already a rush to the answer of the OP's question? Of course I believe in something like a mind-independent tree "out there," but this framework has its tensions. The usual is that the territory apart from the map is seemingly contentless except as the pure negation of the map.

This is where those peddling Wittgensteinian quietism are being disingenuous. — apokrisis

I relate. I think 'quietism' can become a smug hatred of thought.

The language game tree is the social tree, the one that appears to a community of minds connected by a web of linguistic relations. There is a right way of speaking about trees because there is a social level of subjectivity or semiosis. — apokrisis

I agree. I think it's experienced in a non-explicit way. The "shared-world" is a basic intuition or phenomenon. But this tends to get conflated with the scientific image of the world, which of course neglects the role of language and concerned practical involvement in sustaining the condition of possibility for the theoretical-scientific vision of what's 'really' there hidden in all the 'subjective,' value-drenched 'illusion.'-- as if this 'subjective' value wasn't primarily social and didn't maintain a privileging of the scientific image in the first place.

But then the Witti-ites smuggle in their realist claims under the language game smokescreen. Scratch them and you find they believe that makes perception direct. The language game tree is the objective tree - being now defined in terms of the limit of the speakable. — apokrisis

I still read it in terms of an aesthetic preference. Does anyone deny mediation? Or is it all about where to 'stuff' this mediation?

Isn't there a tree-for-me and a tree-for-us, the first experienced in life, and the second a formalized externality? The former subjective and the latter objective (inter-subjective)?

I only count one tree.

Bully for you.

But I would defend pragmatism against subjectivism. Just because we must accept consciousness of the world is indirect, it doesn’t mean that some methods for structuring experience couldn’t also have the goal of being more true, or more objective, or more realistic, or however else we can operationally define a notion of maximal directness.

So conceding the epistemic argument that perception is not direct, does not mean we can’t turn around and have directness as our epistemic ambition. Not all subjectivism has to be equal.

So would I.

So conceding the epistemic argument that perception is not direct, does not mean we can’t turn around and have directness as our epistemic ambition. Not all subjectivism has to be equal. — apokrisis

I agree that we want something like accuracy. Also that not all subjectivism is equal. A radical like Rorty can replace representation with coping, but then we debate not accuracy but effectiveness. The constant is a pushing-forward of ideas as preferable, to-be-believed, to-be-acted-upon. How we justify this preference is perhaps a function of the operant paradigm.

Cheers. One of the problems with this subject/object talk is how it is used to multiply individuals beyond necessity: A subjective tree, an objective tree, a language game tree, a mind-independent tree, the Kantian tree-in-itself.

Seems overly complicated.

So, to answer your question, I think we should apply Occam's razor to the mental trees. — Andrew M

Ah - you already made this point; I agree.

The experience of seeing a tree in a virtual reality that is so realistic that it is indistinguishable from reality is mental. I think that everyone will agree on this point. — Magnus Anderson

I don't think Google Cardboard is that good.

That is, even in the Matrix, there is a difference between seeing a real tree and seeing a virtual tree.

That's rather the point of the plot.

Seems overly complicated. — Banno

Or the truth irreducibly complex. Epistemology involves self-reference. The reason for the irreducible complexity is hardly hidden here.

Look, I know your favourite language game is trapping folk into using a language game in which the realist metaphysics are the already baked-in presumption.

“Come along children, let’s count how many trees we can all see. Let’s move away from all these wild-eyed people questioning the epistemic root of such language use.”

You’re a one trick pony, Banno. You just keep setting the same little snare, hoping to trap another unwary passer by.

It wasn't I who set the snare - the multiplicity of trees is implicit in the question raised by the OP.

I rather see myself as pointing out the snare; but if you wish to stay trapped, so be it.

the multiplicity of trees is implicit in the question raised by the OP. — Banno

But is the tree mental when we actually perceive one (see, smell, touch, hear it fall in the woods, etc)? — Marchesk

So is it an actual multiplicity of objects that is implied, or the irreducible self-referentiality of perception? Are we pointing at several kinds of tree, or is the issue - as I have highlighted - that any act of pointing is always a pointing in two directions.

In pointing from the speaking self, or the linguistic culture, or the scientific reference frame, we are making a claim about a pragmatic or interpretative relation.

So we don’t have to worry about a multiplicity of objects. We only have to pay heed to the epistemic fact that pointing is self referential in an irreducible fashion.

Direct realism formally dies at that point. Only pragmatism remains.