What is terrible is easy to endure
When he was already dying he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: “Living this blessed and also final day of my life I write this to you. Sufferings from strangury and dysentery are continually with me, and there is no way in which there could be any increase in their magnitude. Yet against them all I set the joy of my soul at the remembrance of our past conversations. But as for you: as befits your support of me and of philosophy since your youth, take care of Metrodorus’ children.”
Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans.
The insight being -- it's not that the trick of remembering good times is especially good. It's that the practice of philosophy is so good that all you need is a simple mental trick to endure any pain. — Moliere
I'd also say that though I find the extreme cases (which were relevant to the day, but I'm not so sure we care about invulnerability) hard to buy that there may still be something to the philosophy -- something reasonable and worthwhile -- when an Epicurean isn't trying to defend against counter-examples. If the Epicurean way of life could relieve pain, in the no-bullshit way of actually doing so (as opposed to having a practical benefit by simply believing that pain is easy to endure), then I'd still say that there's merit to the claim. — Moliere
And it strikes me that there are people who are better at coping with pain in their life, even if they are not going to stand up to torture. I could see how a disposition would lend itself to being able to endure pain, too. So, it seems to me, there's plausible reason for accepting that there might be some way to make one better able at coping with pain (though whether Epicurean philosophy actually accomplishes this is another question -- just saying I wouldn't write it off as absurd in lesser, more common, cases) — Moliere
I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. — The Great Whatever
What Epicurean wisdom amounts to, most generously interpreted, is a set of maxims for avoiding typical sources of pain in life — The Great Whatever
I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. — The Great Whatever
The Epicurean life is perhaps so simple and safe that it minimizes risks of certain pains, but even then it reifies certain things that are clearly instrumental, like eschewing luxury.
. Epicureanism and Stoicism create an image of a person who is able to deal with pain and whatnot by sheer will alone - what a strong person they must be! Essentially, these kinds of beliefs revolve around a quest for the ideal hero. — darthbarracuda
I think that certain deep anxious states (like common anxieties about their appearance and death) tends to not just be about the object of anxiety, but something rooted elsewhere. So the Epicurean Arguments that are laid out don't really serve as a good framework to the people who are grappling with those problems. It's the self's relation to the objects of their thoughts & emotions that's often more important. — Saphsin
I think this relation between to the self and the object tends to mean something unique to the experience for each person (a narrative) which is why I think you can often learn more insight from people who can empathize with your experiences (or can analyze them to a high degree) than from general practitioners who just happens to know a lot about how the mind works.
The great difficulty here is just how little that's left to infer from over the ages. But there's enough evidence to indicate that there's more to the philosophy than maxims. — Moliere
And the entire philosophy is not just about avoiding pain -- it's about living a happy life, and the answer to the happy life is pursuing pleasure in the correct way. — Moliere
Especially since, though it is hedonic, the Epicurean does not avoid pain, but deals with it (since pain is an inevitable part of life) — Moliere
What do you mean by reification? What idea are Epicureans treating like a thing? — Moliere
For example, the pursuit of luxury -- where men would pursue luxury as if it were something that can be held onto, Epicureans would say that an item of luxury is of course pleasurable, but that you are hurting yourself because of some idea you have about the luxurious lifestyle when you could just fulfill your desires which are natural to you and, thereby, be happy. — Moliere
Epicureanism's main thrust and appeal was that it was not esoteric, that anyone could practice it and reap its benefits. — The Great Whatever
So aside from the weakness of claiming there were (probably?) deeper doctrines that we don't and can't know about right now,
it seems that even if this is true it's not going to save the common case, which is what is so important to the Epicurean to begin with.
That correct way being the achievement specifically of static pleasure, which is the freedom from pain. — The Great Whatever
But this is precisely what's under question. How does the Epicurean deal with pain? — The Great Whatever
Clearly it can't be by impotent mental tricks, which you seem to agree. But then, we seem to have no evidence that they do, except precisely by avoiding it, which is what the Epicurean recommendations amount to.
There is no such thing as an unnatural or unnecessary desire. Epicureans treat temporary, contingent, custom-bound properties of things (like the desire for a luxurious lifestyle) as if they were inherently bad in virtue of conflicting with a static human nature. This is reification because it takes what is situational and treats it as essential. There is nothing good or bad about wanting a luxurious lifestyle in of itself. — The Great Whatever
But there may be circumstances in which the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle is beneficial. Doctrines about what is natural or unnatural -- which a naturalistic eudaimonism like Epicureanism must commit itself to -- must perform these reifications, or else collapse into a different kind of hedonism (I would say a genuine hedonism) that treats pleasure as good on its own terms rather than because it checks off certain requirements having to do with final ends and human nature. — The Great Whatever
As for "probably" -- if we accept Diogenes Laertius as a source when describing rather than quoting (as I do in the beginning of the post -- where the quote about being happy on the rack comes from, though it is problematic), then he describes several texts Epicurus wrote, including one called On Nature comprising of 37 books. — Moliere
Sort of. First, the division between static and dynamic pleasure is not necessarily an Epicurean one. This way of understanding Epicureanism is at least contended in the literature, and I haven't been able to find the division in the Epicurean texts. If you know where to look I'd be much obliged to you for pointing this out. — Moliere
He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both [...] So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."
Under this rubric I'd categorize the avoidance of bodily pain as natural but unnecessary — Moliere
We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.
I'll remention here because I'd like to see what you think of the argument: Children feel pain to a greater degree than adults do from the same sources of pain. You burn your hand on a stove you don't go crying about it. You may not be a happy Epicurean, but there's a difference in the feeling of pain between these two events. I'd say that this is due to development in dealing with pain. If that were the case, then it seems plausible, at least, that we could further develop ourselves so that pain is less of a nuisance (easy to endure), no? — Moliere
So I suppose that while I agree with you that "human nature" is a reification, I'd just note that it's a practical one which yields practical knowledge (which is contingent, as you note), if not universal knowledge. (which would be a strike against the Epicurean claim to a universal cure -- but the notion of a universal cure is not what I would defend. I fully confess that I doubt this. My aim is to understand what is valuable, though, rather than discount Epicureanism on some of its more exaggerated claims which were more a product of the state of ethics at the time, so I would argue). — Moliere
I would note here that it seems to me your notion of genuine hedonism here seems to be committed to a theory of pleasure which states that pleasure is subjective, empirical (as in, one has to try things out, not in any scientific sense), and phenomenological as I mentioned earlier.
Would you say that's true or false? I'm just guessing because that strikes me as a good approximation of how people talk about pleasure. — Moliere
...we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing
Which would highlight where you differ from the Epicureans. But if that be the case then I would at least float the idea (to see how you would respond) that your disagreement is not with how Epicureans deal with pain (as a related aside, though not necessarily direct to Epicureanism: is pain not inevitable, after all? Won't every life feel pain?), but with their treatment of pleasure. — Moliere
If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever
But why would a work on nature be relevant? — The Great Whatever
Yeah, a pretty clear statement of the division is in Lives & Opinions 10.136: — The Great Whatever
From the Letter to Menoeceus:
We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.
My emphasis. I don't see any way to read this other than being free of bodily pain as being necessary for happiness. — The Great Whatever
One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself. The unwavering contemplation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. As soon as we achieve this state every storm in the soul is dispelled, since the animal is not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure
What I'm saying is, I don't see how this differs from simply conditioning oneself to feel less pain. — The Great Whatever
If you are asking whether pleasure is a feeling, then yes -- and I'd say also that I don't know of any way to understand pleasure except as feeling, to the extent that this seems not to be a theoretical commitment but rather a facet of competence with the lay concept. Epicurus at least seems to agree -- again from the letter:
...we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing
If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever
-Pleasure is good insofar as it is pleasant, not insofar as it services a notion of happiness or eudaimonia. Happiness, if there is such a thing, is worthwhile for pleasure's sake, not vice-versa. — The Great Whatever
Because it's nature which gives sense to the ethic -- in the world, as portrayed by Epicurus, the Epicurean doctrine is what makes sense. Further, it is human nature, in particular the nature of our soul, which gives the ethic its force. — Moliere
Lastly, it seems to go against the claim that epicurean philosophy is just a collection of maxims. Without having the actual texts it's not clear-cut -- but since Epicurus uses arguments in all of his letters, including the letters on nature, it would seem to me that we can't call Epicurean philosophy a collection of maxims only. — Moliere
However, I don't think that this division here goes against what I'm saying about Epicurus' theory of pleasure being central to the philosophy. I'd rather say that this is one way of summing up the philosophy, but that the majority of the philosophical work is being done by the theory of pleasure -- that this is the "main thrust", so to speak -- where the division between natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires is how a proper Epicurean is meant to sort their desires and then act to fulfill the first category in order to obtain the goal of peace of mind and freedom of bodily pain (which you may say I'm contradicting myself here -- I admit there's a tension, but I'm trying to figure out how to resolve that tension more than anything -- but perhaps freedom of bodily pain does not mean we do not feel bodily pain, but rather, a lesser degree of pain? At the least this would make sense if pain is inevitable, which would at least cohere well — Moliere
The other solution that comes to mind, for me, is to strike out the example that Diogenes Laertius uses of on the rack, since it is not in quotes, and simply give up the ground on invulnerability in all circumstances. But that wouldn't work to make sense of pain in the context of the ethics of the day, at least as I've come to understand them through the secondary literature. — Moliere
Does it have to differ? What if "conditioning oneself to feel less pain" is, more or less, what makes pain easy to endure? — Moliere
Subjective -- The person who feels pleasure is the one who can say whether or not this or that is pleasurable. The speaker has priority over anyone else on whether or not such-and-such is pleasurable.
Empirical -- One cannot know what is pleasurable without having tried this, that, or the other thing/activity/state/etc. You must try it out to know if something is or is not pleasurable.\
Phenomenological -- related to the first, but I like to state this explicity; pleasure is had only from a first-person perspective. I differentiate this from the first category only by saying that the first governs the rules by which we may speak of pleasure, while this latter point gives the ontological foundation for said rules. — Moliere
Now, having said this, there's something else that should be noted -- Epicurus' philosophy does not really focus much on particular actions or things. It's not that this, that, and the other are forbidden. And I don't think that a proper Epicurean would be against this, that, or the other on the basis that everyone will react to it in the same manner. So I don't think a charge of hubris would apply so easily, at least, as the strong statement above seems to indicate. There's plenty of leeway for "trying things out" and seeing what works for you in a particular circumstance. What is "fixed", so to speak, is fixed by human nature, and that leads to how we can free ourselves from anxiety, and thereby live a joyous life. — Moliere
On the rest of what you say I'll grant, though your fourth statement strikes me as odd. Here, however, I would note that you are in agreement with Epicurean philosophy. It's perhaps one of the strongest reasons I disagree with Epicureanism, in the end. But the Epicurean puts forth pleasure as the goal. — Moliere
I have doubts both that physics is foundationally relevant to ethics (perhaps it is instrumentally) and that the Epicureans did any useful physics. What we know of their theories makes them seem speculative and unhelpful. — The Great Whatever
But is there any real sense in which Epicurean views on nature tie organically to their ethical project? — The Great Whatever
It seems in the modern imagination the latter has retained some interest while the former hasn't in the slightest. Is everyone involved in modern Epicureanism just deluding themselves? And if not, doesn't that show the physical project to be of little importance?
I never said his theory of pleasure wasn't essential to the project, only that the Epicureans understand pleasure in a certain way, creating divisions between the static and the kinetic, and valuing the latter only insofar as it is on road to the former. Epicurean pleasure is negative and still, a pleasure of freedom from ill. The question as the letter points out is 'necessary for what?' If it's necessary for eudaimonia, the final end, and freedom from bodily pain is among what's necessary for this, there's just no getting around that you need to be free from bodily pain to be happy. And I think this is pretty obviously right. The problem is that once you admit this plausible principle, you're stuck as an Epicurean, because you have to say that the sage somehow must be able to avoid bodily pain with impunity, which he can't. The Epicurean wants, on the one hand, to have complete control and freedom over his life, and on the other, to base his ethics around what by its nature can't be controlled. I don't think there's a way of resolving this dilemma. — The Great Whatever
It's more than that -- it makes one tenet of the tetrapharmikos obviously false, which is what we started out with. I think an Epicurean philosophy that abandoned the abstract ideal of an invincible sage is perfectly coherent, but it goes against the spirit of the philosophy, and eudaimonistic philosophy generally. — The Great Whatever
There's a difference in what usually when we say we can cope with X, or get better at dealing with X, we don't mean we remove it, but make its presence more tolerable. If we could remove it, we exactly wouldn't have to cope with, or get better at dealing with, it. With pain this distinction seems not to hold. I can't make sense of undergoing pain and easing it -- to ease pain is simply for pain to go away. — The Great Whatever
But yes, pleasure is always from a first-person perspective, and nothing is essentially guaranteed to be pleasant or painful, and there is no ultimate measure of what is or is not either of these other than the feeling itself. — The Great Whatever
Epicurus seems to speak explicitly against luxury and sensuous gratification, in a sort of moralizing tone, and defensively as if he knows, claiming to be a hedonist, that people will accuse him of approving of or recommending these things. Certainly Epicureanism makes explicit universal recommendations for how one ought to live. — The Great Whatever
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