Why? Aristotle's metaphysics assumed all common sense notions that it could. It's the basis of his metaphysics. We look around nature and see what is there: change, rest, one being becoming another through the first, forms, telos, etc.

I think it's a stretch to say that Aristotle's metaphysics is a good description of what humans believe as a matter of common sense.

Yadda yadda. Being an atheist doesn't just mean you rebut theistic arguments on the internet, as if dialogue was a competition to be the most right, it means you have to reject theological baggage in how you think. — fdrake

Yeah, idk why charleton is being such a douche then. I'm agnostic by the way, but for some silly reason I'm being associated with theism simply because I'm entertaining a theistic argument...?

No idea brochacho.

An acorn has the potential to become a tree — Marty

I've felt this discussion is lacking a Thomist to defend, or at least elaborate on, the argument. Perhaps you are such a Thomist? If so, you will be providing a useful service, as Thomists that have contributed to discussions in the past are absent here.

My question for the Thomist - be it you or somebody else - about the above sentence, is

"what does the sentence mean, beyond the everyday notion that 'I would not be surprised if this acorn became a tree', and if it does mean something more, can that thing be explained in a non-circular manner, ie without using synonyms for 'potential' like 'can', 'possible', 'may', 'might'.

for some silly reason I'm being associated with theism simply because I'm entertaining a theistic argument...? — darthbarracuda

Cultural misotheism. It does push buttons. It was worse on the old forum, if that's any consolation.

I do read Feser's blog, and am meaning to read some of his books. But this text, taken from the blog, does provide some further detail (in the context of a discussion of 'brute fact').

Lightning causes the forest fire precisely insofar as (the Aristotelian will say) it actualizes the potentiality of whatever foliage it strikes to catch fire. But the lightning can do this only insofar as it is itself actualized (for, since the lightning is not a necessarily existing thing, it too has to go from potential to actual). And whatever is actualized (so the Aristotelian will also say) is actualized by something already actual. Now what we’ve got in any case where C is actualized by B only insofar as B is in turn actualized by A is an essentially ordered causal series, in which the action of the members lower down in the series is unintelligible apart from the impartation to them of causal power by members higher up in the series. This, of course, is the basis for Scholastic arguments to the effect that the lightning could not exist and operate at all even for an instant apart from a purely actual (and thus divine) conserving and concurring cause, who is first in the essentially ordered series in question. But that conclusion can be bracketed off for present purposes. What matters for the moment is just that on the Scholastic analysis, the lightning cannot intelligibly actualize without itself being actualized (whether or not this regress leads us to a divine first actualizer).

So, to conceive of the lightning as a cause of the fire, we ultimately cannot avoid thinking of it as having an efficient cause of its own -- at least to conserve in being, and concur in, its causal activity at the moment at which it actualizes the fire. Hence our grasp of its being a cause of the fire entails bringing in all of the four causes, in which case it is hardly an unintelligible “brute fact.” Of course, this analysis brings in specifically Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysical notions, but there is nothing suspect about that. For in order to evaluate a claim like Oerter’s claim that a bolt of lightning can be a genuine explanation even if it had no explanation of its own, we need to ask ourselves what it is to be an explanation in the first place, and in particular what it is to be a causal explanation (since the lightning is in the case at hand claimed to provide a causal explanation of the fire). And the Scholastic holds, on independent grounds, that formal, material, final, and efficient causes are all part of a complete explanatory story.

From here

Here's a simpler way of stating the cosmological argument:
In the case of every existing thing, the potential for that thing is prior in time to its actual existence. "The potential for that thing" means that at this time, prior to the actual existence of the thing, the thing may or may not come into existence. We say that its existence is contingent. Whether the thing actually comes into existence or not is dependent on a cause. A cause is necessarily something actual. Therefore there is something actual which is prior to every existing thing.

The question is, does Edward Feser reallty think that it is arguments like this that found his belief in God? If so, he's almost certainly kidding himself. If he's like most believers, he believes for entirely different reasons that have nothing to do with Aristotle or syllogisms. Those real reasons are no less valid - in fact in my view they are more so - but perhaps he doesn't want to admit to them because they don't sound as Sciency. — andrewk

*I think I've put my finger on it. Reaching for a proof suggests a lack of visceral experience of the divine on the one hand or a banalization of this experience on the other. If God is intensely there, then one might expect a person to drop the theoretical pretense and have the courage describe this experience poetically, musically, etc. Or maybe remain silent. In any case, such proofs strike me a desiccated, artificial, vaguely false. — 0rff

I guess I would be one of those who is almost certainly kidding myself. How would you know that, and could you help to bring me out of my delusion?

If God is intensely there, then one might expect a person to drop the theoretical pretense... — 0rff

...and convert to Protestantism.

I guess I would be one of those who is almost certainly kidding myself

Not possible. You are either kidding yourself or you are not. The 'almost certainly' is an estimate that the majority of people who think they believe in god because of a logical syllogism rather than, for instance, personal experience of her, are kidding themselves. But each of those people who thinks that is either kidding themselves or they are not. I think most are. If you think you're one of the minority, I'm not going to dispute it with you since I know almost nothing about you. You may be right.

Thanks for making the attempt. Unfortunately that passage is all about 'actual' rather than 'potential'. I don't find the concept of 'actual' nebulous. It seems quite concrete to me. It's 'potential' that I find nebulous.

Have a look at this article which discusses Aristotelian ‘potentia’ in relation to physics. (Ironic, considering. Even mentions acorns.)

I find it hard to imagine that either Feser or Aristotle meant anything quantum by 'potential' since, to the best of my knowledge, neither of them has trained in quantum mechanics.

If one heads in the quantum direction in trying to define the term, an impassable boggy marsh lies ahead with the welter of conflicting interpretations available - in some of which everything is completely determined so the only role 'potential' can play is an epistemological one..

r I find it hard to imagine that either Feser or Aristotle meant anything quantum by 'potential' since, to the best of my knowledge, neither of them has trained in quantum mechanics. — andrewk

it’s a philosophical issue not strictly speaking a question of physics. That’s what makes it both relevant and interesting. And it is being proposed specifically as a bridge across the boggy marsh.

Let's take the many-worlds interpretation as an example. In that interpretation, if the universe is in quantum state S at time t, and it would be consistent with the laws of QM for the event E to either occur or not occur at time t+1, there is at least one world which is identical up to t+1 in which E occurs and one in which it does not. So when we say E is 'possible' or 'there is potential for E to occur' all we mean is that we do not currently know whether we are in one of the worlds where E does not occur.

Do you think Feser or Aristotle would be happy to accept that purely epistemological meaning of 'potential'?

Here's a simpler way of stating the cosmological argument:
In the case of every existing thing, the potential for that thing is prior in time to its actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually Feser takes pains to show how a hierarchical dependency is metaphysically more fundamental than a temporal one. The argument presented here is not really a cosmological argument at all, it's an argument based on the sheer existence of contingent material things right now, as in, not really why do things exist but why do they continue to exist, since this argument is meant to demonstrate that God is the supreme and eternal sustainer of existence (and not that he caused the world to begin).

Do you think Feser or Aristotle would be happy to accept that purely epistemological meaning of 'potential'? — andrewk

I would think that the solution proposed in that paper would obviate the requirement for Everett’s theory, but you’re right, we shouldn’t let Schrödinger’s cat out of the bag.

this argument is meant to demonstrate that God is the supreme and eternal sustainer of existence (and not that he caused the world to begin). — darthbarracuda

The ‘first cause’ in an ontological sense, i.e. the origin, rather than in the sense of temporal priority or first in a sequence.

Let's take the many-worlds interpretation as an example. In that interpretation, if the universe is in quantum state S at time t, and it would be consistent with the laws of QM for the event E to either occur or not occur at time t+1, there is at least one world which is identical up to t+1 in which E occurs and one in which it does not. So when we say E is 'possible' or 'there is potential for E to occur' all we mean is that we do not currently know whether we are in one of the worlds where E does not occur.

Do you think Feser or Aristotle would be happy to accept that purely epistemological meaning of 'potential'? — andrewk

Aristotelian potential is ontological on the Many-Worlds interpretation.

For a concrete example, consider a photon about to enter a beam splitter. The photon has the potential to be split into two photons by the beam splitter. When the photon enters the beam splitter that potential is actualized. There is subsequently a reflected photon on one world branch and a transmitted photon on the other world branch.

Note that there are no epistemic unknowns here prior to the split. There is no uncertainty about which branch the photon will end up on since there will be a future version of the photon on both branches.

That's not my understanding of Many Worlds. My understanding is that all the possible different worlds already exist, and we are in either a world where it splits or a world where it reflects. We only get to find out which of those worlds we are in after the split or reflection occurs.

So, interpreting 'potential' ontologically rather than epistemologically, if we are in the 'split' world there is not only 'potential' but 'inevitability' that the photon will split, and if we are in the 'reflect' world there is no potential that the photon will split - it is inevitable that it will be reflected. That goes against intuition and that is why the epistemological interpretation of 'potential' is more natural.

The photon has the potential to be split into two photons by the beam splitter. When the photon enters the beam splitter that potential is actualized — Andrew M

Doesn't this say that there is a photon prior to it being measured? That is exactly what is at issue in all of this. Whereas the Aristotelian view that Kasner is talking about seems to be that there is a potential for a photon, which is then actualised by the act of measurement. But up until that measurement, the photon as such doesn't exist, it is only real as 'potentia'.

The argument presented here is not really a cosmological argument at all, it's an argument based on the sheer existence of contingent material things right now, as in, not really why do things exist but why do they continue to exist, since this argument is meant to demonstrate that God is the supreme and eternal sustainer of existence (and not that he caused the world to begin). — darthbarracuda

Yes, that is exactly the point of the cosmological argument. It takes the evidence, that there are contingent material things in existence right now, at the present moment in time, and demonstrates that there must be a cause of this, which is other than the material things themselves. The example of the op appears to be a complex representation of the cosmological argument.

When we consider the nature of a contingent thing, we see that any such thing can be caused to cease to exist (be annihilated) by something such as an act of free will, at any moment in time, if one removes what you call the hierarchical support. This demonstrates that a thing's existence must be as you say, "sustained" at each passing moment in time. The support must be asserted at each moment or collapse occurs.

Newton's first law of motion, the law of inertia takes this cause, the sustainer of existence, "the support", for granted, assuming that this support will naturally continue unless interfered with. Once it is taken for granted, we disregard it, as is the case in physics. But the cosmological argument demonstrates that the support is not necessary. The support exists as the relationship between what potentially exists, and what actually exists, and it is the nature of this relationship, that of everything which potentially exists, nothing is actualized necessarily. Therefore the continued existence of material things is not necessary, so it is not something which any metaphysician ought to take for granted.

Yes, that is exactly the point of the cosmological argument. It takes the evidence, that there are contingent material things in existence right now, at the present moment in time, and demonstrates that there must be a cause of this, which is other than the material things themselves. The example of the op appears to be a complex representation of the cosmological argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

But most cosmological arguments take the form of, A causes B, B causes C...etc but what caused A? = God, not A sustains B, B sustains C,...etc but what sustains A? = God. Really, the latter argument is actually implicit in the former arguments, even if proponents of cosmological arguments don't recognize this. For a thing has to exist in order to be the effect of something, and there seems to be the question of what it means to exist, which of course is going to include how a thing exists and continues to exist.

That's not my understanding of Many Worlds. My understanding is that all the possible different worlds already exist, and we are in either a world where it splits or a world where it reflects. We only get to find out which of those worlds we are in after the split or reflection occurs. — andrewk

No (at least, I haven't come across that view).

So, interpreting 'potential' ontologically rather than epistemologically, if we are in the 'split' world there is not only 'potential' but 'inevitability' that the photon will split, and if we are in the 'reflect' world there is no potential that the photon will split - it is inevitable that it will be reflected. That goes against intuition and that is why the epistemological interpretation of 'potential' is more natural. — andrewk

I think you meant "transmit" not "split" above? After the world splits there is a photon on the transmission path and a photon on the reflection path (in different world branches).

Though, given that, I'm not clear on your intuition here. A vase has the potential to break. If it is hit with a hammer, it will break. Similarly, the photon has the potential to split. If it enters a beam splitter, it will split. And each subsequent version of the photon will have the same potential to split.

Doesn't this say that there is a photon prior to it being measured? — Wayfarer

Yes.

That is exactly what is at issue in all of this. Whereas the Aristotelian view that Kasner is talking about seems to be that there is a potential for a photon, which is then actualised by the act of measurement. But up until that measurement, the photon as such doesn't exist, it is only real as 'potentia'. — Wayfarer

Their suggestion seems to be that the potential is real apart from any particulars that would have that potential. Which would make it a Platonic view not an Aristotelian view.

I think your take on Aristotle is far too concretised, as I have said. In Aristotle, there are degrees of reality - things can be more or less real. That is an impossible proposition for modern thinking, for which existence is univocal - something either exists or it doesn’t. If you admit that things can ‘kind of’ exist, then you can accomodate the reality of the probability wave.

But most cosmological arguments take the form of, A causes B, B causes C...etc but what caused A? = God, not A sustains B, B sustains C,...etc but what sustains A? = God. Really, the latter argument is actually implicit in the former arguments, even if proponents of cosmological arguments don't recognize this. — darthbarracuda

Yes, I agree, it is implicit, and that's basically the same argument. The original, from Aristotle, does not use "cause", though Aristotle is clearly familiar with cause. What he demonstrates is a counter-intuitive temporal priority of actuality over potency, despite the fact that we understand the potential for things to be prior to the actual things..

What I think is that anyone who understands the cosmological argument will produce a version of it using ones own terminology, this demonstrates one's understanding. It's like when our teachers used to tell us in school, do not plagiarize, explain it using your own words.

For a thing has to exist in order to be the effect of something, and there seems to be the question of what it means to exist, which of course is going to include how a thing exists and continues to exist. — darthbarracuda

If you recognize that to exist means to be present in time, then you can proceed to ask, what allows something to exist, to be present in time. Notice that by asking "what allows something to exist?", it is implied that existing is having a special position, a privilege. So when existing is seen as a privileged position, not something to be taken for granted, but something contingent rather than necessary, then the cosmological argument comes into focus because the nature of time requires that existence, or "to exist", be "sustained", meaning to have temporal extension. It is this temporal extension which is focused on here.

Therefore we have a different meaning to the word "cause" here. In its average usage, as efficient cause, "cause" implies a separation between that which is prior and that which is posterior, as cause and effect. We might pinpoint a separation between cause and effect, as a point in time. In this case, "cause" implies a unity between that which is prior (the past), and that which is posterior (the future), within the concept "to exist", which is to be present in time. It is this unity of cause and effect, rather than a separation between them, which allows for an understanding of temporal extension.

"what does the sentence mean, beyond the everyday notion that 'I would not be surprised if this acorn became a tree', and if it does mean something more, can that thing be explained in a non-circular manner, ie without using synonyms for 'potential' like 'can', 'possible', 'may', 'might'. — andrewk

Not to be pedantic, but the vast majority of acorns probably never become oak trees, so in a sense it would be surprising if any given acorn became an oak tree, just on probablistic grounds. Of course, any given oak must come from some acorn, so it would be not at all surprising to learn that a given oak tree came from an acorn.

What say you about all this?

Honestly? The interesting thing about this thread isn't whether there is a God or isn't one. It's in what metaphysical assumptions generate that conclusion, and how those metaphysical assumptions are justified. — fdrake

Oh pleeeese. You cannot say anything about those assumptions and conclusions if you are not prepared to say what/which god/s you are talking about.
If you are not willing to say what you mean by god then the thread is empty.

I'd rather see what conception of God is engendered by the assumptions than attempt to shoehorn in a totally irrelevant conception for the sole purpose of refutation.

But that is totally disingenuous since the thread pretends to "prove" god. It's just question begging nonsense. It could be anything from a disinterested unconscious big bang to a breaded guy wearing dress.

It doesn't pretend to prove God. The point of the thread is to examine the argument. If the OP was filled with ridicule of atheists and had 'checkmate atheists' at the end, maybe your responses would be more appropriate.