If the OP intended the title to mean the way you interpreted it, it would say, "Are Some People Better Than Others At Certain Things?" — Harry Hindu

Or in certain respects. That's the only way that it would make sense, so it's a charitable interpretation. I could have just replied that it makes no sense.

If that were the case, then yes, some people are better than others at certain things - but that would be a boring topic as everyone would agree that we have objective measuring sticks of who is a better runner, or ball player. But being a better runner or ball player does not make you a better person. — Harry Hindu

For the love of God, a better person in what respect? The question can't be sensibly answered unless that is specified, except by saying that it makes no sense.

Exactly. That is why I said earlier, "It is nonsensical to ask a subjective question as if it had an objective answer." — Harry Hindu

And that's why I assumed that he was doing something less baffling. But maybe you're right that he was just being nonsensical.

He hasn't bothered to reply, thus far.

The problem with your argument is that it connects truisms with one or more false premises. The less time that is spent on these distracting truisms which you - and certain others who indicate a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way which indicates a certain kind of haughtiness - raise, the better. — Sapientia

Well, thanks for your honesty. I don't know what you mean by "a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way", but re "haughtiness", I definitely don't think I'm superior to anyone. I do think some of my views are more reasonable than others'; and I also think that some of my views might be incoherent or not very well-fleshed out. That's one reason why I'm participating in this forum.

The "problem" could be that you don't understand what I'm saying re "truth" and "fact", I don't understand what you're saying re "truth" and "fact", or that you're wrong (I obviously believe my views are true).

For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us. That is true whether it is judged or not. It would be absurd to suggest that the length of time that the Earth has existed depends on our judgement. You can rightly say that our judgement of that length of time depends on our judgement, but that's trivially true and beside the point. — Sapientia

I'd say that "that the Earth preexisted us" is an empirical claim, and I think you're saying that that empirical claim is "true". So you're judging a (meaningful) statement (that refers to the empirical domain) to be true. That's what truth is for me: a judgment about facts/events or claims (which are mental facts/events).

I'm also not saying or implying that facts/events depend upon our judgements about them; in other words, to use your example, I don't believe that the Earth's preexistence hinges upon our judgments.

As for meaning and reference, there is a charitable assumption that we are both competent English speakers, and that we aren't using words in unusual ways. So, "the cat" refers to the cat, and not a fish or an idea or my experience. If I had meant to refer to a fish or an idea or my experience, then I could have used the right words. That's a starting point to a sensible conversation, and that's the only kind of conversation that I'm interested in. — Sapientia

Even though we may want to enter into conversations with that "charitable assumption" in mind (and I often do), to do so without some scepticism would be foolish, in my view. I've taken part in many discussions in my life-time (which is nearing 40 years), and it's often the case that terms or words are being used conventionally and unconventionally among conversing participants.

I did take your "the cat" as referring to an actual cat, btw. And I don't think words can be "right" or "wrong", only conventional or unconventional. We may use the word "cat" to hold meaning unconventionally for an actual hat, for example. There's nothing "right/wrong" about that particular decision though.

No, the individual is not doing the corresponding. The individual can make a statement, and it either corresponds with the truth or it doesn't. The correspondence is out of our hands. We can make statements, not correspondence. — Sapientia

Ok, what is "the truth", ontologically? Does it have location? Does it have properties? What kind of thing is "truth" for you?

I never suggested that people can make facts about statements. That's a misreading of what I said, as can be seen by comparing the two quotes above. — Sapientia

You said "A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth." I understand "correspond" as something minds do--we make truth-statements in order to match/correspond with facts; this is because my ontology says that "truth" is a property of statements that are used to make judgements that correspond with the facts. So that's why I said "I wouldn't say that" because under my ontology it doesn't make sense to say "facts correspond with truth." Correspondence requires minds, in that sense. I think you're using "correspond" differently, almost interchangeably with "truth". I don't know.

It means that you're missing the bigger picture by focussing on what's close by. What's close by are the words that I'm speaking and the judgements that I'm making and so on. By I'm trying to get you to step back and look at the bigger picture, or at that which is outside of your immediate vicinity. — Sapientia

If we can't sort out the details (i.e. the trees) then the bigger picture is not worthwhile for me. The bigger picture (the wood) hinges on and is identical to the (all the trees).

Judgements don't make sense without something to judge. I'd rather we talk about that something, rather than getting bogged down by the judging and the judgement that is produced, as I think that it has a better chance of getting an answer to the question of the discussion. — Sapientia

I already have an answer for the OP. I'm not sure what question you're hoping to find an answer to.

So then you explain to me why my clarification has not clarified it for you, and we work from there. — Sapientia

Ok, re "fact" and "truth", I'm not clear because I don't understand how you're using those terms. So you can help me understand the difference (if there is a difference?) between "fact" and "truth". What is "fact" ontologically; and the same question goes for "truth" (which I already asked you above).

And I prefer not to digress too much by, for example, talking about talking, or talking about the other person, or their motives, or talking about myself, and so on. — Sapientia

Me neither, but if the issue that is causing an impasse is being caused by how we're conversing, our intentions, etc., then that needs to be addressed. Ignoring that would only make a conversation more impenetrable, don't you think?

I would turn that around and ask you why you think that that definition is inadequate, if that is what you think. — Sapientia

It's not that I think your definition for "criteria" is inadequate, it's rather that it's not conventional, which means it's difficult to be on the same page as you about what we're talking about. Here are some conventional definitions of "criteria/criterion":

- a principle or standard by which something may be judged or decided.
- A standard or test by which individual things or people may be compared and judged.
- a standard by which you judge, decide about, or deal with something

That's how I use the term: "criteria" are subjective/mental constructs i.e. standards/principles that we apply to or impose upon things. That seems to be different from how you're using "criteria".

Do you see why it's sometimes important to focus on the "trees" before we jump to the "woods"?

Furthermore, you said that "criteria" weren't subjective, which was what I was arguing against.

Some words are difficult to precisely define in a way which avoids problems — Sapientia

The way to try and limit that is to know the conventional or standard definitions being used in a particular intellectual milieu.

The words "subjective" and "objective" are like that. I don't think it necessary to attempt to precisely define them, and I'm not willing to do so unless you give me a good enough reason. I could quote you a dictionary definition or give you some examples, but is that really necessary? If your interpretation differs from the norm, then that may be where the problem lies. And if it doesn't, then I'm not sure why you think that there's a problem. — Sapientia

I disagree, and I have a precise definition of subjective/objective; a major upshot of that precision is that it helps make things easier to organise in my thinking/beliefs; and it also helps other people realise the difference between their and my definitions. From that starting point, some progress can be made. Whereas, the less precise definitions are, the much more difficult it can be to make progress.

I could quote you a dictionary definition or give you some examples, but is that really necessary? — Sapientia

It's only necessary insofar as it's helpful for a conversation to progress effectively. That's something I care about, so I deem it necessary. You may not care so much, and that's fine, but that's important to know for me because it can help make a decision re whether to continue conversing with you and to manage my expectations, for example. Not that I'm saying I'm not interested in conversing with you at the moment, I'm getting some value out of it, for one thing.

I use the terms in a not too dissimilar manner. Off the bat, and loosely, I'd say that what is subjective is what relates to, or comes from, or is about, or depends upon, or is produced by, the subject. So, thinking, judgement, opinion, evaluation, experience, and that kind of thing. And what is objective is otherwise, like facts, the truth, rocks, planets, reality, and that kind of thing. — Sapientia

Ok, thanks for clarifying that. I agree, except that I also use "fact" to refer to (non-associative) mental events (i.e. as distinct from mental events as statements about mental events); as well as non-mental events.

I don't know what you mean by "a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way", but re "haughtiness", I definitely don't think I'm superior to anyone. — numberjohnny5

I don't know what I meant either. Do you have any idea, @Sir2u? :snicker:

What about the collective mind? saving face, hive mind, group think. Don't they count for something? — matt

Do they count for something? What part do you think they play?

I don't know if I could definitively say if truth was subjective or objective. Is it possible that truth is beyond subjectivity/objectivity. — matt

Could it be both at the same time? Could it be both at different times? Why do you think it might be objective.

I wouldn't say all facts are subjective. Some facts don't happen in the mind. — numberjohnny5

Name one please.

The reason I believe this is because I think facts are essentially events, and there exist events occurring inside and outside minds. — numberjohnny5

Is a tree in the middle of the forest an event? When does it become a fact?

I don't know what I meant either. Do you have any idea, Sir2u? :snicker: — Sapientia

Oh happy day, I am not on Sappy's list of Dingbats.

As to you question, I think that you are full of shit. Not that you are not telling the truth though, because you probably have no freakin idea what you meant. Not many others do either I think because it makes no sense at all in the context of any sane discussion.

Is it not strange that when I claimed that you should have explained better your OP in that obnoxious self pitying thread about whether philosophy makes people pretentiousness, you said that even a half witted person should be able to figure it out because it was so OBVIOUS and that there is no room for misinterpretation. But then you have the balls to post this.

That's not how the title is worded. That's just one interpretation of it. I interpreted it differently. It's down to the person behind the title to clarify its meaning. If the question is whether some people are better than others, as per the title and opening post, then my answer is yes, in some respects they are. Some people are better than others at the 100 metres, for example. — "Sapientia

One more time.
Learn to be civil, learn to try and see other peoples point of view.
And try to understand that we are not in a battle to be right all the time. You do not have to be telling people "either prove it or admit you are wrong", because you are definitely not prepared to prove anything except with bullying.

Grow up.

Have a nice day too.

I wouldn't say all facts are subjective. Some facts don't happen in the mind. — numberjohnny5

Name one please. — Sir2u

Sure. A person driving a car in another country.

The reason I believe this is because I think facts are essentially events, and there exist events occurring inside and outside minds. — numberjohnny5


Is a tree in the middle of the forest an event? When does it become a fact? — Sir2u

Yes. A tree in the middle of the forest is an event. I'd say events in this sense are "situational", that is, they involve objects "interacting" (which could simply involve "being" a tree in relation to other objects/trees/animals/etc.) in some way within a situation/context/environment.

Facts are observer-independent. Things don't graduate to become facts. Facts exist; observers can happen to experience/perceive facts; and they can make judgements about facts if or when they experience them.

Sure. A person driving a car in another country. — numberjohnny5

The "fact" of someone driving in another country is information, is the information not in your head?

Facts are observer-independent. Things don't graduate to become facts. Facts exist; observers can happen to experience/perceive facts; and they can make judgements about facts if or when they experience them. — numberjohnny5

Information might be observer independent, but a fact is something that has been proven/judged/evaluated to be true. That can only happen in someone's mind which means that a fact is not independent of the observer. Many things might be true even if we have no knowledge of their existence, but a fact is a human construct used to define the level of reliability of information.

The "fact" of someone driving in another country is information, is the information not in your head? — Sir2u

Let's substitute the word "event" for "fact" here. And let's assume there's the event occurring of someone driving in another country. Before I introduced that claim, that event was occurring. After I focused on other things since I introduced that claim, that event was also occurring. The event is occurring as I type. None of what I have been doing has effected the event of someone driving in another country. My role has to just introduce the claim about that event. Introducing and making claims are (ontologically) mental events. So mental events are required to "discuss" non-mental events (someone driving in another country) in this example. But in this example, mental events do not cause non-mental events to occur. In other words, the statement/claim about someone driving in another country has no direct effect on the event of someone driving in another country.

Information might be observer independent, but a fact is something that has been proven/judged/evaluated to be true. That can only happen in someone's mind which means that a fact is not independent of the observer. Many things might be true even if we have no knowledge of their existence, but a fact is a human construct used to define the level of reliability of information. — Sir2u

It depends on what you mean by "information". I've just been having a conversation with someone in another threat about it, and it seems to me that "information" (in that thread) refers to meaningful statements/claims about phenomena that can be relayed via various means of communication to other individuals, and so on.

I don't define "fact" the way you do, and I don't think that's the conventional way in philosophy of talking about "fact" (not that things being unconventional/conventional are "wrong/right"). It seems that you think that facts are only facts if they are tied to truth-statements. I don't think that's a necessary condition for "fact" though. That's tied to what I think "truth" is too: an aspect/part/property of judgments/claims/propositions that relate to events/facts. "Truth" is a mental event about other mental events or non-mental events. "Facts" (i.e. events) do not need truth-statements to validate them as "facts". "Facts" are facts regardless of what any mind thinks about them.

Let's substitute the word "event" for "fact" here. — numberjohnny5

event:
Something that happens at a given place and time

fact:
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction
A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn

I really do find that difficult to agree with. Information about the event, yes, that would be fact but the event itself no.

But in this example, mental events do not cause non-mental events to occur.
In other words, the statement/claim about someone driving in another country has no direct effect on the event of someone driving in another country. — numberjohnny5

But the event causes the information, on that we agree. This sort of brings us back to the falling tree. Millions Zillions of events are happening in the universe as we discuss this, which are facts? I think that we can only call facts the ones that we know about.
Did you read about the supernova in the Orion Belt? No,me neither. Probably because no one saw it. It might have happened or it might not. So can the supernova be a fact? Only when the information is available.

I don't define "fact" the way you do, and I don't think that's the conventional way in philosophy of talking about "fact" (not that things being unconventional/conventional are "wrong/right"). — numberjohnny5

I use the definition I gave above.

It seems that you think that facts are only facts if they are tied to truth-statements. — numberjohnny5

No, facts are only facts if they describe correctly reality. Facts are statements of truth because they describe reality.

I'd say that "that the Earth preexisted us" is an empirical claim, and I think you're saying that that empirical claim is "true". So you're judging a (meaningful) statement (that refers to the empirical domain) to be true. That's what truth is for me: a judgment about facts/events or claims (which are mental facts/events). — numberjohnny5

So much in so little!

First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type, which is important, because you begin by taking what you've put in quotes as a type of claim (which is a statement). In addition to statements (which need to have been stated, and stated by someone) and judgements (which result from the act of judging, which requires someone to perform the act of judging) there are facts (which don't need to be stated or judged by anyone, and do not need anyone to be around at all).

Now, despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact. That would be an error similar to - if not an example of - those errors which arise as a result of a failure to properly distinguish between use and mention. It is a fact that the earth preexisted us. And it is a fact that the earth preexisted us whether I make that claim or not.

You interpret me to be saying that "that the Earth preexisted us" is true, which is understandable, but not quite right. I would say that, "The Earth preexisted us", is true - which is a subtle but important difference. I would not begin the sentence with, "That", because that's how facts are denoted, which would suggest that I'm saying that a fact is true, but that's not what I'm saying. I think that it would be a category error to claim that a fact is true, but correspondence with truth avoids that problem.

Despite the fact that I have judged that Earth has preexisted us, and despite the fact that I have judged the statement, "Earth has preexisted us", to be true, that doesn't really matter here. That is the tree, so to speak. What matters is the woods, which is the fact, which is what I was expressing to you through the use of language.

With regards to your last sentence in the quote above, I think that it's productive to think about this in terms other than - or at least in addition to - claims; so, in that sense, when you bring up facts and events in addition to claims, that's a start. But I don't agree that claims are mental in nature, unless you only mean that they require a claimant for their production. Claims are just a kind of statement or assertion, and are therefore independent of any mind, except for their production. And they're dependent on that which is external and physical, be that my mouth, sound waves, a pen, or my mobile phone which I'm using to type this very statement. One type of statement is a recorded statement, and recorded statements necessarily have physical properties.

Instead of facts, events, or claims, it makes sense to think about the judgement as being about a possibility. It is possible that Earth preexisted us, and I judge that it has. But again, this is not about my judgement, nor, primarily, is it about the possibility. It's about the fact. This is, again, where another tree-wood or map-territory sort of analogy would be appropriate.

I'm also not saying or implying that facts/events depend upon our judgements about them; in other words, to use your example, I don't believe that the Earth's preexistence hinges upon our judgments. — numberjohnny5

That's good. Just take care not to suggest otherwise.

Even though we may want to enter into conversations with that "charitable assumption" in mind (and I often do), to do so without some scepticism would be foolish, in my view. I've taken part in many discussions in my life-time (which is nearing 40 years), and it's often the case that terms or words are being used conventionally and unconventionally among conversing participants.

I did take your "the cat" as referring to an actual cat, btw. And I don't think words can be "right" or "wrong", only conventional or unconventional. We may use the word "cat" to hold meaning unconventionally for an actual hat, for example. There's nothing "right/wrong" about that particular decision though. — numberjohnny5

Okay, well, I'm glad that you caught my drift that I'm using words conventionally (as with "the cat" and the cat, as opposed to the hat, which, funnily enough, I call "the hat"), despite any lingering doubts that you might've had. I am hereby confirming to you that that is indeed the case, so that we may move on.

Ok, what is "the truth", ontologically? Does it have location? Does it have properties? What kind of thing is "truth" for you? — numberjohnny5

It's just a term which refers to what a true statement says. (That's the kind of thing it is). So, if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth. Why should I care whether or not it has a location? I'm not sure whether it even makes sense to ask that question of it. As for properties, I've told you a bit about the truth already, like what I've reiterated above, and like what I've said about correspondence with fact.

You said "A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth." I understand "correspond" as something minds do... — numberjohnny5

Then you misunderstand it, in my assessment. That's the act of association, which is distinct from the correspondence of which I'm talking. Not only is it distinct, the correspondence of which I'm talking does not depend on the act of association.

...we make truth-statements in order to match/correspond with facts; — numberjohnny5

I don't think that that's worded correctly. The "in order" suggests intention. The intention varies and is not relevant. Rather, we make truth-statements which correspond with facts. I know that correspondence between truth-statements and facts do not necessarily require minds doing anything at the time, because, for one thing, if all minds suddenly ceased to exist, then, all else being equal, recorded truth-statements would remain, and at least some of them would correspond with fact. For example, "Earth exists".

...this is because my ontology says that "truth" is a property of statements that are used to make judgements that correspond with the facts. — numberjohnny5

So, you think that truth is a property of statements which correspond with facts. But you also seem to think that how statements are used, and judgement, is also somehow relevant. It's the latter that I have a problem with. In what sense are they presumably of relevance? They aren't necessary for correspondence, properly understood, to take place. You could define it as a mental correspondence, but I don't know why you would do so. That's not the correspondence that I'm talking about, which is the correspondence between true statements and facts. Whenever there's a true statement, like "Earth exists", there's a corresponding fact. That's it. No judgement required. No one is required at all. No one needs to be doing anything. What could possibly make you think otherwise? Are you some sort of idealist or aren't you? Because you sound like one in some respects.

So that's why I said "I wouldn't say that" because under my ontology it doesn't make sense to say "facts correspond with truth." — numberjohnny5

Then the problem must be with your ontology.

Correspondence requires minds, in that sense. — numberjohnny5

Either correspondence does not require minds or you're talking about correspondence in a different sense for some reason. But if it's the latter, why are doing so?

I think you're using "correspond" differently, almost interchangeably with "truth". I don't know. — numberjohnny5

I'm using it differently, yes. But not interchangeably with "truth". Correspondence is about the relationship between true statements and fact, which is a conditional relationship in the logical sense.

If we can't sort out the details (i.e. the trees) then the bigger picture is not worthwhile for me. The bigger picture (the wood) hinges on and is identical to the (all the trees). — numberjohnny5

It's important to recognise which details are essential and which are not. I think that you've been focussing on aspects which are not essential to the bigger picture.

I already have an answer for the OP. I'm not sure what question you're hoping to find an answer to. — numberjohnny5

I know that you already have an answer. I think that it's the wrong answer. That's how we ended up here. The original question was whether some people are better than others. You gave an answer, which I then questioned, which lead to you providing further details, which I have been criticising, and you've been responding to my criticism, and so on, and so forth, and this is where we're at. My concern is the right answer.

Ok, re "fact" and "truth", I'm not clear because I don't understand how you're using those terms. So you can help me understand the difference (if there is a difference?) between "fact" and "truth". What is "fact" ontologically; and the same question goes for "truth" (which I already asked you above). — numberjohnny5

One difference is that truth requires language whereas facts do not. To use your terminology, one could think of truth as a property of statements and facts as a property of reality.

It's not that I think your definition for "criteria" is inadequate, it's rather that it's not conventional, which means it's difficult to be on the same page as you about what we're talking about. Here are some conventional definitions of "criteria/criterion":

- a principle or standard by which something may be judged or decided.
- A standard or test by which individual things or people may be compared and judged.
- a standard by which you judge, decide about, or deal with something

That's how I use the term: "criteria" are subjective/mental constructs i.e. standards/principles that we apply to or impose upon things. That seems to be different from how you're using "criteria".

Do you see why it's sometimes important to focus on the "trees" before we jump to the "woods"?

Furthermore, you said that "criteria" weren't subjective, which was what I was arguing against. — numberjohnny5

No, I was using the conventional definition. What I'm saying, with regards to what we're talking about, and with regards to the example - which, if I recall correctly, was something like whether or not the moon is bigger than my foot - is that the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective, in that it's defining feature is that it reflects reality, rather than my judgement, which might clash with reality.

Also, once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement". So, what I was saying was not far off from the wording and gist of those definitions. I think that you're just over-anyalysing. We can call it something else if need be.

The way to try and limit that is to know the conventional or standard definitions being used in a particular intellectual milieu. — numberjohnny5

Yes, and another way to avoid that is not to seek an unnecessary degree of exactness, not to over-analyse, not to rigidly adhere to the wording of definitions, and to instead adapt to a way of thinking in line with the spirit of what's being said and in line with the Wittgensteinian concept of family resemblance.

Ok, thanks for clarifying that. I agree, except that I also use "fact" to refer to (non-associative) mental events (i.e. as distinct from mental events as statements about mental events); as well as non-mental events. — numberjohnny5

Okay, so we agree on that, except that I haven't quite wrapped my head around your possible exception. I might have some idea about what you're getting at, but don't worry about explaining it in detail unless it's pertinent to our main topic of discussion.

You're right, and I applaud you for even engaging with such an argument. I doubt whether I'd have the patience, or whether I'd see it as worth my time. Our positions are not too far apart, but his is miles away. The way he uses the word "fact" would mean that he'd just be talking past us. Facts, when properly defined, are not dependent on knowledge. The only part of your reply that I don't agree with is what you classify as mental events. Also, I'm not tied to your definition of information, although that's one way of defining it.

You're right, and I applaud you for even engaging with such an argument. I doubt I'd have the patience. — Sapientia

Thanks, but to which post/claim(s) are you referring?

(Btw, I'm currently in the middle of responding to your last (big) post to me, but I won't be able to finish it until the weekend as I'm really busy.)

Thanks, but to which post are you referring? — numberjohnny5

I was referring to his overall argument or stance, which would include posts like the one you were replying to - this one - as well as this one, which I also briefly commented on.

(Btw, I'm currently in the middle of responding to your last (big) post to me, but I won't be able to finish it until the weekend as I'm really busy.) — numberjohnny5

That's fine, I can wait. And besides, it took me a couple of days to reply. (And yes, that was a big post for me. It took me a long time to come up with. I lost track of time because I was concentrating and "in the zone").

I have told you before, do not talk behind my back. If you have something to say about my way of thinking please grow a set of balls and tell me about your problem.

Thank you,have a nice day.

I really do find that difficult to agree with. — Sir2u

Well, at least it shows you're trying to agree! :P

fact:
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction — Sir2u

I've never comes across this definition of "fact".

Anyway, a reason why "fact" is the same as "event" is because in my ontology all things are events. In other words, all things/objects are comprised of properties in relations interacting in particular ways with other things. There's a dynamic fluidity to all that exists, and all that exists is physical, in my view. So in that sense, events are properties undergoing change. Information, as phenomena that we perceive and organise mentally, is included in this ontology.

But the event causes the information, on that we agree. — Sir2u

I think information is a mixture of the event and our experience and processing of the event into an organised, coherent and meaningful set of statements/judgements.

Zillions of events are happening in the universe as we discuss this, which are facts? I think that we can only call facts the ones that we know about. — Sir2u

You're conflating knowledge about events with events. They are not the same. It seems like you're defining "fact" as "knowledge-by-acquaintance" (or acquaintance knowledge). Conventionally, knowledge is justified, true belief in analytic philosophy, right? That's mental phenomena. You're saying mental phenomena about phenomena we have no mental phenomena about is not phenomena.

Do you have a term for phenomena we do not experience and have knowledge of then, if it's not the term "fact" for you?

Let's return to my vignette about someone driving in another country being a fact/event. Would you agree that just because you or I do not know about someone driving in another country at this present moment, that it is therefore not an event that is actually taking place? That because we aren't aware of, having an experience of, or have no knowledge that someone in another country is driving right now, it is not an event? Is that your position?

I presume you'd agree that someone knows that someone is driving in another country even if we do not, right? If you agree, then that means that there are generally people who do know that events are taking place and generally people who do not know that events are taking place in a given moment. What relationship, then, does an event have with mental phenomena in the form of knowledge? How are they connected so that events only qualify as events if they are known?

Did you read about the supernova in the Orion Belt? No,me neither. Probably because no one saw it. It might have happened or it might not. So can the supernova be a fact? Only when the information is available. — Sir2u

If a supernova occurred it would be a fact despite our lack of knowledge about it. Again, knowledge-by-acquaintance is not identical to what--the thing/event in question--we're acquainting ourselves with. Things happen, whether we are aware of them or not.

No, facts are only facts if they describe correctly reality. Facts are statements of truth because they describe reality. — Sir2u

So facts are mental phenomena, for you? What's the difference between "reality" and "fact"? What are events that aren't known?

Because if events/facts only occur when minds know about them occurring, that's a causal argument. That is, you'd be positing that minds and only minds cause events to occur.

I am starting with your definition/explanation of what "truth" is because I think this informs the other parts of your recent post, in terms of where I think the problems lie.

It's just a term which refers to what a true statement says. (That's the kind of thing it is). So, if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth. Why should I care whether or not it has a location? I'm not sure whether it even makes sense to ask that question of it. As for properties, I've told you a bit about the truth already, like what I've reiterated above, and like what I've said about correspondence with fact. — Sapientia

The reason I think it's important to care about where things are located for ontological matters is because I think it's nonsense to believe that things/events that exist have no location. "Truth" as "a term", in your words, is located somewhere, otherwise it doesn't exist. Further, the original focus of my inquiry is related to whether "truth" is subjective (occuring in minds) or "objective" (occurring external to minds). So for me, ontologically, thinking/conceptualising "a term" is a mental event, and hence located in minds. The properties of said mental event (on one relative scale of analysis) are comprised of neurons, synapses, chemical reactions, etc.

The problem I have with your explanation for "truth" is that it's unclear and muddled. You write, "...if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth." Let's break this down.

{The first part of this conditional is:}

(i) "if the statement says that the cat is on the mat,"
(ii) "and the statement is true,"

In other words, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true,...

{The second part of this conditional is:}

(iii) "then that's the truth."

...then the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true.

That's a tautology. In other words, your conditional is stating that if the statement about a fact (the cat on the mat) is true, then the statement is true. (I assume by "that's the truth" you're claiming that the statement about the cat is true. But it's redundant and unnecessary to use "true" and "truth" in that way. It muddies the waters.) So all you need to say is "if I judge my statement to correspond with a fact (in this case, the cat being on the mat), then I judge my statement to be true."

Otherwise, what's the difference between "true" and "truth"? I wonder whether you're conflating "truth" with "fact" there, as in, "it's a fact that the statement about the cat on the mat is true."

Ok, so using your definition/explanation of "true/truth"...you write,

"For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us."

In other words, I read that sentence as claiming: "it is true that Earth preexisted us." I don't know what else is could be saying. Maybe it's saying "it is a fact that Earth preexisted us"? But if so, that sentence is still a statement. Referring to facts necessarily involves statements about facts. There's no escaping that fact. Furthermore, you're judging that statement about facts to be true.

"First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type..."

"a type of claim (which is a statement)"

Any statement is a statement about stuff. Statements refer, that's what they do. So any mention or reference about facts is necessarily a statement or claim of some type. So it does have to be a claim...

"despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact."

In other words, although I am using a statement to refer to a fact in a particular way, that statement is not actually the fact I'm referring to. Yeh, I agree.

Despite the fact that I have judged that Earth has preexisted us, and despite the fact that I have judged the statement, "Earth has preexisted us", to be true, that doesn't really matter here. — Sapientia

Judging something to be the case is identical to judging something to be true. That's the only way we can refer to facts, by referring to them in different ways.

It is a fact that the earth preexisted us. And it is a fact that the earth preexisted us whether I make that claim or not. — Sapientia

Both statements are claims about past facts (i.e. that the Earth preexited us). (And statements about facts as ontological statements about ontological facts are empirical statements/claims.) The first statement is a claim about a past fact that you judge to be true, do you not? You're not saying "it is false that the earth preexisted us", are you? And you're not saying "I'm not making any ontological commitment as to whether the earth preexisted us", are you? If your answer to two those questions is "true", then logically, "It is a fact that the earth preexisted us" is a claim that you believe to be true. What else can it be?

The second statement is also one that believes it is true (again, what else can it be?).

You interpret me to be saying that "that the Earth preexisted us" is true, which is understandable, but not quite right. I would say that, "The Earth preexisted us", is true - which is a subtle but important difference. I would not begin the sentence with, "That", because that's how facts are denoted, which would suggest that I'm saying that a fact is true, but that's not what I'm saying. I think that it would be a category error to claim that a fact is true, but correspondence with truth avoids that problem. — Sapientia

I wasn't using the word "that" in any special way, or in the way you're describing; that is, '"that the Earth preexisted us" is true' and '"The Earth preexisted us", is true' are identical statements to me.

In any case, you're then acknowledging that facts cannot be true. Does that mean that judgments about statements that correspond to facts are the things that can be true?

So, you think that truth is a property of statements which correspond with facts. — Sapientia

It's more that "truth" is a property of statements that judges how statements refer/relate to facts. That is, "truth" is the aspect of statements that we use to judge whether statements relate to the facts "accurately" or not. Having a statement without a judgment about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Statements judge. Statements are a type of sentence. A sentence that doesn't judge is rather a non-propositional sentence, like a question or phrase. So it's the property of "truth" in a sentence that makes it a statement/proposition.

But you also seem to think that how statements are used, and judgement, is also somehow relevant. It's the latter that I have a problem with. In what sense are they presumably of relevance? They aren't necessary for correspondence, properly understood, to take place. You could define it as a mental correspondence, but I don't know why you would. That's not the correspondence that I'm talking about, which is the correspondence between truth statements and fact.

Whenever there's a true statement, like "Earth exists", there's a corresponding fact. That's it. No judgement required. No one is required at all. — Sapientia

The judgement is required, otherwise what do you think truth-values are? They are judgements about stuff: either true or false (depending on the species of logic you use). "Earth exists" is a statement that is judged to correspond with a fact.

Either correspondence does not require minds or you're talking about correspondence in a different sense for some reason. But if it's the latter, why are doing so? — Sapientia

I'm saying correspondence requires minds because that's what's involved when corresponding statements to events/facts.

One difference is that truth requires language whereas facts do not. To use your terminology, one could think of truth as a property of statements and facts as a property of reality. — Sapientia

Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? I would say that "facts [are] a property of reality", but because I think that minds are also part of reality, that means there are also mental facts/events. So "truth" is a type of fact - a mental fact i.e. an event that occurs in minds as opposed to a fact/event that does not occur in minds.

No, I was using the conventional definition. — Sapientia

The conventional definition of criteria refers to standards/principles that we judge. In an earlier post you said "criteria are not subjective". Then you said that criteria are determinants. I don't believe standards are non-mental. So an "objective standard" (i.e. your " the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective") in my ontology would refer to a real external-to-mind standard, akin to what a Platonic realist might believe about Forms being real. I'm an anti-realist on abstract objects like that (insofar as those objects exist external to minds).

You also say "once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement"." Are you saying that minds set or decide upon criteria? If so, it then seems you believe that subjective criteria then "graduate" or change to become objective criteria as "determinants" that relate to (subjective) judgments. Criteria are mental abstract objects, and "judgements" are abstract objects. (I don't know what would be included in "outcome" there.) Which means that subjective standards (as mental abstract objects) "determine" other mental abstract objects like judgements. There is no objective criteria involved.

In an earlier post you wrote, "And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else."

I don't think you're using the conventional definition of "criteria" here. "What makes the moon bigger than my foot" are the ontological properties of those two objects. An assessment of their relative sizes might involve criteria, which would be subjective, obviously (since assessments occur in minds).

What I'm saying, with regards to what we're talking about, and with regards to the example - which, if I recall correctly, was something like whether or not the moon is bigger than my foot - is that the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective, in that it's defining feature is that it reflects reality, rather than my judgement, which might clash with reality. — Sapientia

You say, "Also, once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement". So, what I was saying was not far off from the wording and gist of those definitions. I think that you're just over-anyalysing. We can call it something else if need be."

You could say I'm over-analysing, but I think I have good reason to do so since I don't think you're being clear or coherent, in my view. I think what you're saying is "far off from the gist of those definitions". I also don't understand how criteria that is set or decided by minds can 'determine the outcome or "judgment".'

Well, at least it shows you're trying to agree! :P — numberjohnny5

I always try to understand what others are saying, it is up to them to convince me to agree with them and for me to do the same.

I've never comes across this definition of "fact". — numberjohnny5

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/fact

There are sometimes many definitions of a word. When this happens it is necessary to provide the definition one is using to avoid problems. People tend to presume that the meaning of what they write is obvious.

Anyway, a reason why "fact" is the same as "event" is because in my ontology all things are events. In other words, all things/objects are comprised of properties in relations interacting in particular ways with other things. There's a dynamic fluidity to all that exists, and all that exists is physical, in my view. So in that sense, events are properties undergoing change. Information, as phenomena that we perceive and organise mentally, is included in this ontology. — numberjohnny5

I suppose that if this is your way of seeing things then it is acceptable, but I am still not sure whether or not I could agree with it.

I think information is a mixture of the event and our experience and processing of the event into an organised, coherent and meaningful set of statements/judgements. — numberjohnny5

This is were I disagree most. I do not see the event itself as the information. From my point of view the information is the product of the event, even if the event is just a tree sitting in the middle of a forest. The information is the description of the event.

You're conflating knowledge about events with events. They are not the same. It seems like you're defining "fact" as "knowledge-by-acquaintance" (or acquaintance knowledge). — numberjohnny5

No, you are doing that. See above. Fact and knowledge are not the same. We can have facts as knowledge but we cannot have all of the facts. My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible.

Conventionally, knowledge is justified, true belief in analytic philosophy, right? That's mental phenomena. You're saying mental phenomena about phenomena we have no mental phenomena about is not phenomena. — numberjohnny5

No, I am saying that if something is unknown then we cannot have mental phenomena about it. It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it?

Do you have a term for phenomena we do not experience and have knowledge of then, if it's not the term "fact" for you? — numberjohnny5

The Unknown.

Let's return to my vignette about someone driving in another country being a fact/event. Would you agree that just because you or I do not know about someone driving in another country at this present moment, that it is therefore not an event that is actually taking place? That because we aren't aware of, having an experience of, or have no knowledge that someone in another country is driving right now, it is not an event? Is that your position? — numberjohnny5

Ok, I think that here is were the problem of our misunderstanding lies. If those people are driving around some place, then they are witnesses to their own events. Others would see them as well. This would be a fact.
But how can something be a fact if absolutely no one knows about it?

If a supernova occurred it would be a fact despite our lack of knowledge about it. Again, knowledge-by-acquaintance is not identical to what--the thing/event in question--we're acquainting ourselves with. Things happen, whether we are aware of them or not. — numberjohnny5

This, again, is where we diverge in agreement. Events and information cannot be the same thing. Information is the result of events, events cause information. What information is available if no event occurs? None right.

So facts are mental phenomena, for you? What's the difference between "reality" and "fact"? What are events that aren't known? — numberjohnny5

Look at any of the definitions of fact, what do they all imply? Reality is everything that is in existence, of which we know very little. Fact is what we do know about reality. Event about which we have no knowledge (unknown) are usually called unknown events because we have no facts about them. There might have been events that generated information, but we do not have the facts.

Because if events/facts only occur when minds know about them occurring, that's a causal argument. That is, you'd be positing that minds and only minds cause events to occur. — numberjohnny5

No, events occur all the time. I am positing that events can happen, do happen but we are often ignorant of their passing because we have no facts about them. No one said anything about our minds causing events to happen even though that sometimes is the case, as in the event of me replying to you.

I think that you should stop calling events facts unless you can properly explain how that is possible and where you got the definition of fact that you use.

The reason I think it's important to care about where things are located for ontological matters is because I think it's nonsense to believe that things/events that exist have no location. — numberjohnny5

I think that it might be nonsense to assume that everything that exists must have a location. A thing that exists might well have some sort of relation to something that has a location, but there are some things with which it does not seem to make sense to even ask, due to it seeming to be a category error. Where is perpendicular located? Where is justification located? Where is mathematics located? Where is the biological kingdom Animalia located? Where is the number twenty located?

"Truth" as "a term", in your words, is located somewhere, otherwise it doesn't exist. — numberjohnny5

Yes, in a sense, it's located somewhere. But we'd have to break down what's meant. The term, as a word on a screen, does indeed have a location. But is that necessarily, or always, what is meant?

So for me, ontologically, thinking/conceptualising "a term" is a mental event, and hence located in minds. The properties of said mental event (on one relative scale of analysis) are comprised of neurons, synapses, chemical reactions, etc. — numberjohnny5

Thinking and conceptualising are indeed mental events, and they do indeed occur in minds. But what about concepts? The continued existence of concepts does not seem to depend on anyone being around performing any kind of cognitive act relating to them, nor on any kind of mental event taking place. So, where are concepts located?

The problem I have with your explanation for "truth" is that it's unclear and muddled. You write, "...if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth." Let's break this down.

{The first part of this conditional is:}

(i) "if the statement says that the cat is on the mat,"
(ii) "and the statement is true,"

In other words, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true,...

{The second part of this conditional is:}

(iii) "then that's the truth."

...then the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true.

That's a tautology. — numberjohnny5

It's your analysis that's muddled, not my explanation, although my explanation might have been unclear to you, so I will attempt to clarify.

What I am saying is not like saying that a triangle is a triangle. What I am saying is like saying that a triangle is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles. In saying that the truth is what a true statement says, rather than that the truth is the truth, or that a true statement is a true statement, I'm explaining that if the true statement were, "the cat is on the mat", then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat. Your confusion seems to be a result of confusing a statement with what it says, which relates back to my earlier mention of the use-mention distinction. The distinction here might be seen as subtle and at risk of being overlooked or dismissed as trivial and uninformative, but it's not trivial, because it plays an important role, and it's not uninformative, because it tells us what truth is.

In other words, your conditional is stating that if the statement about a fact (the cat on the mat) is true, then the statement is true. (I assume by "that's the truth" you're claiming that the statement about the cat is true. But it's redundant and unnecessary to use "true" and "truth" in that way. It muddies the waters.) — numberjohnny5

Wrong. The conditional does not state that if the statement is true, then the statement is true, which is like stating that if the shape is a triangle, then the shape is a triangle. The conditional states that if the statement is true, then the truth is what it says, which is like stating that if the shape is a triangle, then the shape is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles.

So all you need to say is "if I judge my statement to correspond with a fact (in this case, the cat being on the mat), then I judge my statement to be true." — numberjohnny5

No, that would be saying something else, which would be making a different point to the one that I'm making. That's a point which is beside the point.

Otherwise, what's the difference between "true" and "truth"? I wonder whether you're conflating "truth" with "fact" there, as in, "it's a fact that the statement about the cat on the mat is true." — numberjohnny5

We've been over this already to some extent. I thought we had it covered. :meh:

A statement can be true, but a statement can't be truth, as that doesn't make sense. We use "true" to say what a statement of that kind is, and we use "truth" to say what a statement of that kind speaks.

I'm not conflating "truth" with "fact", despite the striking resemblance in the way in which they can be used, which I have acknowledged, because, like I said, the truth is defined by its relation to statements, whereas facts are not.

I think that the problem is that you have to pay very close attention to what I'm saying and the distinctions that I'm making, otherwise it's easy to get lost.

"For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us."

In other words, I read that sentence as claiming: "it is true that Earth preexisted us." I don't know what else is could be saying. Maybe it's saying "it is a fact that Earth preexisted us"? But if so, that sentence is still a statement. Referring to facts necessarily involves statements about facts. There's no escaping that fact. Furthermore, you're judging that statement about facts to be true. — numberjohnny5

Of course I'm judging it to be true. That's an implication of my stating it, but that is of no significance here. Another implication is, as you say, that it's a fact that Earth preexisted us, but that's not what it says, as what it says is about a truth. It says what it does, and what it says is close enough to saying that it's true that Earth preexisted us. So I see little point in digging any deeper.

"First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type..."

"a type of claim (which is a statement)"

Any statement is a statement about stuff. Statements refer, that's what they do. So any mention or reference about facts is necessarily a statement or claim of some type. So it does have to be a claim... — numberjohnny5

Use-mention! Please bear it in mind when I'm trying to point out stuff like this:

That the earth preexisted us is a fact, not a statement. The statement would be, "That the Earth preexisted us". I'm using a statement to express a fact, not mentioning a statement relating to fact. It's the fact that I mean to talk about, not the statement.

That's what I was getting it. Do you follow me now?

"despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact."

In other words, although I am using a statement to refer to a fact in a particular way, that statement is not actually the fact I'm referring to. Yeh, I agree. — numberjohnny5

Oh good, so you do understand. It was just a breakdown in communication to some extent, given what we've just gone through.

Judging something to be the case is identical to judging something to be true. That's the only way we can refer to facts, by referring to them in different ways. — numberjohnny5

No, they're not identical, because we judge a statement to be true, whereas we judge a possible state of affairs to obtain or be the case. Resemblance is not equivalence.

Both statements are claims about past facts (i.e. that the Earth preexited us). — numberjohnny5

Yes.

The first statement is a claim about a past fact that you judge to be true, do you not? — numberjohnny5

It's about a past fact. It's not about my judgement, although my judgement is implied when I make the statement. And I don't judge any fact to be true, because I don't consider facts to be the kind of thing that can be true. Statements, on the other hand, can be true. And I do judge, "Earth preexisted us", to be true.

You're not saying "it is false that the earth preexisted us", are you? And you're not saying "I'm not making any ontological commitment as to whether the earth preexisted us", are you? — numberjohnny5

No, I'm not saying either of those.

If your answer to two those questions is "true", then logically, "It is a fact that the earth preexisted us" is a claim that you believe to be true. What else can it be? — numberjohnny5

Well, yes, it is. That shouldn't have been in any doubt. You are drifting away from why I made the comment that you're replying to in the first place, which had to do with the distinction between facts and statements. I wasn't suggesting that statements aren't statements, or anything of the sort.

The second statement is also one that believes it is true (again, what else can it be?). — numberjohnny5

Correction: that "I" believe to be true, not that "it" believes to be true. And I wasn't talking about statements, I was talking about facts!

I wasn't using the word "that" in any special way, or in the way you're describing; that is, '"that the Earth preexisted us" is true' and '"The Earth preexisted us", is true' are identical statements to me. — numberjohnny5

Okay, but I am, and they're not to me, so I would suggest that you abide by this distinction, otherwise I might end up misinterpreting you.

In any case, you're then acknowledging that facts cannot be true. Does that mean that judgments about statements that correspond to facts are the things that can be true? — numberjohnny5

Statements can be true. Judgements can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, etc.

It's more that "truth" is a property of statements that judges how statements refer/relate to facts. That is, "truth" is the aspect of statements that we use to judge whether statements relate to the facts "accurately" or not. Having a statement without a judgment about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Statements judge. Statements are a type of sentence. A sentence that doesn't judge is rather a non-propositional sentence, like a question or phrase. So it's the property of "truth" in a sentence that makes it a statement/proposition. — numberjohnny5

First of all, truth doesn't judge. (I take it that you were not being literal when you said that, but I don't think that that way of talking will help clear this up).

We judge what is the truth, but we don't need to do so for there to be truths. That is, truths do not depend on our judgement.

It's wrong to say that having a statement without a judgement about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Rather, for anyone to make sense of a statement in relation to an agent, it must be assumed that there is an underlying judgement from the agent about the statement, such that the statement is true.

What you're doing here is confusing metaphysics and human psychology. Statements, in the form of recorded statements, would exist without any judgement about them or interpretation of them. They would exist without any humans whatsoever.

The judgement is required, otherwise what do you think truth-values are? They are judgements about stuff: either true or false (depending on the species of logic you use). "Earth exists" is a statement that is judged to correspond with a fact. — numberjohnny5

No, no, no. Truth-values are properties, not judgements! The judgement would be what we make about the truth-value of a statement. Again, judgement is dispensable here in terms of necessity, given that we're talking about metaphysics, and not human psychology.

Correspondence between true statement and fact does not require judgement. Logically, the conditional does not need to include judgement, and it should not include judgement if we're aiming to give an accurate account. If the statement is true, then there's a corresponding fact. That's it! You can't rightly add something to that formulation that has no place being there. Otherwise it's anything goes: if the statement is true, and I feel like a ninja, then there's a corresponding fact!

That a statement is judged in terms of truth-value, is not that it must be.

I'm saying correspondence requires minds because that's what's involved when corresponding statements to events/facts. — numberjohnny5

That reply isn't very helpful, because it doesn't explicitly answer my question, leaving it down to me to figure out what the answer is. I'm going to go with: you're talking about correspondence in a different sense to me, for some reason that isn't clear to me, and you don't want to explain why you're doing this. Well, you'll just be talking past me, and that isn't something that I want to get too involved with, except in order to redirect you back to the sense of correspondence that I'm talking about.

If you want to talk about the mental act of association or comparison, then you should at least be clear about it. The term "correspondence" already has a technical use within philosophy, and, more specifically, in relation to theories of truth. Please use another term if this sense of correspondence is not what you mean.

Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? — numberjohnny5

No, not correct. That's a logical leap you'll have to explain.

I would say that "facts [are] a property of reality", but because I think that minds are also part of reality, that means there are also mental facts/events. So "truth" is a type of fact - a mental fact i.e. an event that occurs in minds as opposed to a fact/event that does not occur in minds. — numberjohnny5

Truth isn't a type of fact - at least not in my book. And also, in my book (which, by the way, is the bestest book ever) there's no such thing as a mental fact, unless by that what is meant is just a fact about something mental. Also, facts and events are different things, and should not be conflated. Facts can be about events, and events that have occurred or are occurring are factual. It isn't correct to say that facts occur and events are the case - it's the other way around.

So, I don't think that you've got your terms straight. But I'm guessing that you might have rejigged your terms to suit your metaphysical commitments, which, for you, take priority.

The conventional definition of criteria refers to standards/principles that we judge. In an earlier post you said "criteria are not subjective". Then you said that criteria are determinants. I don't believe standards are non-mental. So an "objective standard" (i.e. your " the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective") in my ontology would refer to a real external-to-mind standard, akin to what a Platonic realist might believe about Forms being real. I'm an anti-realist on abstract objects like that (insofar as those objects exist external to minds). — numberjohnny5

What I had in mind there was more Lockean than Platonic, as in primary qualities. The moon is bigger than my foot, not because I perceive it to be so, but because of the primary qualities of the moon and of my foot. That's the objective standard to which I was referring.

You also say "once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement"." Are you saying that minds set or decide upon criteria? If so, it then seems you believe that subjective criteria then "graduate" or change to become objective criteria as "determinants" that relate to (subjective) judgments. Criteria are mental abstract objects, and "judgements" are abstract objects. (I don't know what would be included in "outcome" there.) Which means that subjective standards (as mental abstract objects) "determine" other mental abstract objects like judgements. There is no objective criteria involved. — numberjohnny5

It's something that can be either predetermined or set. I could set the criteria for whether the moon is bigger than my foot to be whatever I like, but I can't alter reality by the setting of a standard. That would be a shallow, deceptive, and very egocentric position.

In reality, the moon is bigger than my foot, regardless of the philosophical games that we play.

In an earlier post you wrote, "And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else."

I don't think you're using the conventional definition of "criteria" here. "What makes the moon bigger than my foot" are the ontological properties of those two objects. An assessment of their relative sizes might involve criteria, which would be subjective, obviously (since assessments occur in minds). — numberjohnny5

Okay, so maybe I diverged from convention somewhat. So shoot me. Does it really matter?

With regards to your last sentence, I've noticed that there are two different senses of "subjective" and "objective" at play here. I agree that assessments are subjective in the sense that they are mental and require a subject, but they can also be objective, in a sense, if they are based upon and reflect reality.

You could say I'm over-analysing, but I think I have good reason to do so since I don't think you're being clear or coherent, in my view. I think what you're saying is "far off from the gist of those definitions". I also don't understand how criteria that is set or decided by minds can 'determine the outcome or "judgment".' — numberjohnny5

Well, you'll need to explain why you think that. What's not to understand? That makes me think that maybe you don't understand what criteria are and how they function. Criteria are like rules. If I set as my criteria for what day it is, whatever date on the calendar I judge to be the most appealing, and the date that I judge to be the most appealing happens to be February 25th, then that's what determines what day it is in accordance with the aforementioned criteria. That's the outcome. If someone were to ask me how I was judging what day it is, or how I am determining what day it is, then that would be the answer. That's my criteria.

Similarly, there are facts about the world which, like criteria, determine the outcome to predicted events, and determine the answer to certain questions. The difference is that we don't set these "criteria" - they're predetermined. But we can set our standards accordingly, and that way move closer towards objectivity.

I always try to understand what others are saying, it is up to them to convince me to agree with them and for me to do the same. — Sir2u

Yeh, that's good. I was being facetious, btw. :)

Look at any of the definitions of fact, what do they all imply? Reality is everything that is in existence, of which we know very little. Fact is what we do know about reality. Event about which we have no knowledge (unknown) are usually called unknown events because we have no facts about them. There might have been events that generated information, but we do not have the facts. — Sir2u

Ah, I think I can see how you're defining fact a bit better. My criteria for "facts" include unknowable/unperceived events/things, and yours is tied only to mental events. I'm saying that all things that exist--all events/happening/things--are facts, whether we know about them or not. So it's not tied exclusively to mental phenomena.

I think that you should stop calling events facts unless you can properly explain how that is possible and where you got the definition of fact that you use. — Sir2u

I explained my ontological basis for facts as events already. The definition of fact I use (but which I've elaborated on myself personally) is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_affairs_(philosophy). And here's an excerpt from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich):

"A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs
whose obtaining makes that proposition true. Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs. Facts
possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations. Thus the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing to one another (in
that order) in the relation of stabbing. It is the actual obtaining of this state of affairs that
makes it true that Brutus stabbed Caesar."

No, events occur all the time. I am positing that events can happen, do happen but we are often ignorant of their passing because we have no facts about them. No one said anything about our minds causing events to happen even though that sometimes is the case, as in the event of me replying to you. — Sir2u

Saying something like "we have no facts about them" is confusing. It's not that we literally "have facts" about stuff; it's that we have information or experience about/of stuff--and that "stuff" we call "facts". The facts you're referring to are not internal, but external, so we don't literally "have" the external stuff internally.

This is were I disagree most. I do not see the event itself as the information. From my point of view the information is the product of the event, even if the event is just a tree sitting in the middle of a forest. The information is the description of the event. — Sir2u

"Description" as in a linguistic description?

And I didn't say "the event itself" was the information; I said it's a mixture between the event and our perception and thinking about the event. Think of it in terms of direct realism: phenomena cause us to perceive them (via the particles from their properties that reach our sensorial apparatus). As we experience them, we can think about what we're perceiving/experiencing, and decide to selectively organise some of that experience as sufficient for a "piece of information" that we may want to communicate. So it's a blend of phenomena interacting with us--that's what I think "information" is. It's not either one or the other.

It's not clear to me what you take "information" to be based on your descriptions there. It seems like you've given two definitions of information: "the product of the event" and "the description of the event". Can you clarify what you mean? In what sense "product," and in what sense "description"?

No, you are doing that. See above. Fact and knowledge are not the same. We can have facts as knowledge but we cannot have all of the facts. My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible. — Sir2u

Just to clarify, ontologically, all events/things are facts. That includes mental events. Anything that's actually happening is an event of some sort. So ontologically, "knowledge" of some X is a mental event. The X is also an event/fact, and the X could be another mental event or a non-mental event. For example, I am having the mental event right now of thinking that I know I am having a mental event right now. I can look across the room at a plant and notice I am having a mental event of looking across the room at a plant. The events are facts. The plant across the room (from my perspective) is a fact/event. Every existent is a fact/event.

So "fact" and "knowledge" are ontologically identical in terms of them both being actual events occurring. But epistemologically, (i) "knowledge about some fact" is different than (ii) the actual fact that the knowledge is about.

And I don't think it's possible to have "all of the facts."

My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible. — Sir2u

In my view, if we have no good reason to believe a particular event/fact is occurring whatsoever (so that we're only speculating without any evidence or good reasoning), then we don't know whether it is occurring either way. It could be occurring; it might not. Whether we have that "information" about the event or not doesn't affect whether the event is actually occurring though.

No, I am saying that if something is unknown then we cannot have mental phenomena about it. It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it? — Sir2u

I agree with that. But not having mental phenomena about some X doesn't mean that X isn't real. Things we don't know have no bearing on whether those things exist.

It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it? — Sir2u

If no one knows about some phenomena it doesn't mean that phenomena isn't happening (unless you're some kind of idealist). Facts include knowable and unknowable phenomena. That's because mental phenomena has no bearing on facts obtaining for me (unless the only facts existing were mental facts/events).

And here's an excerpt from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich):

"A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs
whose obtaining makes that proposition true. Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs. Facts
possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations. Thus the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing to one another (in
that order) in the relation of stabbing. It is the actual obtaining of this state of affairs that
makes it true that Brutus stabbed Caesar." — numberjohnny5

:up:

A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true. Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs. — numberjohnny5

"Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs."
The key word here is Actual.
Presently existing in fact and not merely potential or possible
Taking place in reality; not pretended or imitated
Being or reflecting the essential or genuine character of something
Existing in act or fact

Not one of those definitions allows one to suppose that something is happening. They would all need confirmation that an event is happening.

Facts possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations. Thus the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing to one another (in that order) in the relation of stabbing. It is the actual obtaining of this state of affairs that makes it true that Brutus stabbed Caesar. — numberjohnny5

So how does one obtain the state without the information necessary.

It's not clear to me what you take "information" to be based on your descriptions there. It seems like you've given two definitions of information: "the product of the event" and "the description of the event". Can you clarify what you mean? In what sense "product," and in what sense "description"? — numberjohnny5

I use the standard definition of information
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction
A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn

So both of the ways I use it seem to be perfectly in order.

Joe lifts his hand and slaps Fred, a series of events that I have experienced. The event itself was created by the people involved and and I watching received the information.
Because I witnessed the event I have the information about it and a good description(the facts) of it for anyone that wants to hear the details. I can also concluded from seeing Joe's actions that it must have hurt Fred.

But not having mental phenomena about some X doesn't mean that X isn't real. Things we don't know have no bearing on whether those things exist. — numberjohnny5

But not having mental phenomena about something simply means that we do not know anything about them therefore it cannot be claimed that facts exist about them.

A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true. — numberjohnny5

Where would you get the true proposition about anything that is unknown?
Where would you obtain a state of affairs that would make the proposition true?

If no one knows about some phenomena it doesn't mean that phenomena isn't happening (unless you're some kind of idealist). — numberjohnny5

I have already stated that there are many unknown things happening in the universe.

Facts include knowable and unknowable phenomena. That's because mental phenomena has no bearing on facts obtaining for me (unless the only facts existing were mental facts/events). — numberjohnny5

You are very confused. Facts are information therefore they are subjective according to your own words. In your head, mental.

Oh by the way, you really do need to start reading your references.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_affairs_(philosophy). Nice one son. :up:

Where is perpendicular located? Where is justification located? Where is mathematics located? Where is the biological kingdom Animalia located? Where is the number twenty located? — Sapientia

This will take us into new territory, which can only make me think these posts will grow even larger. :S

Perpendicular: if we're only talking about mental abstracts, then perpendicular is a mental event (so located in minds). If we're talking about a state of affairs/fact in which two things are actually at 90 degree angles to each other, then that is located in that state of affairs. If we're talking about a mind assigning a state of affairs/fact as being perpendicular, it's a mixture of both mental and non-mental facts, in which both have location.

Justification: this is a mental event (so located in minds).

Mathematics: a language system that allows us to make sense of relations and has instrumental utility. This is mental, since languages are meaningful, and meaning is mental.

Animalia: according to our criteria/definitions of this kingdom, the "kingdom" is any place the animals in this kingdom are located.

The number twenty: located in our minds, since numbers are mental constructs/events.

Yes, in a sense, it's located somewhere. But we'd have to break down what's meant. The term, as a word on a screen, does indeed have a location. But is that necessarily, or always, what is meant? — Sapientia

I meant "truth/true" as in what it is ontologically. In my view, anything related to "truth/truth-values/claims, etc." is a mental event. (I'm an internalist on meaning.) The term "true" as a word on a screen is ontologically pixels on a screen. But the meaning of "truth/true" is a property of the mental.

Thinking and conceptualising are indeed mental events, and they do indeed occur in minds. But what about concepts? The continued existence of concepts does not seem to depend on anyone being around performing any kind of cognitive act relating to them, nor on any kind of mental event taking place. So, where are concepts located? — Sapientia

I disagree. For example, if only one person existed and at time T1 they had a concept x, and then at time T2 they didn't have a concept x, then concept x would not obtain/exist at time T2. Concepts as mental events are not numerically identical with other people's concepts (even if their concepts share a very high degree of similarity). Concepts also aren't static things; in my ontology: everything that exists is also changing. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.

I'm explaining that if the true statement were, "the cat is on the mat", then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat. Your confusion seems to be a result of confusing a statement with what it says, which relates back to my earlier mention of the use-mention distinction. — Sapientia

No, I'm not confused with the difference between what a statement is ontologically, and what a statement refers to or does. Saying that "if the true statement were, 'the cat is on the mat', then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat" is confusing to me; so you're right about me not finding your explanation coherent. Obviously, if I find something incoherent it doesn't mean others do. I think we may agree in general though that a statement about a fact is not the fact itself, right?

A statement can be true, but a statement can't be truth, as that doesn't make sense. We use "true" to say what a statement of that kind is, and we use "truth" to say what a statement of that kind speaks. — Sapientia

I don't use "truth" in the way you use it. So "truth" is what the truth-statement is stating with regards to facts?

I think that the problem is that you have to pay very close attention to what I'm saying and the distinctions that I'm making, otherwise it's easy to get lost. — Sapientia

I agree that this is partly what is happening, and I'm sometimes still "lost" when you attempt to explain things further. I have hope though! :)

That the earth preexisted us is a fact, not a statement. The statement would be, "That the Earth preexisted us". I'm using a statement to express a fact, not mentioning a statement relating to fact. It's the fact that I mean to talk about, not the statement. — Sapientia

No. It impossible to refer to facts without referring to facts. That doesn't mean I'm saying facts only exist if we refer to them though. So saying "That the earth preexisted us is a fact" is a statement about some state of affairs/a fact. It's an ontological/empirical statement you're making. Please can you tell me how that's not a statement about a past fact? I know that when you're using a statement to "express" a fact you're not referring to that statement as a statement; rather, you're using a statement to make an ontological claim about some state of affairs in the past. I'm saying that statements refer to things, and there's no escaping that fact. You can't make an ontological claim--express a fact--without making a statement about a fact. That's all I'm saying and trying to clarify.

Oh good, so you do understand. It was just a breakdown in communication to some extent, given what we've just gone through. — Sapientia

I hope so :P

Statements can be true. Judgements can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, etc — Sapientia

Sure, I know that's how you use it. Just for clarification, the way I use "judgement" in a statement is that a "judgement" affirms whether a statement is true or false in relation to or when referring to facts.

We judge what is the truth, but we don't need to do so for there to be truths. That is, truths do not depend on our judgement. — Sapientia

Yeh, I've got a feeling that your use of "fact" and "truth" are similar, if not identical. As if you're saying "it's a fact that this true-statement truthfully corresponds to a fact."

Rather, for anyone to make sense of a statement in relation to an agent, it must be assumed that there is an underlying judgement from the agent about the statement, such that the statement is true. — Sapientia

Yes, that's what I mean...what makes a statement true or false is that someone is judging that statement to be true or false. Without that judgement about the statement being true or false means the statement is not a statement--it is a different kind of sentence, like a question or phrase.

What you're doing here is confusing metaphysics and human psychology. Statements, in the form of recorded statements, would exist without any judgement about them or interpretation of them. They would exist without any humans whatsoever. — Sapientia

I'm not. I have so far been referring to statements as being made in the present (as in, statements being actually thought or expressed in the present moment by minds), not statements as recorded on some document or by pixels on a screen. The latter type of statements are ontologically just that, non-mental, organised (symbolic) patterns that we use to assign meaning onto.

there's no such thing as a mental fact, unless by that what is meant is just a fact about something mental. — Sapientia

Yes, there are mental facts: that mentality occurs in brains is a fact. I explain more about this below re "subjective" and "objective"...so stay tuned!

No, no, no. Truth-values are properties, not judgements! The judgement would be what we make about the truth-value of a statement. Again, judgement is dispensable here in terms of necessity, given that we're talking about metaphysics, and not human psychology. — Sapientia

Yeh, I was incorrect that judgements are identical to truth-values; rather, it's that judgements assign truth-values to a statement. So we judge a statement to be true or false (i.e. assigning a truth-value to that statement), in relation to a fact. It wouldn't make sense to judge a statement without a truth-value.

(Aside from that, it doesn't make sense to me to say "Truth-values are properties" because all existents are just bundles of properties, in my ontology. But we don't need to go there...yet.)

Correspondence between true statement and fact does not require judgement. Logically, the conditional does not need to include judgement, and it should not include judgement if we're aiming to give an accurate account. If the statement is true, then there's a corresponding fact. That's it! You can't rightly add something to that formulation that has no place being there. Otherwise it's anything goes: if the statement is true, and I feel like a ninja, then there's a corresponding fact! — Sapientia

That a statement is judged in terms of truth-value, is not that it must be."

Bear in mind my view of "truth" is not conventional. When you say "true statement", I parse that as a person judging that statement to be true (about something). For example, I parse the statement, "the Earth preexisted us" as "the statement 'the Earth preexisted us' is true". I am making a judgement about that statement by assigning a truth-value to it--the value "true". Without my judgement about that statement, it wouldn't function as a statement in the conventional sense. A statement that isn't judged to be true or false (i.e. without a truth-value) is not conventionally "expressing" anything, unless it's functioning as a question or a phrase. I hope that makes things clearer, even if you don't agree.

If you want to talk about the mental act of association or comparison, then you should at least be clear about it. The term "correspondence" already has a technical use within philosophy, and, more specifically, in relation to theories of truth. Please use another term if this sense of correspondence is not what you mean. — Sapientia

Ok. Correspondence does require minds. This is because the correspondence theory of truth is about statements corresponding to facts; and in my view, "statements" as statements occuring in the present in the form of thoughts expressed verbally, are mental events.

Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? — numberjohnny5


No, not correct. That's a logical leap you'll have to explain. — Sapientia

In my view, "truth" is a property of statements/claims/propositions that we judge in relation to what the statements are corresponding to. Since statements as thoughts are mental events, and since "truth" is a property of statements as mental events, then "truth" is a property of minds.

in my book (which, by the way, is the bestest book ever) — Sapientia

Where can I get one?

Truth isn't a type of fact — Sapientia

Let me try to clear this up. In my ontology, all existents/events are facts--they're actual/real. There are non-mental facts, like trees, rocks, stars, and so on. There are mental facts, like thoughts and perceptual experiences. "Truth" is a type of mental fact.

Also, facts and events are different things, and should not be conflated. Facts can be about events, and events that have occurred or are occurring are factual. It isn't correct to say that facts occur and events are the case - it's the other way around. — Sapientia

They're not different in my view. In my ontology, since all existents are consistently, dynamically changing in relation to other existents, all events consist of a collection of existents interacting or in relation to each other. This applies to the micro and macro levels of scale. States of affairs as facts are the way things are happening. Things/existents are constantly happening. Things that are happening are events, in my view.

What I had in mind there was more Lockean than Platonic, as in primary qualities. The moon is bigger than my foot, not because I perceive it to be so, but because of the primary qualities of the moon and of my foot. That's the objective standard to which I was referring. — Sapientia

I see. I define "standards" as norms people create, and so they're not objective (as in, external-to-minds). So "objective standard" doesn't make sense to me.

Okay, so maybe I diverged from convention somewhat. So shoot me. Does it really matter? — Sapientia

Haha. I diverge from convention all the time. I don't think that's a problem in itself. Why it matters to me in this case, is to just clarify your views in lieu of mine.

With regards to your last sentence, I've noticed that there are two different senses of "subjective" and "objective" at play here. I agree that assessments are subjective in the sense that they are mental and require a subject, but they can also be objective, in a sense, if they are based upon and reflect reality. — Sapientia

I only use "subjective" and "objective" one way: they are both terms re location, i.e. where some x occurs. "Subjective" refers only to locations occurring in minds. "Objective" refers only to locations occuring external-to-minds. That's it. So "assessments" are things that occur in minds, and hence "subjective". Assessments can refer to/or are about "objective" things, but are not themselves "objective" (unless by "objective assessments" you're referring to a piece of writing or pixels on a screen, in which case, those things don't have meaning "in" them).

Well, you'll need to explain why you think that. What's not to understand? That makes me think that maybe you don't understand what criteria are and how they function. Criteria are like rules. If I set as my criteria for what day it is, whatever date on the calendar I judge to be the most appealing, and the date that I judge to be the most appealing happens to be February 25th, then that's what determines what day it is in accordance with the aforementioned criteria. That's the outcome. If someone were to ask me how I was judging what day it is, or how I am determining what day it is, then that would be the answer. That's my criteria. — Sapientia

Ah, that sounds different in the way you're explaining "criteria" from the other times. I agree that minds set rules/criteria/standards, and then according to those criteria, minds determine whether facts match them, for whatever reason.

Similarly, there are facts about the world which, like criteria, determine the outcome to predicted events, and determine the answer to certain questions. The difference is that we don't set these "criteria" - they're predetermined. But we can set our standards accordingly, and that way move closer towards objectivity. — Sapientia

I don't use "criteria" for objective, mind-independent facts. I keep those two things separate. I'd just say that we can construct criteria about some facts in order to predict or discover how those facts develop or change.

Perpendicular: if we're only talking about mental abstracts, then perpendicular is a mental event (so located in minds). If we're talking about a state of affairs/fact in which two things are actually at 90 degree angles to each other, then that is located in that state of affairs. If we're talking about a mind assigning a state of affairs/fact as being perpendicular, it's a mixture of both mental and non-mental facts, in which both have location.

Justification: this is a mental event (so located in minds).

Mathematics: a language system that allows us to make sense of relations and has instrumental utility. This is mental, since languages are meaningful, and meaning is mental.

Animalia: according to our criteria/definitions of this kingdom, the "kingdom" is any place the animals in this kingdom are located.

The number twenty: located in our minds, since numbers are mental constructs/events. — numberjohnny5

Well, that's one way of explaining it, but I'm not convinced. It seems as though you're putting the cart before the horse, in that it seems as though you're setting out to reduce whatever I bring up to something that has a mental or a physical location, rather than starting from a position of impartiality whereby you keep your options open.

To focus on just one of my examples: classifications, once made, do not depend on us in any way. They don't depend on our having some kind of mental event which involves them. If a cat has been classified as feline, then, accordingly, a cat is feline, and that's that. That would be the case if there were no cats, no people, or no cats or people. It's not like an electronic device which needs a source of electricity to keep it powered up. It's more like a lever which, once pulled, remains as such until someone comes along and resets it, if they ever do (which they needn't).

I meant "truth/true" as in what it is ontologically. In my view, anything related to "truth/truth-values/claims, etc." is a mental event. (I'm an internalist on meaning.) The term "true" as a word on a screen is ontologically pixels on a screen. But the meaning of "truth/true" is a property of the mental. — numberjohnny5

I know that you meant to talk about what it is ontologically. It was already predetermined that we were talking about a word, because you asked me about the term "truth", which is a single word term. I then gave you a particular example of what that could be referring to, and the example I gave you makes some sense as a reference, has a physical location, and is not mental. But I emphasise that that is only one take on it, and one particular example. It doesn't put the matter to rest. There are a number of ways of interpreting what a word is ontologically, not a single way, and the answers depend on how this is framed.

I disagree. For example, if only one person existed and at time T1 they had a concept x, and then at time T2 they didn't have a concept x, then concept x would not obtain/exist at time T2. Concepts as mental events are not numerically identical with other people's concepts (even if their concepts share a very high degree of similarity). Concepts also aren't static things; in my ontology: everything that exists is also changing. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense. — numberjohnny5

We fundamentally disagree then. It just isn't plausible that the existence of concepts depends on us actively thinking of them; nor, consequently, that they pop in and out of existence, all of a sudden, in accordance with our active thoughts. They're just not like that. Concepts are separable from - and independent of - the act of conceiving. But you're trying to blur the lines.

It doesn't even make sense to take a concept as a mental event. It's conceiving which is the mental event. You're confusing a noun with a verb, and a thing with an act.

Concepts are fixed. Subsequent to conception, they remain static and uniform. They depend on beings such as us for their conception only, and from that point onwards, they're independent. We can alter them, if we're around to do so, but even if we do, those alterations will then remain in place unless tinkered with.

And everything that physically exists is changing.

No, I'm not confused with the difference between what a statement is ontologically, and what a statement refers to or does. Saying that "if the true statement were, 'the cat is on the mat', then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat" is confusing to me; so you're right about me not finding your explanation coherent. Obviously, if I find something incoherent it doesn't mean others do. I think we may agree in general though that a statement about a fact is not the fact itself, right? — numberjohnny5

Yes, we agree about that. But I don't understand your confusion, nor why you don't find my explanation coherent.

I don't use "truth" in the way you use it. So "truth" is what the truth-statement is stating with regards to facts? — numberjohnny5

Yes, so long as you mean what I mean by that. My meaning is consistent with what I've said previously.

No. It's impossible to refer to facts without referring to facts. — numberjohnny5

Yes, but that's disconnected to what I said, and connected to a possible misinterpretation of what I said.

Let me try again:

It is a fact that Earth preexisted us. That Earth preexisted us is a fact. A fact is not a statement. Therefore, that Earth preexisted us is not a statement.

That doesn't mean I'm saying facts only exist if we refer to them though. — numberjohnny5

I didn't think that you were saying that.

So saying "That the earth preexisted us is a fact" is a statement about some state of affairs/a fact. — numberjohnny5

Yes, and my favourite colour is blue, but these points are beside the point. You are focussing on the saying, instead of what's being said, which is always frustrating when it's the latter which matters.

Please can you tell me how that's not a statement about a past fact? — numberjohnny5

Oh god, what a pickle. There's an incongruity between what we're referring to. I'm not disputing the above, so your question contains an erroneous suggestion.

You're referring to a statement about a past fact, and then you're asking me how this statement about a past fact is not a statement about a past fact. :brow:

The problem is with the first part. The point I made was never about a statement, it was about a fact. But you're making this about my statement. I'm talking about stuff, and you're talking about my talk, rather than the stuff. The result is a disconnect.

This is an example of the kind of thing that I think is happening here, where it's easier to spot the problem:

Person A: "That cup is an object".

Person B: "But 'cup' is a word!".

And this is what's happening here:

Me: "That Earth preexisted us is a fact".

You: "But 'That Earth preexisted us' is a statement!".

It's the same problem. :meh:

I know that when you're using a statement to "express" a fact you're not referring to that statement as a statement; rather, you're using a statement to make an ontological claim about some state of affairs in the past. — numberjohnny5

Then what's with the poorly composed question and the points which miss the point?

I'm saying that statements refer to things, and there's no escaping that fact. — numberjohnny5

But I'm not trying to escape it!

You can't make an ontological claim--express a fact--without making a statement about a fact. That's all I'm saying and trying to clarify. — numberjohnny5

Okay, but there was no need for that.

Yes, that's what I mean...what makes a statement true or false is that someone is judging that statement to be true or false. — numberjohnny5

Oh dear. No, that is not the case at all. That's a kind of idealism which I strongly reject. It's odd, because some of the things you've said make me think that you're a realist like me, but then you come out with a bombshell like that.

What makes a statement like, "Earth preexisted us", true or false, is whether or not Earth preexisted us - which has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone judging any statement to be true or false.

"Earth preexisted us" is true if, and only if, Earth preexisted us.

Without that judgement about the statement being true or false, that means that the statement is not a statement--it is a different kind of sentence, like a question or phrase. — numberjohnny5

No, that's not right. There doesn't have to be (present tense) any judgement for the statement to be a statement. It just has to have the right sentence structure; or, at best, you could argue that there must have been (past tense) a judgement (from which it doesn't follow that there must be one).

I'm not. I have so far been referring to statements as being made in the present (as in, statements being actually thought or expressed in the present moment by minds), not statements as recorded on some document or by pixels on a screen. The latter type of statements are ontologically just that, non-mental, organised (symbolic) patterns that we use to assign meaning onto. — numberjohnny5

Then that's the problem. My understanding was that we're talking about statements in general, not restricting the conversation in that manner, which conveniently suits your argument. Why would you do that?

Yes, there are mental facts: that mentality occurs in brains is a fact. — numberjohnny5

That's not inconsistent with what I said. I'm fine with that sort of fact, namely facts about mental stuff.

Bear in mind my view of "truth" is not conventional. When you say "true statement", I parse that as a person judging that statement to be true (about something). — numberjohnny5

Why would you do that? :angry:

The convention makes sense. You shouldn't diverge from it. That's going to cause more problems than it solves.

For example, I parse the statement, "the Earth preexisted us" as "the statement 'the Earth preexisted us' is true". — numberjohnny5

But why? Don't.

Do you parse cats as dogs and up as down?

I am making a judgement about that statement by assigning a truth-value to it--the value "true". Without my judgement about that statement, it wouldn't function as a statement in the conventional sense. — numberjohnny5

I think what you really mean is "assertion" or "claim". Statements are broader and more ambiguous. But again, judgement is only necessary in past tense, not present tense i.e. there must have been a judgement, but there doesn't have to be one.

A statement that isn't judged to be true or false (i.e. without a truth-value) is not conventionally "expressing" anything, unless it's functioning as a question or a phrase. I hope that makes things clearer, even if you don't agree. — numberjohnny5

I can't be bothered to verify whether or not that wording is conventional. The gist of it is understandable, but, given the wording of it, I disagree with it. It makes your earlier mistake of confusing judgement and property. A statement that isn't judged to be true or false is not what makes a statement lack truth-value. Truth-value doesn't hinge on judgement of truth-value. For a statement to have truth-value, it need only be meaningful. And, for the kind of statements that we've been talking about to be true, they'd need to correspond with facts which reflect them.

Ok. Correspondence does require minds. This is because the correspondence theory of truth is about statements corresponding to facts; and in my view, "statements" as statements occuring in the present in the form of thoughts expressed verbally, are mental events. — numberjohnny5

Your conclusion doesn't follow, because statements aren't limited to being those which "occur" in the present, in the form of thoughts expressed verbally (which are arguably "mental events").

Your view is unreasonably narrow, and it seems as though you've purposefully made it that way, because making it that way will give you your desired conclusion.

What you're doing seems to be fallacious along the lines of begging the question or moving the goalposts.

In my view, "truth" is a property of statements/claims/propositions that we judge in relation to what the statements are corresponding to. — numberjohnny5

No, truth-values are properties of statements. The truth is not a property of a statements. We do judge the truth, and we do judge the truth-value of statements, and we do judge whether statements correspond with fact.

Since statements as thoughts are mental events, and since "truth" is a property of statements as mental events, then "truth" is a property of minds. — numberjohnny5

Again, your conclusion doesn't follow, since statements would have to be thoughts. Talk of statements "as" thoughts doesn't work. And your second premise is false: truth is not a property of statements.

Let me try to clear this up. In my ontology, all existents/events are facts--they're actual/real. There are non-mental facts, like trees, rocks, stars, and so on. There are mental facts, like thoughts and perceptual experiences. "Truth" is a type of mental fact. — numberjohnny5

But that's just wrong. Why would you do that?

How about, in my ontology, cats are a type of dog?

They're not different in my view. — numberjohnny5

Okay, but then your view is wrong.

In my ontology, since all existents are consistently, dynamically changing in relation to other existents, all events consist of a collection of existents interacting or in relation to each other. This applies to the micro and macro levels of scale. States of affairs as facts are the way things are happening. Things/existents are constantly happening. Things that are happening are events, in my view. — numberjohnny5

There's a relationship between facts and events, but they're not indistinct, so they can't be identical. And the way that we conventionally talk about them reflects this distinction which you're attempting to set aside.

(N.B. There are parts of your reply that I have not addressed, because I felt, in relation to these parts, that there wasn't much more to be said).

Person A: "That cup is an object".
Me: "That Earth preexisted us is a fact". — Sapientia

Sorry to butt in here, but yes it is easy to see why there is confusion.
In the first sentence "that" is used as a pronoun.
In the second it is used as a conjunction.

Maybe that is why you are confused.

Sorry to butt in here, but yes it is easy to see why there is confusion.
In the first sentence "that" is used as a pronoun.
In the second it is used as a conjunction.

Maybe that is why you are confused. — Sir2u

I don't mind you butting in, but I do mind you butting in with only a trivial point about grammar which misses the point and an ironic accusation of confusion.

I wasn't using the word "that" in any special way, or in the way you're describing... — numberjohnny5

By the way, using the that-clause like this is not really anything special. It's a common way of expressing or referring to facts, and is recognised in the context of philosophy:

The word is also used in locutions such as:


It is a fact that Sam is sad
That Sam is sad is a fact
That 2+2=4 is a fact. — Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

I use the standard definition of information. Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction. A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn — Sir2u

Ok, thanks, I'll go with that definition.

But not having mental phenomena about something simply means that we do not know anything about them therefore it cannot be claimed that facts exist about them. — Sir2u

Let me try to rephrase what you're saying there in an attempt to make progress.

If we are not perceiving/experiencing some X, then we cannot make claims about some X. In other words, we have to have some experience of some X to be able to claim some X exists or to make particular claims about aspects of some X. Is that right?

Information about some X is knowledge obtained from some X. That seems to be saying that making claims about some X is impossible without experiencing some X. Is that right?

If so, the issue I'm trying to resolve is not about making claims about some X. The issue for me is whether experiencing some X and making claims about some X is necessary for some X to obtain/exist.

So how does one obtain the state without the information necessary. — Sir2u

The "obtaining" of a state of affairs just means the actual happening/occurring/existence of a fact/event. But you don't seem to think that facts happen unless they're known about.

Because I witnessed the event I have the information about it and a good description(the facts) of it for anyone that wants to hear the details. — Sir2u

Wait--I just want to make sure I know what you mean by "good description (the facts) of it". Do you mean after having witnessed the event you had knowledge about the event and could therefore describe your knowledge about the event to others? If so, then in other words, you're saying that because I have observed/experienced some X, I have obtained knowledge about some X, and therefore I can make a claim about what I know about some X.

That's not something I disagree with. That you couldn't make a particular knowledge-statement about it prior to experiencing it makes logical sense. I'm saying that some X/that particular X you experienced didn't actually/ontologically just appear/begin-to-exist just when you or because you observed/experienced it. When I talk about "facts" I'm making existence claims. Facts obtain/occur/happen/are/etc. So I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. That objective facts are mind-independent. (Subjective facts are mental facts.)

Where would you get the true proposition about anything that is unknown? — Sir2u

It wouldn't be a true proposition about a particular, actual unknown or un-experienced fact/event. It would be a claim that there exist some unknown or un-experienced facts. It's just an existential claim. It's based on reasoning and other available evidence accumulated by experience. For example, I realise that after having experienced many things in my life, there are some things I haven't experienced that I know exist. I have experienced the sturdiness of a wall in my backyard, and I infer, from experiencing many walls at different locations as sturdy, that other walls exist that are sturdy that I haven't experienced as sturdy. You can apply that logic to other things I haven't experienced but are actual/happening. Essentially, it's an ontological claim based on actuals, i.e. actuals exist in places we have yet to observe. We may not know specifically what those actuals are or what they're like (apart from knowing that they must be physical, in my view), but that's different than knowing that unknown actuals exist in some form.

Again, I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. I think you're arguing that objective facts rely on minds to exist. Correct me if I'm wrong (I know you will ;)).

I have already stated that there are many unknown things happening in the universe. — Sir2u

How could you claim that if you have no information/experience/knowledge about those unknown things? That's the argument you're using against me! You're contradicting yourself. On the one hand, you say one can't make claims about facts unless facts are known about, and also that facts are present actuals that aren't happening. And on the other hand, you're saying that some unknown things are happening. But you say that what determines whether a fact is happening is confirmation of it happening. But how can one confirm something they don't know about? That seems confused to me.

Where would you obtain a state of affairs that would make the proposition true? — Sir2u

Oh by the way, you really do need to start reading your references. — Sir2u

One doesn't literally "obtain a state of affairs". "Obtain" means exist/happen. And I think it's a mis-reading to assume that states of affairs literally "make" (as in, they intentionally/actively make) propositions true. That's just a manner of defining facts. What actually happens is that states of affairs exist, we experience them and judge our statements about them to be true or false. Another way of stating "a state of affairs is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true" is, "a proposition is true if it accurately relates to some state of affairs obtaining".

"Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs."
The key word here is Actual.
Presently existing in fact and not merely potential or possible — Sir2u

Do you believe in past facts?

Not one of those definitions allows one to suppose that something is happening. They would all need confirmation that an event is happening. — Sir2u

How can something actual not be happening? It doesn't make sense to me to suppose any existent isn't happening since all existents are changing. I don't believe in anything being literally static. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.

You are very confused. Facts are information therefore they are subjective according to your own words. In your head, mental. — Sir2u

Or you're using "facts" in a different way to me; or you're misunderstanding me (which I think is true). I've stated multiple times that there are subjective facts (facts about mental events happening like thoughts etc.), and objective facts (non-mental facts). I wouldn't say "facts are information" because that's a category error. Rather, I'd say information as knowledge is factually a mental event, since knowledge occurs in minds.

If we are not perceiving/experiencing some X, then we cannot make claims about some X. In other words, we have to have some experience of some X to be able to claim some X exists or to make particular claims about aspects of some X. Is that right? — numberjohnny5

Yes, it is not possible to make claims about anything that no information exists for.

Information about some X is knowledge obtained from some X. That seems to be saying that making claims about some X is impossible without experiencing some X. Is that right? — numberjohnny5

Not exactly. while it is true that information about anything has to come from the source, the object itself provides us with the information, if no one has any information about something then no one can make any claims about it.

If so, the issue I'm trying to resolve is not about making claims about some X. The issue for me is whether experiencing some X and making claims about some X is necessary for some X to obtain/exist. — numberjohnny5

If absolutely no information about X exists no one can make claims about whether it exists or not, it might or it might not exist. Could you give me an example of something that exists but that we have no information at all about? Our knowledge or lack of it has nothing at all to do with somethings exists, there are zillions of things out there in the universe that no one knows about but nobody can claim that they exist.

The "obtaining" of a state of affairs just means the actual happening/occurring/existence of a fact/event. But you don't seem to think that facts happen unless they're known about.

"Obtain" means exist/happen. — numberjohnny5

I think you should get a dictionary.
So where does the "obtaining" part fit in, is it not the gathering, collecting, acquisition of knowledge? Is there a definition of obtaining that I do not know? What is the definition you use?
Events might happen, as I have already said, but an event is not the same as a fact. And unless you can find some way to prove that they are the same then there is no way to continue. I cannot agree to them meaning the same thing.

I'm saying that some X/that particular X you experienced didn't actually/ontologically just appear/begin-to-exist just when you or because you observed/experienced it. — numberjohnny5

I have never said it did. That is why one says that one observed an event, because one is watching it happening. They happen simultaneously, it would be impossible for the "looking at it" to make it happening.

When I talk about "facts" I'm making existence claims. Facts obtain/occur/happen/are/etc. So I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. That objective facts are mind-independent. (Subjective facts are mental facts.) — numberjohnny5

I cannot accept your use of the word fact to include the unknown. Something that is unknown cannot be a fact. Please mention just one unknown fact and I will agree with you that it is possible. The tell me an objective fact.

It wouldn't be a true proposition about a particular, actual unknown or un-experienced fact/event. — numberjohnny5

If it is not a true proposition about a particular object, event then it cannot be a fact.

How could you claim that if you have no information/experience/knowledge about those unknown things? That's the argument you're using against me! You're contradicting yourself. — numberjohnny5

Simple deduction my friend, if there was nothing unknown in the universe then nothing new would be discovered, but as we see every day new things are being discovered thus there are still unknown things in the universe. But that might change tomorrow if they fail to find anything new.

Do you believe in past facts? — numberjohnny5

Anything, even things in the past that have been certified as a fact remain a fact while the circumstances about the fact remain the same. When they were declared facts they were actual states of affair, or evidence of them still exists to prove that they were facts. Archeologists dig up past facts all the time, even if they don't know what they are.

How can something actual not be happening? — numberjohnny5

Who said it could not?

I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense. — numberjohnny5

That sounds interesting.

Or you're using "facts" in a different way to me; — numberjohnny5

No, you are using it incorrectly.

I wouldn't say "facts are information" because that's a category error. — numberjohnny5

Not in my dictionary.
Fact; A piece of information about circumstances that exist or events that have occurred

Rather, I'd say information as knowledge is factually a mental event, since knowledge occurs in minds. — numberjohnny5

And you would, and do have it wrong. The only part that you have right is that it occurs in the mind.
Knowledge; The psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning.

Many people claim to have knowledge of god, can anyone prove it to be a fact.
Lots have people have been walking around with the erroneous knowledge that screwing standing up stops a woman from getting pregnant. That was the result of perception, learning and reasoning. But a lot of them still get pregnant because it is not a fact.