What does it mean to say that something is physical or not?

Janus

Many people seem to be very concerned about the ontological status of things which we ordinarily think of as 'mental'. I sometimes wonder whether that is because it is (perhaps even unconsciously?) felt that their ontological status has some implications for religious belief, and most especially belief in an afterlife.

Perhaps we say that things are immaterial or intangible simply because we cannot see, hear, touch, smell or taste them. The idea that something is non-physical might mean something quite different; for example that it cannot be understood in terms of physics, even in principle. Is the notion that something is not materials the same as the idea that it is not physical?

So, it may be that we often say things are not physical ( when we really mean 'material') simply because they are not immediate objects of the senses. On the other hand there might be a dualistic metaphysics implicit in such statements.If one wants to say that there are non-physical things; would this necessarily imply dualism? I have heard people say that non-physical things do not exist but they are nonetheless real. Is this a valid or coherent distinction? Why or why not would you say it is, or is not, valid or coherent? If we want to say (some) non-physical things (meaning things which can be completely independent of the physical) are real, do we really know what we are saying?

There is more I could say, but that'll do for now. I'd like to hear what others think about this subject, which is a puzzling one, because it seems to skate on the thin ice of incoherence, and yet notwithstanding that it is apparently most compelling (you only need to look at the number of posts such topics attract) . I'm actually most interested in why people choose to believe one or the other, and also whether religious faith of whatever stripe is necessarily (not historically) more aligned with one position than with the other.

Wayfarer

Physical = defined in terms of physics.

There have been times when that was thought to be straightforward. Not so much now, though.

Wayfarer

↪Πετροκότσυφας

I mean, ‘what is physical’ are the objects, forces, and related phenomena, that are the subject of analysis and investigation by physics.

Wayfarer

↪Πετροκότσυφας

you mean, defining physicalism in terms of physics is circular? You have a better idea?

Wayfarer

Physics being ‘the science of the physical’.

Wayfarer

I’m answering the question the OP title poses :-}

What it means to say ‘something is physical’ is to say that it is what is defined or studied by physics.

Sorry if I’m unable to accommodate all reading ages.

Janus

↪Wayfarer

If things which cannot be understood in terms of physics are non-physical, then animals must be non-physical, since biology cannot be reduced to physics. Also what do you think is meant when it is said that things are immaterial?

Noble Dust

If one wants to say that there are non-physical things; would this necessarily imply dualism? — Janus

I don't think so. The problem for me is that the dualism/monism distinction is unessisary; it's an illusion. This actually relates somewhat to the thread I just started; the idea that there are non-physical things doesn't automatically assume hard dualism; there's no reason to assume that physical reality and a non-physical reality can never interact. A two dimensional drawing is apprehended in three dimensional space, within time. There's no reason to assume that the chain of apprehension stops there. As to whether a higher dimension would be physical and scientifically observable, my knowledge stops there, but I can imagine the strict lines of dualism/monism becoming blurred if science ever reaches out further than that. I also don't discount the possibility of something higher reaching down instead. It seems totally plausible to me.

Janus

the idea that there are non-physical things doesn't automatically assume hard dualism; there's no reason to assume that physical reality and a non-physical reality can never interact. — Noble Dust

This highlights the problem for me, though; because on the one hand you say dualism is not implied, and on the other you seem to be assuming there are two realities which interact with one another.

Noble Dust

↪Janus

I said hard dualism; my understanding is that's a Kantian dualism where the two can never interact, but correct me if I'm wrong. But I'm saying a "soft" dualism could exist where the two interact; oil and water poured into the same glass will interact, although they'll never congeal. But the two will affect change in one another.

I don't necessarily even subscribe to that, but I think it's plausible. What makes more sense to me is a concept that transcends the dualism/monism distinction, which I think of as generative; spirit giving stillborn birth to the physical world. I've talked about that before.

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

I think that's actually an argument against materialism, though. What other definition can even be given?

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

So what's a definition of physical that isn't circular?

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

So defining "physical" is misguided because it suggests dualism? I assume you have a different reason to deny dualism, then? Otherwise, if no definition of physical can be given, I would assume that would open up the possibility for dualism.

Janus

I said hard dualism; my understanding is that's a Kantian dualism where the two can never interact, but correct me if I'm wrong. — Noble Dust

In Kant's system appearances (phenomena) are appearances of things in themselves; so, for Kant we do perceive things in themselves, not as they are in themselves, but as appearances. It is an epistemological, not an ontological, distinction. Kant scholars argue over whether Kant meant to present a 'two aspect' or a two world' theory. I think the distinction between 'aspects' and 'worlds' is not really that significant. If things in themselves are not known to us as they are in themselves, but only as appearances, then these just are the two aspects of things in themselves.

But, if, for us there is a world of things in themselves as they are in themselves that we cannot know, and a world of things in themselves as they appear to us, then for us there are (epistemologically speaking) two worlds. But this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, and thus should not lead us to conclude, that there are, ontologically speaking, two worlds.

Noble Dust

But, if, for us there is a world of things in themselves as they are in themselves that we cannot know, and a world of things in themselves as they appear to us, then for us there are (epistemologically speaking) two worlds. But this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, and thus should not lead us to conclude, that there are, ontologically speaking, two worlds. — Janus

So in this case, knowledge of the two worlds is impossible, but it doesn't mean they don't exist?

Noble Dust

What is misguided is the debate, since it obviously cannot give a coherent account of its terms (i.e. the physical and the mental). — Πετροκότσυφας

As far as I can see, if defining the mental or the physical will always be circular, then I'm not sure what we can define, since the most immediate human experience is the mental, and then the physical. I'm curious what you're getting at here; are you just trying to say that we can't define anything?

Janus

So in this case, knowledge of the two worlds is impossible, but it doesn't mean they don't exist? — Noble Dust

I would say there is only one world, which we know, not in itself, but as it appears to us, and that it exists both as it appears and as it is in itself.

bloodninja

Either we define physics in terms of its object (the physical), or vice versa, the question of what is physical has not been given any content. It remains vacuous. — Πετροκότσυφας

I think you're onto something interesting here. It is vacuous in a way. In a way not. I think the apparent circularity is between the empirical science (physics) and its empirical object (the physical). I think this is only apparent however. Maybe the science of physics and its physical objects aren't defined in terms of each other but each depend upon a prior ontological disclosure of the world as physical. This world disclosure is not empirical, but purely ontological.

Heidegger often points out that the various "ontic" sciences all presuppose an ontology. He said somewhere that Newton's laws didn't exist before Newton. A tricky thought. The above paragraph is what he meant, I suspect.

Janus

↪bloodninja

What about the question I asked earlier though? If the physical is defined as that which is susceptible to being understood in the terms of physics, then animals (and possibly plants) cannot rightly be thought to be physical.

Maybe the science of physics and its physical objects aren't defined in terms of each other but each depend upon a prior ontological disclosure of the world as physical. This world disclosure is not empirical, but purely ontological. — bloodninja

I don't think Heidegger would agree with framing the disclosure of the world which is Dasein as "physical".

bloodninja

↪Janus

Are you equivocating here?

Noble Dust

↪Janus

I think I somewhat agree; what you're saying is mostly what I mean by generative. I just like that word better because it seems more elegant. But I can understand why Kant's terms could be more useful.

But again, this state of affairs doesn't rule out the possibility of knowledge of the world in itself.

Janus

↪bloodninja

That's a very ambiguous question.

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

That clarifies things. So what do you think we can define, then?

Janus

But again, this state of affairs doesn't rule out the possibility of knowledge of the world in itself. — Noble Dust

That's true; we do have knowledge of the world in itself: as it appears to us.

Noble Dust

↪Janus

But why not the experience of the world itself?

Janus

↪Noble Dust

Well, yes, it is the experience of the world in itself; but, by mere definition it cannot be experience of the world as it is in itself. The 'for us' and the 'in itself' is a logical distinction that circumscribes our epistemic limits, according to Kant.

gurugeorge

↪Janus

Generally speaking, I think non-physical things that are real are mostly patterns, relatively stable patterns of behaviour, of interaction, etc., of physical things.

Physical things are things that are amenable to perceptual cognition, or perceptual cognition via scientific instruments.

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

We can define more or less everything, except "physical" and "mental"? Two of the most fundamental concepts?

I acknowledge that the more fundamental the concept, the harder to define. But I think that difficulty warrants the effort to make the attempt. So I disagree with you because you seem to be saying that it's not worth attempting to define the most difficult things to define. Maybe at this point I'm just nit-picking. I'm exploring, just like you are.

Noble Dust

↪Πετροκότσυφας

Edit: and actually, if we can't define the most fundamental concepts, then how can we define the less fundamental ones?

Noble Dust

Well, yes, it is the experience of the world in itself; but, by mere definition it cannot be experience of the world as it is in itself. The 'for us' and the 'in itself' is a logical distinction that circumscribes our epistemic limits, according to Kant. — Janus

I get that that's what is according to Kant, but I'm saying, in disagreement with Kant, why can't we experience the world as it is in itself?

Edited for clarity thanks to Kant's thorny wording.

bloodninja

If the physical is defined as that which is susceptible to being understood in the terms of physics, then animals (and possibly plants) cannot rightly be thought to be physical. — Janus

The 2nd time you use "physical" above do you mean physical as in "an object of physics" like you do the 1st time you used the word? Because physical can mean different things

↪Πετροκότσυφας

Heidegger distinguishes between being and beings (entities), or the ontic and the ontological. Empirical sciences studies beings (the ontic), and depend on being. It's hard to explain if you don't know Heidegger. Perhaps you know Kant? Ontology is basically the conditions of possibility for the ontic sciences. This condition of possibility, Heidegger thinks, is an original world disclosure. Is it mental, is it physical? It's neither...

What does it mean to say that something is physical or not?

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