Semi-Kantian Argument to Personhood
  • ivans
    12
    My own moral philosophy is a modified version of Kant's. First categorical imperative fails(relies on Kant's flawed epistemology) but Kant's second imperative(ends in themselves) is logically certain as it derives from the definition of personhood - whatever the essence of morality is, the person is the subject of moral duties. I propose this argument to personhood as an objective standard of morality.
    1. A person is, by definition, and end in itself.
    2. The self is a person because its rational will allows it to discover moral principles.
    3. If the self is a person because of its rational will, all beings with rational will are persons.
    4. Therefore, all beings with rational will are persons.
    5. Therefore, all beings with rational will are ends in themselves.
    ivans Options
  • tim wood
    8.8k
    Careful, or we all will have to become vegetarians if we're to be moral persons (i. e., obliged to see just about every creature as an end in itself).

    Question: what's wrong with the 1st categorical imperative? I've always thought the expression of it (so act that the maxim of your action could also stand as a universal law) is unexceptionable and straightforward, but the implementation - the settling on the right maxim - is an art. Hard to find epistemological errors/flaws in art....

    I like your argument, and I suspect that someday we all are going to have to acknowledge the sentience and reasoning ability of pretty much all animals.
    tim wood Options
  • ivans
    12
    ↪tim wood
    The problem is that it fails to define exactly what makes something "able to stand as a universal law" without relying on either a subjective standard of morality or ungrounded standard of reason. I have heard the imperative being used when defined in a consequentialist way, in terms of the sustainability of a society, and in terms of the selfish value of an action, but in any case, it does not seem to make meaningful distinction.

    If its application is an intuitive art, I can understand that. That's treading the line between Kantianism and moral intuitionism, though
    ivans Options
  • tim wood
    8.8k
    If its application is an intuitive art, I can understand that. That's treading the line between Kantianism and moral intuitionism, though — ivans

    Intuition implies knowledge that reason can neither tell us nor verify. I don't think that's entirely a weakness. More an opening. Actually, it's the way it is. I don't think you can "geometrize" ethics.

    As to standing as a universal law, I thought that was merely the test of self-consistency. Not sufficient grounds, but necessary, per argument. And it's not the action itself, but the rule governing. The well-known example being the rule not to break promises. If promises can be broken, then there are no more promises.

    I think the ground of Kant's imperatives is intuitional, he just adds some rigor and uncommon sense.
    tim wood Options
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