Nah, you're not serious about being unprejudiced, and making a genuine effort to explain and critique your own positions, so it just aint worth the effort. — Janus

Suit yourself. My position survives the same critique(s) I've levied towards others. What more could you ask for?

:-|

Stick to the rhetoric. Most people are moved more by it anyway...

;)

My criticism has been that your account, or something like it, could be more adequate, more comprehensive, if it allowed for more distinctions, as I have already explained. I haven't said it is fundamentally wrong. In any case I'm not interested in going over it all again.

We agree there.

The nuance isn't simple. Basic understanding comes first. The nuance is had in the consequences of the basics.

By what standard do we determine which report of non-linguistic belief is best? — creativesoul

What does linguistic belief consist of?
What does non linguistic belief consist of?

Those two questions need to be correctly answered. If both kinds are to be sensibly called the same thing... "belief"... then it must be the case that they consist of the same basic elemental constituents. The same 'ingredients' as it were. Since belief is accrued, and at conception we're completely void of any and all belief, it must begin simply. Thus, whatever rudimentary belief consists of, so too must the more complex, but not the other way around, which is precisely what classic epistemology has done by virtue of conflating a report of one's belief with one's belief, and holding that the content of belief is propositional.

My reports about cat and chicken belief a few posts back were in propositional form. It quite simply does not follow that the content of the cat and chicken belief is propositional. The content was correlation and the formation thereof(the act of drawing the correlations) is existentially dependent upon an agent capable of drawing correlations between different things and/or itself.

If a non-linguistic agent draws a meaningful correlation(the attribution/recognition of causality) between some event or other and what happens afterwards, it could very well be a fallacy of thought(post hoc ergo prompter hoc), but there's no justificatory ground for denying that the agent believed. — creativesoul

Right, and as I explained, there is no justificatory grounds for denying that an agent believes everything which is happening in one's dreams. It's just a matter of how one uses the word "believe".

I think that for the sake of an epistemological investigation we need to place some restrictions on how we use the word "believe", we need to find a definition to agree on.

We're not even close. You think that belief consists of making mental correlations. I think that belief consists in maintaining the same thought for an extended period of time. Banno thinks that belief is something completely different. There are chasms between each of our opinions.

If a non-linguistic agent draws a meaningful correlation(the attribution/recognition of causality) between some event or other and what happens afterwards, it could very well be a fallacy of thought(post hoc ergo prompter hoc), but there's no justificatory ground for denying that the agent believed.
— creativesoul

Right... — Metaphysician Undercover

Then any objection you levy against that claim that you just agreed to renders your position incoherent.

All I agreed to, is that you have been using the word "believe" in a way which is different from what I would like. I see your usage as ambiguous and counter-productive. So it's completely consistent and coherent for me to object to the way that you use the word. And of course, you have objected to my requests to restrict your usage. Therefore no progress has been made.

No.

What I am at pains to point out is that neither you nor I make the rules governing all mental ongoings. Seeing how both thought and belief are - in part at least - made up of mental ongoings, it only follows that neither you nor I make up the rules governing either thought or belief...

Now, off with your semantic twaddle.

Both thought and belief consist - in part at least - of mental ongoings... that's how meaning is attributed. We think about stuff and how it effects/affects us. This happens long before language acquisition begins. Those mental ongoings consist of things that exist exactly as they are prior to our becoming aware of them.

If your notion of "belief" contradicts this, it's wrong.

All meaningful sense consists entirely of drawing mental correlations between things.

Your notion of "belief" is a meaningful sense.

Your notion of "belief" consists entirely of mental correlations between things.

Now what?

Whatever pre and/or non-linguistic mental correlations require in order for them to be realized(formed, actualized, enter into existence, emerge, etc.) so too does your notion of "belief".

If you claim that all belief consists of propositional content, then either you deny the existence of belief prior to language, or you claim that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language. You've already claimed the former. Admitting the latter, for you, would force you to admit changing your claims in mid argument.

Neither of those necessary consequences are acceptable.

So, I've shown that your position suffers a number of different reductio ad absurdum, and yet you remain tried and true, tied to an argument that not only suffers such a fate, but more importantly it just doesn't have what it takes to take account of pre and/or non-linguistic mental ongoings.

You don't want to call pre and/or non-linguistic mental ongoings "belief"? Fine by me. You want to continue to believe these things. Fine by me.

You want to provide an example of anything meaningful that does not consist entirely of an agent drawing mental correlations between things?

All senses of both terms "thought" and "belief" consist entirely of mental correlations drawn between things. If you agree, I suggest you follow along and object to what you disagree upon. If you want me to continue to criticize your usage of the term "belief", then either you're not understanding the faults being shown, or your conviction outweighs overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Jack's belief cannot contain the name we place upon toasters. Our report of Jack's belief can. Jack can be said to have belief about the toaster.

Belief such as Jack's is formed each and every time an agent is chasing something which hides behind the toaster. An everyday occurrence. So, there are cases of non-linguistic agents' forming and/or having thought and belief about that which is existentially dependent upon language. No language, no toasters.

But calculus... that is also existentially dependent upon language, and a non-linguistic agents' mental correlations cannot possibly contain and/or have any basis whatsoever in calculus.

So, some things that are existentially dependent upon language can be an elemental constituent of non-linguistic mental ongoings. Other things, not so much. Here, we need a distinction of some sort in order to further discriminate.

My report of Jack's belief is not equivalent to Jack's belief. My report needs only to draw the same or similar enough correlations to take proper account of Jack's correlations. If I accurately determine the content of the correlations being drawn in Jacks' mental faculty, I've offered a true report that is not attributing propositional content to Jack's mental ongoings.

What type of experiment would it take to verify this account?

I'm telling you that a properly nurtured and/or cultivated agent can and will draw mental correlations between things of our own choosing.

These things become significant to the agent via drawing correlations between those things and/or themselves.

Meaning is prior to language. Meaningful mental ongoings are prior to language. True mental ongoings are prior to language. It makes perfect sense to say neither meaning nor truth are existentially dependent upon language.

What I am at pains to point out is that neither you nor I make the rules governing all mental ongoings. — creativesoul

I believe in free will. Therefore I assert that there is no such thing as the rules governing mental ongoings. Until you prove determinism, your pain is in vain. So go ahead, dismiss reality as semantic twaddle and suffer alone.

The premise that belief consists of mental ongoings does not validate your conclusion that mental ongoings consist of belief.

All examples of "thought" and "belief" consist of an agent drawing mental correlations between things. All examples of meaning consist of an agent drawing correlations between things. All thought and belief is meaningful. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of later qualification('real', 'imagined', or otherwise). That is the presupposition of truth(as correspondence to fact/reality) that is inherent to all belief.

When an agent touches fire it learns that fire causes pain by virtue of drawing a causal connection between the touching and the pain that follows. That mental correlation is the agent thinking/believing that the fire cause the pain. The fire becomes meaningful to the agent as a result of this. The agent's thought/belief is true.

In Witt's view, the agent's belief cannot be justified, nor need it be for the behaviour is the end of justificatory regress. I do not think that Witt would admit that the agent knows that touching fire causes pain, and rightly so, for such knowledge is empirical and as such it requires justification, and the agent is incapable of reporting upon it's own belief.

On my view, that's all bound up in yet another flaw. A consequence borne of conflating a report of belief with belief. I think it's absurd to hold that knowing touching fire causes pain requires offering an account of it. All knowing that requires is an agent capable of touching fire, feeling pain, and connecting the two.

While the justification requirement makes sense when it comes to knowledge claims, it is a fatal flaw in one's position if s/he holds that making a claim is necessary for having knowledge. JTB came as a means to discriminate between those who claim to know something and those who can provide the ground for such claims.

The ground ends. The regress ends. It all begins at getting burned.

I was going to post a paper I wrote, but decided to wait. Instead I would like to evaluate a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0j3uoH_-A8) in which Dr. Duncan Pritchard (background is seen here: https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=6341) sees Wittgenstein's views in OC as a kind of support for religious epistemological views. So, Wittgenstein is seen in OC as giving us arational supports for our epistemology, and many philosophers, including myself, believe this is the case.

So, there are some Christian philosophers who are saying that there are very basic arational beliefs that support Christian conclusions. This would mean that the statements "This is a hand," and "God exists," are equivalent, neither require a justification in that they are arational. I don't see this as a correct interpretation of what Wittgenstein is putting forward in OC.

I don't see that Moore's statement, "I know this is a hand," is equivalent to "I know God exists," i.e., I don't agree that Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's statement would be the same critique of "I know God exists." In the former statement the doubt makes no sense. It's hard to imagine such a doubt. Note though, in the latter statement (I know God exists."), it makes perfect sense to doubt that such a being exists. It's not in any way equivalent to "This is a hand." Many Christians want to say that their inner sense of God is equivalent to having a hand, i.e., it's so basic that it's foundational to their beliefs. So, in this sense it's beyond knowing, it's a kind of arational belief that goes beyond the epistemological.

This to me is an attempt to escape the required justification for the existence of God. And, many Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas to claim that many of their beliefs are this way. This makes me ill. :sad:

You may be querying the basis of the way in which Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas but I find your claim that it makes you 'ill' as a bit extreme, even though I realise that you may be speaking metaphorically.

I have not read Wittgenstein in any way as much as I wish, and I do hope to read his writings more fully at some point. However, from some of what I have read I have wondered if there is some mysticism in his thinking insofar as queries the limits of language. So, what you have just written about Christians incorporating his ideas does seem to be one be one possible way of using his ideas, although it is possible that his ideas and statements have so much ambiguity that they could be interpreted to fit religious views or atheism.

You may be querying the basis of the way in which Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas but I find your claim that it makes you 'ill' as a bit extreme, even though I realise that you may be speaking metaphorically. — Jack Cummins

No, I literally threw up. :groan:

Extreme or not, I find their interpretation of W. to be very problematic to say the least.

That is unusual, and I find it interesting, although horrible, because so far no particular idea or use of ideas has ever made me vomit literally. So, I am interested to know why it affected you so much. Was it because you think that it is a complete misuse of the basis of his own philosophy and intention?

I'm joking. Geez. Can't you tell by my body language?

This to me is an attempt to escape the required justification for the existence of God. And, many Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas to claim that many of their beliefs are this way. — Sam26

I can see why:



“Aesthetics and religious belief are two examples - for Wittgenstein, of course, crucially important
examples - of areas of thought and life in which the scientific method is not appropriate, and in which efforts to make it so lead to dis­tortion, superficiality and confusion.

In his lectures on religious belief he concentrates only on the first part of this conviction - the denial of the necessity to have reasons for religious beliefs. In their rejection of the relevance of the scientific mode of thought, these lectures are of a piece with those on aesthetics.

In seeking to answer the why and how of aesthetic
understanding, we are not looking for a causal explanation.

“Russell and the parsons between them have done infinite harm, . infinite harm.' Why pair Russell and the parsons in the one condem­nation? Because both have encouraged the idea that a philosophical justification for religious beliefs is necessary for those beliefs to be
given any credence. Both the atheist, who scorns religion because he has found no evidence for its tenets, and the believer, who attempts to prove the existence of God, have fallen victim to the 'other' - to the idol-worship of the scientific style of thinking. Religious beliefs are not analogous to scientific theories, and should not be accepted or rejected using the same evidential criteria.”

Wittgenstein did not wish to see God or to find reasons for His existence. He thought that if he could overcome
himself - if a day came when his whole nature 'bowed down in humble resignation in the dust' - then God would, as it were, come to him; he would then be saved.”

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that
he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrec­tion - ifhe could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed.


From Wittgenstein’s biography)

prepare to vomit

So, there are some Christian philosophers who are saying that there are very basic arational beliefs that support Christian conclusions. This would mean that the statements "This is a hand," and "God exists," are equivalent, neither require a justification in that they are arational. I don't see this as a correct interpretation of what Wittgenstein is putting forward in OC. — Sam26

I don't know what Wittgenstein said or meant, but I think this approach provides a framework for a valid belief in God. If I have experienced God directly, I believe he exists. You have not, so you don't.

the required justification for the existence of God — Sam26

There is no required justification for the existence of God.

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that
he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrec­tion - ifhe could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed. — Joshs

So, what's your point, and how does this lead to me recanting or reconsidering what I said. I've read enough of Wittgenstein to know that he had a mystical side. All you would have to do is read my thread on NDEs, and you would know that I'm not against the mystical. And by the way, the "make me ill" comment could also easily be made against the materialists, naturalists, and many atheists who think that their way of seeing the world is somehow intellectually superior to any view that looks beyond the material world. So, to be fair I'll add that little bit to the mix. And, I don't think that Wittgenstein is some kind of god, i.e., even if you pointed to something W. said that contradicted my point, that somehow isn't going to make me think I'm wrong. I enjoy W., and I think he contributed some important things to philosophy, but I don't think he was correct about all his musings. I'm sure you don't either.

I don't know whether there is a God or not, but it seems to me that if you're going to claim such a thing, you need some kind of justification. And, I don't think anyone is warranted in believing in some kind of inner knowing or inner justification.

What makes me use the phrase "makes me ill" in relation to religious belief is the conviction that they have some special access to knowing that the rest of us don't; and where this kind of thinking logically leads.

Justification is a linguistic concept, and the use of the concept takes place within our epistemological language, viz., propositions. The idea that justification is something within us, is just anathema to me, and to my way of understanding W. If you don't get anything out of W. surely this would be the one thing that sticks out for most student of W., viz., that meaning doesn't arise from within. Meaning by its very nature, is public; and, recently this has been argued about in the many threads that have sprouted up about W.'s thinking.

Second, as I've mentioned in the first post that kicked this recent tranche of posts, comparing the proposition "I have hands," to "God exists," in terms of W's bedrock or hinge-propositions is a bit of a stretch (which is what Pritchard is implying). One can see this if you compare doubting that one has hands to doubting that God exists. Hell, even Christians doubt their belief in God from time to time, but I'd find it amazing if they doubted the existence of their hands in ordinary circumstances from time to time. The key, at least the way I'm interpreting W., to understanding what a basic belief (or Moorean proposition) is, is that doubting them doesn't make sense, at least generally.

Now of course you can retort and claim that you have direct experiences with God, and if this is really true, then you would have access to something most people don't. However, most of these claims are very subjective, and are open to many different interpretations. Not only that, but they tend to be self-sealing, you can make any experience you have conform to a belief in God in some way. I compare this to the way many Christians, not all, but many, think of answers to prayer. There isn't a non-answer, every event in their lives is made to conform with an answer, i.e., even if they didn't get what they specifically prayed for, it was an answer, specifically a no answer. It's a self-sealing view. It doesn't allow for counter-evidence. What would a non-answer look like? In the same way, if every experience you deem to be of God, is of God, how would you know if you're wrong. These kinds of experiences are even worse than pointing to something internal and saying, "There is my pain." Why? Because at least with a pain there is something external to latch on to, a cry or a scream. But, the experiences many religious people refer to as "an internal knowing" have nothing external to latch on to. There is no corresponding ouch or other kind of thing that attaches externally to the experience, other than a claim. Surely this is the proverbial beetle-in-the-box, maybe worse.