Saul Kripke contends that a natural language can in fact contain its own truth predicate without giving rise to contradiction. He showed how to construct one as follows:
Begin with a subset of sentences of a natural language that contains no occurrences of the expression "is true" (or "is false"). So The barn is big is included in the subset, but not " The barn is big is true", nor problematic sentences such as "This sentence is false".
Define truth just for the sentences in that subset.
Then extend the definition of truth to include sentences that predicate truth or falsity of one of the original subset of sentences. So "The barn is big is true" is now included, but not either "This sentence is false" nor "'The barn is big is true' is true".
Next, define truth for all sentences that predicate truth or falsity of a member of the second set. Imagine this process repeated infinitely, so that truth is defined for The barn is big; then for "The barn is big is true"; then for "'The barn is big is true' is true", and so on.
Notice that truth never gets defined for sentences like This sentence is false, since it was not in the original subset and does not predicate truth of any sentence in the original or any subsequent set. In Kripke's terms, these are "ungrounded." Since these sentences are never assigned either truth or falsehood even if the process is carried out infinitely, Kripke's theory implies that some sentences are neither true nor false. This contradicts the Principle of bivalence: every sentence must be either true or false. Since this principle is a key premise in deriving the Liar paradox, the paradox is dissolved.[63]
The Stanford site makes pretty clear that true as a general term does not have a single definition, but rather a constellation of differing and irreconcilable definitions. The details are extremely tedious - you're welcome to travel that path if you want to. More interesting to me is speculating on why. — tim wood
The Stanford site makes pretty clear that true as a general term does not have a single definition, but rather a constellation of differing and irreconcilable definitions. — tim wood
(For present purpose I'm defining true and truth as meaning the same thing, expressed as an adjective or a noun.)
By the way. What you've just quoted is a misrepresentation of the facts. It makes it seem as if I offered that answer to that quote. I didn't. I abhor insincerity.
— creativesoul
Maybe you should read the post; it's just above. — tim wood
creativesoul does that mean then that some beliefs are inherent and are never questioned? — Myttenar
↪creativesoul "it" was in reference to your post about correspondence theory..
Thought and belief without propositional content.. to me resembles instinct.
I had assumed that propositional content was exactly the methodology used to develop beliefs.
Maybe I am unclear on the idea? — Myttenar
How many ways are there to get a person to suspend their critical judgment in favour of acceptance? — tim wood
Sure, confidence, but you also have a categorical proposition about your chances that is true, if you've done the math right, and false, if you haven't. — tim wood
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