I'm using scope specifically for the range of the belief. What S says would seem to be irrelevant.

And no, I'm not just avoiding giving a straight answer. Scope is a point of logic, rather than of conversation.

Okay. No problem. I'm just attempting to understand the position you're defending.

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time? — creativesoul

Form the OP, beliefs explain, but do not determine, actions. Any belief can be made to account for any action, by adding suitable auxiliary beliefs.

So they are not determined.

Are you asking how one decides that S believes p? Well, by their actions, including what they say.

Again, it seems the core reasons for talking about beliefs are firstly in order to differentiate times when we are wrong or mistaken - when our beliefs are not true; and secondly to explain actions: S went to the fruit because he wanted an apple and believed there was fruit in the bowl.

"The clock is not broken" has to stay within the scope of S's belief. And it seems to me that you miss this. — Banno

How do you determine what would be included or not within the scope of S's belief at any given time?

I don't see a difference between that question and your previous one. That S believes the clock is broken was specified, by you.

You emphasized that a certain proposition had "to stay within the scope of S's belief". I'm asking how you determine what must be included or not within the scope of S's belief. Rules? Intuition? What S would assent to at the time?

That S believes the clock is broken was specified, by you. — Banno

That's not true.

That's not true. — creativesoul

Yep. My bad. This whole process is so wearisome, I lost track. My apologies. You specified that S believed the clock was working. That's what I'm working from.

Do you need me to guess your argument again? You claimed something like "S believes that the broken clock is working" and now perhaps you want to know why it's that the clock is working that is in the belief and not that the clock is broken?

Well, right back in my first couple of replies I pointed out an ambiguity. We're just assuming that S does not believe that the clock is both broken and working - that S is reasonable.

This discussion is about conventional belief ascription practices, particularly regarding propositional attitude reports.

I'm claiming that we sometimes believe that a broken clock is working, but never do we ever believe that "a broken clock is working" is true.

Do you agree with what I'm claiming... as set out directly above?

I'm tired of this constipated approach. Sure.

Make an argument.

p1 Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working
p2 We never believe that "a broken clock is working" is true
C Not all belief is equivalent to propositional attitude

It's invalid, and P1 is ambiguous in the way already discussed.

How is it invalid?

:lol:

By the conclusion not following from the premises. Indeed, "propositional attitude" is not even mentioned in the premises.

P1. Sometimes we believe, of a broken clock, that it is working.

The propositional content here is "the clock is working"; the bit after "that".

This is not an example of a belief that does nto have a propositional content.

True, but p2 sets out a propositional attitude. Does it not?

If one believes that there is a tree in the yard, and we adhere to the conventional propositional attitude reporting practices, then we say S has an attitude/disposition towards the proposition "there is a tree in the yard" such that they believe it to be true.

We cannot do this with this example.

We do not believe (a clock is both broken and not broken)

You're saying that "a clock is both broken and not broken" is not a proposition?

No. I'm wondering why you keep changing the example.

P1. Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working.

The propositional content here is "a broken clock is working"; the bit after "that".

This is not an example of a belief that does not have a propositional content. It is an example of a belief that we can have even though we would not agree to the propositional content at the time. This belief, when put into propositional terms, is not something that we would assent to at the time.

That seems to me to cause a problem for the current belief attribution practices...

Disquotation:If an agent A sincerely, reflectively, and competently accepts a sentence s (under circumstances properly related to a context c), then A believes, at the time of c, what s expresses in c.

I'm wondering why you keep changing the example. — creativesoul

You're having a lend.

:confused:

Maybe a different tack...

False belief cannot be true
S's belief is false
"That clock is working" can be true
"That clock is working" cannot be S's belief

:brow:

False belief cannot be true
S's belief is false
"That clock is working" can be true
"That clock is working" cannot be S's belief — creativesoul

This just says that S has a false belief. Yep.

You're having a lend.

You're running the conversation. Nothing you have said makes a case for there being beliefs that are not propositional.

For three pages.

I'm not offering an example of beliefs that are not propositional. Language less belief does that. This example shows the inherent inadequacy regarding disquotation and belief as propositional attitude.

False belief cannot be true
S's belief is false
"That clock is working" can be true
"That clock is working" cannot be S's belief — creativesoul

The above negates your rendering.

You're running the conversation. — Banno

That's never true with your threads!

:cool:

Sometimes we believe that a broken clock is working. — creativesoul

Again, this is ambiguous. It might be either

Sometimes we believe that a clock is both broken and not broken

or

The clock is broken and sometimes we believe that it is not broken.

De dicto/ de re.

Where does disquotation fit here? Why are you now talking about theories of truth?

I'm finding this too ridiculous. Walking away.

Suit yourself.

Ignoring the negation does not make it go away.

Where does disquotation fit here? Why are you now talking about theories of truth? — Banno

The SEP article on propositional attitude reports places the practice under scrutiny as well, although Kripke and Frege take different issue than I. Disquotation plays a role in the practice you're employing.