I think we should discuss Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False,” That sets out the terms of the dualist-embodied debate nicely.

Can you explain why you think Stephen Bachelor's separation of the practical aspects of Buddhist teaching and practice from its unfounded, superstitious elements is a bad idea? I believe Gautama is reputed to have said that we should believe nothing on account of authority or tradition, but should just practice and see for ourselves. To anticipate a possible objection you might have, this relates to the OP because there is no physical evidence for reincarnation; so the question is whether we should believe in the non-physical 'whatever' (soul? emptiness?) that is purported to reincarnate, and if so, how, and on the basis of what, could we make sense of it ?

I think we should discuss Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False,” That sets out the terms of the dualist-embodied debate nicely. — Joshs

I think that's a very good idea. Unfortunately it would require someone to read some philosophy. Not going to happen I suspect.

He might have said that, but that doesn't mean the explanation is going to be what we now understand as a scientific one, for reasons that I won't begin to try to explain to you. — Wayfarer

What other kind of explanation would it be? How would we test the veracity of the explanation?

Your "unwillingness" to explain is evidence for my case - that you can't explain the distinction between "physical" and "non-physical". To hold back information that you are unequivocally correct, would be like holding back information of your innocence and the guilt of another just to spite the prosecutor who you think doesn't deserve to be "educated". Give me a break. You don't explain, not because you won't, but because you can't.

Can you explain why you think Stephen Bachelor's separation of the practical aspects of Buddhist teaching and practice from its unfounded, superstitious elements is a bad idea? I believe Gautama is reputed to have said that we should believe nothing on account of authority or tradition, but should just practice and see for ourselves. — Janus

That's really a discussion for Dharmawheel. Suffice to say, I have met Stephen Bachelor, and heard him speak, he's a very nice guy, and I think he plays an important role in the introduction of Buddhism to the West. When the subject of re-birth comes up at the Buddhist library, the advice I give is that it is perfectly fine to remain agnostic on such questions. However arguing against the possibility is another thing altogether, and Bachelor is becoming an anti-religious ideologue, unfortunately. (I have a pile of references, should you be interested.)

there is no physical evidence for reincarnation — Janus

The researcher Ian Stevenson published a two-volume study on reincarnation and biology. You may choose to disregard or disbelieve it, but you can't say there's no evidence.

the question is whether we should believe in the non-physical 'whatever' (soul? emptiness?) that is purported to reincarnate, and if so, how, and on the basis of what, could we make sense of it ? — Janus

There's a statement on reincarnation by H H The Dalai Lama here which addresses many of those points.

Your "unwillingness" to explain is evidence for my case - that you can't explain the distinction between "physical" and "non-physical". To hold back information that you are unequivocally correct, would be like holding back information of your innocence and the guilt of another just to spite the prosecutor who you think doesn't deserve to be "educated". Give me a break. You don't explain, not because you won't, but because you can't. — Harry Hindu

Physical things are those things that obey the laws of physics.

Which laws? Certainly the conservation laws and principles.

I think we should discuss Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False,” That sets out the terms of the dualist-embodied debate nicely. — Joshs

I started a thread on it some weeks back.

However arguing against the possibility is another thing. — Wayfarer

Sure, but who argues against the possibility? There are other positions apart form mere agnosticism; one could argue that there is no good evidence for reincarnation, and that it is therefore implausible, and ought not be entertained. One could argue that it is most likely merely a device used to control the masses through fear, or a cultural artifact from a pre-scientific era, and so on. One could even argue that belief in it is attractive because of ego-attachment, and that it thus should be relinquished.

but you can't say there's no evidence. — Wayfarer

It's not physical evidence; but anecdotal.

There's a statement on reincarnation by H H The Dalai Lama here which addresses many of those points. — Wayfarer

None of this is scientific evidence, though, which is necessary if we are going to make empirical claims about what actually happens.

I have read somewhere that the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that some of the tenets of Buddhism might need to be revised if they do not accord with modern science, and particularly, neuroscience. If that report is accurate it leaves me wondering if he was genuine about that.

It's not physical evidence; but anecdotal. — Janus

You plainly didn't read any of it. I've actually taken the book out of the library.

A Turkish boy whose face was congenitally underdeveloped on the right side said he remembered the life of a man who died from a shotgun blast at point-blank range. A Burmese girl born without her lower right leg had talked about the life of a girl run over by a train. On the back of the head of a little boy in Thailand was a small, round puckered birthmark, and at the front was a larger, irregular birthmark, resembling the entry and exit wounds of a bullet; Stevenson had already confirmed the details of the boy’s statements about the life of a man who’d been shot in the head from behind with a rifle, so that seemed to fit. And a child in India who said he remembered the life of boy who’d lost the fingers of his right hand in a fodder-chopping machine mishap was born with boneless stubs for fingers on his right hand only. This type of “unilateral brachydactyly” is so rare, Stevenson pointed out, that he couldn’t find a single medical publication of another case.

I have read somewhere that the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that some of the tenets of Buddhism might need to be revised if they do not accord with modern science, and particularly, neuroscience. If that report is accurate it leaves me wondering if he was genuine about that. — Janus

He was genuine about it. It's in his book The Universe in a Single Atom.

The problem with the idea of re-birth is that it's doubly taboo in Western culture. First, because the Church anathematized it in the 4th Century AD. Second because it undermines scientific materialism. So it pushes a lot of buttons.

You’re concluding rhetorical question relies on a circular argument, as far as I can currently see.

Just as can be the case with any other stance regarding, basically, philosophy of mind—idealisms (in plural since these can take many forms), Cartesian substance dualism, pluralism, and (my now personal favorite) dual-aspect neutral monism—so too can physicalism be a circular argument in search of some justification for not merely being a “because I say/believe/will so” argument.

Hence: P1) because I/we/they so assert, everything discoverable by science is physical (even though science might have no clue as to what it is; e.g. dark matter and dark energy (maybe over 90% of the known universe and of what we ourselves consist of as physical beings, this in the colloquial sense of physical); P2) because I/we/they so assert, everything shall be discovered by science at some future point in time (including all aspects of being and its becoming involved in consciousness); C) therefore, everything is physical (this due to the cause of me/us/them so saying it is—as explicitly affirmed in the two former premises).

This, as presented, is then a circular argument (where the conclusion is implicitly upheld in the premises) that does not demonstrate any stance to be true at expense of any other stance being erroneous. — javra

Thank you for this. I'm not sure if you noticed, but I put "physical" (and "non-physical") in quotes because the whole basis of this thread is questioning the validity of the distinction between the two. I keep asking for a explanation of the distinction, but thankfully I haven't been holding my breath.

Now that I think about it, this distinction seems to be related to the distinction between philosophy and science. In this case, the distinction seems to be in the manner we seek truth.

In my mind, there is only one way to seek truth - logic and reason. If all schools of truth-seeking are really trying to get at the way things really are, and not how they would like it to be, then it seems to me that they all will come to the same truth. In that case, there would be no distinction between them.

Philosophy is a science. Philosophy can't sit on it's own just questioning everything with it's skepticism. It needs the answers science provides, in the manner science provides, because science is the most skeptical of them all - always testing past and current theories.

Science requires falsification. Anyone with an ounce of wisdom knows that a person's account isn't proof of anything. We need more evidence, like more people performing experiments, and even then only holding the explanation as a place-holder for the next best explanation because history has shown that even a majority believing something doesn't equal proof (appeal to popularity).

Most of the great discoveries have come from looking at things from a different vantage point (Newton's theories of gravity, Einstein's theory of relativity, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, etc.) - a more objective vantage point, and that is what I try to in my thinking of things. It is how I have come to see that many of these distinctions seem unnecessary, harmful even, to getting at the truth, or the way things are.

Physical things are those things that obey the laws of physics.

Which laws? Certainly the conservation laws and principles. — tom

When you say, "laws of physics", do you mean the explanations science currently provides, which even science admits could be wrong, or do you mean the way things are?

So, you're saying that he was genuine about dropping the idea of re-birth because it does not accord with science, or it does not accord with Christianity, or because "it pushes a lot of buttons"?

From an essay of mine about Buddhism on the West:

[The Dalai Lama] often remarked to my Buddhist colleagues that the empirically verified insights of modern cosmology and astronomy must compel us now to modify, or in some cases reject, many aspects of traditional cosmology as found in ancient Buddhist texts.' However he is also averse to scientific materialism, saying that 'The danger...is that human beings may be reduced to nothing more than biological machines, the products of pure chance in the random combination of genes, with no purpose other than the biological imperative of reproduction.'

But he never suggested 'dropping the idea of re-birth'. He was referring to traditional cosmological ideas, like the idea that Mount Meru is at the middle of the Cosmos. But as I said, there is evidence for children with memories of their past lives which has been gathered with the same kind of methodology that would be used for epidemiological studies. Stevenson was a psychiatrist by training and quite meticulous in his methods.

What I meant by 'pushing buttons' is that the notion of re-birth is taboo in Western culture, on the grounds that I mentioned. Generally there is a lot of hostility towards the idea.

Fair enough. Can we agree on this, though: You hold a trust/faith/belief that things such as the true nature of experienced/enactive aesthetics will be answered via investigation of objects while I hold the trust/faith/belief that such things can never so be discovered?

(I say "trust/faith/belief" because they in at least one sense all signify the same thing.)

I have read somewhere that the Dalai Lama has acknowledged that some of the tenets of Buddhism might need to be revised if they do not accord with modern science, and particularly, neuroscience. If that report is accurate it leaves me wondering if he was genuine about that. — Janus

Without any modesty intended or implied, why is there a logical contradiction between neuroscience and reincarnations. Would one hold a naïve physicalist mindset in which solid atoms are supposed to disassemble and the reassemble back into the same object/body? Such assumption, if at all held, would be specious.

Without claiming this to be a fail-proof argument: you neurologically are more similar—in innate and context-relevant-acquisition of affinities, interests, aptitudes, etc.—to one human in the history of all mankind than to any other. Same self, but dwelling at a different time (especially if we entertain Buddhist “neither is there or is there not a self”). Project this into the future and you obtain the same results, that of reincarnation of the self.

Yes, there’s a bunch of additional things that could be here inquired into and debated. Still, here you have both neurological presence and the concept of reincarnation in manners that are not logically contradictory.

When you say, "laws of physics", do you mean the explanations science currently provides, which even science admits could be wrong, or do you mean the way things are? — Harry Hindu

I think a line in the sand has to be drawn. Physicalists can't constantly retreat into yet to be discovered physics. Of course, new physics has to be admitted, but the line says that all new things will adhere to the fundamental principles of physics.

We have a set of principles, which are laws about laws. A physicalist seems compelled to draw the line there. There may be new principles, but the old ones must survive.

So, according to physicalism, mental activity obeys the laws of thermodynamics; it requires energy and increases entropy.

according to physicalism, mental activity obeys the laws of thermodynamics; it requires energy and increases entropy. — tom

It's the leap from the second paragraph to the third that I take issue with.

The mind deals with meaning and symbolic logic, which is not inherently physical; this is reflected in the distinction between semantic content and physical representation. Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and other physical phenomena, are devoid of inherent meaning (as physicalists never tire of telling us). By themselves they are simply patterns of electrochemical activity.

Yet ideas do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart meaning to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc, and also how we are able, as humans, to communicate.

In short: Thoughts and ideas possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and ideas cannot be identified with brain processes, as they are of a different order to the physical.

Physicalists can't constantly retreat into yet to be discovered physics. Of course, new physics has to be admitted, but the line says that all new things will adhere to the fundamental principles of physics. — tom

The physicalist relies on the possibility that things not now understood by physical principles will in the future be understood by physics. Therefore the onus is on the non-physicalist to demonstrate that there are aspects of reality which are impossible to understand with the principles of physics. There are a number of ways which this can be done, all of which are usually rejected by physicalists as unintelligible, indicating that the average physicalist is not really interested in understanding the nature of reality.

Then how can there be "physical" stuff that science hasn't yet explained? How is it that the mind, and it's relationship with the world, isn't just one of those "physical" things that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu

The acceleration of the recession-rate of the more distant galaxies is a physical observation of physical things, and so it's physical, though physics hasn't explained it.

Most likely, if human (or AI?) physicists proceed far enough with physics, then, at least in principle, that acceleration of recession-rate could be consistently physically explained.

Likewise ball-lightning.

But there might be a limit to how far physics can proceed. Maybe it will be limited by the amount of energy needed by particle-colliders, etc. Or, as some have suggested, maybe physics (which has been getting more and more complicated as it advances), will get so complicated that no human can understand it. Maybe AI will be able to take over.

Story:

A robot is working in a field, building some apparatus. A human physicist walks up and asks the robot what it's building. The robot replies, "It's an experimental-apparatus to measure a physical quantity that couldn't possibly be explained to a human."

By the way, I said that physics has been getting more compicated as it advances. I meant modern physics, including general relativity, particle physics, quantum mechanics. More unintuitive, and more mathematically complicated.

But it wouldn't be true to say that classical mechanics doesn't get complicated too. Calculus is required even in lower-division classical mechanics physics courses for science and engineering, And planetary orbits are a bit of work.

And, like general relativity, the study of the stresses and strains in solid materials can involve tensors.

Wanting an easy brief derivation of conservation of angular momentum, i looked up Lagrangian dynamics, and, via it, found that easy and brief derivation of conservation of angular momentum.

Its derivation by Newtonian dynamics is a bit more lengthy, and I wanted something really brief.

Then I read read about Hamiltonian dynamics, a chapter that presumably didn't have any prerequisites other than the chapter on Lagrangian dynamics. I couldn't understand Hamiltonian dynamics.

Hamilton worked it out around 1830 or so. Picture him getting out of a horse-drawn carriage, with his papers rolled up and tied with ribbon. But in 1980, I couldn't understand it, even when I (presumably) had studied what is prerequisite to it.

Even in those days, it sometimes seems unbelievable how advanced and clever some people were.

I had no idea what he was talking about. And it was just classical mechanics.

Michael Ossipoff

Isn't physical typically contrasted by mind and abstracts respectively ...?
Mind is not abstract; abstracts may be contingent on mind.
Mind could be experiences themselves, qualia, dreams, feelings, etc, as contrasted with whatever perceived extra-self, others, processes, objects, all that.
Abstracts are generalizations, not concrete, perhaps universals, acausal.
Some occasionally use non-quantifiable to contrast physical.
Anything else typically contrasted by physical?
Whether minds and abstracts are (contingent on) physicalities is up for debate I guess.

The mind deals with meaning and symbolic logic, which is not inherently physical; this is reflected in the distinction between semantic content and physical representation. — Wayfarer

If you think that is what the mind does, then computers are capable of that now, and in many tasks easily defeat minds.

Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and other physical phenomena, are devoid of inherent meaning (as physicalists never tire of telling us). By themselves they are simply patterns of electrochemical activity. — Wayfarer

You CLAIM that physical processes are devoid of meaning, yet we have biodiversity and libraries.

Then I read read about Hamiltonian dynamics, a chapter that presumably didn't have any prerequisites other than the chapter on Lagrangian dynamics. I couldn't understand Hamiltonian dynamics.

Hamilton worked it out around 1830 or so. Picture him getting out of a horse-drawn carriage, with his papers rolled up and tied with ribbon. But in 1980, I couldn't understand it, even when I (presumably) had studied what is prerequisite to it.

Even in those days, it sometimes seems unbelievable how advanced and clever some people were.

I had no idea what he was talking about. And it was just classical mechanics. — Michael Ossipoff

"Just classical mechanics"? Hamilton was within a whisker of discovering quantum mechanics, if he had only taken his equations seriously.

If you think that is what the mind does, then computers are capable of that now, and in many tasks easily defeat minds. — tom

They’re the instrument of minds. Were there no mind, there would be no computers.

You CLAIM that physical processes are devoid of meaning, yet we have biodiversity and libraries. — tom

Which, I am saying, cannot be accounted for with reference to only physical laws.

Without any modesty intended or implied, why is there a logical contradiction between neuroscience and reincarnations. — javra

I haven't claimed that; there is no logical contradiction between neuroscience and any belief as far as I can tell.

the notion of re-birth is taboo in Western culture, on the grounds that I mentioned. Generally there is a lot of hostility towards the idea. — Wayfarer

...because it conflicts with Materialism, the official metaphysics. But Materialism is unsupportable, and reincarnation is metaphysically implied, or even metaphysically predicted.

So, as I've said, though it can't be proven, I suggest that there's good reason to say there probably is reincarnation.

But what would be a metaphysics by which there could be reincarnation in which people can remember a past life?

Michael Ossipoff

the question is whether we should believe in the non-physical 'whatever' (soul? emptiness?) that is purported to reincarnate, and if so, how, and on the basis of what, could we make sense of it ?

--Janus

You're right, Janus, reincarnation is incompatible with Materialism. ...you know, Materialism, that disregards (when it doesn't deny) "nonphysical whatever".

Some people claim to not be able to "make sense of " anything but Materialism.

You're looking at it in terms of a thing, like a soul, or emptiness (??!) that reincarnates. A noun-subject to go with the verb.

I don't believe in a soul separate from the body. But I've amply described how the person, unconscious at some stage of death-shutdown, but still retaining his/her subconscious wants, needs, predispositions and attributes, thereby remains someone who is the protagonist of a life-experience possibility-story. There is a life-experience possibility-story about that person.

Another thing that s/he retains is an orientation toward the future and life.

If that sounds fantastic, I remind you that it's also fantastic that you're in a life now. Why are you? Why did it start?

You don't know? Then it isn't justified to draw convinced-conclusion about it.

Then is it so implausible that, if the reason why it started remains at the end of this life, then the same reason will have the same result?

As I've said, I don't have proof of reincarnation. I doubt that proof is possible. But it is implied or predicted from a plausible, reasonable explanation for this life, and by an uncontroversial metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

thoughts and ideas cannot be identified with brain processes, as they are of a different order to the physical. — Wayfarer

Thoughts, ideas, feelings, wants, fears, aversions, can all be identified with the person's (or other animal's) physical body.

A person, or any other animal is a purposefully-responsive device.

Your thoughts and ideas are part of your purposeful responsiveness. Their evolutionary, natural-selection purpose has to do with causing you to act to fulfill your built-in purposes.

Yes, a human is more complex than other purposefully-responsive devices such as mousetraps, thermostats and referigerator-light switches. That's why your thoughts, ideas and feelings aren't always simply and directly identifiable with an immediate action.

An purposefully-responsive device's experience is it surroundings and surrounding events, in the context of the purposes of its purposeful-responsiveness.

There's no distinct Soul and body. A person's thoughts, ideas, feelings, wants, fears aversions, etc. don't require a Soul.

If you say that there must be a soul because we have thoughts, and thoughts aren't physical. A Roomba has responsiveness, and a program, and preferences for some choices and actions. Does it have a Soul too then?

Michael Ossipoff

Thoughts, ideas, feelings, wants, fears, aversions, can all be identified with the person's (or other animal's) physical body. — Michael Ossipoff

That's not the point I am trying to make, although the point I'm trying to make is a difficult one.

Physicalists will generally insist that 'mind is what the brain does'; that what is experienced as 'thought' is in reality a physical process which is being carried out by the brain. The example I was responding to was this one:

according to physicalism, mental activity obeys the laws of thermodynamics; it requires energy and increases entropy. — tom

So to counter that, I gave the example of the difference between the semantic and physical aspects of language - language is represented physically, but the semantic content requires interpretation of the meaning and relationships of words. So I am arguing that the semantic cannot be reduced to the physical as it comprises a different type of order to the physical. It is suggestive of at least some form of dualism, (although I certainly didn't introduce the idea of 'the soul')

But just because your thoughts, and the program-logic and preferences of a Roomba, aren't physical doesn't mean that you and the Roomba have souls. It doesn't require a Dualism.

(Say that the Roomba was programmed in a high-level language that's far-removed from transistor-switching and machine-instructions.)

My metaphysics is an Idealism, based on inevitable abstract if-thens about hypotheticals, but I suppose that, though I'm a metaphysical Idealist, and NOT a metaphysical Physicalist, I could maybe be called a philosophy-of-mind Physicalist. ...because I claim that there's no reason to believe in a Soul, or a basis or identity for us other than the body.

(But I'm not an Eliminative science-of-mind Physicalist.)

Michael Ossipoff