Determinism would seem to negate the possibility, not of knowing anything, but of having any justifiable confidence in the rationality of judgements. Of course if you are one of those who is determined by nature to have confidence in the rationality of judgements, and determined to think that confidence justified, then... — John

A view similar to the one that you are expressing is called internalism about epistemic justification. It is the view that knowledge requires not only that beliefs issue from the actualization of a reliable method (or mechanism) of belief formation (in order that they would qualify as knowledge), but also that the epistemic agent be justified (in each separate case of belief formation) in believing that her belief is issued from such a reliable power. If the agent thus has a power of knowledge, this very power must include this specific reflective ability (at least tacitly).

The first condition -- of the reliability of the method of belief formation -- is the only one required by externalists about epistemic justification. This externalist condition is easily endorsed by compatibilists with an account similar to the one that I sketched in my previous post (without quite endorsing it). One could compatibly have one's belief that there is a cat on the mat determined by conditions that held one billion years ago and, also, conceive of this belief being the actualisation of the reliable power to form true beliefs about cats and mats when one encounters them. (Likewise in the case of compatibilist free will, it could have been determined one billion years ago that I would chose vanilla ice cream today, while, compatibly with this fact, my choice can be regarded as the actualization, today, of my "free" power to chose, and obtain, the ice cream flavor that I want.)

So, the area where compatibilism might clash with the possibility of knowledge concerns the specific condition of internalism about epistemic justification that you are alluding to. This would be troublesome for the compatibilist if it could be shown that belief in determinism (or lack of knowledge that determinism is false) isn't consistent with one being justified in holding the (second order) belief that one's empirical beliefs are, on a case by case basis, actualizations of a power of knowledge.

I don't endorse such a compatibilist conception myself (while I do endorse internalism about epistemic justification) but that's because, as is the case with compatibilism about free will, the idea of universal determinism, which such conceptions incorporate, seems flawed for reasons that I alluded to in a previous post. If one, however, grants such an idea of (universal) determinism to the compatibilist, then, it seems to me, it might be rather more difficult to argue that belief in determinism is inconsistent with the condition of internalism about epistemic justification, as this inconsistency would need to be demonstrated in order to find fault with a compatibilist conception of knowledge in the way you are proposing. (And also, the compatibilist could be an externalist about epistemic justification, but the shortcomings of such an externalism can be argued separately from any consideration about determinism).

Determinism would seem to negate the possibility, not of knowing anything, but of having any justifiable confidence in the rationality of judgements. Of course if you are one of those who is determined by nature to have confidence in the rationality of judgements, and determined to think that confidence justified, then... — John

Which is exactly my point. You are left believing whatever it is that you must believe, including believing that you believe correctly.

One could compatibly have one's belief that there is a cat on the mat determined by conditions that held one billion years ago and, also, conceive of this belief being the actualisation of the reliable power to form true beliefs about cats and mats when one encounters them. — Pierre-Normand

And in order for one to hold the belief that beliefs about the world are typically true because determinism just happens to be set up that way, one has to have faith. That dogma would read as follows: Your beliefs reflect reality when you feel you have an adequate justification for them even though your justifications are entirely beyond your control but are forced upon you by your genetics and environment. How one responds to conflicting views is problematic as those other people with varying beliefs would supposedly subscribe to the same dogma.

If I'm going to take a leap of faith, I'd likely not make it so limited and complicated. I'd likely just say that I do have free will to the extent that I really can choose to do otherwise, even if I can't fully make sense out of that concept.

To simplify my point:

This is really the Cartesian problem of the brain in the vat. We can't know whether all of our perceptions and judgments are accurate because an evil genius might be probing our brains and inserting all of these ideas in us. Or, using a more modern example, we don't know if we're in the Matrix.

The evil genius planting thoughts in us is a deterministic force. It is that force that negates our ability to know anything about the world. Whether that deterministic force is an evil genius or just the omnipotent power of the causal chain, we can know nothing about the world.

To remove us from the evil genius (or the causal chain) is the only way to make us an autonomous agent, fully capable of knowing reality. That is why free will is necessary for us to have knowledge.

I'd also point out that the solution to this mess is exactly as Descartes suggested and it's what has been suggested in this thread. It's to just assert that a good God would never so deceive us and make us believe that which is not true. So, yes, we can simply assert that determinism is just set up to give us correct knowledge, just because it's a good world I suppose.

Which is exactly my point. You are left believing whatever it is that you must believe, including believing that you believe correctly. — Hanover

Which implies nothing about whether those beliefs are justified, correct, true 'only be happenstance,' etc. But this is derailing anyway.

Which implies nothing about whether those beliefs are justified, correct, true 'only be happenstance,' etc. But this is derailing anyway. — The Great Whatever

Your comments are very unclear. If your beliefs are the result of pre-determined causes beyond your control, they would be held by pure happenstance (i.e. it's just the way things are). They would also not be justified to the extent that justifications are defined as subjectively held explanations that one has some control over deciding which is correct (as in a determined world there is no ability to decide which explanation is correct). Someone could have a belief that happens to be correct and true (synonyms), but that belief would not be knowledge to the extent that a justification could not be had (as explained above) in a determined world.

This is nonsensical. Your beliefs can't be a predetermined result because it takes your belief's existence to result in the relationship. Not only can we not tell what you belief will be from the states which preceded it alone, but it is not even defined because the prior state isn't your belief. The version of determinism you are proposing is logically incoherent.

I couldn't understand your post.

To simplify my point:

This is really the Cartesian problem of the brain in the vat. We can't know whether all of our perceptions and judgments are accurate because an evil genius might be probing our brains and inserting all of these ideas in us. Or, using a more modern example, we don't know if we're in the Matrix.

The evil genius planting thoughts in us is a deterministic force. It is that force that negates our ability to know anything about the world. Whether that deterministic force is an evil genius or just the omnipotent power of the causal chain, we can know nothing about the world. — Hanover

Under that scenario our power of knowledge is indeed abolished since, if the belief that a cat is on the mat, say, would be forcefully inserted in us while the cat isn't on the mat (or while there isn't even a cat, or a mat, etc.), then our belief that a cat is on the mat can't constitute knowledge, and that's true even in the case where, accidentally, the outside world is as we believe it to be (assuming that we could so much as make sense of the idea of empirically contentful beliefs in such a brain-in the vat scenario, which we arguably can't). The reason why we can't be ascribed knowledge, in that scenario, is that even in the case where the cat is on the mat, and our belief happens to match the way the world is, this matching isn't an outcome of a power of empirical knowledge but rather the result of an intervention of an evil genius, and the actions of this evil genius, let us assume, are (counterfactually) insensitive to the way the world is. That is, we are assuming that the evil genius would, or would be liable to, insert in us the belief that the cat is on the mat even in cases where it it isn't, or where there is no cat, etc. This is what makes the evil genius evil.

If, however, we imagine that the "evil" genius would merely ensure that (or enable the possibility that) our beliefs reliably have the content that they would have if they were the outcomes of a normal (albeit fallible) power of empirical knowledge, as such a power could also conceivably be realized in a non-deteministic (thought regular) world, then the activity of the genius drops out of the picture. It is a helpful genius of that kind that a compatibilist about the power of knowledge could pictures determinism to be embodying. Such a genius would (effectively) be looking out in the world before inserting into us a matching belief. Hence, in the case where we form the belief that there is a cat on the mat, because the evil genius is aware that there is one (and that there aren't any observational circumstances that would ordinarily defeat our fallible power of knowledge) then the counterfactual conditional claim that we wouldn't hold this belief if the cat weren't on the mat also holds true.

Consider again the deterministic robot that I discussed earlier. If the robot is designed to detect and pick up empty soda cans, and can reliably do so in some particular kind of environment, then it is irrelevant if the laws that govern the robot's interactions with its environment also are deterministic (such that the robot+environment constitute jointly a single deterministic system). The robot can still be credited with an ability to form true beliefs about the locations of empty soda cans (and manifest this ability through picking them up reliably) even though, in each case, it was already "determined" what the robot would do, even before the robot saw any soda cans, and that it would form the true belief that there is a soda can there. The compatibilist thus may view determinism as an enabling rather than coercitive "force" in relation to the robot's cognitive powers. And so can the compatibilist view our situation qua naturally evolved cognitive engines embodied in flesh in a deterministic world. This is how the compatibilist accommodates the externalist requirement about epistemic justification.

In order to rebut this account, you must, I think, either question the coherence of the view of universal determinism tacitly assumed (to be intelligible) by the compatibilist or target her ability to accommodate the internalist requirement for epistemic justification (or both).

I couldn't understand your post. — Hanover

Yes, the wording is defective. But I think TWOD may be making an argument similar to mine, targeting the very idea of universal determinism. In a way, I am both a compatibilist and an incompatibilist. That is, I hold the issue of determinism at the level of micro-physical law to be irrelevant to the analyses of free will and of the power of knowledge. Hence, our self-conception qua free cognitive agents ought not to be hostage to whatever discovery physicists might hold in reserve. We can still establish a priori that the doctrine of universal determinism spells trouble for our self-conception, but that this doctrine however is, fortunately, unintelligible. So, I hold free will (and the possibility of knowledge) both to be consistent with the possibility of determinism holding at the level of physical law but to be incompatible with universal determinism; while the latter can't be true anyway.

So, I think TWOD is right to question the coherence of the idea that our beliefs can be determined by the past (in the sense that they would necessarily follow from the past "state of the universe" conjoined with deterministic laws). For sure, our beliefs can be strongly influenced or, to some extent "governed" by intelligible social or cultural or cognitive forces (e.g. strong sources of cognitive bias that social or evolutionary psychologists are studying). Those are conditioning forces, or hurdles, that fall short from absolving us from our cognitive responsibilities and hence, also, from negating our powers to acquire knowledge.

So, there are two sorts of deterministic forces that we are subjected to. Intelligible forces of the first kind (cultural/cognitive, etc.) are sources of bias in our abilities to judge, but they fall short from completely determining us. Our awareness of them doesn't lead to a justified sentiment of powerlessness, but, on the contrary, ought to raise our awareness of our cognitive responsibilities. We have the power to, and therefore are responsible for, defeating our own biases. And then there are sources of "determination" of our "behaviors" that are strict and inescapable. We can't violate the laws of physics, and those laws, in conjunction with the past (physical) "state" of the world govern what it is our physical "bodies" do and how our brains are configured. But the doctrine of universal determinism is incoherent because it attempts to lawfully bridge the gap between (physical) "body" and human bodies, between physical process and human behavior, between brain states and states of knowledge. But there are no such bridging laws. Physics and psychology disclose only partially overlapping empirical domains. The concept of a cause may also bridge them somewhat, but not in accordance with deterministic laws.

Agents, I would have thought, are rational animals and thus belong to the category of substance (ousia). A state is a particular determination (in one specific respect) of a substance. It is expressed by a predicate, whereas an agent is typically designated by a proper name (or demonstrative), and characterized as the sort of substance that it is by a "substance form" concept, (e.g. the concept of a human being). I don't know what it could possibly mean to say that agents are states. What would they be states of? — Pierre-Normand

Ah, but that is the metaphysical error which is at stake here. We cannot be of substance. Substance is constant. No matter what happens in the world, substance remains the same. In the chaos of ever changing, destroying and forming states of existence, substance doesn not move or alter. Substance is identical at all these moments (i.e. "the world," "the set" which is of all existing things). The distinction and change which is characterises states of existence cannot be found in substance. To say otherwise would be to argue that, for example, that my hand and my foot had the same identity as existing states. They don't. My existing hand and foot are always different. Substance cannot be an existing state. We (and everything else) are states of nothing.

The reverse of the common approach is true: substance is of states. Any existing state (whether a human emotion or a rock) exists on it own terms and expresses substance. Substance cannot have any form.

All the controversy over predicates and proper names is born out confusion about substance. Since we initially consider substance and then search for its form which defines and object, we limit the definition of any object (existing state) to what we say or name in that moment. Our reasoning about substance prevents us from considering objects on their own terms. We think there can't be an object which extends beyond what we say because, we think, there can be no object without us saying the form of substance.

If, on the other hand, we begin an object, all these problems disappear. Speaking meaning is no longer required for an object to exist. Form of an object becomes not a feature of existence (i.e. a form of substance) but rather an expression of the object (i.e. substance is of the object). Existing human aren't present by the concept of a human being. Instead, they are an existing state which expresses the concept of a human being. Agents are existing states which express the concept/meaning of awareness and reaction to their environment.

Speaking an name or a predicate is no longer required to define the object. Any object may have more than meaning than is spoken in a given name of predicate. Indeed, all objects have more meaning than is spoken in a name or predicate, for neither name or predicate amount to a description of every aspect and relation of an object. Sometimes there is even meaning which is not spoken about in a used language. There are an incalculable transfinite number of meanings we could speak about every object. The meaning expressed by any object extends beyond the description we give about it, in any and every case.

If your beliefs are the result of pre-determined causes beyond your control, they would be held by pure happenstance — Hanover

Read this claim over and over again until you realize that it's nonsense. I really don't want to discuss this, it's not what the thread is about and I never committed to metaphysical determinism anyway.

If your beliefs are the result of pre-determined causes beyond your control, they would be held by pure happenstance (i.e. it's just the way things are). — Hanover

How exactly are you planning on executing free will in this situation? This argument suggests free will must executed by one's present belief, such that one's beliefs weren't determined by a prior state of oneself. How then can states of myself prior to my present belief control that I hold the belief in the future? Free will becomes impossible. No matter what I think, my beliefs will always be of random whim. I would have no control over them because I couldn't take action prior to the belief which would cause myself have it in the future.

In other words: all our beliefs would be happenstance without determinism.

So, I think TWOD is right to question the coherence of the idea that our beliefs can be determined by the past (in the sense that they would necessarily follow from the past "state of the universe" conjoined with deterministic laws). For sure, our beliefs can be strongly influenced or, to some extent "governed" by intelligible social or cultural or cognitive forces (e.g. strong sources of cognitive bias that social or evolutionary psychologists are studying). Those are conditioning forces, or hurdles, that fall short from absolving us from our cognitive responsibilities and hence, also, from negating our powers to acquire knowledge.

So, there are two sorts of deterministic forces that we are subjected to. Intelligible forces of the first kind (cultural/cognitive, etc.) are sources of bias in our abilities to judge, but they fall short from completely determining us. Our awareness of them doesn't lead to a justified sentiment of powerlessness, but, on the contrary, ought to raise our awareness of our cognitive responsibilities. We have the power to, and therefore are responsible for, defeating our own biases. And then there are sources of "determination" of our "behaviors" that are strict and inescapable. We can't violate the laws of physics, and those laws, in conjunction with the past (physical) "state" of the world govern what it is our physical "bodies" do and how our brains are configured. But the doctrine of universal determinism is incoherent because it attempts to lawfully bridge the gap between (physical) "body" and human bodies, between physical process and human behavior, between brain states and states of knowledge. But there are no such bridging laws. Physics and psychology disclose only partially overlapping empirical domains. The concept of a cause may also bridge them somewhat, but not in accordance with deterministic laws. — Pierre-Normand

I’m afraid to say this rather missies my point. Under my argument, there is only one sort of determining force: existing things causing other existing things, whether those things involves the expression of “laws of physics (e.g. rocks failing to the ground)” or “cognitive responsibility (e.g. whether or not someone understands that a group of people have particular right or not).“ All that’s different between these deterministic relationships is the states of existence involved and their differing expressions.


We can break the “laws of physics.” All it would take is a change in causal relationship (e.g. nearby masses react to stay in the same spot unless acted on by an outside force) between existing objects. In this sense, the world is no more “restricted” then our own behaviour. It’s just the objects which are us, as far as we have observed, are caused to express certain meanings more often than we’ve seen the world breaking present “laws of physics.” The behaviours we end up taking are, in fact, inescapable, in every case. We can no more violate what we end up doing than the path of a rock falling to the ground. Our bodies and decisions are “physical” in nature (similarly, “laws of physics” are just as "escapable," as QM alludes to; how the world works might change at any moment) .


Like all sorts of other systems in nature, they are cause of action we end up taking. Physics and psychology are overlapping empirical domains by definition: both involve the existence of humans states responding to the world around them. They are about the same objects. Indeed, the causation of “cognitive responsibility” involves the relationships of the “laws of physics” (reactions within the body and to the environment, chemicals, molecules, atoms, etc.,etc. )”

“Universal (pre)determinism” is about something else entirely. It’s not about trying to bridge the gap between humans and the rest of the world. Rather, it’s about trying to say some state of the world is logically necessary on the grounds of another, such that we could merely look at the position of an atom and tell everything that would ever exist. Without, you know, actually ever observing or even knowing anything about a future state of the world. The goal is to say that, logically, because X (X on its own), Y must be. It’s actually about possibility rather than the determination of any state. “Universal (pre)determinism” is about claiming there are no possible outcomes, in favour of saying there is a logically necessary one. Its problem is it attempts to talk about future caused events while denying they can be (as there are no possible outcomes) entirely.

I’m afraid to say this rather missies my point. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, I must acknowledge that I had (mis)understood your argument to be much simpler than it actually is. But you are working from metaphysical assumptions so radically different from those I am relying on that it is difficult to meaningfully engage; though we may, of course, try.

“Universal (pre)determinism” is about claiming an absence of possibility. It's problem is it tries to talk about events while denying they can be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Don't you mean that it is a claim about the absence of alternative possibilities (alternative to what is actual, that is)? I would rather say that determinism is the doctrine according to which, given the "state of the universe" at any time (and the laws of nature), then there is just one state that the universe can possibly be in at any other given time. Of course, this means that what will in fact occur necessarily will occur given what was the case in the past (or given what is the case now). This doesn't entails actualism (i.e. the idea that only the actual is possible, and hence that possibility entails actuality) since one can still maintain, as compatibilists do, that many future outcomes are possible conditionally on whatever state one (and the universe) might possibly be in at earlier times. Only if the "initial state of the universe" is the only initial state possible, does determinism entail actualism.

I avoided that suggestion deliberately. Yes, it is true that many of these arguing "Universal (pre)determinism envision the are talking about the absence of alternative possibilities, but how does this make sense? To say something is a possible event is to speak of context where the future is not yet defined. That's why a suggested outcome is a "possible" outcome, as opposed to "The Outcome."

(Pre)determinism only has "The Outcome." At no point is what is yet to happen undefined such that it makes sense to speak of possible event(s). Under (pre)determinism, there is only the actual (states as will exist). Since everything is defined by an initial point alone, there are no possible outcomes to play in the world. Effectively, all events are subsumed into the one initial event. The presence of the initial event (supposedly) defines the presence of all existence events, logically collapsing the identity of every state into the initial one. This is obviously nonsensical as each state is it's own logical identity. For there to be one state, say a Big Bang, it doesn't define the presence of anything else. If there is to be a universe of plants and galaxies, it take those objects to exist. (Pre)determinism (and its assorted concepts, such as Lapace's demon) is logically incoherent and we are right to reject it.

Determinism is a different question though. What do we mean by it? Well, we are essentially saying that one state will exist after another. Cause and effect. That for each state of the world, there will only be one particular outcome which occurs, regardless of what happens. In other words: we are talking about the actual. To talk about determinism is to speak not of possibility, but rather of the logical expression of the actual. The events that actually happen after one another, to which there can be no challenge or alternative.

Where (pre)determinism goes wrong is failing to realise that determinism is about the actual. Instead, they take the actual and misread it as having consequences for possibility. Supposedly, the fact there is only ever one actual outcome means there were no possible events, as if it didn't take each state in its own moment to define the actual. This is a category error. The possible is not the actual. Possibility is what might happen. The actual is what does happen. They cannot touch each other. What actually happens has no effect on what is possible. One set of events occurring doesn't mean other outcomes are not possible. It just means they didn't happen. Possibility is always concurrent with the actual.

If we properly understand the possible and the actual, what we get is a wholly deterministic world in which anything is possible. The actual turns form being the opposite of possibility to an instance which is possible. All this handwringing over whether events are "deterministic" or not is revealed to a waste of time build on a fundamental misunderstanding of the possible and actual. The question doesn't make sense. It is not a question of finding evidence and proving a deterministic link.

Since any event is actual, it is necessarily determined, not by "the initial state," but by causes prior to it. Any event is also, by definition, one possible instance of what might happen, so it is one instance of a possible outcome. Logic tells us that both determinism and possibility are logically necessary.

I avoided that suggestion deliberately. Yes, it is true that many of these arguing "Universal (pre)determinism envision the are talking about the absence of alternative possibilities, but how does this make sense? To say something is a possible event is to speak of context where the future is not yet defined. That's why a suggested outcome is a "possible" outcome, as opposed to "The Outcome." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Here I am going to agree with the compatibilist for the sake of argument. I don't know, myself, what to make of the claim that there is one well defined "state of the universe" (a state of the universe, that is, that I am inhabiting presently) such that this state is actual and, conditionally to its being actual, the laws of physics ensure that there only is one possible future unfolding of events. But the compatibilist believes that she can live happily with this idea and I am going to follow through on her reasons for believing that she can be free in such a deterministic universe.

The important distinction for the compatibilist to make is the distinction between (1) what is, in a sense historically necessary, from the standpoint of her historicized and embodied circumstances in the world and (2) what it is up to her to chose to do in those very same circumstances. Such historically necessary circumstances don't consist in whatever determines the "present state of the universe", which is something necessarily inaccessible to her limited perspective as a rational agent, but rather what it is about her past history (and the history of her world) that constrains the range of things she can do conditionally to her seeing to it that she will do them. For instance, her historical circumstances can make it impossible that she will get to work on time if her work shift begins in two minutes and her workplace is 50 miles away. But if her work shift begins in two hours and she has access to suitable means of transportation, then it may be (mostly) up to her whether she will get to work in time. There are thus many options that are open possibilities from the standpoint of her deliberative perspective as a rational agent, and it is precisely the availability of those several options that constitute, according to compatibilism, her freedom to get to work in time (or be late intentionally).

The hard determinist will argue that in the case where the agent takes the means necessary to get to work in time, then it was in fact historically necessary that she would have done so, and hence her belief that there were other options available to her, which she had while she was deliberating what to do, was an illusory belief. An impartial observer who would have been better apprised of the agent's "circumstances" (including every details of her cognitive states), and of every constraints that the laws of physics entail, would have known that the agent could only have gotten to work in time.

The broadly correct response that the compatibilist can make to the hard determinist, it seems to me, is that the latter is conflating two distinct ranges of historical possibility that hold relative to two distinct agential perspectives. Maybe the "observer", from her own stance, can see that the agent is bound to get to work in time. But that's because her perspective encompasses the fact that the agent is (or will come to be) motivated to get to work in time. From the perspective of the agent, however, her own motivations aren't part of the circumstances that are constraining her action. They are rather part of what she is. So long as those two perspective (i.e. the observer's and the agent's) are properly kept separate, then the fact that from the point of view of the observer the first agent was bound to get to work in time (and thus that it was impossible that she would have gotten to work late) has no bearing on the range of possible outcomes that are genuinely open to her (and hence possible) relative to her own deliberative perspective -- a practical perspective, that is, from within which her own motivations don't constitute external constraints.

In light of those considerations, I just wanted to make clear that the specific feature of the compatibilist account that I am agreeing with is that the idea of a singular outcome that is necessary conditionally to the universe being in a determinate state in the past (or present) of the agent has no bearing on the range of possible courses of actions that this agent can possibly take, consistently with historical necessity, from the point of view of her own deliberative perspective. But I hold, in addition, that there doesn't exist any such perspective, practical, theoretical, or of any other kind (not even in the mind of God) from which our universe can be said to exist in a definite state; though I haven't argued for this here. Any necessity that is knowable or intelligible to us always has the shape of historical necessity -- and hence there doesn't exist any perspective from which freedom is totally absent.

The way you describe "pre-determinism" and "determinism" they are the same. You are confusing yourself over the ideas of actuality and possibility, it seems to me.

I agree that the idea of universal determinism (which is logically equivalent to TWOD's "predeterminism", although he doesn't seem to see that) is flawed (and utterly unwarrantable).

The problem, as I see it, is that the idea we have of causation is that it is rigid, which leads to this idea of inescapable universal determinism as per 'Laplace's Demon'. This is sometimes expressed as the notion that everything that has happened was rigidly determined (in other words, predetermined) at the Big Bang.

I also think that the libertarian idea of free will is logically incompatible with this rigid notion of predetermination. Free will as absence of coercion seems obviously compatible even with hard determinism, but then, under its aegis, as TGW argues we are really forced to do everything we do, real freedom is then an utter illusion and it then just becomes a question of "of what are we free and by what are we forced?" (as if it could really matter if that really were the situation).

I think the problem is that we have this rigid notion of causation on the one hand and on the other we have the idea that we do and believe things for reasons. The two ideas are utterly incompatible, we have no idea of how to map them onto one another. That is why I agree with Hanover that the idea of rigid determinism completely undermines the idea of doing or believing anything for any reasons. People who want to maintain a belief in both of these ideas simultaneously, wriggle and squirm every which way, but to no avail. Personally, I can see no reason not to believe in freedom, (I think it's actually practically impossible not to assume it) but I also think it is unanalyzable; I don't think it is possible to understand how it is related to, or compatible with, indeterminism; but it would seem that, somehow, it must be at least compatible with it.

They are the same with respect to the idea of future outcomes being necessary by an initial state. I used "(pre)determinism" for exactly that reason. My point being that such a notion of determinism is really a position that poses future states are defined by a prior initial state.

I was drawing the distinction between this and "determinism" as it actually makes sense. Rather confusing "(pre)determinism" with determinism, I'm specifying a distinction which allows us to understand the incoherence of "(pre)determinism" while also grasping the deterministic (that there is only one set of actual events of the world) nature of the world. You are ignoring the language I'm using (I agree "(pre)determinism" is the same as the "determinism" you are talking about; that's part of my point) and strawmanning my argument here.

I think the problem is that we have this rigid notion of causation on the one hand and on the other we have the idea that we do and believe things for reasons. The two ideas are utterly incompatible, we have no idea of how to map them onto one another. — John

What is it then, in the version of compatibilism that I have sketched in my recent posts, that you find unsatisfying? Is it just a matter of it merely being counterintuitive? We both agree that the doctrine of universal determinism is reliant on a flawed conception of causality (and, I also think, correlatively, to a flawed conception of "universal" laws of nature). And this is the reason why I don't fully endorse compatibilism. But it nevertheless seems to me that the compatibilist account of freedom is partially right inasmuch as it dislodges a faulty assumption shared by hard incompatibilists and many libertarians alike, and this flawed assumption is the intuition that freedom requires that some strong form of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) be true (as I explained recently). The hard incompatibilists and (many) libertarians all are incompatibilists precisely because they believe there to be such a requirement for freedom and they take universal determinism to preclude this strong version of the PAP.

That is why I agree with Hanover that the idea of rigid determinism completely undermines the idea of doing or believing anything for any reasons. People who want to maintain a belief in both of these ideas simultaneously, wriggle and squirm every which way, but to no avail. Personally, I can see no reason not to believe in freedom, (I think it's actually practically impossible not to assume it) but I also think it is unanalyzable; I don't think it is possible to understand how it is related to, or compatible with, indeterminism; but it would seem that, somehow, it must be at least compatible with it.

I also wonder why you believe there to be a difficulty in combining freedom with indeterminism (where "indeterminism" is understood simply as the negation of universal determinism). Is it troublesome that our actions wouldn't have sufficient causes? Such an alleged requirement (which may be derived from Donald Davidson's idea of the nomological character of causality) is something that you seem to be granting (as do I) as stemming from a flawed conception of causality. Hence, it doesn't seem to threaten freedom, in my view, because it isn't entailed by ordinary conceptions of the explanation of beliefs and actions that trace them back to intelligible causes -- episodes of practical or theoretical reasoning/deliberation -- that explain them but fall short from being sufficient causes (i.e. antecedent circumstances that necessitate their effects).

I don't understand what you mean by saying that determinism is a position that asserts that subsequent states are "defined by" prior states.

As I understand, it determinism is a position that asserts that subsequent states are necessitated by prior states.

Do you mean 'necessitated' when you use 'defined' or something else?

A prisoner escaping from jail is no longer restricted. — darthbarracuda

I've only read several comments on the first page. I just thought that I'd stop by to briefly state that I think that the above analogy does a good job at highlighting the rather obvious flaw in TGW's reasoning about life after childbirth.

Indeed, I mean (pre)determinism suggests that prior states necessitate future ones. That's it's error. Prior states cannot perform such an action because they do not amount to the presence of any future state. Anything could be after any given state. All it takes is the right state of existence. Possiblties only become actualised when the FUTURE event happens. In causal relationships, the effect state plays as much of a role in defining what occurs as the cause state.

If rocks didn't fall to the ground when dropped, the CAUSE of opening one's hand to drop rocks would not exist. The necessary only makes sense when the past and future are taken together. If there is only the prior state, we have only half the equation. I would exist letting go of rocks. But then what happens? No-one knows. It isn't even defined in the world. It could be anything. The rock might suddenly cease to be. It might fly up in to the sky. It might fall to the ground. It might float and start making sounds. My letting go of the rock necessitates nothing. Only when the specific EFFECT from the cause happens is the necessary(the actual) defined. For all instances of prior states possibility is maintained. States which follow could be one of any number of possible outcomes, regardless of what nessesary outcome (the actual) occurs.

What is it then, in the version of compatibilism that I have sketched in my recent posts, that you find unsatisfying? — Pierre-Normand

Pierre, sorry about the delay responding. As it seems to me you have given an account, in your post 175, which differentiates between two different conceptions of "historical necessity" based on two different perspectives; the first and third person perspectives.

You have posited an ideal observer that can see every motivation of the agent and all the laws of physics and can thus predict precisely what will inevitably happen. And you have posited a less than ideal agent who cannot see her every motivation and presumably cannot see the laws of physics and so cannot predict what will inevitably happen. This is just like Spinoza's example of the stone rolling down the hill (or flying through the air?) which, if it could experience as we do would feel itself free in its rolling (or flying?).

What this comes down to is that we feel that we are free only by virtue of the limitations of our knowledge of the factors determining what we do. The determinist will say that we are thus not really free at all, that our freedom is an illusion. But the compatibilist seem to want to argue, not that we are really not free and merely feel we are, but that our genuine freedom is compatible with our being really determined. Now, I would agree that, within a scenario where we posit that we are really rigidly determined to do everything we do, that fact would be compatible with the fact that we would nonetheless be determined to think that we are free, and I think this would be the correct conclusion, but I don't think it is what the compatibilist really wants to argue.

I also wonder why you believe there to be a difficulty in combining freedom with indeterminism (where "indeterminism" is understood simply as the negation of universal determinism). Is it troublesome that our actions wouldn't have sufficient causes? — Pierre-Normand

I think that genuine freedom can only be "combined" with indeterminism (insofar as we can think real freedom (as we conceive it) as being genuinely and generally logically compatible in principle with indeterminism and not with determinism; my point was only that we should not expect to be ever able to give an exhaustive or even satisfying account of how freedom is possible.

I think you are equivocating between what would be the case, as it is conceived, under rigid determinism and what would seem to us due to our limited knowledge of determining factors just as with the Spinoza example I gave above.

What would be the real case if rigid determinism were true would be the ontological or metaphysical reality and what we could know would be the epistemological 'reality for us'. This is just to say that your fact that 'present states do not define future states' is just a formulation, which is based on our necessary ignorance, of the illusion that present states do not determine (which would be to necessitate) future states . As I said to Pierre above, I don't think this is what compatibilists are wanting to argue.

In other words: all our beliefs would be happenstance without determinism. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Substitute the term "belief" with X and I agree with what you're saying in a very global way. Everything would be happenstance without determinism, including all your judgments and beliefs.

Determinism leads to happenstance as well.

This means that neither determinism nor indeterminism offers a meaningful way for free will to exist. The idea of free will is incoherent under both the determinist (whether a compatibilist or hard determinist) and the libertarian (indeterminate) account of free will. Either your decisions are based upon the pre-existing causes or they are based upon random events that are uncaused.

Free will is therefore a mystical sort of uncaused cause that expresses the decision of the decision maker without reference to how the decision was reached. It assumes that a variety of factors can be considered by the agent, but which should prevail and result in the ultimate decision are never determined and fully uncaused.

By the same token, if one were to accept this position, one is led to admitting a sort of solipsism, where nothing can really be known other than that you exist in some sort of confused state. And so I simply hold to the general idea that the acceptance of the existence of free will is a necessary precondition for interacting with the world and understanding reality at any level. It must be accepted superficially because any attempt to clarify it will lead to incoherence.

That's what I've been saying all along.

Determinism is not about metaphysical actors. It cannot be. One state causing other involves states of existence. It’s an empirical question. Causality. Rigid determinism is incoherent because substitutes in the metaphysical (logic, necessity) where states of the world should be (not necessary, existing moments).

The compatbilist’s point is determinism has freedom. Rigid determinism’s error is not in arguing there will be only one outcome which occurs, but rather in suggesting that fact eliminates possibility and freedom. Only when the specific outcome occurs is the one set of events which occur defined. Here freedom is about far more than merely our limited knowledge. Since the outcome is absent, we lack not only the knowledge of what happens, but there is no necessity that any given outcome will occur. It isn’t defined in existence yet. The specific causal(deterministic) relationship hasn’t emerged. There is no effect. Not only can we not speak of any casual relationship, but it isn't expressed in existence yet. Here the past state hasn’t caused anything. Our freedom isn’t an illusion.

Spinoza is actually attacking libertarian free will with that example, not our freedom. The illusion he is talking about is the idea of us sitting outside casualty (determinism). If we knew what was going to happen in the future (knowledge of causes, what’s determined), we could tell what was going to happen in the future. There would no longer be any uncertainty about what would happen. Indeed, this uncertainty is entirely a feature of our lack of knowledge. There has always been one determined outcome which will occur. We just don’t realise it when we lack knowledge of what’s determined. What is at stake here is not freedom, but the uncertainty of future existing states.

Indeed, you are correct that the compatbilist’s is not saying freedom is merely an illusion. But you are also dismissing their argument by rejecting what they mean when they talk about freedom and determinism. Instead of addressing the argument they are making, you are prescribing what they are saying must mean the same as argument for “rigid determinism” and its understanding of freedom. You are stuck using the language the compatbilist is deliberately leaving behind because it is inadequate.

Your problem is you are treating free will like its a state of existence. It's actually a logical expression of our states of decision. We can't point any moment in time which is a state of "free will." States involved in the casual relationship of decision making are always instance of a thought (e.g. "I will make a post) or other states of the body (e.g. someone's fear response). Free will is what is means for us to knowingly cause are future actions in someway (which is why it's so linked with our awareness). It's not any one state of the world. Free will isn't a cause. It's the meaning that one has caused their actions through a state of awakeners of themselves.

Either your decisions are based upon the pre-existing causes or they are based upon random events that are uncaused. — Hanover

That's a false dichotomy. All events are actually a question of both pre-existing states and randomness. Each events follows what came before. Any future events is born form some pre-existing state. No state in our world is given without pre-existing states.

Yet, it is also true that any pre-existing state, on it's own, does not defined a future outcome (and what is caused). So if we take any pre-existing state on its own, the future outcome is, indeed, random and uncaused. Without the definition of the specific effect and so the casual relationship, it entirely undefined what a future outcome will be.

Consider a book on the table. If no events which follow it are defined, nothing points to what will follow the state. It could be anything. From this position, anything which follows it will be random and uncaused, for there is no rule or law sets what it will be. Why was this state followed by someone picking-up the book than not? Well, it just so happened a person who picked-up the book existed. There's no determining reason. It just so happened it was determined a person who picked up the book would be there rather than not. Underneath all the deterministic relationships, existence is arbitrary and random.