but it intrigues me as to why TGW thinks that consciousness must be defined in terms of qualia. — John
The very fact that it is widely rejected by philosophers shows that it is far from being a necessary idea. — John
I am not sure what is more immediate than the warmth and cold of touch, the taste of ice cream, the color of the sky, smell of something cooking, and the sound of a familiar song. — schopenhauer1
Why do think the things you list are qualia? Remember qualia are defined as something like 'qualities of experience'. I would say that when you see the blue sky you see blue sky not a quality of blueness or the experience of blueness. And likewise for your other examples. — John
I would say that when you see the blue sky you see blue sky not a quality of blueness or the experience of blueness. — John
I don't think so. Consciousness is ordinarily understood to be consciousness of oneself, other people, animals, things, thoughts, bodily feelings, emotions, memories, not qualia. — John
The notion 'qualia' is itself not a naturally occurring, ordinary everyday idea, but an artificially produced, extraordinary philosophical idea, probably incomprehensible to, and certainly not spontaneously entertained by, most people. — John
The very fact that it is widely rejected by philosophers shows that it is far from being a necessary idea. — John
There's a difference between the intentionality of experience (the blue sky) and the substance of experience (the qualia, allegedly). — Michael
The notion 'qualia' is itself not a naturally occurring, ordinary everyday idea, but an artificially produced, extraordinary philosophical idea, probably incomprehensible to, and certainly not spontaneously entertained by, most people. — John
than it is of seeing a blue sky. I would say the notion of seeing "immediate sensations of quality" is secondary to and derivative of seeing anything as something.immediate sensations of quality such as blueness — schopenhauer1
than it is of seeing a blue sky. I would say the notion of seeing "immediate sensations of quality" is secondary to and derivative of seeing anything as something. — John
They are not examples of not seeing something as something. You see an afterimage as an afterimage. a light flashed at you as a light flashed at you, scintillating scotoma as scintillating scotoma and so on. Otherwise how would you be able to identify and differentiate those experiences as such? — John
Remember, seeing something indefinite counts as seeing something as something as much as seeing something definite does. Both experiences are always already conceptually articulated. — John
Not really, no. You don't have to individuate something as 'a flash of light' to experience a flash of light. In fact that would make seeing really fucking hard, you'd never be able to see anything, always having to think about what it was before you could experience anything. — The Great Whatever
and philosophical positions generally do not admit of evidence, — John
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