There being language users in the vicinity is not a feature of the circumstances that has any relevance to evaluating whether the English sentence "Smokey the cat is on the mat" is true when Smokey the cat indeed is on the mat in those circumstances. We can imagine some circumstance in the distant past, in the distant future, or in a distant galaxy far away, when, or where, there are no language users around. If, in those actual or counterfactual circumstances, Smokey the cat is (was or will be) on the mat, then the English sentence "Smokey the cat is (was or will be) on the mat" as used by us now to describe what is (was, will be, or would have been) the case in to those actual or counterfactual circumstances is true. — Pierre-Normand

No, not language users; language. Without language, there can be no sentence. If there can be no sentence, then there can be no true sentence. Yet, at that time, it would be the case that the universe exists (but not that "the universe exists" is true).

Q.E.D.

No, not language users; language. Without language, there can be no sentence. If there can be no sentence, then there can be no true sentence. Yet, at that time, it would be the case that the universe exists (but not that "the universe exists" is true). — Sapientia

On edit: If you will bear with me, I will make my main point more explicitly in the last paragraph below, also added on edit.

The statement '"Smokey the cat is on the mat" is true' (if you allow me to stick with this example) isn't qualified by a time. It is a statement that we are making right now. It doesn't really make sense to ponder over what change it would make to the truth value of this statement if we were to evaluate it as it would have been made at a different time. Likewise, if the English statement "Smokey the cat is one the mat" is true, then it doesn't really make sense either to inquire about its truth value if the statement itself had been made by me three feet further on the left. Likewise with 'moving' the expression of this statement three hours or three billion years in the past.

One difficulty that seemingly arises is due the the tense of the verb that occurs in the sentence used to make the statement. This tense seems to make the statement dependent on the time when it is made in order to determine what strate of affairs it is describing. But this is an illusion that stems from confusing (1) the situational sentence used with (2) the statement made with the use of this situational sentence, as I had earlier suggested.

If I say right now that I am at home, and I am thereby making a statement that is true, my statement remains true in the future when I am not at home anymore. I could then re-express the same statement, if I wanted to, with the use of a different situational sentence that included a past tense verb. Those difficulties usually are glossed over in discussions of the T-schema through assuming that the truths being evaluated are eternal rather than temporal (e.g. we assume that Smokey always has been on the mat or never was). But if we are to make the account more general, we have to interpret all the indexical words and verb tenses of the mentioned sentence relative to its intended circumstance of expression in order to determine the statement being made, and hold this statement fixed while considering the range of circumstances relative to which its truth value is evaluated.

On edit: The range of circumstances just mentioned, relative to which the truth value of the statement are evaluated -- and, indirectly, the truth value of the sentence used by us to make this statement -- includes past, future, and counterfactual circumstances where we weren't yet around, aren't around anymore, or never were around, respectively.

I asked you this:

If dinosaurs were roaming the earth (to use Michael's example), does it follow that "dinosaurs roam the earth" was true, or merely that "dinosaurs roamed the earth" is true? — John

Michael responded with this:

If dinosaurs were roaming the Earth then "dinosaurs were roaming the Earth" is true. — Michael

which I take to show that he does not believe that "dinosaurs roam the earth" was true at the time that they roamed the earth. You responded by saying that you agreed with Michael. Hence I asked this:

OK, so, that dinosaurs were walking the earth, although true now, was not true at the time. But now that we have judged it to be true that they were walking the earth it will be true for all time, even at some time in the future, when there are no humans? — John

And you replied that you did not mean to imply that "dinosaurs roam the earth" was not true at the time. This seems to contradict your earlier statement that you agreed with Michael, so now I am confused as to what you do beleive.

And you replied that you did not mean to imply that "dinosaurs roam the earth" was not true at the time. This seems to contradict your earlier statement that you agreed with Michael, so now I am confused as to what you do beleive. — John

That's because I understand "...is true" as predicated of a statement to be tenseless. The statement at issue is the statement expressed by us, in the present, with the use of the mentioned sentence. Statements that are true at one time are true at all times. This is more apparent in the case of so called eternal truths, such as mathematical truths, but is also true of temporal truths (i.e. truths that pertain to something being in a definite state at some definite time). The latter is somewhat hidden by the fact that we represent statements with the sentences used to express them. For instance, if Smokey the cat is on the mat right now, the sentence used by me in the future to express this very same fact (which concerns what's up with Smokey right now) will be different. This sentence will use a past tense.

So, when someone claims that "dinosaurs roam the earth" was not true at the time, one may mean that the present tense sentence "dinosaurs roam the earth" would not have expressed a truth if it had been used by an English speaker in the distant past. It could also mean that the statement made by us through using that sentence right now doesn't truly ascribe a property to the Earth that it would have exemplified in the distant past. (It doesn't really matter if you hold either "... roam the earth" or "dinosaurs roam ..." to be the predicate). But on that second interpretation, the sentence is understood as an open sentence that includes a time variable. Saying then, now, that it "was true at the time", is meant to fill up the time variable in the mentioned sentence in order to express with it a definite statement (expressing a timeless truth) that is then properly evaluated true, and tenselessly so.

It is the second interpretation that I favor, since it is how the T-schema, and disquotational schema, are meant to be understood, with the mentioned sentence held to express a definite statement (i.e. a definite Fregean though) rather than as an open statement (i.e. a Fregean concept) that is predicated of a time.

So, I am agreeing with Michael that the disquotational schema, or the T-schema, are valid even as they refers to past circumstances before any human language was in use. But I disagree about the interpretation of the schema often incorrectly foisted on it, possibly by Micheal, but also by other participants in this thread too. And this is not just a matter of convention, but reflects are deeper philosophical point about the tenselesness of "...is true" as revealed by logical grammar, though somewhat hidden by English grammar.

OK, thanks Pierre, that clears it up somewhat. I have had extensive arguments with Michael about this very point in past threads. The one I can remember (and if I remember it incorrectly he can correct me) is that he claimed that although Everest may have been the tallest mountain at some prehuman time, that it could not have been true at that time that it was the tallest mountain, because no statement of that truth could have been uttered at that time.

This seemed just plain wrong to me, although I acknowledged that no truth-apt statement could have been uttered at that time. And to assert this wrongness does seem to commit one to the idea that truth is not a property of statements but of the propositions that are expressed by them and also to the idea that there must be, in some unimaginable way, unexpressed propositions. Then this begins to look like a form of Platonism.

And to assert this wrongness does seem to commit one to the idea that truth is not a property of statements but of the propositions that are expressed by them and also to the idea that there must be, in some unimaginable way, unexpressed propositions. Then this begins to look like a form of Platonism. — John

Yes, this raises issues regarding the ontological status of propositions (Fregean thoughts). But maybe this is a topic for another thread; or possibly suited for the now dormant Pattern and Being thread ;-) (Hint: a proposition can be regarded as, in a sense, a possible pattern -- i.e. a possible way for our world to be -- while a true proposition would be grasped when one objectively refers to an actual pattern -- i.e. a way our world can intelligibly be thought to be, and, indeed, is. Also, in the previous sentence I have used "to be" and "is" tenselessly. Our world being different in the past makes a difference to how it "is" in that sense)

I am interested in these kinds of questions, and I want to get back to the Haugeland paper, and hopefully be able to make some comments about it, but I've been so busy with work lately, and now I'm a bit burned out, so...I'll have to return to it when I can.

I've been so busy with work lately, and now I'm a bit burned out, so...I'll have to return to it when I can. — John

No worry, and no hurry. The end of this month isn't a deadline either. The discussion about Brassier's paper spilled over the next couple months and there are outstanding issues there too (such as the "argument from ancestrality".)