I would rather say that there is a rational discourse that might reasonably be called induction, a rational discourse that is valid because it can always be framed in deductive form. — Janus

That is why Peirce was concerned with the proper grammar of reasoning. You need to wrap the deductive bit in the preface of an abduction and the conclusion of inductive confirmation.

Banno adopts the transcendental view of the naive realist. Or at least his speech acts are identical to a naive realist. So same thing.

Deduction is syntactically close and so of course can't introduce semantic novelty. It can only rearrange the facts it is given. So deduction can't know about the truth of the world - even the kind of pragmatic truth that is the truth of a semiotic relation between a self and its world.

Therefore "truth-telling" needs some way of introducing the underlying semantics in a sensible fashion. The inductive side of the equation needs to be formalised as possible - even if in the end it is going to be still irreducibly an art.

And that is Peirce's innovation - later sort of recapitulated by Popper. He didn't bother trying to make induction work as inverse deduction (even if it sort of does work that way). He broke induction into the complementary steps of hypothesis formation and hypothesis confirmation. And deduction stood inbetween as a fully formal connection. Deduction turns general concepts into particular predictions.

So as much as possible, human thinking was cast as a formal and grammatical habit.

I realise you understand this. I just wanted to sum up the critical gist of the thread again. :)

Odd, also, that from what I understand Apo rejects the body of modern logic. But perhaps I misunderstand him, since that seems so absurd. — Banno

To deal with this one last misrepresentation, the logic you are talking about is designed for dealing with the particular or individuated. So of course it is part of the body of logic. It just ain't the whole - or holistic - story.

The whole story is triadic. It includes the logic of generality and the logic of vagueness.

the obsession with trinities is another odd thing about your scripture.

hm

deflection. Again.

the obsession with trinities is another odd thing about your scripture. — Banno

Trichotomies = hierarchical causal structure. Simple, innit?

deflection. Again. — Banno

Yeah. It would be useful if you could decide how you approach hinge propositions given your comments about me. But I fully expect you to take rapid evasive action as usual.

Quick, start waggling your naive realism again. That always attracts an inquisitive crowd.

To remind you, here was a fulsome reply. Now rather than doing your usual of pretending it wasn’t said, then coming in later with claims of a refusal to reply, let’s see you respond with a counter argument.

Do you dispute the correctness of what I say here? If so, make a case.

But your spoken truths always rely on unspoken ambiguities.

Are we talking about adult black swans or their fluffy white goslings? Are we talking about "swans" as being generically Cygnus atratus, or Cygnus olor and Cygnus cygnus? Are we talking about black swans that include albino Cygnus atratus?

So we can resolve some of these ambiguities with more careful speech. We can say that is a member of the genus Cygnus. It is black.

Yet ambiguity is in principle irreducible in speech acts. We can only hope to constrain it. Which is where pragmatism comes in as it then only make sense to put so much effort into constraining the semantics of our utterances. The truths we tell turn out to have as least as much to do with our intentions as they do with "the facts of the world". — apokrisis

well the basic logical issue in you argument is that it’s structure is that of a transcendental Argument; that there is only one solution, pragmatism.

So even if one entertains your view of ambiguity, pragmatism is one possibility among many.

And even then, that whole reply does not address the criticisms I set out.

There is here a failure on your part to commit. Do you have a partner? Is your affection for them only probable? Is your respect for rationality based on certainty or just what suits your purpose? Do you have hands or are you only partially confident In hand utility?

well the basic logical issue in you argument is that it’s structure is that of a transcendental. Argument; that there is only one solution, pragmtism. — Banno

It's hard to be sure how to interpret this bizzarely incoherent sentence. But how would it be a problem if there were some transcendental argument in play, and what are you saying that argument is?

My post was about the irreducible ambiguity of speech acts and how that is indeed exactly what we would expect of a constraints-based view of logic. In the end, it is up to us - in informal fashion - to decide what counts as the "truth" in terms of some act of measurement or observation.

You seem to be talking about something else now. But then you don't even seem to be talking English anymore. And is that a half-empty bottle of red I spy on your kitchen counter?

So even if one entertains your view of ambiguity, pragmatism is one possibility among many. — Banno

So what is the alternative that you are championing here? And what flaw is there in Pragmatism. Be as precise as you like.

There is here a failure on your part to commit. Do you have a partner? Is your affection for them only probable? Is your respect for rationality based on certainty or just what suits your purpose? Do you have hands or are you only partially confident In hand utility? — Banno

Again you are choosing to talk past the case I've already made. Not very charitable, hey?

I've said Pragmatism is making the choice to believe. Indeed, the choice to ignore exceptions to the rule is part of the constraints-based deal. Uncertainty is irreducible. But also, we can find reasons for thinking that after a certain point - one defined in terms of our interests or purposes - any further differences fail to make a real difference.

So goose, swan or duck? Sometimes it doesn't matter. And sometimes it might.

There are always going to be differences. Is the three-legged rabbit still a rabbit? If Bonzo the dog's arse is a hair off the mat, is Bonzo still sat on the mat? But to the degree our semantics are aligned - and the semantics include our intentions - then we can all draw a line across reality with enough agreement to make translation second-nature rather than an arduous process of exegesis.

You keep relying on this easy translatability to speak like a naive realist. Who can deny the Cygnus atratus is a black swan? Who can deny the dog is on the mat? Who can deny your first sentence was in English? But as I am saying, you are relying on a principle of indifference to dismiss any skepticism. You are making a choice in terms of some concept of a self with its intentions. And that is not a formal thing. But Pragmatism gets us as close to formalising this epistemic state of affairs as epistemology can get. Hence science is pragmatism in practice. The proof is in the application.

I note that you try to divert the conversation to the red herring that pragmatism = Jamesian utility. And this is after I've already cited Russell's rightful dismissal of James ... and quiet praise for Peirce.

Just another example of how dismally you argue your case. Every time you get caught out, just pretend it never happened.

as if Issues of ambiguity and error were only solved by Peirce.

Perhaps it would be a good idea for you to look up transcendental argument on wikipedia.

Do you say that the condition is unknowable to the agent themselves? — Perplexed

We can never have full knowledge of all the causalities, but no I am not saying that. On the most basic level, we are not aware of all the chemical pathways that make us hungry for example. Low blood sugar ,balance of hormones etc... we just feel hunger and that informs our motivation to seek food.

What role do you play in determining them? — Perplexed

I am what determines my actions. My life, my experience, my emotion, my volition, what my body tells me. Free will is simply not being constrained by external forces - it is not some magical ability to act against what makes me determined.
I am a determinist. I am determined.

It could be better put into this simpler form:

If it is a consequence of natural law that all swans must be white, then all observed swans will be white. — Janus

But all this is deduction, not induction, as I was trying to point out.

FYI, but not particularly relevant....

we just feel hunger and that informs our motivation to seek food. — charleton

But then we still get to choose to follow these instincts or not. Obviously we are still constrained by external forces. I don't get to chose to suddenly appear upside down six miles above the earths surface. But clearly my choices allow for the possibility of diverting determinism in more than one possible direction. Is this a roll of the dice, or do I have the power to load the dice in my favour?

But then we still get to choose to follow these instincts or not. — Perplexed

Describe how you make that choice, please!

Odd. First you promise that you will be getting back to me with a proper reply and then you edit your message to tell me to look up transcendental arguments.

Are you now telling me that you are not a Peircean because you prefer to be a Kantian? :D

Because I am a bit sick of responding to you. Arguing with preachers is like that. I keep allowing myself to feed your obsession.

What about phenomenology or process philosophy? Have they nothing at all to offer to increase our overall understanding of human life and the world in your view? I tend to think that all possible avenues of intellectual enquiry and speculation should be explored; if possible without prejudice. — Janus

True; a good philosopher is able to understand a novel philosophical approach at a gut level, and yet still step away from it so that they can criticise it.

For me the private language argument shows the limits of phenomenology, and process philosophy has not yet shown its potential. At the moment I have become more interested in exploring belief and its variations, following on from the thread Sam started.

This thread has served to reinforce my rejection of induction as a rational process, recognising the ad lib nature of scientific enquiry. Belief, conviction, certainty and so on are best understood as decisions rather than the forced result of some algorithmic scientific process.

True; a good philosopher is able to understand a novel philosophical approach at a gut level, and yet still step away from it so that they can criticise it. — Banno

Yes, I agree with this. The point of all rational inquiry is really critique it seems. I mean the rational part is to keep check on the intuitive part. Analysis should aim to find the inconsistencies and incoherence in philosophical proposals and approaches.

For me the private language argument shows the limits of phenomenology, and process philosophy has not yet shown its potential. At the moment I have become more interested in exploring belief and its variations, — Banno

Good phenomenology is an inter-subjective project, though. It's true that we can never have certainty that our private experiences are more or less the same, but why should they not be if we share the same culture and biology; the same public expressions? This expectation seems reasonable; although to return to the subject of the discussion, it can never be deductively certain. So, again, it is an inductive expectation; where would we be without them? It seems that deduction alone cannot be any more than 'pouring from the empty into the void'.

Belief, conviction, certainty and so on are best understood as decisions rather than the forced result of some algorithmic scientific process. — Banno

Again, I agree. The notion that our beliefs are completely deterministic leads to the conclusion that they are not freely acquired and held. If that were true, there would be no point...

The inquiry into the nature of belief is interesting; but it seems that any such inquiry must be phenomenological, which means descriptive (I think the Wittgenstein of the PI is pretty close to being a phenomenologist), rather than scientific, in the sense of proposing hypotheses. That's why I think current attempts to explain human behavior, ethics, aesthetics and belief in general in terms of Darwinian evolutionary theory are wrongheaded.

It's true that we can never have certainty that our private experiences are more or less the same, but why should they not be if we share the same culture and biology; the same public expressions? — Janus

I can go along with this; but discussions of phenomenology very quickly turn into effing the ineffable. At that point the discussion becomes mystical.

I'm increasingly drawn to externalism with regard to knowledge, belief, and other aspects of mind. Remove private mental language and it becomes evident that they are somehow things in the world. That's badly expressed, but that is the area in which I am reading at present.

This thread has served to reinforce my rejection of induction as a rational process, recognising the ad lib nature of scientific enquiry. Belief, conviction, certainty and so on are best understood as decisions rather than the forced result of some algorithmic scientific process. — Banno

So if it ain't inductive and it ain't deductive, then how is the decision "rational"? Surely the whole bleeding point of epistemology - a theory of truth - is to have some actual theory about the best process for arriving at that destination?

What does a no-process system of belief look like, anyone?

No worries. I knew you would bottle it.

I'm still here. And for the record, my request for a debate or thread on the pros and cons of your theory of truth remains; I am happy to join you in a discussion between ourselves. I'd be interested to see you come clean about things like your inability to state a truth or give an accurate measurement and your rejection of logic and the concealed scientism that underpins your views. That request has stood for a few years now, and continues to stand.

But that's not for your benefit. You don't do philosophy, you just preach the Good Word of Peirce.

I'd be interested to see you come clean about things like your inability to state a truth or give an accurate measurement and your rejection of logic and the concealed scientism that underpins your views. — Banno

Those are just your misreprentations of what I have said. And I’ve corrected you on them often enough.

Truth is what we believe in the long run following a process of reasoned inquiry.

Acts of measurement are informal and so always reflect the embeddness, the intentionality, of the person(s) seeking the answers. Accuracy is a pragmatic thing, not an absolute one.

I don’t reject predicate logic or deductive syntax. I place them within a more holistic view of logic that is triadic.

My scientism is hardly concealed. Nor the fact that I am a holist or systems scientist rather than a reductionist or atomistic scientist.

So your complaints are just bullshit. You’ve heard me say these exact same things many times. It is not me who bottles it when the discussion gets detailed and your general lack of a choherent position is exposed.

If you want a debate, you’ve got one right here. But you don’t really want a debate where you have to give a position and then a proper defence. We’ve all seen that time and again.

Truth is what we believe in the long run following a process of reasoned inquiry. — apokrisis

You confuse truth and belief. Yep, I've pointed that out before. You do not have a theory of truth, you have a theory of belief.

Acts of measurement are informal and so always reflect the embeddness, the intentionality, of the person(s) seeking the answers. Accuracy is a pragmatic thing, not an absolute one. — apokrisis

So, then, what is the height of the Eiffel tower? Is it 324 metres? When I ask you questions like this you seem to need to add some sort of explanation when a simple yes or no would suffice. Why the added
complexity?

I don’t reject predicate logic or deductive syntax. I place them within a more holistic view of logic that is triadic. — apokrisis

An oddly eccentric view of logic - since it has been shown here that induction and abduction are invalid.

You confuse truth and belief. Yep, I've pointed that out before. You do not have a theory of truth, you have a theory of belief. — Banno

Not a problem. That's what I say. Pragmatism is a theory of justified belief - as well as a theory of how the notion of objective truth is a naive realist pipedream.

Now maybe you want to define truth as tautological truth. But I just call that a theory of tautology. If you have a syntax closed in a way that prevents any possible semantic leakage, then sure, it is "truth preserving" in its grammar.

But only logic wonks would call syntactical water-tightness "truth". It's not what we really mean by truth, is it?

So, then, what is the height of the Eiffel tower? Is it 324 metres? When I ask you questions like this you seem to need to add some sort of explanation when a simple yes or no would suffice. Why the added complexity? — Banno

Well given that I like to be as careful as possible about epistemology, then of course I can't just accept the idiotic simplicities of a naive realist answer.

So if you don't like "complicated" answers, that's your tough shit. Don't pretend to be an epistemologist.

An oddly eccentric view of logic - since it has been shown here that induction and abduction are invalid. — Banno

Wow really! >:O

So we are agreed that you are not offering a theory of truth. A good start.

I'm not too sure what objective truth is. Are there subjective truths, to oppose them? And if so, are they amenable to the same pragmatic analysis? Or are there subjective truths but no objective truths?

You again didn't directly address the question of the height of the Eiffel Tower. Is it 324 metres, give or take a bit? It's actually an important point, because it has odd implications. If you say that the tower is 324m heigh, then it seems you are committed to it being true that it is 324 m heigh. Whether you like it or not, that tautology is hard to shake.

After all, we also agree that we need to be as careful as possible with our epistemology.

I don't accept that there are two types of truth - subjective and objective. I think it best to take the notion of truth as unanalysable, as fundamental. Truth is introduced as soon as a language becomes able to talk about itself or another language. Of course an language that can talk about itself by that very fact includes a semantics. So it seems to me that your comments regarding syntax and semantics are a bit odd. I do not, for example, understand what you might mean by:

If you have a syntax closed in a way that prevents any possible semantic leakage, then sure, it is "truth preserving" in its grammar. — apokrisis

What is semantic leakage? Will it stain?

Let's go over validity and induction again, and let me know if we agree.

An argument will be valid just in the case that, if the assumptions are true, then the conclusion will also be true.

We can set out induction as follows. We have observations f(a), f(b), f(c)... for some limited and incomplete interpretation of a,b,c... and f.

An induction would have it that from f(a), f(b), f(c)... we can conclude (x)f(x). This is clearly invalid.

So you can either offer a different definition of induction, or you can re-define validity to include such an induction.

Which will you choose?

So we are agreed that you are not offering a theory of truth. — Banno

That could depend on how you are defining truth, Banno. So how are you defining truth?

I'm not too sure what objective truth is. Are there subjective truths, to oppose them? And if so, are they amenable to the same pragmatic analysis? Or are there subjective truths but no objective truths? — Banno

If you think I am not offering a theory of truth, how could I possibly answer that? So evidently - despite what you just said - you agree that I'm offering a theory of truth.

You again didn't directly address the question of the height of the Eiffel Tower. Is it 324 metres, give or take a bit? — Banno

Ohh. Suddenly it's "give or take a bit". Is that the bit that doesn't matter - a difference that doesn't make a difference?

So is this question now still the same as your earlier version? Or has the ground shifted?

While you are at it, how does your theory of truth deal with the issue. From what you said in this thread, your theory is....

"P" is true IFF P.

That's as close as can be got, and I have said it to the point of tedium. — Banno

So we have: "The Eiffel Tower is 324 metres high, give or take a bit" is true IFF The Eiffel Tower is 324 metres high, give or take a bit.

Fine. But how do we get from that truth condition to a belief that is in fact justified and therefore true? What is the reasonable thing to do to validate the proposition? How do we establish the truth or falsity of this statement in practice?

I shouldn't have to ask really. But you always go oddly silent when called on to explain the grounds why one would assent to such a statement as if there were an unassailable fact.

I'm sure that is because you would have to sound pretty Peircean in your answer. But surprise me.

I don't accept that there are two types of truth - subjective and objective. — Banno

Those would be the complementary limits on pragmatically justified belief. So all actual belief would lie within those opposing extremes.

Thus you could say all belief is just belief. And yet also there is the standard distinction between belief that is at one extreme, just an individual's idiosyncratic view - their personal truth - and at the other end, the kind of truth that aims to be as impersonal as possible.

What there isn't is your naive realist truth - a truth in which no person is involved as a believer with a purpose giving shape to that truth.

The naive realist is a representationalist. S/he looks at the world and sees facts. A Peircean realist looks at the world and see signs. The facts are already part of a semantic structure. That is how we can know anything. We are looking at meaning from the get go.

That explains why the naive realist feels both so convinced by the transparent simplicity with which they just look and "see the world", and why naive realism is so wrong as an epistemology.

I think it best to take the notion of truth as unanalysable, as fundamental. — Banno

So you are banging on about something you can't even bang on about in your own admission?

Unanalysable! Give me a break. You are just making excuses for why you haven't got a theory yourself. What a cop out.

Let's go over validity and induction again, and let me know if we agree. — Banno

Where have I claimed that abduction or inductive confirmation are "valid"? Why do you harp on about something which is not an issue anyone is disputing?

Hanover put it very neatly. But in typical fashion, you just blanked his inconvenient truth.

Deduction may be valid but it produces no new knowledge. It is syntactically closed and, by design, can't. And that is why the species of induction are so much more important in the end - if you actually want to create new knowledge. You have to be able to go beyond the known to improve on what you've got. Scientific reasoning then ensures that error-minimising feedback is built into that loop of thought.

Induction is why deduction even has a job.

I'm increasingly drawn to externalism with regard to knowledge, belief, and other aspects of mind. Remove private mental language and it becomes evident that they are somehow things in the world. That's badly expressed, but that is the area in which I am reading at present. — Banno

I'm not really much familiar with externalism, beyond a passing acquaintance with Putnam's
'twin-Earth' argument which featured in an undergrad course at Sydney Uni I participated in about 10 years ago. I remember I didn't find it very convincing. Somebody posted a link to a series of interviews with Riccardo Manzotti recently. I read some of those, and I seem to remember you were commenting favorably on them. Is that the sort of thing you have in mind?