Hmm, think of the same scenario of perceivable behavior but with a different set of imperceivable intentions: Person A violently shoves person B to the ground (this being the exact same act with an identical degree of harm upon person B in crashing to the ground) but, in this version, the act is performed with the intention of saving person B’s life from the assassination attempt of person C. The discernable outcome of harm (and of a saved life) remains the same; the sole difference now is in the private intentions with which the act of shoving person B is performed by person A. — javra
Intention although important is not always the deciding factor. One can have good intentions and yet still commit an immoral act, as in accidental harm that should or could have been foreseen. — Sam26
There is also an important point here, that is, that all immoral acts have the property of harm, but not all moral acts lack harm, some do some don't. — Sam26
I also don't associate immoral acts with sin, that is, sin is a religious word that carries religious connotations. In fact, I don't believe in sin in terms of an act against God, which is deserving of punishment, or that it's something we need to be saved from. In the sense that evil is equated with sin, I would disavow evil too. — Sam26
The same is true in my above example, you know that if you don't pay sufficient attention to the road you can cause bodily harm to another, but you ignored this important point. — Sam26
These problems are essentially the reason why virtue ethics persists, even though you're focusing on intent you still have a consequentialist ethic because you're using the consequences of the perpetrators actions as a means of determining their intentions, it therefore suffers from the same problem as all other consequentialist ethics, what point in the future do we use to judge? — Inter Alia
because the action of telling the truth would lead to murder, thus telling the lie would lead to the least amount of harm — Sam26
If I understand you correctly, you are saying that although we may all have theoretical knowledge of the moral good, we may lack the knowledge of the right course of action in a given situation. That may be, and this is where the Golden Rule becomes a useful tool. How should I act? The same way I would want others to act towards me in the same situation if the roles were reversed.It is possible, therefore, that determining whether an action is moral, can only be only be done in the context of the perpetrator's acquired knowledge of morality (in the normative sense) because although innately born with the concept of what is 'good' and what is 'evil', they may have no moral knowledge at all i.e. have no clue as to whether their actions will achieve or frustrate the achievement of that state. — Inter Alia
I completely agree.I understand, but it's an important part of my view of ethics, there are many who view ethics as subjective and/or relative. [...] So it's my view when talking about justice that we have a view of justice that's has some objective standard. — Sam26
Well, in theory, we could always ask the individuals whether they have an inclination to seek justice for themselves or not; but I see your point that this is not practicable to do in a large scale. Much like for intentions, we cannot be certain about inclinations from mere observations. However, we have a few solutions left: (1) reasonable claim, and (2) empirical data by observing ourselves.Your response to the self-sealing fallacy is not sufficient. [...] Thus, because of the way your argument is framed, it's self-sealing as far as I can tell. — Sam26
It must be so, because if they sincerely did not know that their act was causing some harm, then it would be an honest mistake; which is a mistake, but is not unjust.I don't think it's true that necessarily all unjust people know their unjust (you seem to be basing this on the idea of innate knowledge). — Sam26
Specifically regarding morality, I summarize here the argument from my original post, which has yet to be refuted: if knowledge is necessary for intentions, and intention is necessary for moral language, then knowledge is necessary for moral language. And we know it cannot be learned from observation, because as Mr. Wayfarer stated earlier, we cannot entail 'what ought to be' from 'what is'. Therefore, either moral language does not exist, or if it does, then its knowledge must be innate.What is the evidence that we have innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained in some other way. — Sam26
andAlthough it is difficult, or even impossible, to discover some's true intention, true intentions still exist. — Samuel Lacrampe
In more complex cases, the intended outcome is more challenging to achieve, but this does not change the intention itself. I.e, willing good or willing harm as the end. — Samuel Lacrampe
To your direct question first, I'm afraid the answer is no, although I realise such a fundamental shift in axiom might end this otherwise fascinating conversation. As I mentioned earlier, I'm a compatibilist, so I don't even really believe in free will, but I certainly don't think morality requires it. All I'm interested in is how to guide people's behaviour to help bring about the society that I firmly believe all people (of sound mind) would want to live in. — Inter Alia
How does one justify any interpersonal interaction if the issue of intention is to be completely done away with? — javra
So your position is that an immoral act is always harmful because the person that causes the immoral act always harms themselves. In your view, is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral? If the former, then how do you know they harm themselves? If the latter, then what makes the act immoral besides intention? — Samuel Lacrampe
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