that is more palatable than idealism. — MetaphysicsNow

And then, the question is ‘why’. What is so unpalatable about the irreducible nature of mind? Why is that such a boogeyman? It seems to me an illustration of the incredible things people will be prepared to entertain, just to avoid the possibility that materialism might not be real. Not trying to argue the case, only for reflection on it.

And then, the question is ‘why’. What is so unpalatable about the irreducible nature of mind? Why is that such a boogeyman? It seems to me an illustration of the incredible things people will be prepared to entertain, just to avoid the possibility that materialism might not be real. Not trying to argue the case, only for reflection on it. — Wayfarer

I think it just comes down to one's fundamental philosophy, especially one's position on universals.

It seems to me that you start with mind (a universal) and your ontology follows from that. What seems incredible to you, and yet seems reasonable to a materialist, is just a function of where one starts from. For a materialist, quantum mysticism seems incredible.

I agree. But I think that the Platonist insight into the reality of incorporeal entities (universals and the like) requires a genuine meta-cognitive shift - a gestalt shift, if you like.

Years ago, there were books published with 'magic eye' puzzles in them. They looked just like completely random patterns of colours and shapes until you held them in a particular way at an arm's length from your eyes, then suddenly an image would come into focus.

Apparently, anyway. I never saw it. ;-)

But I think that the Platonist insight into the reality of incorporeal entities (universals and the like) requires a genuine meta-cognitive shift - a gestalt shift, if you like. — Wayfarer

True, but genuine cognitive shifts don't have to end there. As you know, Aristotle was well-versed in Plato's ideas and his hylomorphism retained universals sans the Platonic reification.

Aristotle's position stands in contrast to both Platonic idealism and Democretean materialism. An Hegelian synthesis perhaps.

I'd be interested in your take on this blog post; I myself find it quite persuasive, and it is said to be written from the perspective of Aristotelianism.

Yes I agree with the blog post - I think the basic argument boils down to both form and matter being indispensable categories that aren't reducible to the other.

So materialism fails when it eliminates form and idealism fails when it eliminates matter. Hence hylomorphism.

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