I think Kant is right on the point that we can't know an object freed of all subjective interpretation. — Hanover
I'm not sure Kant is wrong. For Kant to be wrong, I think the transcendental aesthetic must fall - without collapsing the transcendental aesthetic, I don't think it's possible to show that Kant is wrong. — Agustino
For example, given the transcendental aesthetic this is wrong. Those "intelligible objects" are given at minimum mediately, through the pure intuition of time. Thus, they are not given as they are in-themselves, but as they are in time. — Agustino
It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover
What are those metaphysical principles? The Transcendental Aesthetic is not super long (well, it is long, but not super long), so we can quote at length from it:There's a lot of good insight in the transcendental aesthetic, but it's doubtful whether the metaphysical principles which it is based in are acceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what this means from within Kant's system. "Physical existence" is not something different from the phenomena, so we can't apprehend it by means of phenomena - "physical existence" just is the phenomenon.Consider that physical existence, which we apprehend through the senses, by means of phenomena, is "in itself" noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover
In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.
The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.
I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. — Kant
What does it mean to apprehend directly with the intellect? Anything that the intellect apprehends has already passed through the "filter" of the pure intuition - it must pass through that filter in order to be individuated and be an object of awareness at all.It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here's what that means:Notice that Kant even describes the intuition of time as an "internal" intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover
I suggest you re-read the Transcendental Aesthetic quickly (or at least the relevant parts) since otherwise it will be difficult for me to tell you at each and every point how Kant uses his technical terms, so that we can be talking about the same thing.Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone. On the other hand, because all representations, whether they have or have not external things for their objects, still in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state; and because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, to time—time is a condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever—the immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition of all external phenomena. If I can say a priori, “All outward phenomena are in space, and determined a priori according to the relations of space,” I can also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm universally, “All phenomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time.” — Kant
It is "internal" in the sense that it applies to our subjective world as well - to what thoughts we have and, in short, to our intellect.As an internal intuition it is distinct from the phenomenal influence of sensation, and therefore must be a direct intuition of the noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover
But our apprehension of our own being is given through the mind right? And the mind thinks successively, not all at once. Thus this aspect of ourselves presupposes time.So our intuitions of time may be derived from our direct access to the noumena through the apprehension of our own being, rather than what you describe, as the intuition of time being a medium between oneself and the noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative. — Hanover
I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative. — Hanover
But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant
So it's like this. Sense impressions are given within the pure intuition (of space and time), and structured under the categories of the understanding (like causality).
...
What does it mean to apprehend directly with the intellect? Anything that the intellect apprehends has already passed through the "filter" of the pure intuition - it must pass through that filter in order to be individuated and be an object of awareness at all. — Agustino
I suggest you re-read the Transcendental Aesthetic quickly (or at least the relevant parts) since otherwise it will be difficult for me to tell you at each and every point how Kant uses his technical terms, so that we can be talking about the same thing. — Agustino
But our apprehension of our own being is given through the mind right? And the mind thinks successively, not all at once. Thus this aspect of ourselves presupposes time. — Agustino
There is a problem with the traditional sense of "intuition". Philosophers have used it as a coverup, when they didn't know how to explain how something came about. Why is it that so and so is true? Oh, it's an intuition. If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner.The point is that in the traditional sense of "intuition" an intuition is the direct apprehension of an intelligible object with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why are intelligible objects noumena? And what does it even mean "intelligible objects"? When you are critiquing a system of philosophy, you should first try to get into it, and critique it from inside. That is what Socrates was doing - he would get into what his interlocutors were saying, and show inconsistencies from the inside.So Kant denies the possibility of apprehending intelligible objects (noumena) direct with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
I quoted it already before. Did you read it?What do you mean by "pure intuition"? — Metaphysician Undercover
And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. — Kant
A pure intuition is what is left when you abstract sensation and the categories that are imposed by the understanding.What could a pure intuition be? — Metaphysician Undercover
So you start out with an empirical (or impure intuition) you abstract sensation and the categories of the understanding from it (like causality), and then you're left with pure intuition, which are space and time.Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. — Kant
No, I read those words guiding myself by the larger context and the way Kant has defined them.So, is it the case, that if you don't like certain words in the text, you simply leave them out of your interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a problem with the traditional sense of "intuition". Philosophers have used it as a coverup, when they didn't know how to explain how something came about. Why is it that so and so is true? Oh, it's an intuition. If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner. — Agustino
Why are intelligible objects noumena? And what does it even mean "intelligible objects"? — Agustino
A pure intuition is what is left when you abstract sensation and the categories that are imposed by the understanding. — Agustino
But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant
You need to make an effort and use terms as Kant means and uses them. You can't just start using terms your way if you want to discuss this. — Agustino
Hmm no, I believe I misunderstood what you meant at first. I thought you did not understand that there was a form which was given through the pure intuition of space & time and also through the understanding.OK, but when you previously answered 'no' to this it seemed as though you wanted to deny that sensation, for Kant, is formless. — Janus
Hm? I never claimed not to have studied Kant/Schopenhauer (especially in-so-far as metaphysics is concerned). It's Hegel and the other German Idealists that you have certainly studied more than me.And this is puzzling beacuse you should know from previous conversations that, from your own admission, I have studied Kant, and German Idealism in general (with the exception of Schopenhauer who I have little regard for) far more than you have. — Janus
If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner. — Agustino
I never claimed not to have studied Kant/Schopenhauer (especially in-so-far as metaphysics is concerned). It's Hegel and the other German Idealists that you have certainly studied more than me. — Agustino
Sorry, I didn't mean to put that in an insulting way (as in, saying that you don't know Kant), I simply didn't understand what you meant by your question. Maybe not being a native speaker doesn't help here.OK, I don't want to get into arguing over who has studied what more; perhaps I was mistaken in my impression that you were familiar with Kant mainly through the lens of Schopenhauer (if that can be counted as being familiar with Kant). In any case I thought you were aware that I have studied Kant's critical philosophy sporadically yet consistently for more than twenty years, a fact which would make it surprising if I were not aware of something so fundamental to Kant's thought. — Janus
Yes.Kant denied that there is intellectual intuition in the very sense that Spinoza (probably following Descartes) claimed is the highest form of intellectual knowledge. "Intuition' for Kant denotes something like 'sense perception'. — Janus
Sorry, I didn't mean to put that in an insulting way (as in, saying that you don't know Kant), I simply didn't understand what you meant by your question. Maybe not being a native speaker doesn't help here.
And I don't prejudge people by how much they studied a certain thinker, it is possible to be mistaken about details even if you have spent a long time studying a certain thinker, especially one who makes as many distinctions as Kant. — Agustino
Also, not quite sure why you say that someone who studies Schopenhauer won't be familiar with Kant - that is somewhat strange. — Agustino
With regards to Schopenhauer, yes, I think Schopenhauer is more complete and coherent than Kant in his metaphysics. — Agustino
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.