@csalisbury, does this make sense to you, or am I talking to myself here?

The subject is atemporal, but so is the subject/object relationship. I hope that sums it up differently. I agree, if beginnings exist only in time, then there was no beginning to the organism that has subject/object relationship. You have to make an account for the representation side of the account. — schopenhauer1

I am still trying to figure out where, and whether, we actually disagree on this, because I am having trouble understanding what you're saying.

If by 'organism' you mean the human animal, empirical object in the world, flesh and bones and all, then of course it has a beginning in empirical time, so your position isn't tenable as a reading of Schopenhauer, but would have to be a disagreement with him. The subject has no beginning in time, but (i) that's not because it has been around forever, but rather because the category of time doesn't apply to it, and (ii) the subject is not an animal, but the source of the representational forms.

I disagree. He we know ourselves as both subject AND object. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what you mean, you disagree. This is explicit in the text. The subject/object distinction is all part of the world as representation, but we also know ourselves as will, via the movements of our body and the experience of pleasure and pain. There is no subject/object distinction there, and we know the will by being it rather than by observing it. This is in Book II of WWR. To focus on only our view of the world through representation, and the subject/object distinction, is to cut off half of Schop's philosophy and relegate yourself to a Kantian one-sided view that he warns against. The view you present here would be what you would get if you didn't heed that warning and stopped reading after Book I. This latter part of Schop's philosophy is the unique potion that separates him from Kant and other transcendental idealists like Husserl.

The subject has no beginning in time, but (i) that's not because it has been around forever, but rather because the category of time doesn't apply to it, and (ii) the subject is not an animal, but the source of the representational forms. — The Great Whatever

Let's look at what Schopenhauer said shall we?:

Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity, we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge... The necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use Kant's phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different side—the side of its inmost nature—its kernel—the thing-in-itself... But the world as idea... only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time.

Since, however, it is the most universal form of the knowable, in which all phenomena are united together through causality, time, with its infinity of past and future, is present in the beginning of knowledge. The phenomenon which fills the first present must at once be known as causally bound up with and dependent upon a sequence of phenomena which stretches infinitely into the past, and this past itself is just as truly conditioned by this first present, as conversely the present is by the past. Accordingly the past out of which the first present arises, is, like it, dependent upon the knowing subject, without which it is nothing. It necessarily happens, however, that this first present does not manifest itself as the first, that is, as having no past for its parent, but as being the beginning of time. It manifests itself rather as the consequence of the past, according to the principle of existence in time. In the same way, the phenomena which fill this first present appear as the effects of earlier phenomena which filled the past, in accordance with the law of causality. Those who like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos, the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him, since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease, and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene. — Schopenhauer

The organism must be present for time to be there. We agree on this. We agree that Schopenhauer conceives of Will, which we can make an analogy from by our own subjective willing. However, our disagreement is over how it is time exists at all. Why not just will and no subject/object relationship? I will not even go further and let you answer the question first and go from there, because I think that will be telling as to how this disagreement will unfold.

The organism must be present for time to be there. We agree on this. — schopenhauer1

No, the subject must be. The subject is not the organism, or any worldly object.

Why not just will and no subject/object relationship? — schopenhauer1

There is no reason. You're thinking of the principle of sufficient reason as if it applied to thing in itself. From within the world, we can give reasons as to why certain biological organisms with representational capacities developed. But this entire explanation, and the world itself, is already just an objectification of will. At bottom, will has no reason for what it does. To think otherwise is to make a category error.

No, the subject must be. The subject is not the organism, or any worldly object. — The Great Whatever

I agree yes, but disagree that because (emphasis mine)

Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be — Schopenhauer

And here:

But the world as idea... only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time. — Schopenhauer

There is no reason. You're thinking of the principle of sufficient reason as if it applied to thing in itself. From within the world, we can give reasons as to why certain biological organisms with representational capacities developed. But this entire explanation, and the world itself, is already just an objectification of will. At bottom, will has no reason for what it does. To think otherwise is to make a category error. — The Great Whatever

What are you talking about? Explain "already" and "objectification of the will".

I really do not understand what your question/complaint is. You just quoted things we've already been over back a me, so I'm not sure what you want.

What are you talking about? Explain "already" and "objectification of the will". — schopenhauer1

This is explained in Book II of WWR.

This is explained in Book II of WWR. — The Great Whatever

No, I just want you to get at something you are missing. Will "objectifying" itself, I'd like YOUR interpretation of that notion, not explain to me as if I did not know anything about Schopenhauer.

No, I just want you to get at something you are missing. Will "objectifying" itself, I'd like YOUR interpretation of that notion, not explain to me as if I did not know anything about Schopenhauer. — schopenhauer1

I didn't know we were talking about 'my' interpretations?

I didn't know we were talking about 'my' interpretations? — The Great Whatever

Unless you are quoting directly from Schopenhauer or unless you are a direct conduit as to Schopenhauer's meaning, we are.

I have my own disagreements with Schopenhauer as far as the text goes, but have not been articulating them here. I have only been reproducing, to the best of my ability, a reading of the text itself. Much of what you have previously said and implied, about the equation of the subject with will, the subject with the organism, denying that Schop. says we experience the will in any way other than in a subject/object framework and so on, has been at odds with the text on any plausible reading, given that the author outright denies all of these claims, and while you seem to think I am being condescending by telling you to read Book II, I think your comments portray basic misunderstandings of the material, which is why I said it.

As for how I would characterize objectification, it would be: the will without presentation has a kind of unity to it, which isn't the singularity we find in presentation (of being 'numbered' one). This unity is pretty abstract and hard to understand, not well fleshed out in the text. But this unity is one of striving and competition with itself. In other words, the will is internally strife-indicing, fights with itself, injures itself, on its own terms (which we experience as pain). Representation then arises as a way of doing this, by more effectively managing its own struggles, and creating codes, signs, and pathways for trying to satisfy the will by committing these injuries and winning these internal competitions. If you can see where the food is, you can eat and satiate your hunger. This results in a kind of seeing, rather than just a dull experience of hunger, of an object as if distinct from oneself, which acts as a kind of objectified 'unit' that is a kind of guidepost to fulfilling those desires. But, since this 'unit,' the object, is just a kind of bundle of indications as to how to manipulate the will, it is an objectification of the will itself, a kind of crutch that lets the will see how to attack and hurt itself for its own satisfaction. So if I see someone eating, I am seeing the will satisfying itself -- this is how the will reacts to its own processes, with a kind of dull awareness of what is going on with itself, but only through this refracted lens.

As for how I would characterize objectification, it would be: the will without presentation has a kind of unity to it, which isn't the singularity we find in presentation (of being 'numbered' one). This unity is pretty abstract and hard to understand, not well fleshed out in the text. But this unity is one of striving and competition with itself. In other words, the will is internally strife-indicing, fights with itself, injures itself, inures itself on its own terms (which we experience as pain). — The Great Whatever

All this I agree he pretty much lays out and is not my disagreement.

Representation then arises as a way of doing this, by more effectively managing its own struggles, and creating codes, signs, and pathways for trying to satisfy the will by committing these injuries and winning these internal competitions. — The Great Whatever

THIS is where we disagree. Representation "arising" just does not make sense. Whether it is Schopenhauer or your interpretation of it, makes little difference to my argument in this case. Schopenhauer cannot have it both ways where Representation "arises", or "emerges" and have an atemporal Will or a non-temporal Will (or whatever way is best to describe this unity). The "arising" must be accounted for itself.

THIS is where we disagree. Representation "arising" just does not make sense. Whether it is Schopenhauer or your interpretation of it, makes little difference to my argument in this case. Schopenhauer cannot have it both ways where Representation "arises", or "emerges" and have an atemporal Will or a non-temporal Will (or whatever way is best to describe this unity). The "arising" must be accounted for itself. — schopenhauer1

Okay, sure. What can happen, though, is that the will in objectifying itself presents representation itself as arising in time, via presenting biological organisms arising in time who have representational capacities (and a past where there were none). If you like, from the atemporal perspective of the will itself this is a kind of illusion.

Okay, sure. What can happen, though, is that the will in objectifying itself presents representation itself as arising in time, — The Great Whatever

Ah, see I told you, you were going to "school" me on illusion :)! This all just seems like getting something from nothing. Your use of the word "arising" as if at point A is will at point B is the world of representation seems a category error as it makes no sense that there is arising in an atemporal unity. Your use of the word illusion as a way to be the final word, when the idea of illusion itself makes no sense when there is just unity. If all is one, there cannot be room for One and Illusion, it is just a meta-version of subject/object, the exact thing you say does not exist. One/Illusion is just a replacement for subject/object and you simply have the same problem with different terms.

The will just swerves its way into representation, I guess.

It does seem confusing to explain the 'arising' of representation in instrumental terms, since there can be no instrumentality before that arising.

And it makes no sense to talk of strife outside temporality, though we can certainly talk about it outside kantian temporality which is linear and homogenous, analogous to geometrical space.

Ah, see I told you, you were going to "school" me on illusion :)! This all just seems like getting something from nothing. Your use of the word "arising" as if at point A is will at point B is the world of representation seems a category error as it makes no sense that there is arising in an atemporal unity. Your use of the word illusion as a way to be the final word, when the idea of illusion itself makes no sense when there is just unity. If all is one, there cannot be room for One and Illusion, it is just a meta-version of subject/object, the exact thing you say does not exist. One/Illusion is just a replacement for subject/object and you simply have the same problem with different terms. — schopenhauer1

I got into this a little with csalisbury before, but I think this is a fundamental misunderstanding of what an illusion is. It's not as if there is a new thing that arises, a second sort of thing, an illusion, that introduces a duality that now has to be explained. An illusion is just the mistaken conception that there is some new thing.

An illusion is just the mistaken conception that there is some new thing. — The Great Whatever

You keep trying to move the goal post but getting at the same problem. Then instead of illusion, you have to account for the "mistaken conception" when there is just Will. You can explain to me it is a result of will fighting itself and still not get anywhere.

All of a sudden you have wrought some sort of ontology of Will that seems more simple escoteric rhetoric. Two Wills don't make a right, they make a "mistaken conception"? I don't think so.

But that's simple. The misconception comes from thinking of time as if it were transcendentally real, rather than ideal, and so making category errors.

But that's simple. The misconception comes from thinking of time as if it were transcendentally real, rather than ideal, and so making category errors. — The Great Whatever

There cannot be misconception. All is Will.

This makes no sense, friend.

This makes no sense, friend. — The Great Whatever

That's what I'm saying!

Perhaps @csalisbury is right, Will just swerves into representation :).

No, I'm saying your objection doesn't make sense, because you're presenting two thing alongside one another as if they're contradictory when there's no clear sense in which they are.

Imagine if I said, 'there can't be trees -- all is plants.'

It's not as if there is a new thing that arises, a second sort of thing, an illusion, that introduces a duality that now has to be explained. An illusion is just the mistaken conception that there is some new thing.

I know we went over this above, but, as long as you don't reify illusions, it's perfectly legitimate to ask why the will suddenly wills illusorily, since it never had before.

No, I'm saying your objection doesn't make sense, because you're presenting two thing alongside one another as if they're contradictory when there's no clear sense in which they are.

Imagine if I said, 'there can't be trees -- all is plants.' — The Great Whatever

Well they are contradictory. You are presupposing that there is the misconception in the first place. How can a misconception exist alongside unity? In order to have misconception, you need to have something outside of itself. Well, that is why I say that an interpretation can be that the misconception is simply the other aspect of Will, which means, there is Will and representation as flip sides of each other, not one arising from the other. However, this still doesn't make sense, because then you have that pesky ever present first organism.

However, this still doesn't make sense, because then you have that pesky ever present first organism. — schopenhauer1

Okay, I really don't want to continue this conversation anymore. I'm sorry, I just don't think it will be profitable, given that you're still on this and nothing that I say seems to help clarify what you want or mean.

Sorry, I think I lost the plot a bit. Yes, I agree that your closeness to someone is what makes it painful for them if you die, which in turn is a deincentive to killing yourself so as not to hurt them. But no, I don't think closeness generally is the cause of suffering, since you will suffer no matter what, only in different ways, if that closeness is abandoned.

Oh, I wasn't arguing that closeness generally is the cause of suffering. We were talking about why people, yourself included, are averse to hurting family - in particular, through suicide. I contended it had something to do with compassion. You mentioned it had more to do with convention. We went back and forth about what that meant exactly. But I think we agree, at least, that it has to do with 'closeness.' I think 'closeness' brings us v close to compassion.

Compassion can be conventional, though. I do believe in compassion, but I doubt it's the watery-eyed universal force that a kind of Christian sentimentalism would have us believe.

Okay, I really don't want to continue this conversation anymore. I'm sorry, I just don't think it will be profitable, given that you're still on this and nothing that I say seems to help clarify what you want or mean. — The Great Whatever

It's not that it doesn't clarify, it just doesn't answer it. You keep changing the terms and thinking you are going to get a different result. Will/Illusion.. Will/Misconception.. there is always a dichotomy and not a unity. "No No No" you say.. "misconception is some sort of meta meta, where the Will fools itself that it is itself".. And of course the fact that there is this "fooling itself" in the first place is the very thing to be explained. Will/Will-fooling-itself is still pretty much the same dichotomy of will and representation.

Look, I really don't want to continue this. I refer you to my previous comments on illusion. Illusion is not some kind of 'second substance' or something like that.

Look, I really don't want to continue this. I refer you to my previous comments on illusion. Illusion is not some kind of 'second substance' or something like that. — The Great Whatever

And I acknowledge that, and thus the Will/Illusion dichotomy is ever present.