Perfect in regards to what? As I said (and you agreed), "perfect" is subjective. So when you say something is perfect, you need to make explicit what it is perfect for.

Noun:the condition, state, or quality of being free or as free as possible from all flaws or defects.

Again, as I said (and you agreed) "flaws" or "defects" are also subjective. What is all of this in reference to? Perfection and flaws only make sense in context or comparison.

I'll give you an example:
A perfect sphere is only perfect in regards to it matching every single one of the criteria for what a sphere is. A sphere would be flawed or have defects if it met some, but not all, of these criteria.

So, when you say God is "perfect", what is he a perfect example of? Furthermore, what criteria is God meeting that makes him perfect? You cannot have perfection without initial conditions being set, because perfection as a concept is relational to specific criteria.

There is no such a thing as Zeno's paradox. — bahman

Zeno's paradoxes

Self-contradictory ideas cannot exist. — bahman

Theism vs Atheism...Materialism vs Idealism...etc.

Because such an illogical reality is impossible. — bahman

Yes, the current state of logic doesn't allow contradictions but people have developed different kinds of logic that allow contradictions - see paraconsistent logic.

Again, as I said (and you agreed) "flaws" or "defects" are also subjective. What is all of this in reference to? Perfection and flaws only make sense in context or comparison.

Perfection is only understood in regard to what is not perfect.

If movement is possible then there's a problem with Zeno's paradox. The issue we have is in figuring out what that problem is. — Michael

I just wanted to show the OP that contradictions aren't impossible.

the current state of logic doesn't allow contradictions — TheMadFool

"practice makes perfect"

Perfect for what????

The question makes no sense.

Perfection is a state of being, it is not for anything except itself.

Are you serious?
Okay, I give up. I tried.

Well tell me what do you think god is?

"So close yet so far"

That is the perfect song for this occasion (though I find Elvis to be perfect for any occasion)

Must be a coincidence. :)

Well tell me what do you think god is? — Cavacava

Nature.

I thought of one more way to try to get this concept across:

Remember those spheres I was referring to earlier? I said one was a perfect sphere and explained why. But you say God is perfect, so I assume this hypothetical sphere can't be perfect, because if it were it would be God according to you, correct? So tell me, what is it that makes my sphere imperfect? What characteristics does it lack which are required to qualify for your idea of perfection?

I guess

Actually I don't disagree, I have recently thought that some sort of plural pantheism might be close to the case.

However, I took this discussion to be more of an epistemological discussion about the nature of god, as the absolute, as a subjective concept. Your sphere participates in god's perfection, as Plato would have it.

Actually I don't disagree, I have recently thought that some sort of plural pantheism might be close to the case. — Cavacava

Read Spinoza's Ethics, if you haven't. His explanation of God as Nature had a huge impact on me.

However, I took this discussion to be more of an epistemological discussion about the nature of god, — Cavacava

It was. I was just trying to get you to understand that perfection needs qualifiers. You cannot just say something is perfect, you have to be clear on what it is a perfect version or example of, and what characteristics qualify it to be a perfect version or example of whatever it is.

You should look into this more elsewhere, maybe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The things I'm saying are true; this wasn't an opinion I was defending. You just don't seem to understand the concept of perfection.

Reading William James.

I was just trying to get you to understand that perfection needs qualifiers

I guess we will have to disagree here, I don't think that perfection can be qualified or limited in any manner.

ps. good night.

That's the trouble with god; it does no good to introduce him by way of explanation. He's just too good at it.

Although the stone paradox is a problem for essential omnipotence, it isn't a problem for accidental omnipotence. If God can create such a stone but doesn't then there's nothing he can't do. It's only if he does create the stone that he loses his omnipotence. — Michael

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here with regards to the use of logic to resolve the paradox. If God can create such a stone, the it becomes logically possible for such a stone to exist (by God having created it). He doesn't have to actually create it for the logical possibility to derive. So as soon as we admit that God can create such a rock, the exists a logically possible thing that he cannot do. Whether he actually does it not is irrelevant.

But this doesn't tell us anything about God, it tells us about the uselessness of the term 'omnipotence'. It's like 'infinity', it's a perfectly logical term, but when you start to actually play with it, the meaning starts to break.

We could do the same stone paradox in any number of ways to eliminate the 'can/actually does' problem. Can God create a being more powerful than himself? If he can't then he is not omnipotent because we can conceive of a task he cannot do, if he can then he's not omnipotent because we (or he) can conceive of a being with greater powers.

Can God create a universe in which his existence is unnecessary? (how do we know he hasn't already done so?). Can God reverse time and create a universe such that, on going forward in time he would cease to exist? Can God create something capable of destroying God? I mean we could go on all night. Omnipotence is a meaningless concept unless constrained by what is logically possible.

The problem with arguing about God's properties is that God is a concept in our heads. If we can't conceive it, then God can't do it. The whole question is back to front. We have a concept 'God' and the we ask if such a thing exists. I we cannot properly conceive of the thing we're supposed to be investigating, how can we ask ourselves if such a thing exists or not? If I asked people to investigate whether a Jabberwocky existed, the first question would be "well what is it?"

If we're to say that God can defy logic, but then admit we are incapable of conceiving of such an entity, then we are not really making a statement about 'God' (the concept in our heads) at all, because that concept is constrained by the ability of the human mind to conceive of it.

God then, if we pursue this unconstrained approach, ceases to be a meaningful concept and just becomes a place-holder for "all the things we can't conceive of", which is certainly a far cry from any religious interpretation of the deity, even Spinoza's God ceases to have any definition if it no longer is constrained by conceivability.

I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here with regards to the use of logic to resolve the paradox. If God can create such a stone, the it becomes logically possible for such a stone to exist (by God having created it). He doesn't have to actually create it for the logical possibility to derive. So as soon as we admit that God can create such a rock, the exists a logically possible thing that he cannot do. Whether he actually does it not is irrelevant. — Pseudonym

At T₁, before creating the stone, there's nothing he can't do. At T₂, after creating the stone, there's something he can't do. Therefore, at T₁ he's (accidentally) omnipotent and at T₂ he's not omnipotent.

You seem to be saying that if it's possible that at T₂ there's something that God can't do then God isn't omnipotent at T₁. That would be essential omnipotence, which personally I think is a useless definition. If at T₁ there's nothing God can't do then why not just call him omnipotent at T₁? That he could (not even will) limit his own power in the future doesn't take away from his power in the present.

And if we insist on both 90º angles and four sides, we constrain the space to a plane.

Oddly, logic constrains the world... ↪unenlightened — Banno

You are telling me that our insistence obliges the world to be of some geometry and not another? I think not. No, our insistence constrains what we can say about the world, and possibly makes it impossible to tell it like it is. The world shrugs and carries on as it pleases.

That's a pretty ambiguous question. Both sides of what - the '+' or the '='? I gave you an example where the equation worked with drops of water. One drop of water added to another drop of water makes one drop of water. — Banno

Consider all "1" similar.

But then I'm omnipotent right now. There's nothing I can't do right now until some of the Atoms in the universe organise themselves in such a way as to prevent me, which of course they will do the instant I try any impossible action, but right now I can do anything. Humes's problem of induction.

But then I'm omnipotent right now. There's nothing I can't do right now until some of the Atoms in the universe organise themselves in such a way as to prevent me, which of course they will do the instant I try any impossible action, but right now I can do anything. Humes's problem of induction. — Pseudonym

This seems facetious. If God wants to create or destroy or rearrange a world in any conceivable way then he can. He can do anything. That he could choose to limit his power doesn't then entail that his power is currently limited. He's all-powerful. Any other definition of "omnipotent" seems pretty pointless.

And on the same point, to say that a God that can't limit his own power (by creating a stone too heavy for him to lift) isn't omnipotent is also to use a pretty pointless definition of "omnipotent".

It's up to you if you want to use a definition of "omnipotent" that is self-defeating or open to paradox, but why would you want to do that?

If God wants to create or destroy or rearrange a world in any conceivable way then he can. He can do anything. — Michael

This is begging the question. That's what we're trying to find our, if it makes any conceivable sense that God is both omnipotent and unconstrained by logic. If you're starting from the premise that God definatly is omnipotent then you've already ruled out one of the options.

That he could choose to limit his power doesn't then entail that his power is currently limited. — Michael

He is not 'choosing' to limit his power by creating the stone, it is limited already by the logical possibility of creating such a stone.

You'll have to explain why you think such a definition of omnipotent is 'pointless' as opposed to yours because I'm not seeing any reason.

This is begging the question. That's what we're trying to find our, if it makes any conceivable sense that God is both omnipotent and unconstrained by logic. If you're starting from the premise that God definatly is omnipotent then you've already ruled out one of the options. — Pseudonym

Sorry if I wasn't clear. What I'm trying to say is that if God can will a universe into and out of existence, and if he can will it to behave however he wants, then it is entirely appropriate to consider God to be omnipotent, even if it is (im)possible for God to create a situation in which there is something he can't will to happen (e.g. lift a particular stone).

You'll have to explain why you think such a definition of omnipotent is 'pointless' as opposed to yours because I'm not seeing any reason.

Because as the paradox tries to show, such a definition is self-defeating. Your definition of "omnipotence" depends on a contradiction: it is both the case that God can create a stone that he cannot lift and the case that it isn't possible for there to be a stone that God cannot lift (reminds me of this comic). Why choose to use an incoherent definition?

He is not 'choosing' to limit his power by creating the stone, it is limited already by the logical possibility of creating such a stone.

Like above, your definition of "unlimited" power depends on a contradiction, so it seems like a pointless definition. I think it far more reasonable to say that to have unlimited power is to have the power to will a universe into and out of existence, to have the power to will the universe to behave however one wants, and for there to be no other power to stop you. The mere (im)possibility of being able to create a situation in which one cannot do something isn't sufficient to deny this unlimited power.

You've pretty much nailed what I am trying to say (although I personally have jumped the other side of the fence on the use of the word omnipotent in that I think it is is more useful philosophically to point out it's incoherence than to define it in a useful way). Putting all that aside, your cartoon is as good a summary of what I'm saying as any.

Of course God had to be able to defy logic, because if he wasn't able to, his omnipotence would be constrained by the rock problem. His only way out of it is to say that he can create a rock he can't lift and then lift it, because he's not constrained by the laws of logic that say he can't, or that he can create such a rock because he's not constrained by the fact that such a rock is a logical impossibility. Either way he cannot be both omnipotent and constrained by logic.