The Eternal life of the Dog with his Bitch? — Janus

Indeed. And there's also the way of a man with a maid. The good stuff is the same old stuff. In my experience, the high feelings come with a sense of being universal or ancient.

The Buddha denies a soul but affirms consciousness. What then is the difference between a soul and consciousness? — TheMadFool

In those times, the orthodoxy was the Vedic religions - those traditions derived from the Hindu Vedas and also the Upanisads, which were philosophical addenda to the Vedas. And their teaching centred on the Atman (which etymologically is the first-person participle of 'I Am'). Atman was conceived of as being like the principle of immortality, so to attain immortality was to achieve complete identification with or absorption in the Atman. This kind of teaching is found in the Upanisads.

The Buddha denied that any such eternal or unchangeable self could be found. So the keynote of his entire teaching was that everything (all phenomena, sensations, etc) had 'three marks', those being dukkha (roughly, unsatisfactory or stressful), anicca (impermanent) and anatta (not self. Early Buddhist texts spell 'atman' as 'atta', due to the difference between Sanskrit and Pali, and 'an-' is the negative particle, so 'an-atta' is 'not self'). Whereas, the 'eternalists' were those who believed there was an eternal self that transmigrated from life to life and could be reborn in perpetuity - hence the name 'eternalism'.

So in none of this is the word 'soul' mentioned. However many people will assume that 'atman' and 'soul' amount to the same thing, but I personally am dubious about that. The term 'soul' is derived from a completely different domain of discourse, and it has layers of meaning which are quite distinct from the Hindu 'atman'. But suffice to say, the Buddha denies that there is any permanent entity or 'substance' in the Aristotelian sense. So not only no soul, but also no God, and no atoms - nothing which exists separately, which is unchangeable. To those who challenged him, he would basically say: if you say there is something that never changes, then show it to me! Needless to say, nobody could.

As regards the nature of consciousness - the description varies depending on the school of Buddhism. In the early Buddhist texts, 'mind' was 'manas' which is treated as a kind of sensory organ, but one that grasps ideas rather than perceptual objects. However, there is also a term 'citta', which in modern Buddhist philosophy, is translated both as 'mind' and 'heart', and even as 'heart-mind', which I think is nearer in meaning to English word 'being'. But the notion of mind-body dualism of a Cartesian variety is generally alien to Buddhism.

So I suppose the natural question is, then, what is it that is reborn? The rather subtle answer is that karma propagates future existences - that persons are actually bundles or 'heaps' (skandha) of interconnected dharmas (moments of experience) and that these propagate between lives as well as within individual lives. Perhaps needless to say, the theory behind this kind of thinking developed into a highly complex metaphysic in its own right, which was explicated by the later Mahāyāna Buddhist school known as Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda. The texts on those theories are large, elaborate and extremely detailed. But the basic idea is that beings are reborn in one of the six realms indefinitely, until such time as winning liberation from Saṃsāra by being fortunate enough to have been born in an age when the Buddha's teachings are known, and by putting them into practice. That is the theory.

I have clearly misunderstood Buddhist reincarnation as you explained it. However, what do you make of Buddhist and even Hindu claims of people remembering past lives? Bogus? Could the Buddha be wrong?

What needs re-thinking is the notion of what constitutes the self. As I said, the Buddha rejected what he described as 'eternalism' - this is the view that there is a self, soul, or person, that transmigrates from life to life. But there is still re-birth in the Buddhist view. One modern analogy that is sometimes given is of a fax transmission - when you send a fax, a copy of the document turns up on the other end, but really it is made of completely different material to the first one. Another question that is asked is: are you the same person you were when you were seven? (no). Are you a different person (no). So - neither the same nor different. 'Identity' doesn't reside in some separate 'essence' but is the very combination of elements that give rise to the person.

In the Vijñānavāda school I mentioned, this was given the name citta-santāna which is generally translated as 'mind-stream'. So that allows for the sense of continuity which clearly manifests in Buddhist cultures, such as for example in Tibetan Buddhism where there is the tradition of the 'reincarnate lama'. Between you and me, I think that this citta-santāna idea almost amounts to the same as 'a soul' but the politics are such that you're never allowed to suggest such a thing to Buddhists!

modern analogy that is sometimes given is of a fax transmission - when you send a fax, a copy of the document turns up on the other end, but really it is made of completely different material to the first one. Another question that is asked is: are you the same person you were when you were seven? (no). Are you a different person (no). So - neither the same nor different. 'Identity' doesn't reside in some separate 'essence' but is the very combination of elements that give rise to the person. — Wayfarer

Sounds very much like Western thought on personal identity.

I wonder at the universal nature of the concept of a soul. The idea seems to have arisen at different places with no historical evidence of interaction. Does that mean something?

Personally, I want to have a soul AND, ironically, I have a soft spot for Buddhism. Any advice?

Before I was born, the universe existed as evidenced through the experience and memory of others. After I die, I'm absolutely sure that the universe will continue to exist. How then does the universe depend on me?

If you had not lived, the universe would have been different both before and after you were born.

If you had not lived, the universe would have been different both before and after you were born. — andrewk

Different, yes but not non-existent as inter-dependence implies.

Between you and me, I think that this citta-santāna idea almost amounts to the same as 'a soul' but the politics are such that you're never allowed to suggest such a thing to Buddhists! — Wayfarer

Buddhist political correctness! Who'da thought?

What would you say the differences are between the idea of atman on the one hand and the "almost identical" ideas of citta-santāna and soul on the other?

They are many and varied, but it would take a long essay to spell them out.

Hindus and Buddhists debated each other for millenia and each influenced the other. From the outside, so to speak, they seem to have much in common, but from a perspective within those traditions, there are great differences. But it takes quite a bit of work to get any kind of internal perspective. I suppose one way to approach would be to compare the writings of Advaita Vedanta to those of Mahāyāna Buddhism but again it would be a book, I think.

But, here’s a pragmatic example. There’s an account in a bio of Krishnamurti of his meeting with the young Dalai Lama, in the late 50’s when the latter had not long escaped the CCP. His Holiness compared Krishnamurti to Nāgārjuna - and was also said to have remarked that he was a ‘great soul’!

There must be some fundamental difference(s) that you can pinpoint and articulate if indeed there is any coherent discursive difference at all.

You did well on your New Year resolution, by the way. >:)

wonder what it is, within us, that gives rise to concepts like soul, heaven, hell? Do you see any evidence for them or are they the result of a mash-up of fear, hope and immature thinking? — TheMadFool

The feeling of self, identity, soul, ego, and similar aspects of ourselves is a common human experience. It makes sense that there would be a word for it. Actually, there are many - identity, self, soul, mind, ego, heart, self-awareness, consciousness, self-consciousness, spirit, me, myself, I, will, being, psyche, character, personality, essence, brain, mentality. Once they've experienced it, many have a hard time imagining it could stop existing. It must go somewhere after you die because it's clearly not still here.

The feeling of self, identity, soul, ego, and similar aspects of ourselves is a common human experience. It makes sense that there would be a word for it. Actually, there are many - identity, self, soul, mind, ego, heart, self-awareness, consciousness, self-consciousness, spirit, me, myself, I, will, being, psyche, character, personality, essence, brain, mentality. Once they've experienced it, many have a hard time imagining it could stop existing. It must go somewhere after you die because it's clearly not still here. — T Clark

Could it be that such conceptual entities are just a "convenient" way of discourse rather than being substantive? It could be that there is no self or ego or identity and that these simply makes for easier conversation or thinking. This then, over time, becomes an ingrained habit; so ingrained that we think that they actually exist.

Could it be that such conceptual entities are just a "convenient" way of discourse rather than being substantive? It could be that there is no self or ego or identity and that these simply makes for easier conversation or thinking. This then, over time, becomes an ingrained habit; so ingrained that we think that they actually exist. — TheMadFool

In what way is this "ingrained habit" any different from the experience we call the self or the soul. Now I can add that to my list. I'm being serious. I'll also paraphrase one of your statements with an important change - Could it be that all conceptual entities are just a "convenient" way of discourse rather than being substantive? Again, serious.

Are you saying that all internal experiences are not substantive? Some definitely believe that. I don't.

Have you seen the new season of Black Mirror? It's interesting to see technological versions of Heaven and Hell. They aren't called that in the show, but it's the same idea. — dog

I watched, pretty disturbing.

No less disturbing was the Metalhead episode. How much of a leap is it to go from the SpotMini:



to this:



There's currently an AI arms race going on.

Back to the topic!

In what way is this "ingrained habit" any different from the experience we call the self or the soul. — T Clark

What I'm saying is that communication or language requires the distinction self-other. Look at animals. They don't possess language, at least not as well-developed as human language, and they lack, as evidenced by many experiments(?), a sense of the self-other distinction. This suggests that the concept of self/ego/I is just a convenience of language. It makes for easier discourse rather than there being meat in it.

What I'm saying is that communication or language requires the distinction self-other. Look at animals. They don't possess language, at least not as well-developed as human language, and they lack, as evidenced by many experiments(?), a sense of the self-other distinction. This suggests that the concept of self/ego/I is just a convenience of language. It makes for easier discourse rather than there being meat in it. — TheMadFool

There is some evidence that some animals have a sense of self, obviously without language. Crows, octopi for God's sake, toucans. Certainly not conclusive evidence.

I don't see how you're "convenience of language" as applied to self or soul differs from any concept. I'm pretty sure the connection between language and consciousness is an established understanding.

This suggests that the concept of self/ego/I is just a convenience of language. It makes for easier discourse rather than there being meat in it. — TheMadFool

Interesting point. But what occurs to me is that substantive/non-substantive is the same kind of convenience of language.

What do we mean when we say there is really or not really a self? As we move away from the objects and actions of non-theoretical life, it appears that we converse in a kind of endless fog. I know what it means for it to be 15 degree outside. But do I know what it is to know? I reach for a certain coat in the closet when it's time to walk the dog. In my view, the philosophers have fussed over this stuff for centuries and made very little progress. The ones that have impressed me have tended to dispel the fog in one sense by acknowledging it in another. We cut the knot rather than untangle it every time we go out in the world and use words like 'self' and 'truth' and 'certain' without anxiety --and successfully.

I'm not saying 'don't think.' But I am saying that the problem is artificial and part-time in an important sense. Whatever the self is (if anything or if the issue is confused or undecidable), the abstract issue seems to have little bearing on how 'it' functions and is experienced.

But I feel kind of bad for writing this. I feel like a party pooper. The sense of doing armchair science is enjoyable. I sometimes miss it. But I also miss the sense of this kind of negative critique being itself a kind of important armchair science. 'If only philosophers would be worldly, etc.' Nah. If it's a vice, it's a fairly innocent vice that keeps the brain lit up.

I watched, pretty disturbing. — praxis

Remember the first episode of season 2? The woman who is devoured by social media ratings systems? That episode nailed something true and terrible. I suppose we were always products in capitalism on some level, but the electronic village quantifying popularity like that takes it all to hellish extremes. It forecasts a possible perfection and omnipresence of They, the death of privacy, of complex thought that doesn't fit into neat little ideological fashions.

There is some evidence that some animals have a sense of self, obviously without language. Crows, octopi for God's sake, toucans. Certainly not conclusive evidence. — T Clark

Only in the sense of a flickering light; not as full-fledged like the human sense of self. I'm guessing here but in babies the sense of self develops after language acquisition. I don't remember me as me before I could speak. Do you?

But what occurs to me is that substantive/non-substantive is the same kind of convenience of language. — dog

You're right. Ouroboros. Do you see a way out of the vicious cycle?

I'm not saying 'don't think.' But I am saying that the problem is artificial and part-time in an important sense. Whatever the self is (if anything or if the issue is confused or undecidable), the abstract issue seems to have little bearing on how 'it' functions and is experienced. — dog

You're right but don't you think, even in the fog, that we may be able to discern a form and make sense of the matter?

Only in the sense of a flickering light; not as full-fledged like the human sense of self. I'm guessing here but in babies the sense of self develops after language acquisition. I don't remember me as me before I could speak. Do you? — TheMadFool

How do you know this? Is there evidence or just your intuition. It is my understanding Octopi, tucans, and some other animals can recognize themselves in mirrors and pass other consciousness tests. There is a significant amount of literature about this. Do you have information that conflicts with this?

What is the significance of whether or not I can remember things before I can speak? That's not evidence at all. I don't really remember much until I was in kindergarten.

How do you know this? — T Clark

Google. Children speak their first words around 6 months of age. A complete sense of self is formed at around 2 years of age.

I think defining exactly what constitutes “a complete sense of self” may prove to be a little elusive, especially at the age of 2. Concepts grow, particularly in early development.

Sense of self in children

From the link:

Self-concept or just self-recognition?
Of course this study simplifies a mass of psychological complexity. Psychologists have raised all sorts of questions about what the mirror test reveals. It could be, for example, that infants just don’t understand faces particularly well until they are around two years old. Perhaps, then, they develop a self-concept at a much earlier stage.

Alternatively it could be that at around two years old infants develop a solid physical or visual self-concept, but still have little mental self-concept. In this case all the test is showing is that we know what we look like; perhaps we don’t develop our self-concept until much later in life.

I guess the beginnings of self-identity begin at 2 years of age. Anyway, it's much much later than language development. Thanks for the showing my error.

Of course this study simplifies a mass of psychological complexity. Psychologists have raised all sorts of questions about what the mirror test reveals. It could be, for example, that infants just don’t understand faces particularly well until they are around two years old. Perhaps, then, they develop a self-concept at a much earlier stage.

When I said that octopi, crows, and tucans have shown signs of consciousness, that was hypothesized, by others, based on use of the mirror test. It is my understanding the results are not widely accepted yet.

You're right. Ouroboros. Do you see a way out of the vicious cycle? — TheMadFool

No. We can't get behind our getting behind, as far as I can see. Someone might say something revolutionary and clever and change my mind, I guess. But it's not something I'd expect, and it couldn't be the same old dictionary math.

You're right but don't you think, even in the fog, that we may be able to discern a form and make sense of the matter? — TheMadFool

I think we can focus here and there and see this or that more clearly/effectively. Indeed, I think we do it all the time. And I'm arguably trying to do the same thing with the points I offered. I'm trying to economize my effort, pick my battles, get behind my getting behind as much as possible. But I still hold that we don't question the questioning as we question. A moment afterward it becomes material for further reflection, but there seems to be a cutting edge of faithful creative know-how. (For instance, I didn't know how I would finish that sentence. I just had a vague intention. The fog condensed. Then it occurred to me to use it as an example.)

No. We can't get behind our getting behind, as far as I can see. Someone might say something revolutionary and clever and change my mind, I guess. But it's not something I'd expect, and it couldn't be the same old dictionary math. — dog

I call this the self-referential problem. There's something wrong with it but I can't seem to pin it down. A lot of "useful" knowledge is abandoned on account of this. Take statements like "everything is relative" or "all Cretans are liars". These are all actually useful observations but are attacked on the point that they're self-contradictory.

I think we can focus here and there and see this or that more clearly/effectively. Indeed, I think we do it all the time. And I'm arguably trying to do the same thing with the points I offered. I'm trying to economize my effort, pick my battles, get behind my getting behind as much as possible. But I still hold that we don't question the questioning as we question. A moment afterward it becomes material for further reflection, but there seems to be a cutting edge of faithful creative know-how. (For instance, I didn't know how I would finish that sentence. I just had a vague intention. The fog condensed. Then it occurred to me to use it as an example.) — dog

Perhaps the fog is the truth and there isn't any further clarity to be had.

I call this the self-referential problem. There's something wrong with it but I can't seem to pin it down. A lot of "useful" knowledge is abandoned on account of this. Take statements like "everything is relative" or "all Cretans are liars". These are all actually useful observations but are attacked on the point that they're self-contradictory. — TheMadFool

I've thought about this too. In my opinion, the statements are just taken too literally. If someone says 'everything is relative,' they are sharing an attitude. There's the classic philosophical vice of assuming that everyone is playing the philosophical game. I'd call it a lack of social-emotional intelligence. Of course sometimes those who assert 'all is relative' really are playing the philosophical game, and then the usual objections are valid.

Perhaps the fog is the truth and there isn't any further clarity to be had. — TheMadFool

I can relate to that. We use or live in the fog for the most part. Here and there we get more clarity. With science we get something like falsifiable statements, at least ideally. That still depends on non-controversial inexplicit know-how (the common sense metalanguage in which uncertain statements have meaning enough to be falsified), but it clearly works. The technology gives us what we want. With poetry and philosophy, there's a limit to explaining why something is good. Or rather we can keep coming up with reasons for a basic positive feeling or action-generating trust. Of course this is just my perspective, as I've dug it up on the fly.