[Dawkins] has chosen materialism out of the range of equally valid ideologies — Inter Alia
I still don't feel like anyone has answered, why? All that's happened is there's been a robust proof that naturalism is just an ideology like any other, so? What is then wrong with choosing it as often as we like and following the moral implications of doing so? — Inter Alia
"I perceive something" still presupposes realism (that the something exists). "I experience an internal sensation, one I've come to associate with perceiving something" is a description that does not assume Realism. It is obvious then that whilst you're not looking, that experience goes away, it comes back when you start looking again. This does not tell us anything about the laptop whilst you weren't looking, but it doesn't tell us anything about the laptop whilst you were looking either. Unless we relate the experience to the existence of an object outside of our minds the issue with closing your eyes and opening them again is an unnecessary distraction. The question is simply, does the experience relate to a thing outside of your mind? — Inter Alia
, every instinct in your body would be crying out to tell you that £300 of equipment is about to be nicked. — Inter Alia
Begs the question! — Wayfarer
ideology is just the kind of thing that the sceptic ought to avoid. — Wayfarer
as philosophical naturalism now occupies a similar role in culture to that previously occupied by religion in the sense of being a normative belief system, then it is also deserving of scepticism — Wayfarer
Are my instincts a reliable guide to reality? — PossibleAaran
I am quite confident that this is a wholly unreliable means of belief formation. — PossibleAaran
What does not having an ideology look like. — Inter Alia
So the question is not can they be trusted, but can anything else be trusted more? — Inter Alia
When I look at the stick immersed in water my instincts urge me to believe that it is bent, before I learn that it isn't. — PossibleAaran
“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”. — javra
Begs the question!
— Wayfarer
Care to explain how? — Inter Alia
That's the question I've been trying to address here. What does not having an ideology look like. What sort of things would Dawkins do differently if he didn't have an ideology? — Inter Alia
recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues. — ff0
to say that his choice of materialism amounts to one amongst 'a range of equally valid ideologies', assumes what it sets out to prove - which is the precise meaning of 'begging the question'. — Wayfarer
Presumably he would stick to science instead of engaging in anti-religious polemics. — Wayfarer
in practical terms, that a sceptical philosophy ought to try and avoid dogmatic creeds and rigid ideologies. — Wayfarer
But do you have a better one? — Inter Alia
But why is the bent stick the illusion and the unbent stick the reality? I suggest because the unbent stick is what figures in the total practical context. Optical illusions are illusions, it seems to me, because they aren't something we can generally build on. We are future oriented beings. We make plans. It's in terms of these plans that we care about seeing a situation 'accurately' (usefully, enjoyably). If we weren't future-oriented beings who work and suffer now to avoid more work and more suffering later, we might not bother with doubt. In my view, recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues. — ff0
But I don't believe you did 'already tell me'. This argument about taking a picture is a new argument introduced with this post, is it not? — PossibleAaran
At any rate, this isn't all that clear. What exactly does taking the picture prove? So at this moment, T1, I am perceiving something. I close my eyes at T2. Does that which I perceived when my eyes were open still exist when unperceived? I take a picture with my eyes closed at T3. When I open them at T4, I can see on the camera a picture which 'looks just like' that which I experienced with my eyes open. What is the evidence we have at this stage? Well I remember perceiving something at T1 and I remember taking a picture at T3, and I am currently perceiving something else (namely, the picture which looks like what I perceived at T1, on a camera screen) at T4. These three bits of evidence don't logically entail that something existed unperceived and which the camera took a picture of. — PossibleAaran
I know at this point you will likely complain that they do entail it, because cameras take pictures of things and they can't take pictures of things which don't exist. So if I really did take a picture of something at T3, it follows that the thing I took a picture of existed unperceived at that time. But now it is clear that this whole language of the camera 'taking pictures of things' assumes that Realism is true and hence begs the question. — PossibleAaran
In other words, it is an interpretation of the evidence to suggest that I took a picture of something which existed unperceived at T3 and that thing is what I have a picture of at T4. — PossibleAaran
The experiences I have at T1-T4 do not entail that interpretation. We should describe the evidence neutrally, in a way that doesn't just assume that something existed at T3 of which I took a picture. If we do that then the evidence I have is that I perceive something at T1, then I close my eyes at T2, then I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound, then at T4 I perceive a picture of something which looks like the thing I perceived at T1. None of that entails that things exist unperceived, so how do you cogently infer that things exist unperceived from this data? This would be an intriguing argument, if you could fill the details in. — PossibleAaran
This is the 2nd time you have accused me of this conflation. I am well aware of the difference, which Moore pointed out, between the experience of something and the object of the experience. I am not sure I even used those words in my last post. At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. This was also the reason I spoke of the 'object of my experience'. The 'object', as I was thinking of it, is merely that which I see. I see a black, rectangular thing with a slightly lighter front face. What I don't see, is the property of unperceived existence, which is why if the thing I perceive really has that property, I can only reliably tell that this is so by inference. — PossibleAaran
I'm not talking about how he got his job, I'm talking about why there is a movement within epistemology to take his views seriously, but not those of our delusional Nelson. Lots of other people believing him is a perfectly good reason to conclude he's probably not mad, it's also a perfectly good explanation of how he got his job, it is not an epistemological argument. — Inter Alia
Is this strictly relevant? We began looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived. You suggest instinct and I replied by saying that pure instinct is unreliable. You now ask me whether I have a more reliable method than instinct to suggest. — PossibleAaran
I've made this case in previous threads. There is not room enough or time to make it here. — T Clark
Is there some way you could provide links to these threads, the case for what benefits alternatives to Realism bring is exactly what I've been asking about. See my post above for how I think it links to the question here. — Inter Alia
Nope, not getting any of that, are you saying it isn't a valid ideology, or it isn't one amongst many? — Inter Alia
If he's not allowed to speak against religion because he is a scientist then who is. — Inter Alia
You need to decide whether to use contraception or not, Catholicism sounds a bit like a dogmatic creed to me so we ignore what the Pope says about it, but hang on, those who suggest religion is a load of nonsense are now dogmatic too, so maybe we should listen to the Pope, what does the skeptic do? — Inter Alia
We might well conclude that we can't trust our eyes or that materialism might not encompass all there is, I'd entirely agree, but it's a very big leap from that to "the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism." and "Naturalism has far too easy a time these days...". — Inter Alia
Maybe people feel it's too off topic, but the question was "what is Skepticism?" and I'd say the simple answer would be it is exactly that quality that virtually every single human already displays, no-one is 100% certain of anything, deep down. Which means what we're really talking about is "are people skeptical enough?", as revealed by the two quotes I've cited above. To answer this we must first answer "enough for what?". — Inter Alia
It comes down to this: what reason do you have to suspect that things could possibly exist that to all appearances seem like normal physical things, except that they pop out of existence when they're not being perceived? — gurugeorge
But, being the default position is not really a very good reason to keep thinking something, in fact it's a rubbish reason unless there is no better alternative, in which case it becomes an excellent reason for continuing to believe something. — Inter Alia
Well, if I were to say that some experience is an 'illusion', I wouldn't mean that the experience 'isn't one that I can build on'. What I would mean is that the thing which I experience does not exist unperceived. If I say that the bent stick I perceive is an illusion, what I mean is that the bent stick doesn't exist unperceived. And to add to this that 'what really exists is an unbent stick', is to add that an unbent stick exists unperceived. That's what I would mean by those words, at any rate. I certainly wouldn't mean anything merely pragmatic. — PossibleAaran
It is true that classical physical theories assume that things exist unperceived, but this is hardly a justification of that claim. — PossibleAaran
The theories predict that 'if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences'. What would those consequences be? It seems like the hypothesis that things only exist when perceived has all of the same predictive consequences as the hypothesis that they exist also unperceived. Perhaps I have missed something. But if so, it would be good to be clear about what. — PossibleAaran
I am not sure what the point of this is. Are you merely insisting that the word 'scepticism' describes your position and your position only? If so, that ignores the evident fact that philosophers have used the word 'scepticism' to refer to many different things. I am not sure why you insist on it being used in only your sense. — PossibleAaran
instead of arguing for WHY materialism is ‘equally valid’, you’re simply assuming it. Hence, begging the question. — Wayfarer
all I am saying (and very many of his critics agree 1, 2) is that he makes a hash of it, because he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. — Wayfarer
what is the advantage of believing Realism as opposed to Idealism? — PossibleAaran
Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism? — Inter Alia
Here's a link to a discussion of the Tao vs. objective reality. I just went back and reread a few posts. I remember how much I enjoyed the discussion. — T Clark
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