It seems like what premise 2 and 3 are saying is that change exists only if "actuality" and "potentiality" exist, but this does not seem obvious at all; consider this alternative: change is the inherent nature of the universe and that for every event there is a temporally precedent event that is its cause.

In this alternative explanation of change, change needs no explanation outside of itself since the existence of change is due to it being the inherent nature of the universe. — Walter Pound

But this explanation does not describe "change", as the word is commonly used. "Change" refers to the difference between two states. If your two states are two different events, one following the other in time, as you describe, then to explain change requires that you explain why the two events are different from each other. To say that one is the cause of the other does not explain the change from one to the other, i.e. why the one is different from the other.

That is why "potentiality" and "actuality" are introduced. At the time of the prior event, when the prior event is actual, there is the potential for the latter event. The latter event only potentially exists at this time, because even if the prior event is known to cause the latter event, something could interfere, and prevent this from occurring. So the nature of "change" is much more complicated than just a series of events.

What is meant by #3 is that the existence of things are contingent, and that they are temporal, meaning that they have a beginning and ending in time.

I don't think that is correct. Feser has stated that his argument is unaffected by whether the universe has always existed or not. If the universe is eternal or has existed for all time, then it had no beginning, but Feser believes that his argument still is sound.

If the universe is a "thing" then we conclude that it has a beginning in time, (requiring the potential for that thing to precede the actual thing) like all things do, as #6 of the op states;

6.) Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized. — darthbarracuda

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If the universe is a "thing" then we conclude that it has a beginning in time

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI

@15:02 Prof. Feser argues otherwise.

20.) But these are the characteristics of what we call God - therefore God exists. — darthbarracuda

Yes, belleiver like me aggree with conclusion but also no-believer say they charaterisic of reality. It demonsrate absoluttenes of any name and open 2 many conclusson. Me believe in God but have no seen propper argument, only own coclusion and is no fair to others.

15:02 Prof. Feser argues otherwise. — Walter Pound

I don't agree with Feser's argument on that point. Notice he refers to multiple universes, which implies that this universe, as a thing, does have a beginning, coming into existence from a previous universe. So instead of actually addressing the issue, that it is impossible that our universe, as a particular thing, doesn't have a beginning, he obscures it in "many universes", dismisses it, and proceeds to talk about his preferred way of understanding the relationship between potential and actual.

2.) Material objects that change can only do so because they have potentials that have been actualized; — darthbarracuda

I already have a problem when we get to #2. (I'm fine with #1.)

I don't necessarily disagree with #2, but we need to be very careful re just what we're saying when we claim that potentials or possibilities "exist." We need to be careful not to reify potentials or possibilities as if they are "somethings that obtain." I'm fine with saying that "there are" potentials or possibilities, but only in the sense of it being a fact that particular things are not precluded from occurring ontologically. In other words, it's another way of saying, "No facts amount to x (some potential or possible) not being able to happen."

So then we'd need to also be careful with something like this:

3.) A potential cannot be actualized except by something already actual. — darthbarracuda

So that we make sure that we're not saying that something actual can do something to a possible or potential, as if the possible or potential is somehow a "thing in itself." Possibles and potentials are not things in themselves. They're simply the fact that some state isn't prohibited from obtaining given ontological facts. Possibles and potentials are only "actualized" in the sense that the nonprohibited state at time T0 (not a thing-in-itself) is the obtaining state at time T1. The idea of something needing to "act on potentials or possibles" thus doesn't make sense, which makes the argument not work.

I think this forum has rules against soliciting.

I watched the bit at 15 mins in the video where Feser talked about 'hierarchical ordering of causes'. The only thing I can infer from that is that either he never studied physics or he didn't understand it. He speaks of a cup on a table on Earth as being an ordered sequence of actualisers of potential - the Earth actualises the potential of the table to be where it is and the table actualises the potential of the cup to be where it is.

What he doesn't understand is that in physics there is no such ordering. It is a three-body problem in Statics. In such problems, every body in the problem depends on every other body in the problem. There is no ordering or hierarchy. Remove any one of the bodies and the equilibrium is disturbed so that all bodies move until they find a new equilibrium. So in his example, the cup actualises the potential of the table and the Earth to be where they are, just as much as the table actualises the potential of the cup. There can be no ordered sequence of causes.

What is ironic about this is that in a sense Feser, as a representative of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy, is less spiritual in regard to this example than is physics. The physical analysis, which is that 'everything depends on everything else' is essentially similar to the Mādhyamaka notion of Emptiness and Dependent Origination.

What is ironic about this is that in a sense Feser, as a representative of the Roman Catholic orthodoxy, is less spiritual in regard to this example than is physics. The physical analysis, which is that 'everything depends on everything else' is essentially similar to the Mādhyamaka notion of Emptiness and Dependent Origination. — andrewk

it's debatable whether Feser is "less spiritual", but what he does do is remove the temporal connotations from the concepts of "potential" and "actual", allowing that what is actual, and what is potential, are equal in relation to reality, at the present moment. Classically, what is actual at the present moment is what is real, and potential, referring to future possibilities does not share equally in reality. In classical Christian theology, actuality is given priority, precedence over potentiality. It is only by removing this precedence, and assuming actual and potential to have equal status at the present, that Feser is able to transpose the temporal hierarchy of temporal order, to a physical hierarchy, an order of things.

The problem is that the precedence, or priority, of actual over potential is given, validated, or justified by the nature of time. Past existence is actual (real) while future existence is potential (requiring actualization to become real). When "actual" and "potential" are removed from this context, the validity of any order, and consequently the validity of Fesesr's hierarchy, is also removed. So Feser creates his hierarchy by referring to the priority of actual over potential, but by removing actual and potential from the temporal context he negates the validity of that priority.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A48zsMFodG4

Here is a debate between Prof. Ahmed and Prof. Feser over two different arguments for God. The first half of the debate goes over the argument of change; can anyone tell me what the definition of "actuality" and "potentiality" are? In the first half of the debate, time is spent trying to answer that question and it was still hard for me to grasp the definition.

Here is a debate between Prof. Ahmed and Prof. Feser over two different arguments for God. The first half of the debate goes over the argument of change; can anyone tell me what the definition of "actuality" and "potentiality" are? In the first half of the debate, time is spent trying to answer that question and it was still hard for me to grasp the definition. — Walter Pound

Feser (after Aristotle) isn't using the terms "potential" and "actual" in any novel manner. The sticking point is that there are some unclear metaphysical claims going on re just what the reality of potentials is prior to them being actualized. It's basically the same question as whether unrealized possibilities exist and in what sense do they exist--what sorts of things are they supposed to be, exactly?