I look at it this way. Science and philosophy, while sharing some similarities, are methodologically distinct: the former is generally more experimental, and the latter generally more analytical.

According to their (constructed) models, some scientists make ontological/metaphysical commitments and some make ontological/metaphysical claims (where claims/proposals don't necessarily equate with commitments). Both approaches (commitments or claims) can still allow for practical development in science. This is because there can be instrumental value (i.e. instrumentalism) in how commitments/claims help develop ideas and outcomes, regardless of whether the commitments/claims are ontologically true.

The difference between an ontological claim and an ontological commitment is what, as far as you understand it? Is it that the former is always explicit, the latter not always so (i.e. might be implicit only in the use of such things as the principle of least action, as the web article suggests)?

The difference between an ontological claim and an ontological commitment is what, as far as you understand it?

Firstly, some ontological claims are identical with ontological commitments. That's why I wrote "where claims/proposals don't necessarily equate with commitments."

Ontological claims can be logical propositions about stuff that don't need to be committed to. For example, "I propose that based on model x and model y, String Theory could be true, but I'm not making an ontological commitment to it being true. String Theory could be true; it could also be false."

Ontological claims that aren't made from this logical perspecitve are identical to ontological commitments, which require a belief that some thing is the case, and it's not just a proposal one is considering or holding as a counterfactual, for example.

they tend to think that what they are doing commits them to nothing other than constructing models. — ProcastinationTomorrow

The scientific models allows for scientists to avoid absolute "commitments" because they are working with hypotheses and theories. The (good) scientist tests his/her hypotheses and upon reaching a point where it doesn't work, can go back and edit their assumptions until they find out what does work.

So, for instance, the scientist dropping an apple on the ground to test gravity assumes s/he and the apple are real--perhaps it would be difficult for the scientist to adjust a hypothesis if s/he found out his/her own existence was false :joke: but if the apple turned out not to exist, or be a helium balloon, or something like that, the scientist could, should, and hopefully would go back to the drawing board.

Of course, I'm talking about the ideal scientist--it is likely that many scientists could not be so open-minded about some of their metaphysics, especially those beliefs that we all rely on in our day to day lives.

Doesn't seem correct to me - I've met a few physicists in my time and they tend to think that what they are doing commits them to nothing other than constructing models. Are they wrong about that? — ProcastinationTomorrow

Seems to me that constructing models requires background assumptions - that's all metaphysics is, at least in the sense philosophy of science tends to use. Fundamentally, to construct models about reality presupposes that reality has some kind of formal, rational structure that can be modeled, typically with the use of numbers and logic.

Generally scientists are at least methodological, if not metaphysical naturalists, and work on science within this naturalistic framework. When approaching a question about the world, the explanation sought is one that is naturalistic and has no reference to something that cannot, in principle, be studied by science. Note that this does not entail circular scientism but rather is merely a methodological bracketing-off of anything not within the parameters of science.

Then, of course, there are the assumptions that other people do in fact exist, that there is actually a real, external world that continues to exist without our participation, that there are "laws" that are explicable mathematically, etc. Sometimes assumptions are proven false, or have to be revised: we call these paradigm shifts. Look at special relativity, biological evolution, quantum mechanics, etc.

Basically, then, if science is the study of the ontic, phenomenal, natural world, then there must be some basic assumptions ("metaphysical" ones), that are required for science to even get off the ground. These don't need to be complex, necessarily, and I hardly think scientists "need" metaphysicians to help them out. What's important to remember is that these are metaphysical, and not scientific, and that they can be up for debate, and, historically, have been. What's dangerous and incorrect is the ahistorical belief that science has operated under one continuous framework since its "inception", whenever that is claimed to be.

A lot of physics is done according to the ‘shut up and calculate’ approach, which means NOT discussing the various philosophical quandaries that are thrown up by physics, and just keeping your head down.

On the other hand, there is a huge and highly charged debate going on in current physics and cosmology, as to whether string theory and the speculative multiverse that flows from it, is really a matter for science or not. On the Nay side are those who say that these ideas can never be falsified even in principle, as they concern matters which are by definition outside the universe. On the Yay side are those who say that, because of the compelling nature of the mathematics and the solutions that these models offer to many intractable problems, then such speculations should be regarded as within the ambit of science. So part of this, is actually discarding Popper's idea of 'falsifiability' as a criterion for what constitutes a scientific hypothesis. And this is a debate that doesn't look like finishing any time soon. (Lots of useful discussion of it on Peter Woit's website Not Even Wrong, from the Nay perspective.)

On the other hand - one of the consequences of so-called Enlightenment thinking, is that science, and specifically physics, will do away with a lot of the 'fog of metaphysics'. It was felt that the useless scholastic blatherings about 'angels on the head of a pin' could be blown away by firm concentration on the undeniable objects of the physical realm.

Shame about supervenience superposition, then.

Enlighenment science may have gotten rid of one ‘fog of metaphysics’ only to replace it with the fog of physicalism. At least , according to a different and more more encompassing way ofunderstanding metaphysics than just via the issue of whether science can describe all aspects of reality.
According to this alternate perspective, any science , in any era, is always already a philosophical worldview , articulated via a particular vocabulary and methodology that marks it as science according to the conventions of that era.
A hot topic in current philosophy of mind is whether it’s time to jettison objectivist and physicalist presuppositions in the hard sciences, and how such a rethinking would change how science is practiced.
Nelson Goodman recognized the dependence of the objects of science on subjective construction.
“If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”

I think the idea of an initial singularity entails that the principle of sufficient reason is false but I've never seen a discussion of that problem - maybe because I haven't looked hard enough or because there is no entailment. Or because we can jettison sufficient reason without caring much. I don't know.

Hello Cuthbert - small clarification, the article I cited is talking about the principle of least action, not the principle of sufficient reason. I can see why an intial singularity would be anathema to the principle of sufficient reason, but not the principle of least action.

"..I hardly think scientists need metaphysicians to help them out". The article seems to suggest precisely the opposite. The idea seems to be that the principle of least action commits scientists to possibilia, scientists only treat of actuality, so metaphysicians must step in to sort it all out. I'm not saying the article is right about that by the way - but I do agree that scientists who think metaphysics should be buried are wrong.

Sure, but the general point that "modern physics is up to its eyeballs in metaphysical commitments it has nothing to say about" perhaps applies. I hear the impatience in the replies of physicists to the question 'What came before the Big Bang?' or 'What caused the Big Bang to happen when it did?' and an apparent lack of awareness by both physicists and questioners that these are metaphysical questions but not necessarily irrelevant ones.

According to this alternate perspective, any science , in any era, is always already a philosophical worldview , articulated via a particular vocabulary and methodology that marks it as science according to the conventions of that era. — Joshs

:up:

Agree with you entirely. Perhaps we should start up a separate discussion (if there isn't one already) on the principle of sufficient reason.

The only difference between physics and metaphysics is that claims made by the physicists are falsifiable, while metaphysical claims are not. Eventually they both have to be compatible with each other and cannot contradict each other.

Nelson Goodman recognized the dependence of the objects of science on subjective construction.
“If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.” — Joshs

Right, there are assumptions made about the nature of space, the nature of time, the nature of living beings, etc., which form the fundamental conventions that are used by science. These assumptions are the metaphysical principles which science relies on. When we apprehend these conventions as metaphysical principles rather than as brute facts, we see how metaphysics underlies science.

The blog post is weird in that it acts as though it's exposing some hidden or esoteric aspect of science that scientists have been doing their best to keep secret for fear of embarrassment or something. Which would be interesting if it wasn't for the fact that scientists deal with possibility all the time, and that wrangling with possibility is incredibly run-of-the-mill for everyday work both in and out of the lab,

Not only in the example given, but also in modelling exercises, which aim to do nothing less than track possibilities among actual systems. One can also think of the relevance of statistical thinking in biology and thermodynamics, not to mention quantum physics. Hell, cosmology even creates entire toy universes to play with so that they can shed more light on how our universe works. Feynman's sum-over-paths method of measuring particles literally assumes that a particle travels along all possible paths to get to a destination. It does this by quite literally mathematizing possibility. The idea that 'science only concerns itself with the actual' seems bizarre to say the least, and seems to evince nothing other than a poor and unrecognizable conception of science shared by no actual scientists. To this degree the blog seems to be beating on a wide open door, or at least an imaginary one.

If there's a grain of truth in the blog post it's that the exact ontological standing of 'possibility' is often left untheorized, but for the simple reason that it doesn't really need to be. If a prediction comes out right, or your model correctly tracks the phenomenon under investigation, then you've done your work as a scientist. One can employ possibility without ontologizing it. At the very least the post reeks of the same kind of arrogance and one-upmanship that it so dislikes, and so is as much a part of the problem it tries to diagnose.

I believe there is no meaningful difference to be made between scientific and metaphysical beliefs.

That being said, I have to echo some of what StreetlightX says above. The blog post does come across as a bit odd. In particular...

This physical system has a kinetic energy, determined by the velocity and mass of the javelin, and a potential energy, fixed at any moment by the javelin’s height above the ground and its weight. The physical quantity known as the action of this system is defined by physicists in terms of changes in these two quantities of energy over specific periods of time. The Principle of Least Action requires precisely and only one thing: that the actual value for the action of this system during any such interval should be the smallest it could possibly take. In this particular case, this translates into the requirement that during any period of the javelin’s flight, out of all the possible paths between its initial and final location for that period, the javelin must follow the path that ensures the action of the system will be zero. As it turns out, only one path meets this requirement, and it is the one that Newton’s laws of motion describe. So, Newton’s laws follow from the Principle of Least Action.

is just a bad argument. There is no such thing as "the action of this system", and the Principle of Least Action is something the writer is importing here. There isn't anything to be said about paths in basic energetic modeling, only that energy is neither created nor destroyed. So Kinetic Energy is converted into Potential Energy as the javelin travels to its apex, and converted back into Kinetic Energy as it descends to the Earth where it is transferred to the Earth upon impact. Further, motion is different from energy in that it has a direction that is specified, and deals in forces rather than in energy.

If the principle of least action requies that the actual value for the action of the system during any interval should be the smallest, such reasoning doesn't enter in arguing where the javelin is going to fall or what is going to happen. The writer may see something of his principle in basic motion puzzles, but I sure don't. It just seems inserted in the middle of a text-book problem meant to explain the basics of motion without doing any argumentative work, and then is assumed to be required.

If that be the case then the rest -- possibility, actuality, paths -- are likewise not really part of the reasoning, since they all follow from this principle.

While it's the case that metaphysics is part and parcel to science -- or so I believe -- I'd say the writer here is way off, and hasn't really done the work necessary to understand the science.

but I do agree that scientists who think metaphysics should be buried are wrong. — ProcastinationTomorrow

It's not about getting rid of metaphysics. To do science, you must do metaphysics. But the metaphysics scientists need to operate is not something only a metaphysician can figure out. The problem is not that metaphysicians are being ignored - the problem is that some scientists are ignoring metaphysics, and some metaphysicians are ignoring science. The ideal scientist should also be a philosopher, and vice versa. So you have some scientists who think "Science" is a magical, perfect, self-contained intellectual project that can do no wrong and will ultimately figure everything out, "given enough time" - this is a problem.

Typically these sorts of scientists (or science-fanatics) are annoying and not wise. They make grandiose claims about the scope and potential of science, with little to no actual evidence to back it up. There's science, and then there's scientism, and the problem is that the latter is being appropriated into the former, so that science must now necessarily be scientistic. With the development of any kind of monism, such as scientism, comes the threat of dogmatism, so that intellectual progress is no longer open and free but now constrained within the metaphysical parameters that are informed by a select few charismatic individuals and their biases. These people can, upon realizing their position of authority in the public eye, use their platform to push unscientific and sometimes immoral public policies.

There is something unsettling to me about power-structures, and science isn't exempt. In my opinion, scientific realism might be justified, but anti-realism certainly provides a solid foundation for healthy relationship between science and the rest of society. It keeps scientists from getting too arrogant and presumptuous, and it helps secure the freedom of individuals to choose a worldview that fits their way of life.

If a prediction comes out right, or your model correctly tracks the phenomenon under investigation, then you've done your work as a scientist. — StreetlightX

This is not at all true. Thales predicted a solar eclipse. Following motions, and predicting what will be where at a future time, does not conclude the work of a scientist. The scientist's endeavour is to produce a complete understanding of the phenomenon. This attitude, that the work of science is simply to predict, is a philosophic illness, a mental laze.

I agree the author of the article seems to be a bit of a crank (seems he or she thinks he or she can prove god exists for one thing). Having said that, I'm not sure I agree with your analysis of the argument concerned. As far as I understand the Principle of Least Action, at a general mathematical level it involves integration of differences between values over times, and requires that the integral be minimized. If a principle requires that some value be minimized, it allows that there might be all manner of possible values for that integral, and when applied to basic motion problems, those possible values do cash out as possible paths that particles or javelins or whatever might take. Thus the commitment to possibilia. The argument seems okay to me, at least structurally, although its individual premises might turn out to be untrue, or require other assumptions. For instance, I seem to recall reading that the Principle of Least Action can itself be deduced from Newton's Laws of Motion (which don't have ontological commitments to possiblia, just to instantaneous forces) so I guess there is a question of what laws or principles should be regarded as more basic. Of course, the Principle of Least Action is more general I presume, since as the cranky author says, its used in many different areas of physics.

:up:

I guess my thinking is this -- if you can model a physical system without reference to the principle of least action, then in what way must we be committed to whatever metaphysical commitments which come with it? With a system as simple as a javelin being through we certainly can do so -- and just because we can derive equations from some principle that does not then entail that we must do so.

I guess the example is just meant to be illustrative, though, rather than definitive. And yeah, it does seem more general. I had myself a bit of a wikipedia reading session after your reply to check myself and see if I was mistaken, and I was indeed ignorant of it being present in physics at a higher level. So I could be speaking a bit too ignorantly here, after all.

It seems, though, that the point could be made more simply. We don't need the most general form of physical theory to demonstrate that metaphysical commitments are part of physics. Interpretation of force, gravity, inertia, mass, and so forth fall squarely within the realm of metaphysics, by my lights.

Suppose things were made of pixie dust.
The scientific methodologies wouldn't change a bit.

In (very) short, science is self-critical, bias-minimizing model → evidence convergence, where tentative hypotheses can be derived from the models.
Evidence, observations, experimental results accumulate, and the models convergence thereupon.
The convergence protocols are what scientists do.

So, on that angle at least, only regularities are required, without which everything would be incomprehensible chaos anyway.

So, on that angle at least, only regularities are required, without which everything would be incomprehensible chaos anyway. — jorndoe

Regularities may be all that are required, but even specifying some belief in regularities is already a commitment. And if scientists said all things were made of pixie dust, rather than particles, then these would also be commitments. Since they are commitments about what exists, they are metaphysical commitments.

A commitment can be changed, of course, upon pain of further reasoning or new discoveries. We could just as well use "belief" for "commitment", I'd say.

And if scientists said all things were made of pixie dust, rather than particles, then these would also be commitments. Since they are commitments about what exists, they are metaphysical commitments. — Moliere

Right.
There's a difference between merely that something exists (∃) and what exactly something is (quiddity), though.
Shamelessly pointing over at an old post: ∃ and quiddity
In general, the sciences tend to suppose that something is, and then try to learn more about what it is.
That said, of course some make commitments to specific metaphysics about what exactly things are, but, on the angle above, the sciences don't really care much.

I agree there's a difference between those two, but I don't know why you'd think science is restricted to one or the other.

How would a biologist work under such a regime? "We agree that yeast exist, but we do not characterize them" isn't exactly what microbiology looks like.

It might help, too, to note that beliefs of the form "does not exist" or "does not necessarily exist" would also count as metaphysics, in my view. So we might talk in terms of forces but believe there is no such entity, but it is a convenient shorthand for describing the behavior of fields. Or we might take an instrumentalist approach to scientific discourse and claim that while it works it does not speak of what exists, even while making what appear to be existential claims.

Perhaps you could say you are a sort of agnostic and say that all entities named by science may or may not exist, but even this sort of ploy seems to me to take a sort of skeptical stand towards metaphysics -- which is either a convenient opinion which suits one's feelings, in the absence of an argument, or a sort of belief with regards to the knowability of entities in the presence of an argument, and would count as a kind of commitment with respect to metaphysics because it deals with entities and our minds relation to said entities in such a case.

Unless science, in spite of appearances to the contrary which seem to make claims about what exists and how it exists, could be construed to somehow be about something else in actuality -- sort of like an error theory of science -- science talks about what does or does not exist, therefore is discussing metaphysical topics. And any argument which says science does not deal with entities would itself be a metaphysical thesis, so I don't see much escape from the charge of "doing metaphysics" here.

Not that there's anything wrong with that, by my lights. I don't think there's anything useful to be had by trying to separate the two. Science is just a bunch of arguments, in part empirical and in part more a priori. It's a hodge-podge of impurity interested in asking and answering questions, not some sort of regimented methodology followed with ritual precision to obtain the pure stuff of nature.

Science tends lead people to one of these views:

1. Reductionism: There is one true ontology (usually assumed to be something like that of the Standard Model of particle physics), while the ontologies of other sciences are useful fictions. This is mostly favored by physicists and others with "physics envy" (like chemists ;)).
2. Instrumentalism: All ontologies are useful fictions.

I would also add

3. Pluralism: Ontologies are dependent on theories that posit them, and they are all real just to the extent to which their respective theories are taken seriously.

In general, the sciences tend to suppose that something is, and then try to learn more about what it is. — jorndoe

It’s more that modern science wished to start with assuming the ‘apodictic certainty of the testimony of the senses’ by first of all discarding the ‘fog of metaphysics’ [Bertrand Russell’s term] and beginning with what could be analytically and experimentally known and measured. And who could possible disagree with that, right? Galileo rolled two balls down an inclined plane and showed that their arrival was not dependent on their mass - thereby disproving scholastic philosophy once and for all, which was thrown out with Ptolemaic cosmology, right? What could be more obvious?

I'd probably fall closest to number 3. Seems about right to me.