More Is Different

Streetlight

A while ago, I wrote this, on the topic of 'reductionism':

"Most definitions of reductionism are terrible, and tend to resolve into some sort of useless tautology; "reductionism means that everything can be reduced to..."; To treat reductionism rigorously however, is to recognize that 'reductionism' simply means context invarience. It says: here is an explanation of the thing, and this explanation holds irrespective of context". On this understanding, reductionism is a one-way street: it means explaning the thing from the inside-out, and never the outside-in, which is why reductionist explanations are always accompanied by the phrase 'is only', as in, such and such 'is only...' (...atoms at work, ...God at work, etc - there are material reductionisms no less than there are idealist and spiritualist reductionisms).

I still think this understanding of reductionism is mostly right, but I think it can also be expanded. P. W. Anderson, the Nobel prize-winning physicist, draws out what I think are the implications of denying this kind of - let's call it - 'one-way street' reductionism: "The main fallacy in this kind of thinking is that the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a 'constructionist' one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the more elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the science, much less to those of societies". (Anderson, "More Is Different").

This 'inability to reconstruct the universe' from first principles is, I think, the exact corollary of understanding reductionism as context-invarience: it means that there is no one-way street, and that explanation (of any phenomenon) needs to be (at least) 'two way' - context matters. David Pines and Robert Laughlin, two physicists who themselves have written much on the poverty of 'theories of everything', put it this way: "If you are locked in a room with the system Hamiltonian, you can't figure the rules out in the absence of experiment, and hand-shaking between theory and experiment" (source): that is, if you are locked in a room with an equation that describes the behaviour of any system, you can't reconstruct that system without actually getting one's hands dirty and doing the experiments.

There are a few directions one can take this. One is that science itself does not - despite popular misconceptions, often spread by philosophically inept scientists themselves - sanction any kind of reductionist metaphysics. As Anderson himself understood, there are no 'base levels' of reality any more fundamental to any other, insofar as "at each new level of complexity entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new behaviours requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature as any other" (my emphasis). For Anderson, even science itself is internally differentiated such that principles used at one level of scientific investigation cannot be used to explain phenomena at another level - which is of course obvious to anyone who has even more than a casual acquaintance with science, insofar as one doesn't use the laws of solid state physics to explain ecosystem evolution: hence Anderson's slogan - 'More Is Different [pdf]'.

Another implication here is that science is always specific: 'is only' ought to never figure in the vocabulary of anyone who claims fidelity to the scientific method. Instead, explanation in the sciences always amounts to - in the words of Isabelle Stengers: "this..., but in other circumstances that ... or yet again that..." (Stengers, Power and Invention).

Galuchat

↪StreetlightX

This agrees with:

1) Lower levels of description always underdetermine higher levels. Newell, A. (1990). Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and

2) Data are not accessed and elaborated independently of a level of abstraction. Floridi, L. (2010). Information: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Streetlight

Hah, I've read that Floridi book - pamphlet, really - but unfortunately found it so painfully average that I think that connection would have escaped me entirely. I can't speak for Newell, but the idea that "lower levels of description always underdetermine higher levels" sounds about right.

Galuchat

Hah, I've read that Floridi book - pamphlet, really - but unfortunately found it so painfully average that I think that connection would have escaped me entirely. — StreetlightX

Perhaps you could clarify/answer the symbol grounding problem Floridi raises (i.e., "how data can come to have an assigned meaning and function in a semiotic system like a natural language")?

I currently see the notion of data as foundational to scientific theories and the systems they explain, being inclined to view natural laws rather as natural syntax (i.e., encoding/decoding principles), and natural codes as transformed, translated, or converted natural data.

Streetlight

Perhaps you could clarify/answer the symbol grounding problem Floridi raises (i.e., "how data can come to have an assigned meaning and function in a semiotic system like a natural language")? — Galuchat

I have vague intuitions about this question, but I'm still lacking the conceptual clarity I need to really address it properly. There's a whole nexus of terms - around embodiment, gesture, sense, and asymmetry that I need to do more research on, and am planning to do in the future.

T Clark

I still think this understanding of reductionism is mostly right, but I think it can also be expanded. P. W. Anderson, the Nobel prize-winning physicist, draws out what I think are the implications of denying this kind of - let's call it - 'one-way street' reductionism: "The main fallacy in this kind of thinking is that the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a 'constructionist' one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the more elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the science, much less to those of societies". (Anderson, "More Is Different"). — StreetlightX

I was looking through Wikipedia trying to figure out what this "symmetry breaking" StreetlightX and Apokrisis are always talking about. I found a reference to the Anderson paper. It's wonderful. He writes clearly and conversationally without oversimplifying. I especially liked the passage you quoted above.

I still haven't figured out what "symmetry breaking" means or how it relates to emergence. I'll keep trying.

Streetlight

↪T Clark

Here is one of the clearest primers I know, although it explains it through reference to Merleau-Ponty.

But yeah, the Anderson paper is awesome. I couldn't not talk about it.

I think I should have named this thread something like: Reductionism is Bad Science or somewhat.

T Clark

Here is one of the clearest primers I know, although it explains it through reference to Merleau-Ponty. — StreetlightX

Read it. Knocked my socks off. I only understood about 1/3 of it. Need to read it again. This changes everything. It puts words to things I've felt, but in the process requires me to change my entire understanding of how the universe works. I can't imagine anything more radical. Quantum mechanics is easier because I don't have to understand it, I only have to believe that things behave the way scientists say they do.

Thank you.

Caldwell

This 'inability to reconstruct the universe' from first principles is, I think, the exact corollary of understanding reductionism as context-invarience: it means that there is no one-way street, and that explanation (of any phenomenon) needs to be (at least) 'two way' - context matters. — StreetlightX

Excellent post!
Phenomena and processes are 'complex' in the philosophical sense (of course, that is also true if strictly science). Reductionism in the true sense of existence denies the complex and what's left is ultimately the indivisible something -- say an atom. I don't suppose the (old) traditional reductionists would want to change the entire meaning of their endeavor. Reductionism is about what is ultimately cannot be denied.

Caldwell

I realize I am sort of defending the traditional reductionism even through I am not a follower of this school of thought.

Streetlight

Phenomena and processes are 'complex' in the philosophical sense (of course, that is also true if strictly science). Reductionism in the true sense of existence denies the complex and what's left is ultimately the indivisible something -- say an atom. I don't suppose the (old) traditional reductionists would want to change the entire meaning of their endeavor. Reductionism is about what is ultimately cannot be denied.

I realize I am sort of defending the traditional reductionism even through I am not a follower of this school of thought. — Caldwell

Yeah, it's actually a really hard mindset to shed, and it inevitably creeps back when one isn't paying attention. It doesn't help when people talk about genes as 'the secret to life' or atoms as 'the building blocks of the universe', and so, as is often done in pop-sci presentations of these topics. It makes for good, bold headlines, but for horrible philosophy - not to mention science! In fact, the oddest thing about such reductionist programs is that, taken to their logical conclusion, the ability to reconstruct the universe from first principles is idealism in it's most extreme form; they literally 'vacate the world of its content' as it were, giving up empiricism - the very loadstone of science - for ideality. Yet this almost entirely antiscientific POV is what is almost universally associated with so-called 'hard core science'. It's both bizarre and saddening.

'Complexity' - a different, but related topic - is also another one of those concepts that is generally often defined in vague, imprecise ways (usually circularly as well: 'what is complex is what cannot be broken down into simple parts.... which is to say that it is complex'; or the even worse and more fuzzy 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts'.). The only definition of complexity with rigour that I know of is Robert Rosen's, which 'relativizes' complexity to our ability to model a particular system, and stipulates that a complex system is one with no 'largest model' - no single model that can capture all the dynamics of such a system. There's a nice summary of it here.

I can't imagine anything more radical. Quantum mechanics is easier because I don't have to understand it, I only have to believe that things behave the way scientists say they do.
— T Clark

T Clark

I can't imagine anything more radical. Quantum mechanics is easier because I don't have to understand it, I only have to believe that things behave the way scientists say they do. — T Clark

Serious. As I said, QM is just the way things are. I don't feel any ontological agita. Why would you expect things to behave the same at atomic scale as it does at human scale. I hate it when people, even physicists, get all excited and talk about "quantum weirdness" as if they're Neil DeGrasse Tyson, that son of a bitch. This stuff makes me rethink how the universe works.

Pierre-Normand

A while ago, I wrote this, on the topic of 'reductionism': — StreetlightX

Very nice OP, and thanks for the links to the texts by P. W. Anderson; by Noah Moss Brender; and by R. B. Laughlin and David Pines. I now know what I'm going to be reading tomorrow.

Regarding the issue of context, here is a relevant quote from Patrick Aidan Heelan's own preface* to his book The Observable: Heisenberg's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, which I was reading earlier tonight:

"I had found that phenomenology and hermeneutics were helpful in making sense of the distinction between classical physics and post-classical physics of relativity and quantum mechanics because these new philosophies had the capacity to explore the latent significance and function of context in both scientific traditions; ‘context’ was arguably the central innovative component of these physical theories that had revolutionized 20th century physics.

Specifically, the notion of context can be thought of as having two parts: a part internal to human consciousness, comprising the functions of meaning-making, meaning-using, and meaning-testing; and a part external to human consciousness, comprising the physical processes associated in human life with meaning-making, meaning-using, and meaning-testing. The internal part draws on the hermeneutic resources of intentionality, which is a technical term for the making, using, and testing of meanings. These hermeneutic resources include not only the habitual practices of categorizing what is represented in the sensory flux, but also habits of relating groups of categories to one another by higher-order explanatory laws (or theories). The external part of context acknowledges the physical aspects of the embodied practices of meaning-making, using, and testing, such as the organized conditions of the space and time of the laboratory bench and engagement with the ‘world’ through acts of measurement performed by a qualified embodied observer who, in his/her community of practice, has become skilled in ‘interpreting’ the measured scientific phenomenon as a datum, present as described within the context of the relevant categories and theories." (All italics in the original)

* There also is a preface by Michel Bitbol and another one by Babette Babich who edited to book after Heelan's passing. Bitbol's preface is outstanding.

T Clark

↪StreetlightX

Don't the processes discussed in the paper you referenced take all the mystery out of QM? Don't they explain how quantum behavior at atomic scale can emerge as classical behavior at human scale? Isn't that all that matters from an ontological point of view?

Pierre-Normand

Serious. As I said, QM is just the way things are. I don't feel any ontological agita. Why would you expect things to behave the same at atomic scale as it does at human scale. I hate it when people, even physicists, get all excited and talk about "quantum weirdness" as if they're Neil DeGrasse Tyson, that son of a bitch. This stuff makes me rethink how the universe works. — T Clark

Until just a few years ago I tended to share this judgement about the (lack of significant) philosophical significance of quantum mechanics. There is rather more to it than just a description of the way microphysical objects happen to behave, though. Maybe Bitbol's preface to Heelan's book would lead you to change your judgement about this topic. It is very short and entirely devoid of weirdness or woo. It's been published separately from the book, in case you would have some trouble locating it. (Search for 'Heelan' on this page).

Streetlight

Serious. As I said, QM is just the way things are. I don't feel any ontological agita. Why would you expect things to behave the same at atomic scale as it does at human scale. I hate it when people, even physicists, get all excited and talk about "quantum weirdness" as if they're Neil DeGrasse Tyson, that son of a bitch. This stuff makes me rethink how the universe works. — T Clark

Ooh, I see what you mean. But yes, all investigation ought to be scale specific - which is not to say that it isn't interesting or important to understand QM! In fact, even a minimal understanding of QM helps to explain why QM isn't super important at macro scales on the basis on QM itself. You don't need any fancy philosophy here at all. The first point and most important point to note is that QM does in fact apply at all scales. The question is over the effects of QM at macro scales, and it's that effects that are negligible. Why? First because Planck's constant ('h') is so, so tiny: 6.626176 x 10^-34 (as Karen Barad puts it, if you convert Planck's constant into a length, 'this length is so small that if you proposed to measure the diameter of an atom in Planck lengths and you counted one Planck length per second, it would take you ten billion times the current age of the universe."). And the second reason is that quantum effects take place at the order of the ratio between Planck's constant and mass (h/m): for objects with tiny mass - like an atom - that ratio is high. For objects with large mass, that ratio basically becomes negligible, but never non-zero.

Barad: "There is a common misconception (shared by some physicists as well as the general public) that quantum considerations apply only to the micro world. Some people think that the fact that h is very small means that the world is just as Newton says on a macroscopic scale. But this is to confuse practical considerations with more fundamental issues of principle. ... The fact that h (Planck’s constant) is small relative to the mass of large objects does not mean that Bohr’s insights apply only to microscopic objects. It does mean that the effects of the essential discontinuity may be less evident for relatively large objects, but they are not zero. To put it another way, no evidence exists to support the belief that the physical world is divided into two separate domains, each with its own set of physical laws: a microscopic domain governed by the laws of quantum physics, and a macroscopic domain governed by the laws of Newtonian physics". (Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway)

Streetlight

"I had found that phenomenology and hermeneutics were helpful in making sense of the distinction between classical physics and post-classical physics of relativity and quantum mechanics because these new philosophies had the capacity to explore the latent significance and function of context in both scientific traditions; ‘context’ was arguably the central innovative component of these physical theories that had revolutionized 20th century physics." — Pierre-Normand

It's odd isn't it? I mean, the idea that context matters is so simple an idea, yet it is routinely ignored despite it. And it provides such a simple retort to those who believe in atoms or genes or whathaveyou as constituting any kind of 'fundamental ground' for the rest of the world. Yet the only thing that's 'fundamental' is that everything can function differentially, depending on the context which explicates it:

"What counts is the question: of what is a body capable? And thereby he [Spinoza] sets out one of the most fundamental questions in his whole philosophy (before him there had been Hobbes and others) by saying that the only question is that we don't even know what a body is capable of, we prattle on about the soul and the mind and we don't know what a body can do. But a body must be defined by the ensemble of relations which compose it, or, what amounts to exactly the same thing, by its power of being affected." (Deleuze, Lecture on Spinoza).

Pierre-Normand

(Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway) — StreetlightX

I only read half of Meeting the Universe Halfway, a few years ago, not because it's not good -- it's excellent -- but because of time constraints. I'll come back to it eventually.

It's worth noting that although the smallness of Planck's constant entails that, for instances, for mesoscale sized bodies very much larger than electrons, Heisenberg's inequality relation relating the products of the uncertainties (or indeterminations) of the positions and momenta of such bodies to Planck's constant have little practical signifiance, measurements of observables that relate to individual photons or electrons *do* have immediate practical significance for the behaviors of the macroscopic measurement apparatuses that are set up for measuring them. The main reason for that is that the mutuality relations that hold between conjugate variables (complementary observables such as position and momentum) do not just affect how microphysical entities behave but limit what sorts of measurement apparatuses can be jointly implemented to probe the very same phenomena that they are measuring without destroying their very conditions of existence. So, just because microphysical phenomena can be effectively amplified by macroscopic apparatuses that interact with them, the finiteness of Planck's constant (i.e. the fact that it's larger than zero) has direct consequences for the structure of the phenomena that we can observe at the macroscopic scale, such as interference patterns. This constraint also undercuts the idea that the microscopic events that are being probed have their determinations independently from the instrumental contexts in which they are being measured, or so have Bohr and Heisenberg argued.

T Clark

It's odd isn't it? I mean, the idea that context matters is so simple an idea, yet it is routinely ignored despite it. And it provides such a simple retort to those who believe in atoms or genes or whathaveyou as constituting any kind of 'fundamental ground' for the rest of the world. Yet the only thing that's 'fundamental' is that everything can function differentially, depending on the context which explicates it: — StreetlightX

It doesn't seem as though this would be controversial, so how can any smart, competent physicist claim that physics can be reduced to particles spinning around in isolation from the rest of the world? I haven't taken physics in 30 years. Do they teach this now?

Pierre-Normand

It doesn't seem as though this would be controversial, so how can any smart, competent physicist claim that physics can be reduced to particles spinning around in isolation from the rest of the world? — T Clark

You can read the third chapter -- Two Cheers for Reductionism -- in Steven Weinberg's book Dreams of a Final Theory, for an instance of such an argument. Such reductionist authors don't reject the idea that the particles are interacting with the rest of the world, where the rest of the world is being characterized as just more particles (and fields), of course. They are saying that whatever complex phenomena "emerge" from such elementary interactions are "nothing over and above" the elementary particles that they are being constituted of, and the interactions between them. Weinberg attempts to cash out such ideas of ontological and explanatory reducibility in terms of "convergence of arrows of explanation" to a lower level of fundamental physics while relying entirely on a strikingly impoverished notion of what an explanation is.

Streetlight

↪T Clark

Yeah, having someone like Weinberg doesn't help, but I suspect that the basic answer is that it's not as 'pretty'. To say that everything is just 'atoms in motion' is an incredibly attractive thesis, a powerful-looking, parsimonious 'explanation' for things that absolves one from going out there and doing the hard work. It's good PR ('the God particle', 'Grand Unifying Theory', etc), and moreover, it has a long and rich history, which used to culminate in 'God' instead of 'atom'. But both are idealist claptrap.

The other reason is that science is, in general, methodologically reductionist: an experiment has value precisely to the extent that 'context' is, as much as possible, controlled for, such that we can track one variable while holding equal an entire background of other variables. 'Context' is exactly what you exclude in experimentation, all the better for experimental success. This is less a vice than a virtue however, and is one of the reasons science is so very powerful. In other words, reductionism works. The problem is when this necessary methodological reductionism is translated into, as it were, ontological premise.

So, just because microphysical phenomena can be effectively amplified by macroscopic apparatuses that interact with them, the finiteness of Planck's constant (i.e. the fact that it's larger than zero) has direct consequences for the structure of the phenomena that we can observe at the macroscopic scale, such as interference patterns. This constraint also undercuts the idea that the microscopic events that are being probed have their determinations independently from the instrumental contexts in which they are being measured, or so have Bohr and Heisenberg argued. — Pierre-Normand

Yeah, this makes alot of sense, and the implications of this kind of thinking are something I'm always keen to try and tease out. Also, Weinberg's 'arrows of explanation' are pretty much exactly the 'one way street' explnations I was aiming at in the OP.

Streetlight

↪Galuchat

Thinking a little about this in terms of information, part of what it means to subscribe to reductionism is to say that context contains no information, or rather, cannot function informationally. For example, in biology, people have had to work hard to demonstrate that information about gene expression (what DNA codes for) and heredity (what gets passed down from one generation to the next) is not contained in the genes alone: DNA alone is not sufficient a mechanism, on it's own, to constitute an organism. This is the case both ontogenetically (development of a single organism though it's life) and phylogenetically (evolution at the level of a species, from one organism to it's offspring).

Ontogenetically, the exact protein a DNA will code for will depend not only on it's so-called 'primary structure' (the precise order of amino acids coded for by DNA sequences), but also it's 'secondary' and 'tertiary' structure: that is, the local geometries of any one protein: the spacing between amino acids (are they folded into helixes or pleated into sheets?), as well as the timings and temporal sequences in which the protein is 'folded'. Space and time literally carry information regarding the 'end result' of what DNA codes for, in a way that is not itself contained in the DNA sequence (usually regulated by chemical gradients, electrical differentials, and maybe some other mechanisms).

Phylogenetically, what is 'passed down' from parent to child is also not 'only' contained in the DNA. Instead, information is carried by the entire 'developmental system', i.e. the entire environment in which the DNA is passed down, such that it too carries the information necessary for the development of the offspring.

In both cases, reductionism would require denying the informational role that context plays - 'context' being space, time and other mechanisms of heredity which specify how an organism will develop through it's lifetime. And again, to be against reductionism here is just to be for science, not against it; at least, it is to hew closer to the discoveries of science than any extra-scientific metaphysics which is foisted onto it from the outside. This obviously doesn't answer the symbol-grounding problem which you asked about, but it does imply thinking about 'symbols' differently: as not carriers of information in their own right, but as resources that need to be thought about in terms of wider, context-bearing processes.

Galuchat

Thinking a little about this in terms of information, part of what it means to subscribe to reductionism is to say that context contains no information, or rather, cannot function informationally. — StreetlightX

That would appear to be the case. Thanks for the gene expression example. Mention of developmental factors brought gene switching to mind. Since I'm currently focused on cognitive psychology, I tend to be more annoyed by attempts to explain mind solely in terms of brain anatomy and/or neurophysiology.

And again, to be against reductionism here is just to be for science, not against it; at least, it is to hew closer to the discoveries of science than any extra-scientific metaphysics which is foisted onto it from the outside. — StreetlightX

I agree. The problem is not one of restricting empirical investigation to a single level of abstraction, but of reaching inappropriate conclusions and deriving incoherent concepts from the results of those investigations.

This obviously doesn't answer the symbol-grounding problem which you asked about, but it does imply thinking about 'symbols' differently: as not carriers of information in their own right, but as resources that need to be thought about in terms of wider, context-bearing processes. — StreetlightX

Hence, the difference between data and information.
I'm in the process of reading the Brender paper to see if there are any insights worth pursuing.

T Clark

'Context' is exactly what you exclude in experimentation, all the better for experimental success. This is less a vice than a virtue however, and is one of the reasons science is so very powerful. In other words, reductionism works. The problem is when this necessary methodological reductionism is translated into, as it were, ontological premise. — StreetlightX

Isn't it more than just philosophical ontology? I've tried to pay attention to discussions over the past months that you and Apokrisis participated in relating to abiogenesis and the development of consciousness. There's no way those can be understood using a reductionist approach.

This is a pain in the ass. It's making me re-evaluate my understanding about the difference between facts as a matter of truth and ontology and epistemology as matters of choice.

T Clark

You can read the third chapter -- Two Cheers for Reductionism -- in Steven Weinberg's book Dreams of a Final Theory, for an instance of such an argument. — Pierre-Normand

Thanks. I'll take a look.

T Clark

That would appear to be the case. Thanks for the gene expression example. Mention of developmental factors brought gene switching to mind. — Galuchat

Here's a link to a discussion on gene expression that SLX started a few months ago. It really opened my eyes:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2235/networks-evolution-and-the-question-of-life/p1

Streetlight

↪T Clark

I'm glad you're finding some of these threads useful, or at least provocative! Note that the thread on gene expression is basically an example or a 'case' of the more generalized principles I've tried to outline in this thread: context always modifies the operation of the elements so contexualized - genes will express differently depending on 'context' (where here 'context' serves to cover a shit ton of interesting biology, only some of which I broached in that previous thread). And note also that the stuff I did speak of in that thread - re: gene networks - didn't even begin to broach the question of protein folding and the secondary and tertiary structures (along with their regulation) that also influence the production of a protein. The path from DNA to trait is basically an entire biological adventure (i.e. DNA = organism = wrong!)

Isn't it more than just philosophical ontology? — T Clark

As in?

T Clark

Isn't it more than just philosophical ontology?
— T Clark

As in? — StreetlightX

A couple of weeks ago I started a discussion - "An attempt to clarify my thoughts about metaphysics." I wanted to lay out my thoughts about the difference between questions of fact and questions of what I called "metaphysics." One of the upshots of the discussion is that I think calling it metaphysics is probably not right. At least it's misleading. The questions I was interested in were those that are not matters of fact, but are more a matter of choice about how you want to look at things, e.g. is there such a thing as objective reality? is there an objective morality? Is there free will? I have always said that type of question does not have a yes or no answer. It's a matter of usefulness, not truth.

The discussion we are having now is making me rethink that.

Caldwell

In fact, the oddest thing about such reductionist programs is that, taken to their logical conclusion, the ability to reconstruct the universe from first principles is idealism in it's most extreme form; they literally 'vacate the world of its content' as it were, giving up empiricism - the very loadstone of science - for ideality. Yet this almost entirely antiscientific POV is what is almost universally associated with so-called 'hard core science'. It's both bizarre and saddening.

The only definition of complexity with rigour that I know of is Robert Rosen's, which 'relativizes' complexity to our ability to model a particular system, — StreetlightX

(Good reference. I like Rosen's description of complex and simple).
Yes, reductionists could be easily read as idealists. After all, the exercise of their intellect is of a priori kind -- what we see is what we don't understand.
Reductionists are simply purists -- remove the clutter to get to the neat stuff. The point is not to reconstruct the universe, it is to see it as it really is.
To put it simply, to the reductionist, the universe is complete.

Streetlight

A couple of weeks ago I started a discussion - "An attempt to clarify my thoughts about metaphysics." I wanted to lay out my thoughts about the difference between questions of fact and questions of what I called "metaphysics." One of the upshots of the discussion is that I think calling it metaphysics is probably not right. At least it's misleading. The questions I was interested in were those that are not matters of fact, but are more a matter of choice about how you want to look at things, e.g. is there such a thing as objective reality? is there an objective morality? Is there free will? I have always said that type of question does not have a yes or no answer. It's a matter of usefulness, not truth.

The discussion we are having now is making me rethink that. — T Clark

Excellent :D This is, obviously, a different topic, but I think you're on exactly the right track; I don't think truth has ever been an index of philosophy, nor do I think it ought to be. As Deleuze says, philosophy lives and breathes not on truth, but on the Remarkable, the Interesting, and the Important: categories of sense, of significance. I would quibble about the the idea that it's a matter of 'choice' - philosophy or 'metaphysics' always arises, for me anyway, out of the necessity of responding to a problem, where the problem - whatever it is - is immanently defined by the solution which addresses it. But this is somewhat off-topic.

Streetlight

The point is not to reconstruct the universe, it is to see it as it really is. — Caldwell

Yes, but who doesn't claim to 'see things as they really are'? This is why I insisted, in the OP, on the rhetorical trope of the 'is only...' when it comes to reductionism. 'Is only' excludes, it denies, as I said, the informational capacity of context, it rules things out so as all the better to rule (one) thing(s) in - atom, mind, God, etc. It is simplicity bought at the price of simplification, in the most pejorative sense of that word.

More Is Different

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Categories